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Lomas, R. v. Kravitz, J.
130 A.3d 107
Pa. Super. Ct.
2015
Check Treatment

*1 ry claims, respect LeAnn’s ex

plained why policy previously lapsed, that,

explained several paid claims were but plan

error that Conseco did to seek funds, for those

reimbursement and en duplicate copy

closed Policy

LeAnn’s Id. As authorities review. demonstrate,

cited above Conseco’s letter

explaining its prior denial of benefits Jones,

WOP did not toll the statute. See

Cozzone, supra. reasons,

For I respectfully these dissent majority’s decision on LeAnn’s ground

bad faith claim on the that the trial

court properly entered a verdict in favor

Conseco LeAnn’s bad faith claim.

Roy LOMAS, Sr., H. Roy Lomas d/b/a/

Carpet Contractor, Appelle

e KRAVITZ, B.

James Springs Andorra Inc.,

Development, Cherrydale Con Co., Development

struction Eastern

Enterprises Inc., Kravmar, Inc.,

Appellants. Court,

Superior Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct.

Filed Dec.

HI BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES,' BEFORE: J., PANELLA, J., DONOHUE, J., SHOGAN,.J„ J., LAZARUS, ALLEN, J., WECHT, STABILE, J.-, J. PANELLA, OPINION BY J. This appeal phases of concerns two underlying liability trial: verdict and As assessment. detailed be- low, liability the entire affirms verdict entered the Honorable Thomas Rogers -P. the Court Common Pleas Montgomery County. Accordingly, our holding reasoning regard in that binding precedential. See Common- Brown, (Pa.Su- wealth 23 A.3d (ere banc). per.2011) reasoning *5 liability our affirmance of the verdict fol- introductory these lows words. n damages verdict affirmed an equally holding divided Court. Our reasoning is, respect damages with therefore, non-precedential and binding only on the parties. id. See verdict, In damages relation to the on appeal issue Rog- was whether ers, as well Montgomery as the entire bench, County should have recused. The Majority Appellants’ holds that recusal and, untimely was patently motion there- fore, waived. We n further conclude that the recusal motion was a baseless attack following on trial court an unfavorable on liability, expense verdict at the made integrity Montgomery County case, trial bench. This is a not an waiver Rogers, “appearance” case. as the judge, every that was trial made disclosure required of him. concede Judge Rogers is no there evidence bias, unfairness, prejudice. showed Leonard, Thomas A. Philadelphia, for appellants. Additionally, case, facts of this under the Rosen, Philadelphia,

Paul R. appel- cannot-agree we Dissent that a conflict, a single judge, lee. which affects but $30,913 performed due for work the entire balance leads to damages, compensatory attorney’s twenty judges.1 plus of over bench fees, costs, and interest calculated ac- than affir- other Finally, result Cherrydale with CASPA. filed a cordance cam- Kravitz absolve mance would final award which petition strike the use abuse of of incessant paign ultimately on October was denied litigation processes. civil petition pending, Appellant While Appeal The Parties all out Kravitz transferred assets of Cher- Kravitz, B. Andorra James Appellants, rydale, Springs, and Eastern to Andorra (“Andorra Inc. Development, Springs under his himself other entities con- Com- Cherrydale Construction Springs”), trol. Inc., Kravmar, (“Cherrydale”), and pany In March initiated the Appellee Development formerly known Eastern seeking pierce corpo- action instant (“Eastern”), collectively Inc. Enterprises, alleg- veil the Kravitz Entities and rate Entities,” appeal “Kravitz known as the ing fraud fraudulent transfers. Sever- judgment August from the entered years legal proceedings discovery al Lomas, Roy H. Appellee in favor trial commenced in before a bench ensued Sr., Carpet Lomas contractor Roy d/b/a/ agreed parties to bi- January 2007. (“Lomas”), $1,688,379.10. amount of trial, and furcate the after court en- Summary verdict and in favor liability tered order Ap- Appellant Cherrydale and Appellee against Appellants in July into a contract pellee phase Lomas entered commenced in agreed in- supply Appellee September 2007. coverings in floor new construction stall following After close the record *6 by Cherrydale. Appel- being built homes trial, second but phase before shortly immediately, but lee work began verdict, its the trial court rendered final Cherrydale breached con- thereafter sought Appellants the entire stopped work. At that Appellee tract and County Court Common Montgomery Cherrydale Appellee point, owed delays Pleas. More ensued before tri- $30,913.00. to arbitra- The matter went April al court On denied motion. of arbitrators unanimous- panel and 2011, the court issued extensive trial find- Cherrydale had breached ly concluded ings of fact and conclusions law deter- entry of an interim After contract. mining Appellant Kravitz had inten- favor, $30,913.00 Appellee’s award tionally deprived Cherrydale with assets to vacate inter- Cherrydale petitioned Appellee, had pay and intentional- which im award. fraudulently ly disregarded the corpo- and form, intermingling rate his com- panel the arbitration and In September $200,601.61, totaling perpetrate fraud pany’s award affairs and a final entered injustice. confirmed Contractor and with the accordance (“CASPA”), $200,601.61 Payment Act initial arbitration and award Subcontractor 501-516, punitive compensatory awarded dam- §§ included P.S. provide any principled judges; it seriously Pleas has over cannot fails The Dissent guidance argued single judge for bench to assess that a conflict rule example, challenges in the future. For these to taint the entire trial carries over bench in has Philadelphia counties, trial bench over as well as other counties. these Allegheny judges Common and the

