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Lone Oak Solar Energy LLC v. Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor
24A-EX-00033
Ind. Ct. App.
Oct 17, 2024
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Facts and Procedural History1
Discussion and Decision
Notes
Opinion Summary

Facts

  1. Lucita Singleton filed a petition on October 10, 2017, under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, claiming her flu vaccination caused seizures and epilepsy [lines="15-17"].
  2. The special master denied petitioner’s entitlement on April 28, 2023 [lines="20"].
  3. On October 23, 2023, Singleton submitted a final motion for attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $111,602.14 [lines="21-24"].
  4. Respondent acknowledged that the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs were met but requested the Court determine a reasonable award [lines="55-59"].
  5. The special master reviewed the billing entries and found the overall number of hours billed reasonable [lines="192-198"].

Issues

  1. Whether petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act despite denial of entitlement [lines="68-69"].
  2. Whether the requested hourly rates and number of hours for attorneys’ fees are reasonable and consistent with the prevailing market rate [lines="104-106"].

Holdings

  1. Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act as the petition was filed in good faith [lines="68-69"].
  2. The special master found the requested rates and hours reasonable, awarding $83,513.45 in attorneys' fees and full reimbursement of $26,543.09 in costs, totaling $110,054.74 [lines="199-218"].

OPINION

Date Published:Oct 17, 2024

Lоne Oak Solar Energy LLC, Appellant-Petitioner v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor, Madison County Board of Zoning Appeals, and Madison County Board of Commissioners, Appellees-Administrative Agency/Statutory Party/and Respondents

Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-EX-33

Court of Appeals of Indiana

October 17, 2024

Mathias, Judge; Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Appeal from the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission; The Honorable James F. Huston, Chairman; The Honorable Wesley R. Bennett, Commissioner; The Honorable Sarah E. Freeman, Commissioner; The Honorable David E. Veleta, Commissioner; The Honorable David E. Ziegner, Commissioner; The Honorable Loraine L. Seyfried, Chief Administrative Law Judge; IURC Cause No. 45883

Image in original document— clerk filed stamp

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Bryan H. Babb

Nikki Gray Shoultz

Kristina Kern Wheeler

Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Beth E. Heline

Jeremy Comeau

James Surd

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

Indianapolis, Indiana

Theodore E. Rokita

Benjamin M. L. Jones

Kyle M. Hunter

Office of the Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA OFFICE OF UTILITY CONSUMER COUNSELOR

William I. Fine

T. Jason Haas,

Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS AND MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Kevin D. Koons

Adam R. Doerr

Kroger Gardis & Regas, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA STATEWIDE ASSOCIATION OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC.

Erin C. Borissov

Leah Robyn Zoccola

Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE CLEAN GRID ALLIANCE

Todd A. Richardson

Lewis Kappes, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF INDIANA, INC., AND INDIANA CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE FOR ENERGY

Jennifer A. Washburn

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE INTERESTED INDIANA PROPERTY OWNERS

Laureen R. White

HeplerBroom, LLC

Hammond, Indiana

Opinion by Judge Mathias

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Indiana law permits the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an energy utility where the IURC concludes that exercising its jurisdiction is not in the public interest. In 2019, Lone Oak Solar Energy LLC asked the IURC to decline to exercise jurisdiction over Lone Oak‘s construction and operation of a solar farm in Madison County, which Lone Oak would construct and operate instead in accordance with a special use permit entered by the Madison County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA). The IURC agreed with Lone Oak‘s request and entered a declination order. In 2023, Lone Oak asked the BZA to amend the special use permit, but the BZA refused. Lone Oak then asked the IURC to reassert its jurisdiction and declare the BZA‘s refusal to amend the special use permit unrеasonable. The IURC declined to reassert its jurisdiction.

[2] On appeal, Lone Oak raises four issues for our review. However, Lone Oak does not argue on appeal that the merits of the IURC‘s decision to not reassert its jurisdiction is erroneous. Nor does Lone Oak explain why it should be allowed to ask the IURC for relief by way of a declination order, receive that relief, and then later argue—as it does here—that the IURC violated the law by granting Lоne Oak that relief. Accordingly, ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‍we conclude that Lone Oak is unable to demonstrate error in the order on appeal. We therefore affirm the IURC‘s decision not to reassert its jurisdiction over Lone Oak‘s solar farm рroject.

Facts and Procedural History1

[3] Lone Oak is a public utility and an energy utility, and it has proposed constructing a solar-energy generation system, commonly called a solar farm, in Madison County. Lone Oak would sell the electricity generated by thе farm into the interstate wholesale power market. Lone Oak does not have captive retail consumers in Indiana.

