Lonell Newman; Hoseia Chestnut, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. Levi Holmes, Defendant - Appellant,
No. 96-3840
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
September 3, 1997
Submitted: May 22, 1997
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
In this
I.
On May 7, 1994, inmate Johnson was housed in Barracks 4 at the Tucker Maximum Security Unit prison. Johnson was on disciplinary cоurt review status (“DCR“), charged with violating prison rules. DCR is a type of isolated confinement. The inmate is fed in his cell and is not allowed out of the cell unless handcuffed and escorted by a prison officiаl. One reason for isolating DCR inmates in this manner is to protect other inmates and guards from a presumptively dangerous prisoner until his disciplinary hearing is completed. The record does not reflect the disciplinary issue that caused Johnson to be on DCR status.
On May 7, Newman and Chestnut were in the general prison population but were also housed in Barracks 4. At about 4:15 P.M., Newman and Chestnut were watching TV in the cell block day room when Johnson attacked first Newman and then Chestnut, cutting both with a homemade knife. They escaped the day room and alerted prison officials, who subdued Johnson after a struggle. The attack was unanticipated. Newman had never had any other problem with Johnson. Chestnut testified that he and Johnson had exchanged heated words playing basketball the previous day, but “it wasn‘t nothing but talk.”
Officer Holmes was assigned to the Barracks 4 control booth on May 7 and was responsible for opening and closing the doors in Johnson‘s cell block. At trial, Holmes testified that he knew of Johnson‘s DCR status, which was shown on the cell block roster. He also knew that DCR inmates may not leave their cells unescorted because they are presumptively dangerous to others. When he began his shift that morning, he placed a prominent DCR tag on the switch controlling Johnson‘s cell door, the standard reminder to the control booth operator not to
The cell bloсk log for May 7 was a trial exhibit. It reflects that a routine check at 4:00 P.M. showed Johnson‘s cell door closed, and that he was fed in his cell at 4:01 P.M. The normal procedure for feeding a DCR inmate is to hаndcuff him through the cell bars, open the cell door, place his food tray inside, and then secure the cell door before uncuffing the inmate. The log does not reflect who fed Johnson at 4:01, and that prison official did not testify. There was testimony that escapes from isolated confinement are not uncommon, that inmates in isolation are clever at wedging obstructions that keeр their cell doors from fully closing or locking, and that Johnson‘s cell block nickname was “Houdini.” Lieutenant Hampton testified that he investigated the incident and concluded that Johnson most likely escаped because Holmes inadvertently opened the cell door, for example, by hitting an “override” button that opens seventeen cell doors at once. The jury was told that Holmes and another officer were subjects of a disciplinary hearing, but it was not told the results of that hearing.
II.
Holmes argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he violated plaintiffs’
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court confirmed that a prison official violates the
The Court then undertook to define more precisely the conceрt of deliberate indifference. Because the
On appeаl, Holmes first argues that there was insufficient evidence of an excessive risk of harm because there was no evidence that inmate Johnson was a risk to attack Newman or Chestnut unless they were kept separated. We disagree. There was testimony that prison officials isolate all DCR inmates because they are a potential danger to others. No doubt some prison rule viоlations suggest a greater propensity toward violence than others. But when prison administrators conclude that all inmates charged with rule violations should be isolated as dangerous, it would enсroach upon the administrators’ greater knowledge of prison conditions for us to hold as a matter of law that release of such inmates to the general prison population does not create a substantial risk that they will attack others.
Holmes next argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of harm to plaintiffs. This issue requires more lengthy consideration. In Farmer and our prior
Holmes admitted knowing that he should not open Johnson‘s cell door without a guard escort because DCR inmates are a danger to others. The critical questiоn is whether Holmes was merely negligent, or did his conduct manifest the requisite deliberate indifference for an Eighth amendment violation.
Plaintiffs argue that Holmes should be liable because he “knowingly releаsed Johnson from his cell.” But the
That leaves the question whether the jury could reasonably find that Holmes nonetheless recklеssly disregarded a known excessive risk to inmate safety by opening the cell door of a DCR inmate. In Prater, where the issue was knowledge of the risk, we restated the Farmer standard as being whether “prison officials fаiled to act reasonably despite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” 89 F.3d at 541. But the duty to act reasonably is a negligence standard, and Farmer stands for the broad proposition that deliberatе indifference includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm. If Holmes was merely negligent in creating a known risk by opening Johnson‘s cell door, he is not liable under the
or the prison doctor who negligently mistook a heart attack for indigestion in Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994). See also Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[d]eliberate indifference, i.e., the subjective intent to cause harm, cannot be inferred from a prison guard‘s failure to act reasonably“), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 167 (1995).
Having thus defined the appropriate standard, we find the question to be very close, particularly because it is well-settled that Holmes‘s violation of an internal prison regulation does not by itself give rise to an
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.