H3 interest, Cherrydale’s only Cherry- fees, penal- was customer. ages, attorney’s capital, had no dale contract be- $1,688,379.10. Af- for total award ties Cherrydale Springs tween and Andorra August entry of judgment . ter Cherrydale had value to such inherent to this timely appealed it could obtain a loan from a bank. three-judge panel of this Court A Court. Cherrydale payments di- was receive court’s adopting after the- trial affirmed rectly from Andorra for in- Springs costs Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) as its This opinion own. building curred connection reargument, en banc. granted Court then homes. Background Appellant . man- Eastern served Entities

The Kravitz An- agement payroll company for the B. Appellant From 1994 to James Steven Group.- dorra A. Braun was the officer, director, and Kravitz was Chief Financial Officer of Eastern the sole group companies leaving 100% 1992 to After his employ- shareholder of a Eastern, ment with was collectively Group.2 known as the Braun retained Andorra accounting pre- Kravitz to offer advice comprised Group Andorra the tax returns pare companies for subchapter many corporations involved S within .the Andorra Group. including, building in the home business to, Appellants but Andorra limited Appellee’s Involvement and Subse- Springs, Cherrydale, Krav- quent Kravitz Actions arid Eastern. meetings'or

itz corporate did not hold 10, 1994, On Cherrydale, as November practices conform to otherwise standard for con- Springs, contractor Andorra Appellant required of such entities. Krav- Appellee supply tracted with install itz personally The Reserve at La- owned floor coverings Appellee in its new homes. (the fayette Township Hill in Whitemarsh began work but immediately stopped “Reserve”), large he parcel of land which Cherrydale December 1994 because had six divided into sections residential de- paid At point, Cherrydale him. II, I, velopment. He Sections contributed $30,913.00. Appellee January owed III, million, to Andorra valued $3.2 1995, Appellee that Appellant demanded Springs, which been formed Cherrydale submit to arbitration accor- II, I, purpose owning sole Sections their contract. C. dance with Thomas *7 housing III developing single-family and Branca, Appellee Esq., represented IV, V, there. Kravitz Sections and kept 24, 1996, May arbitration. On the arbitra- for himself. VI Sometime Kravitz panel award, partial issued an interim jnto agreement with entered an option finding Cherrydale had its breached Corporation Home Delaware Pulte Val- Appellee- contract with and had violated (“Pulte”) ley whereby purchased Pulte CASPA, §§ Immediately 73 P.S. 501-516. (cid:127) IV, V, Sections from Kravitz. and thereafter, VI petition seeking Kravitz filed a have the interim vacated. to award was formed in Appellant Cherrydale During pendency when it of that petition, was until 1993 but inactive to Appellant Kravitz and his accountant Springs build contracted Andorra de- allegedly declining cided that to finan- single-family Andorra due Springs homes. one used Kravitz so that he could have Group 2. The Andorra a fictitious name was representing companies, developments all of most Kravitz’s name for his that would be building were in the home business recognizable by public. during years 1994-1998. name was II, III Reserve that Andorra benefited Cherrydale, cial conditions IV, However, V, at the VI. Sections each insolvent. Eastern were Springs, and in- Springs was that Andorra same time 20, 1996, Krav- Accordingly, on Décember Cherrydale for the of con- to costs debted shareholder, itz, director secre- as sole homes, Springs structing Andorra loaned tary company, executed “Com- each over approximately Eastern million $5.8 Consent Shareholders bined "Unanimous what for man- and above it owed Eastern for each of the three com- and Directors” agement services Reserve. related business activi- terminating panies their money from Andorra Eastern used company to ties. He also each directed interests, fund Springs to Kravitz’s other necessary steps wind-up and take to, horse including, but not limited his residential construction and all terminate farm, Farms,5 Chimney personal Burnt activity and sell re- business related Gladwyne prop- residence in and his other therewith, associated maining assets Dublin, Upper Hunter’s Pointe erties pay, possible, the extent the sub- “to By Andorra the end Glen. accounts intercompany amounts stantial over one million Eastern advanced otherwise cancel those ac- payable or to horse dollars Kravitz’s then-insolvent payable.” counts On December Eastern no efforts to collect farm. made $2,169,575 Cherrydale off wrote debts eventually Kravitz determined that debt. Springs. it Andorra On Janu- owed to Chimney that Burnt Farms could re- 4,1997, ary Cherrydale Kravitz authorized Eastern, it and Eastern wrote off pay payable both its accounts cancel bad debt.6 Kravitz determined also accounts receivable.3 repay Springs Andorra Eastern could not Inter-Company Entities’ Kravitz $4,905,000 as approximately off and wrote Transactions allegedly Eastern was bad debt. While (cid:127) insolvent, approxi- Kravitz transferred supposed were flow Funds $654,108 money Eastern’s mately owner, Cherry- Springs, Andorra capital himself the form of a distribution contractor, dale, paid. By were never of val- nothing for which Eastern received Springs owéd Andorra the.end ue in return. for the homes Cherrydale million $3.7 Cherrydale addition, 12, 1997, had built.4 In Cher- the Honorable Wil- On June rydale $714,000in costs Montgomery had incurred relat- liam T. Nicholas Coun- I, ty Appel- improvements to ing to Sections Common Pleas denied the site loans, Chimney transfers Cherrydale to build homes for Burnt continued those Springs Springs re- even Farms was insolvent. Andorra Andorra n loans, though allegedly winding Cherrydale security ceived transfers Chimney though unen- its business. even Burnt Farms had down $1,000,000 over cumbered assets valued at land, horses, buildings. Burnt such as August 1994 4. Braun authored memoranda *8 1995, paid Springs Chimney Farms never Andorra and December indicated , steps to Springs never took profitable. It lacked back Andorra Cherrydale was .cash Springs wrote off Springs pay did not it. collect debt. Andorra because Andorra $577,551.81 as bad debt. 1996, During Springs 1995 and Andorra personally Chim- also Burnt transfers to Burnt 6.Kravitz loaned made cash or loans Chim- million, Farms, but he ney approximately $1.8 ney Farms Kravitz's horse farm. On Decem- 31, 1996, did not view own loan as uncollectible ber of the transfers and balance Chimney write off his loan to Burnt by Springs to did not loans made the' farm Andorra $577,552, bad At as approximately the time of Farms debt. petition for lant's to vacate confirmed receivable the site improvement from Cherrydale arbitration to Springs, interim award. Andorra from Kravitz, Springs Andorra to Kravitz owed 1997, September awaiting while Springs $714,000. Andorra Andorra award, entry of the Krav- final arbitration Springs nothing received for distribu- itz directed Braun to make series Kravitz, tion to other than the cancellation adjusting year for the journal entries end- $124,000 loan allegedly by made 31, 1996, for ing December the Kravitz Kravitz to Andorra Springs. Kravitz then As part adjusting journal of the entities. capital from received a distribution Andor- entries, Cherrydale, which had incurred $590,000. ra for Springs remaining $714,000 relating in costs to im- the1 site nothing exchange Andorra received for IV, V, provements that Sections benefited the capital contribution. This series of VI,7 transferred that account to receivable transactions allowed Kravitz to pay- avoid Springs. Cherrydale Andorra received ‘ ing creditors of the Group compa- Andorra nothing from Springs Andorra for nies, and to retain the value the Andor- except transfer to promise pay. corporations ra Group through transfers Cherry- to promise pay was worthless to improvements, distributions, and capital was, Springs dale because at that Andorra write-offs of loans made himself and his time, insolvent. Once the account receiv- horse farm. for improvements able the site been adjustment journal entry September transferred On the arbitrators (“Final Springs, Award”) Springs Andorra Andorra issued a pur- trans- final award ferred the site also via suant CASPA in improvements, the amount of journal adjustment, $200,601.61, entry including Kravitz and compensatory dam- off fees, wrote Cherrydale. ages, attorney’s debt it owed costs and interest As result of the transfer the accounts determined as follows. Unpaid performed 30,913.00 for work balance Lomas: $ Unpaid per on 1% up Interest balance [at month] 7,1998: including 13,302.00 August $ profit unperformed Lost for to improper work due 94,199.00 termination the contract: $ profit per up the lost [at annum] Interest amount 6% on August deposit credit less interest 1,1995 April 7,1998; 14,872.00 August $ litigation 41,834.78

