219 Ct. Cl. 687 | Ct. Cl. | 1979
This civilian pay case comes before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a former Treasury Department employee and a veteran’s preference eligible with 30 years of Government service, seeks back pay and reinstatement to his former position from which he retired on April 10, 1976. He claims that his retirement was involuntary because it was the result of wrongful Government conduct amounting to coercion, duress, time pressure, and intimidation, and, further, that his proposed transfer, which resulted in retirement because he found the transfer unacceptable, would have resulted in a reduction in rank which could not have occurred except after compliance with certain statutory procedural safeguards which were denied to plaintiff. We grant defendant’s motion and dismiss the petition.
Plaintiff was called to a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, with the Regional Administrator of the Comptroller of the Currency, on February 25, 1976. At that meeting he was told his performance in his Orlando position lacked efficiency, but that he would be transferred to another position in Atlanta at the same grade and pay. The new position would be one without supervisory responsibilities over other employees and would be that of a senior financial analyst of banks and bank holding companies. Plaintiff was told that if the transfer was not acceptable to him he could retire, and he was advised what his retirement benefits would be. He was also told that if he retired his application therefor could be processed in 2 days, which would entitle him to a pending cost-of-living adjustment.
Plaintiff pointed out that his performance evaluations had won him above-average ratings, that he had not been criticized by other regional administrators, and thus sought to rebut his alleged deficiencies. He also stated that he and his wife were responsible for the care of his mother-in-law, who suffered from a heart condition and needed to remain in Florida for her health. He sought time to consult with his wife and was told that he could call back on the matter later in the day. Upon returning home, however, plaintiff found that his mother-in-law had suffered a heart seizure and was hospitalized. He so informed the Regional Administrator on that day and asked to be allowed to stay in Orlando in a subordinate position. The Administrator told plaintiff that they would discuss his problems later and in a week called back rejecting plaintiffs request to stay in Orlando in a subordinate status, informing plaintiff again that he had an important job for him in Atlanta at no loss of grade or pay. Plaintiff then accepted the transfer, effective April 5, 1976.
Thereafter, plaintiff received a memorandum of the February 25 conversation which apparently contained
Two weeks later, on April 23, plaintiff requested cancellation of his application for retirement, apologizing for the inconvenience which his family problems had caused. That letter was received by the Regional Administrator’s office on April 29, 1976. On that date the Administrator attended a luncheon in Orlando at which he presented plaintiff with a service award. Plaintiff did not mention his request to withdraw his retirement notice, which had been effective since April 10. He did ask the Administrator for leave to give him as a job reference. The Administrator returned to his office and found plaintiffs request to cancel his retirement notice. By letter of May 4, 1976, to plaintiff, the Administrator recalled plaintiffs job reference request at the luncheon and stated his assumption that plaintiff had elected to remain retired. Plaintiff did not respond to this letter.
About a year later, on May 5, 1977, plaintiff appealed to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA), which, on November 15, 1977, denied his appeal in a written opinion after a hearing. Plaintiff did not seek review by the Appeals Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. He came to court on December 6, 1977.
The FEAA discussed and rejected plaintiffs contentions of duress and reduction in rank. Plaintiff then, and now, relies on Roskos v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 34, 549 F. 2d 1386 (1977). There are certain differences in the facts of the two cases. Among those differences is the fact that Roskos was subjected to a proposed adverse action for alleged misconduct not present in the instant case. While those charges were dropped, he was given a disadvantageous transfer which the court held "had no solid or substantial basis in personnel practice or principle” and was an improper effort to pressure plaintiff to retire. Here, on the other hand, the FEAA held that there are no punitive overtones, that plaintiffs conduct was not challenged by any charges brought against him, that there was a genuine,
Plaintiff has mounted an attack on the transfer as an invalid discretionary order because the position in Atlanta was long left unfilled after he rejected it. He also suggests that the duties of the position were of no real consequence. The court is in a poor position to second-guess the Regional Administrator about the needs of his office or to intervene in administrative actions not demonstrated to have been taken in bad faith. We decline to do so here. Defendant was complimentary of plaintiffs experience and of his technical abilities, except as a supervisor, and gave him adequate time to make a decision about defendant’s perceived needs which involved his services. This is incompatible with an effort to force plaintiff out. The offer would have preserved
We do not find it necessary to reach any of plaintiffs other arguments. We have examined his authorities and do not find them helpful to his case on its facts. The court regrets to see a Government employee with a long and honorable record of public service terminate it in bitterness. But, he is not the victim of punitive action. Nothing that has happened here casts any reflection or taint upon plaintiffs record, conduct, or abilities. He is just not entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
it is therefore ordered, upon consideration of the pleadings, the motion and briefs, and the administrative record, without oral argument, that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The petition is dismissed.