[4] Madison County Ordinance No. 2017-BC-0-01 establishes standards in Madison County for the development and use of solаr-energy generation systems. In May 2019, the BZA granted Lone Oak a special use permit pursuant to that ordinance. The special use permit required Lone Oak‘s solar farm to be constructed and operational by December 31, 2023.

[5] After it had obtained the special use permit, Lone Oak filed a verified petition with the IURC in which Lone Oak requested the IURC to decline to exercise jurisdiction over Lone Oak “with respect to the construction, ownership, operation, and any other activity in connection with” its proposed Madison County solar farm. Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2, p. 233. In October 2019, the IURC accepted Lone Oak‘s request and entered an order in which thе IURC found and concluded that exercising its jurisdiction over Lone Oak‘s Madison County solar farm project was not in the public interest. Although the IURC generally declined to exercise its jurisdiction, it did retain jurisdiction over Lone Oak with respеct to “certain affiliate transactions, transfers of ownership, financial assurance requirements, and material changes” to the solar farm. Id. The IURC also imposed certain reporting requirements on Lone Oak. Otherwise, however, the IURC found that Lone Oak had acknowledged that it would comply with Madison County zoning regulations and would not rely on any public-utility exemption from those regulations.

[6] According to Lone Oak, soon thereafter the COVID-19 pаndemic and other causes resulted in significant supply-chain issues that made the special use permit‘s December 31, 2023, completion date impossible. Lone Oak thus asked the BZA to amend the special use permit to extend that date into 2025 or to two years after the completion of any judicial review, whichever was later. The BZA declined to amend the special use permit. In August 2022, Lone Oak filed a petition for judicial review of the BZA‘s dеcision with the Grant Circuit Court.

[7] Meanwhile, Lone Oak also filed the instant petition, albeit under a new IURC cause number. In its petition, Lone Oak asked the IURC to reassert jurisdiction “for the limited purpose[] of . . . invalidating the . . . BZA findings that require Lone Oаk to commence construction and achieve operation by the dates specified” in the special use permit. Id. at 234. Lone Oak also asked the Grant Circuit Court to stay proceedings on the petition for judiсial review pending the IURC‘s decision, which the Grant Circuit Court granted.

[8] After receiving evidence from the parties, the IURC found and concluded in relevant part as follows on Lone Oak‘s petition to reassert jurisdiction:

  • Lone Oak has the availability to seek—and has ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‍sought—judicial review of the BZA‘s decision;
  • Lone Oak affirmatively requested the IURC‘s initial order declining to exercise jurisdiction;
  • the basis for the IURC‘s initial order declining to exercise jurisdiction “in the public interest has not changed,” and, in particular, “Lone Oak has no direct Indiana retail customers”;
  • the BZA‘s regulation of the solar farm project is more than adequate to meet the public‘s needs; and
  • reinstating jurisdiction for the limited purpose of reconsidering the solar farm‘s date of completion and operability “would only promote uncertainty about which entity has regulatory authority” here.

Id. at 240-42. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Lone Oak appeals the IURC‘s decision to not reassert jurisdiction over Lone Oak‘s Madison County solar farm project. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

The General Assembly established the [IURC] “as a fact-finding body with the technical expertise to administer the regulatоry scheme devised by the legislature.” N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted) . . . . Review of [IURC] orders is two-tiered.

First, “it requires a review of whether there is substantial evidence in light of the whole record to support the [IURC‘s] findings of basic fact.” Id. at 1016 (citing Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 1985)). Under this substantial evidence standard, the [IURC‘s] “order will stand unless no substantial evidence supports it.” Id. (citing McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep‘t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Ind. 1998)). The reviewing appellate court is to neither reweigh ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‍the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Id.

Second, thе appellate court reviews whether the order contains “specific findings on all the factual determinations material to its ultimate conclusions.” Id. (citing Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc., 485 N.E.2d at 612). The Court reviews the “conclusions of ultimate facts for reasonаbleness,” giving deference to the [IURC] in areas within its expertise. Id. (citing McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317-18).

City of Carmel v. Duke Energy Ind., LLC, 234 N.E.3d 816, 819 (Ind. 2024).

[10] The IURC is responsible for assuring that Indiana‘s public utilities provide constant, reliable, and efficient service to all Hoosiers. Id. at 820. This responsibility includes the authority to detеrmine whether municipal ordinances regulating public utilities are “unreasonable and thus void.” Id. at 818, 820 (citing Ind. Code § 8-1-2-101). Because the IURC has ratemaking expertise, it can determine how a municipality‘s ordinances might affect costs to utility customers statewide. Id. at 820.