Attorney’s fees and costs: $ $ 4,032.66 expenses: Reimbursement administrative fees compensation expenses Reimbursement 1,448.17 arbitrators: $ $200,601.61 TOTAL Arbitrators, 9/4/98, CASPA, § Final Award of provided by at R.R. 73 P.S.

722a. portion interest on the the award ($94,199) profit lost would accrue Final Award that interest confirmed 6% per Septem- rate of annum. On legal unpaid would accrue balance ($30,913) performed per entry work 1% month ber after the of the final *9 improvements electricity, basically grading, preparing 7. Site for include under- the site de- ground systems, roadway, wiring velopment. sewer for they pre- against Cherrydale, for both sides stated that were judgment as a

award summary judgment. motions petition paring to strike the Cherrydale filed judgment. their fur- Notwithstanding promise 2004, delays, July after Appellee ther of that During proceeding, pendency summary judgment, Ap- filed a motion for discovery anticipa- Appellee conducted sought and received pellants sixty addi- judgment executing on tion of and discovery. to days tional conduct On Appellant Kravitz had discovered day, made sixtieth additional Cherrydale, all assets transferred requests seeking information and docu- Eastern his other and to Springs, Andorra already produced. been ments and himself. entities actions, of Appellants’ Because redundant Litigation The Instant Appellee’s summary judg- resolution 2000, 31, awaiting while On March delayed ment motion until June 2005 was peti- on Cherrydale’s trial court’s decision Despite when the trial court denied it. judgment, then-Attorney tion to vacate the opposition to arguing Appellee’s sum- the instant action Thomas Branca initiated mary judgment motion that there were complaint Appellee’s on filing behalf fact, Appellants then material issues 10, September seeking to collect the for summary judg- filed their own motion (1) piercing corpo- on: judgment based further, delay. causing ment thus veil; (2) transfer under rate fraudulent ultimately Nicholas denied their motion Act, Transfer Uniform Fraudulent Pa. Be- and the case was scheduled trial. (3) 5101-5110; §§ fraud. Dis- C.S.A. 2007, continued tween was and motions ensued. covery alleged times unavail- numerous due Appellants’ ability of witnesses and ex- 2001, Attorney Branca In November perts. Montgomery County was elected Pleas; he of Common referred pre-trial January At a conference on attorneys, load to other and filed a

ease Rogers Honorable Thomas P. the instant withdrawal counsel, specifically with discussed January 2002. On March matter counsel, Kapustin, Appellants’ with Steve Spector, Gadon attorneys from & now-Judge hav- Esq., the issue of Branca (“SGR”) appear- Rosen P.C. entered their ing represented previously Appellee. mo- Appellee, ances on behalf filed Judge Rogers par- gave assurances production compel of docu- tions he case ties that had never discussed the been previously requested. ments that had All unequivo- counsel Branca. thereafter, Appellant Kravitz filed a Soon cally agreed proceed Judge Rog- before petition disqualified. SGR After a have ers.

hearing, Judge Appel- Nichols concluded liability phase bifurcated without merit lants’ were concerns January Ac- commenced June 2002. denied motion regarding countants for both sides testified discovery nearly complete, Appellants, in- the financial activities

When attorney sought cluding transfers loans withdraw as various Appellants’ them, dispute with payment Krav- Kravitz’s of in- amongst counsel over declaration ensued, during Appellant Corporations hearing A of each of Ap- solvency itz. Appellee entry pellants’ May after interim counsel assured award, tax delayed resulting case would and the court that the arbitration flowing Attorneys implications of counsel. benefits Krav- the substitution *10 80, 2007, Judge ney July Rogers regarding Appellee’s itz. en- expert’s On discus- liability and order in favor of report, tered verdict sion tax' issues in his but ob- against Appellants, con- Appellee that .those and served issues that far “were Id., cluding Rravitz had misused his cor- that significant.” from at 2503. fraudulently porations and transferred as- Judge Branca clearly also testified that Cherrydale disregard sets out in wanton spoken had never he judge about rights Appellee for the as a creditor. this case. also concluded that testimo- witnesses, Three other including Appel- by ny provided Rravitz and Braun was not Rravitz, lant then testified. Rravitz re- The court credible. scheduled the second to answer many questions fused regarding phase the trial on attor- his assets and the of his ney’s begin transfer assets. September fees in 2007. however, testify, Rravitz did that in In preparation damages phase for the had equity he million in in the land $5.5 trial, requests Appellee pro- served entities, owned one the Andorra duction of documents seek- was subsequently which sold for mil- $32 ing identify .to the net worth Rravitz lion. split Rravitz his wife net Appellee his entities. received 80-20, proceeds opened and each certifi- small requested. number documents deposit cates mil- the amount of $2 September On of trial the eve identify lion. would not or He could joints Rravitz tax returns produced pro- what done with remaining statements condition financial between n from ceeds He testified sale. that the wife, pro- his himself and but refused deposit certificates of liquidated had been many duce other court-ordered docu- 2007,. January but refused state what in. to: ments.8 proceeds. he done with the trial, At Judge regard- Branca testified ing his involvement prior case his Rravitz also regarding testified numer- bench, assets, ascension to the his counsel ous other earned including commercial and fees, SGR, his referral of the case to parcels Plym- residential located in land Appellee Dublin, the referral fee Township; had directed SGR outh' Upper Hunter’s Pointe, See at pay him the end case. and Philadelphia; which were (“N.T.”), 9/6/07, Testimony Notes of R.R. owned various S Corporations in at 2504.9 also Branca testified that he had an 80%-100% interest. also He spoken Appellee he had with SGR and testified that he 100% the S owned periodically Corporation about case Chimney indicated Burnt owned Farms, fields, of sub- nothing “[were] discussions the 160 polo acre farm with Id., at stance.” 2502. He also noted that which he stated was mil- valued $3.5 he a discussion with recalled an SGR attor- lion'.10' also He stated that December produce, among proceeds Rravitz refused .other third referral the net as a- fee.” Id.,, things, appraisals on non-residential real 21-22. There is no indication in the . owned, brokerage estate he state- bank as to what record "a third referral of the net ments for 2006 or re- documentation proceeds” it means or would include what deposit garding money certificates of agreement under the forged Appellee between January held market funds 2007, or cashed out in and SGR. relating partner- and documents to two Carlisle, ships Pennsylvania. "may 10.. Rravitz also testified he have” paid expenses players polo Ar- Appellee Branca testified Farms, polo although gentina play at the he SGR had he decided that would receive "a *11 exists or of of No million in certificates he had $3 simply million in a because a presumed an exist

deposit and additional $5 account, Kravitz money but could of of Pleas of Judge market Common Court identify gone. had County those funds not where an interest Montgomery has he had a home also stated that valued He underlying case.