[11] In some circumstances, even though an entity might ordinarily be subject to the IURC‘s jurisdiction, if the public interest would not be served by the IURC‘s exercise of jurisdiction over it, the IURC may enter an order declining to exercise jurisdiction over the entity. I.C. § 8-1-2.5-5 (2018). In determining whether the public interest would be served by entering any such order, the Indiana Code directs the IURC to consider:

  1. Whether technological or operating conditions, competitive forces, or the extent of regulation by other state or federal regulatory bodies render the exercise, in whole or in part, of jurisdiction by the commission unnecessary or wasteful.
  2. Whether the commission‘s declining to exercise, in whole or in part, its jurisdiction will be beneficial for the energy utility, the energy utility‘s customers, or the state.
  3. Whether the commission‘s declining to exercise, in whole or in part, its jurisdiction will promote energy utility efficiency.
  4. Whether the exercise of commission jurisdiction inhibits an energy utility from competing ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‍with other providers of functionally similar energy services or equipment.

I.C. § 8-1-2.5-5(b).

[12] Here, there is no dispute that Lone Oak would usually be subject to the IURC‘s jurisdiction. There is also no dispute that Lone Oаk had standing to request and did request that the IURC decline to exercise jurisdiction over the construction and operation of Lone Oak‘s Madison County solar farm project in accordance with Indiana Code section 8-1-2.5-5. And there is no dispute that the IURC granted Lone Oak its requested relief by entering a declination order. The instant appeal arises out of Lone Oak‘s ensuing attempt to have the IURC reassert jurisdiction over the solar farm project, which the IURC declined to do.

[13] Lone Oak asserts that, (1) in seeking to have the IURC invalidate the BZA‘s refusal to amend the special use permit, the IURC‘s jurisdiction “is not discretionary[] but mandatory” under the usual statutory regime for public utilities that are subjected to municipal ordinances. Aрpellant‘s Br. at 18 (citing, inter alia, I.C. § 8-1-2-101). Lone Oak likewise asserts that (2) the usual statutory regime exempts it from Madison County‘s regulations and that the IURC “has no authority to determine otherwise.” Id. at 19. And Lone Oak asserts that (3) Madison County‘s ordinance unlawfully discriminates against Lone Oak based on its fuel source. Finally, Lone Oak also argues that (4) the IURC‘s declination of jurisdiction violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

[14] Lone Oak‘s first three arguments each seek tо apply the IURC‘s usual statutory regime, and, accordingly, those arguments assume IURC jurisdiction in this case. But Lone Oak‘s solar farm project is not proceeding under the IURC‘s usual regime. Lone Oak itself asked the IURC to decline to exercise its usual jurisdiction in accordance with Indiana law, namely, Indiana Code section 8-1-2.5-5. The IURC granted Lone Oak‘s request, which removed Lone Oak‘s construction and operation of the solar farm from the IURC‘s jurisdiction and placed the project undеr the regulation of the BZA. Thus, Lone Oak‘s first three arguments are all based on the incorrect premise of usual IURC jurisdiction, and they fail accordingly.

[15] Still, Lone Oak also appears to suggest that, by filing a new petition with the IURC under a new cause number, Lone Oak automatically reinstated the IURC‘s usual jurisdiction over the solar farm project. The IURC did not consider Lone Oak‘s new petition to be a basis to circumvent the standing declination order, and Lone Oak cites no compelling authority to our Court for its proposition that the IURC was obliged to entertain Lone Oak‘s attempt to circumvent that order. We therefore reject this argument as well.

[16] Finally, we briefly note Lone Oak‘s fourth аrgument that seeks to overturn the IURC‘s declination order under the Dormant Commerce Clause. But the IURC entered the declination order at Lone Oak‘s request, and Lone Oak cites no compelling authority for the proposition that it cannot be held to an order, even an unconstitutional one, that it has expressly requested. Lone Oak has invited any error under the Dormant Commerce Clause, and, accordingly, we will not consider this argument. E.g., Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651, 656 (Ind. 2018).

[17] For all of these reasons, we affirm the IURC‘s ‍‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‍decision to not reassert jurisdiction.

[18] Affirmed.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Notes

1
We thank the several participating amici for their helpful briefs.

Case Details

Case Name: Lone Oak Solar Energy LLC v. Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 17, 2024
Citation: 24A-EX-00033
Docket Number: 24A-EX-00033
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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