at $1.9 um Florida, million in which Gladwyne; a he had transferred to condomini- % [*] during ownership with wife joint a permit party a undersigned will not The a litigation; of pendency progress with who'is dissatisfied $140,000 paid for which he had BMW arbitrarily at- the1 mid-stream close that at the Kravitz testified cash. tempt disqualification to cause the 2006, worth of over he a net $27 shopping Presiding Judge. has Damages, Findings See million. Fact — universally and will not condemned been at 12-15. proceed- any stage at be tolerated trial; over At the close of the See, ings. Ryan e.g., Commonwealth Appellee’s objection, Appellants were 602], (Pa.1979). Pa. [484 A.2d to determine whether granted days prejudice here does not show The record a accountant they forensic needed to retain bias, hence, without substantiation invoices submitted to review the' redacted they not the record receive did attorneys. Although by Appellee’s they full, trial, impartial fair and Defendants the court of they stated that would tell question the permitted shall not decision, thirty with days passed .the their court’s verdict. no from Appellants. word 12/31/08, 8, Opinion, Trial Court dated 2007, On October1 after record 12-13. closed, with Appellants appeared had been n pur- newly partial judgment counsel and submitted retained The court entered Montgom- for July entire in favor of 2007 order suant its motion Pleas, County trans- ery of Common against Court for Appellants Appellee and venue, assignment to an out-of- fer $200,601.61. Appellants filed an interlocu- county judge Judge Branca’s in- based quashed tory appeal, this Court which , the, volvement case. On with .December Appellants then March filed 31, 2008, motion, Judge Rogers denied extraordinary relief with application for stating:. . it requesting that ex- Supreme our Court imputed improprie- “appearance authority King’s Bench as- ercise its claim exists

ty” which Defendants jurisdiction. Appellants si- plenary sume interest virtue of Branca’s stay for. a multaneously filed motion court underlying provides the with case proceedings both this trial court legal to conclude upon basis Supreme pending the Court and our receive, cannot have not that Defendants application. King’s outcome of the Bench not to receive a received or will continue mo- Superior Appellants’ Court denied Montgomery trial in fair and impartial stay, and on tion for June County. . by per curiam Supreme Court denied or-

[*] % # der both the motion stay Appel- 15, ¶ Damages Findings testify so. as to which could or would Fact — years years may have many done he how H9 for extraordinary generally accepted lants’ application accounting practices relief. petition filed a for recon- purpose minimizing, then for the lawful tax liabilities, [sic ] the trial sideration with reconsid- recusal, its denial motion. eration Whether, law, as 'a matter punitive denied, petition July That and on *12 may damages awarded be where the 2010, closing court argu- the trial heard underlying arbitration award was based interest, Appellee’s ments on claims on the- Contractor and1 Subcontractor fees, punitive attorney damages. and Act, Payment which includes provision a authorizing 29, 2011, statutory the award a April pu- On the trial court issued [sic ] orders, penalty. nitive detailing findings two one of fact respect Ap- law with and conclusions Whether, law, as a matter of punitive liability, assessing and pellants’ the other damages’ may Appel be awarded where punitive compensatory damages, and pen- lants’ conduct was by 'general motivated alties, interest, attorney’s and in fees the ly accepted accounting and tax planning $1,688,379.10 of April amount principles willful, and outrageous, hot Appellants’ the denial of post- 201Í. After wanton, reckless, or Appel and where motion, prothonotary the fi- trial entered litigation conduct in defending lants’ judgment August nal process Was rights within its due and obdurate, dilatory, was not vexar timely and/or appealed to this : tious? Court, have following briefed the sev- Whether, issues. en law, as a punitive matter of a law, damages Whether, exceeding award far a 1:1 ratio as a matter of the entire compensatory Montgomery damages bench of Court of award Com- recused, "rights Appellants’ pro- mon should violates Pleas have been due full, complete, cess under the United States required Constitu- dis- and/or tion? covery permitted, of the irrepa- because

rable created Whether, law, as a matter trial by ongoing participation and finan- attorney’s could award Lomas court by sitting cial litigation interest a fees, interest, penalties under the member of that Court? Payment Contractor and Subcontractor Whether, law, (“CASPA”) Act as matter of testi- when did Lomas mony CASPA, Appellee’s expert bring trial should have claim .under stricken, altering been was precluded. discredited be- from or and/or court attorneys sitting adjusting underlying cause Appellee’s and- arbitration -County Montgomery member of the award did certain award altered, edited, CASPA, bench improperly arid the trial mis- court under expert’s applied influenced content of the its of dam- CASPA award - report, ages? [sic ] law, Whether, corpo- as matter of Appellants’ at 2-3. Brief pierced rate veil can be to find James B. Discussion liable, individually Kravitz all Appel- scope Our re standard transfers, of.

lants liable fraudulent follows. non-jury view verdict are as of a accounting adjust- based on non-cash arising ments bookkeeping entries appellate made Our role cases is to professional non-jury licensed accountants thé trial determine verdicts ordinary pursuant findings the trial course business court whether competent “A recusal or party seeking disqualifica- evidence supported are objection committed to raise required] court [is whether moment, application of the law. The possible error in the earliest that party must fact the trial findings of consequence being suffer the will time weight same and effect Lokuta, given In re 608 Pa. barred.” jury. the verdict appeal as .We (2011) added) (emphasis A.3d light in a most evidence consider (quoting Casey, Goodheart 523 Pa. winner. will verdict We favorable (1989)). Once party A.2d findings if its reverse the issue, has “he cannot waived be heard supported by competent of fact are complain following an unfavorable re- findings if its record evidence Stanton, Commonwealth v. sult.” *13 on error of law. How- premised are an 516, 585, Pa.Super. n. 440 A.2d 6 588 ever, ... a the issue concerns [where] omitted). (citations (1982) law, plenary. our review is question Here, Appellants opportunities had two conclusions of law court’s The trial they eventually to seek recusal before filed non-jury from a originating appeal first opportunity their motion. The oc- binding appellate on an not are in January curred before trial 2007 when appellate duty court’s because it Judge parties Rogers informed the correctly if the trial court to determine Judge representation Branca’s prior law to of the case. the facts applied the Rogers’s) (Judge assured them of his abili- Heating and Electric Stephan v. Waldron ty fair impartial. Appel- to remain LHC, 660, 100 A.3d 664-665 Cooling opportunity lants’ second to seek recusal (citation omitted). “[A]b- (Pa.Super.2014) 2007, September occurred immedi- discretion, reviewing an sent abuse ately Judge regard- Branca after testified by the trial court’s credi- court is bound his ing past and current involvement with De Lage Landen bility determinations.” case. Services, Manage- Inc. v. M.B. Financial Inc., (Pa.Su- Co., 888 A.2d 898 ment Appellants that it was on Sep- contend omitted). (citation per.2005) they first that tember learned Recusal Judge that had an Branca maintained in- result, As Appel- terest the case. a issue, Appellants first aver In their 6, 2007, lants that argue September was Rogers granting in not Judge erred possible the “earliest moment” bench of to recuse entire motion their they have their mo- should filed recusal County Com Montgomery Lokuta, tion. re 11 A.3d close of the mon Pleas after the However, rather than file an immediate Although they concede that there trial. motion, Appellants recusal allowed the tri- Judge Rogers showed no evidence proceed testimony al three bias, prejudice, Appellants unfairness witnesses, signifi- most including, more argue Judge that because nevertheless N.T., Kravitz. See cantly, Appellant to have connection Branca continued Trial, 9/6/07, Damages at 65-83. As not- his with the case after election ed, testimony appeared Kravitz’s bench, extreme- the mere ly It evasive was fabricated. such entire existed negative development required. that new- Appellants have bench was after ly-retained appeared failing timely Ap- counsel and filed argument waived this pellants’ spe- recusal motion. To be more possible opportunity. it first raise at the ciñe, attempt judge shop: late Appellants requested it not “Given the until n importance of court post-hearing thirty-day proceeding, not. to review expense, mention bills, party their time attorneys’ period thirty-day and the objection should able be to save passed Appellants filing any had without hedge until a against later as a documents, .losing date the rec- relevant until a case.” closed, Id. newly-retained coun- ord

sel the recusal motion. appeared filed citations, Among other cites treatise decision, ato Pennsylvania Reilly by Reil action, action,

This is unac or lack ly Pennsylvania Transp. Southeastern Judge Rogers ceptable untimely. told Authority, Pa.Super. A.2d Judge ear Appellants’ counsel of Branca’s (1984), aff'd, 507 Pa. A.2d litigation prior to involvement in the lier (1985), for policy the well settled that a ques trial. took action motion extent, for the disqualification on the Branca “should made at possible the earliest involvement, informally formally either time after party has actual notice through deposition. Appellants could disqualifying facts.” easily about Bran- have found out just ca’s continued financial interest opinion Our in Reilly, as well as the Instead, *14 asking “Appellants] him. chose Pennsylvania Supreme opinion in Court’s silent, resorting case, to remain the uncon the same clearly mandates the neces- reprehensible laying sity scionable and tactic of timely disqualification. motion for waiting grass, [was until decision In Reilly, the Superior Court concluded imminent], disqualifi raising the and then that the timely defendant had not SEPTA Goodheart, cation 565 A.2d at issue[.]” filed its for Motion Recusal because it had timely 763. Because failed to not during only been raised trial and was motion, raise recusal they their waived the for during raised the first post-appeal time See, e.g., Datagate, issue. Inc. v. Hewlett- pleadings. panel support found broad Co., (9th 941 Packard 871-872 F.2d holdings federal and state deci- Cir.1991) (delay of six weeks rendered mo sions. untimely); Hosp. v. Apple Jewish If party fails to at object the earliest Center., (2d Medical 829 F.2d 334 opportunity following of actual receipt Cir.1987) (noting delay a months two knowledge, objection will be held allegedly after facts movant re learned waived. A not party máy elect take quiring untimely). motion recusal rendered gaining chance on a favorable decision also re Mar See International Business then, unfavorable, if is the decision (2d Corporation, chines 643 45 F.3d grounds raise for which he recusal Cir.1995). knowledge his prior counsel had actual Every recognized made. jurisdiction being has decision See Deles waivable, Porterie, (5th disqualification judge demier F.2d is v. 666 116 Cir.), denied, party “if a cert. 459 U.S. 103 knows facts that would dis- (1982) (motion qualify judge, S.Ct. not move for 74 81 but does L.Ed.2d right disqualification, untimely judge so at a made do when disclosure pre-trial later relationship will be considered waived.” and recusal motion date al., on appeal Alfini made for first after James J. et Judicial Conduct time ed.2007). trials); § (4th two full v. City Ethics 4.14 Para- Potashnick Port Co., (5th mount 1101 among untimely Construction F.2d [609 concerns about an Cir.1980)] (grounds recusal party’s motion to is a for raised disqualify judge 122 Rogers presiding over be appeal waived case.

for first time While the alone after until cause it was not discovered recusal, enough recusal must warrant trial); Conforte, States v. 624 United - appropriate circum- occur (9th Cir.), denied, under cert. 449 F.2d 869 (cid:127) were not stances. Those circumstances 1012, 101 470 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d U.S. present here. (1980) (cannot grounds raise recusal had notice appeal time on when first that a party who asserts be cannot facts earlier —timeliness “pro judge disqualified must must be cases, although may it disregarded in all bias, establishing prejudice, evidence duce cases); Smith extraordinary be v. or unfairness raises a substantial Cir.1978) (timeli (3d Danyo, 585 F.2d ability preside jurist’s doubt as to-the cannot toler significant ness because Arnold, v. Arnold A.2d impartially.” information and litigant knowing' ate (citation omitted). 674, 680 (Pa.Super.2004) rul holding hoping for favorable back judges is a of this presumption There seeking ings recusal when rul and then “honorable, fair and Commonwealth are favorable; ings recusal motion are Lokuta, competent,” In re 11 A.3d giving months after events filed three (citation (2011) omitted), and, when con objection but before rise demand, able to fronted are recusal rulings in there been when “in they rule determine can whether timely); United States meantime personal manner, free of bias impartial (D.Mass.1981) Kelly, F.Supp. Arnold, outcome,” 847 A.2d interest in (motion untimely attorney had where (citation omitted). judge If the until after facts waited knowledge but impartial, he or she determines can. 29(c) trial, six mistrial and Rule week “the must decide whether then motion); *15 motion to file Common or her case continued involvement-in Pavkovich, 444 Pa. 283 wealth v. an appearance impropriety of creates (was (1971) judge who 295 error A.2d public would tend undermine and/or attorney to sit on prosecuting had been judiciary. per in is a confidence This deciding post-trial mo banc en -that sonal and decision unreviewable tions, objection prior was no raised but Id., (cita jurist can 680-681 make.” Musto, v. appeal); Commonwealth omitted). deny A a judge’s tion decision to (defen (1944) 348 Pa. 35 307 A.2d motion not be recusal disturbed absent will objection when proceed dant he waived Lokuta, an of See In re abuse discretion. objection, despite to trial ed without 11 A.3d at may have a been knowledge judge Here, Appellants no evidence presented witness); v. [Brown] Commonwealth bias, or unfair- prejudice, that established Bahl, Pa.Super. 170 A. 346 111 as a substantial doubt ness raised (1934) (motion untimely judge when impar- Rogers’s ability preside Plaintiff com disclosure before made. tially. case and motion was made pleted his recognized has Supreme Our case). of end defendant’s it A.2d at 988. 479 be an- rule which de- unworkable Further, judge if when- even -the issue were manded that a recuse waived, party with Dis or agree acquaintance cannot an was a we ever controversy. an conclusion that there interest sent’s overstated through- judges ignores a rule Such appearance an inherent of unscrupulous know are the trial bold out the advo- Commonwealth n .. cause, . by many people, might litiga- known cates or assumes be fatal a when judge impartial that no can remain might unfairly improperly tion be presiding such a case. up awaiting held the decision such of question the assignment another Perry, v. 468 Pa. Commonwealth (1976). try judge lightly case. If also counte- A.2d See Korner nanced, Warman, (Pa.Cmwlth. practice might such be resorted A.2d 1995) to, (finding thereby “just tending judi- no reason for to discredit the recusal (cid:127) judge allegedly county fellow is system. because a cial conscience of case, implicated in the trial where judge brought judge question; he alone ]”). problems impartiality[ with should, no foresees as far as possible, avoid Moreoyer, . feeling hostility of unfairness or of,

[w]hile the mediation courts is based litigants in a case. judicial upon principle impartiali- Reilly Reilly, 489 at 1299 (empha A.2d disinterestedness, per- ty, and fairness added). sis judicature, whole vading system courts may so that near as possible rely and the Dissent Comm is, other, suspicion, be above there on the Armor, ex rel. onwealth Armor v. side, important issue at stake: that (1978) (en Pa.Super. 353, 398 A.2d 173 is, may unfairly prej- that causes not be banc) (plurality), in asser support udiced, unduly delayed, or discontent that recusal -of bench is the entire charges through created unfounded required. Initially, we note that Armor prejudice against made unfairness precedential provides regarding value in the cause. It issues great importance to the administration impropriety by trial court.11 If justice that such should occur. Armar, petition a father filed judge feels he can hear Montgomery County Court of Com- dispose fairly case and without support Pleas to mon reduce child obli- prejudice, his will final un- decision be day gation. hearing, béfore the he less there an abuse of* discretion. venue, change asserting for a moved security This so for the must (1) that because his former was mar- wife bench the successful administration *16 Otherwise, (2) bench, judge of to a on justice. and ried the and unfounded charges during controller, any represented by county ofttimes malicious the made (1998) -Although Judge 496 n. 4 by Armor Pa. 717 A.2d was written Price, (“While in of relation to the issues recusal and plurality opin the a ultimate order of appearance of impropriety, judge i.e., con- ion, reversal, one binding an affirmance or is judge one curred result and concurred in the case, legal parties particular the in on that only. judges'explicitly Three from dissented reasoning by employed conclusions a and/or holding judge Price's no of the that certainly binding plurality do not constitute County Montgomery the bench could hear Brown, authority.”); Commonwealth v. case, x.e.,Judge support child in his Cercone (en banc) (Pa.Super.2011) A.3d dissenting opinion, concurring Wieand, and and here, ("Where, however, the concurrence Hester, joined by Judge in his dis- explicitly agreement does not state its or dis Therefore, senting opinion. not is Armor agreement the plurality, we with must look plurality opinion, binding a which carries of the substance the concurrence to deter authority, holding joined majority the was not provides prece- the mine which extent it by judges of sufficient number to warrant points agreement.”). dential value to of O.A., precedential value. Interest See of case-by-case light in County basis of Montgomery be made within hearing facts, the of specific underlying of nature appearance impropriety. the create interest, relationship denied motion of and the The peti- and dismissed the As change venue bench to that interest. stated entire Superior On Court in his appeal, tion. Donald the Honorable dis- Wieand father could receive a fair opined sent, expressed the consensus which hearing impartial in Montgomery and judges of the in Armor: half County. the trial We nonetheless vacated expects right has a public and orders, stating: court’s degree high integrity and demand a approve procedure should not [W]e part responsibility on its ethical whereby any judges of the judges. can be no There doubt all Montgomery Pleas of Coun- Common be free judicial proceedings must upon to ty are called rule matters Therefore, impropriety. appearances relating wife-appellee’s support child in judge participate pro- not should would, actions in matters. Such ceedings objectivity which his or her public confi- opinion, tend weaken the likely are to be im- impartiality and a court has established an dence hand, public other paired. On the performance record its enviable and courage independence expects also and County Montgomery service to and its its It is part judges. on the 1 of citizens. Pursuant Canon in the individual who must first Conduct; Code such action Judicial good con- instance whether determine contrary would be or she can judgment science he hear integrity independence judi- impartially, dispute objectively ciary charged pre- we are a recusal. His whether there should be serving. or her will not be decision disturbed Further, that such action is we believe unless an abuse of discretion. there contrary 2 of Code to Canon public independent is entitled to the pro- in that it not Judicial Conduct does judgment judiciary of its and should not public integrity mote confidence judgment by unsupported be denied that judiciary. impartiality partiality. claims of Id., at 174.12 my public confidence in judgment, strengthened,

Contrary judiciary will be Appellants’ con weakened, tention, ruling respecting upholding not create a Armor does judge’s in all determination that he presumption that cases where a the trial has an could the instant case member of the bench interest hear decide Rather, impartially. Public confidence entire bench must recused. are principle judges Armor confirms the called decision weakened because difficult upon determinations to hear decide review recusal *17 reiterating opinion by not with its Appellee responds the did issue an remand trial opinion in It cannot be said that court’s that had been "abro- order Brockerman. Armor declined, “abrogated” by Supreme gated” in has been Brockerman when the Court Armor order, Supreme in per opportunity to or that our Court's action take the. to Brock curiam any precedential See "uphold presumptive value. Com standard articulated erman has ” 198, thus, Thompson, "specifically rejected 604 Pa. 985 in monwealth v. Armor and it.” Brief, (2009) (citing (citing law for Appellee’s re Estate A.2d case at 937-938 Brockerman, proposition per Pa.Super. that curiam orders hold 480 A.2d (1984)). authority). Supreme precedential 1201 n. 3 The public dispute The There is no. Rogers cases. does ex- that Judge controversial n however, judges pect, that will rise impartial fair all times. We in any above influence which inherent repeat, Appellants concede that is no there or high litigants low estate who Judge Rogers bias, that evidence showed Courage integ- come before them. unfairness, We, therefore, prejudice.' or rity the hallmarks an independent are conclude that even if motion for recu- More than like to judiciary. often we raised, timely Judge Rogers sal had been readily it is too contemplate, recusals not abuse his denying did in discretion in complex and controversial tendered Appellants’ recuse, motions to change ven- public cases weaken respect ue, assign an out-of-county judge. judiciary. by Dissent, result advocated Id., (internal omitted). citation damages that the verdict should be vacat- Furthermore, Armor, the motion was trial, and the case ed remanded a new hearing, made before the not after the is unfair judi- improper exercise of closed, record as in had been the case power. The position cial Dissent’s would Here, us now. had before extremely prejudicial be to Appellee knowing advantage Judge Rog- that place that it would Appellee at a distinct against liability them in ers ruled disadvantage 20-year-old litigation. trial, testimony of the portion judge The trial who heard the evidence appalling Kravitz was when he tried findings and made liability hide his and divert relevant assets funds frus- not would judge decision trate the'court’s award. who ad- dresses the portion case. Our Code of Judicial Conduct credibility decisions, the observations a norm of for all judges “set[s] conduct evidence, witnesses and other impose legal substantive do[es] the conclusions judge reached the trial them.” duties on Commonwealth liability phase in the would be rendered Druce, Pa. 848 A.2d meaningless another judge because (citation omitted). (2004) Judge While por- have hear the damages decide Ap Branca’s of the discussions ease with case. If this were caused pellee’s may may not raise a counsel necessity, such as the retirement or death personal ethical under our issue Code judge, aof then we would not have Conduct, Judicial the circumstances here However, concerns. remove provide legal do or ethical reason midstream, on ah issue that was impugn impartiality bench entire easily by Appellants discoverable prior Montgomery Court of Common unprecedented. trial would be unfair and Judge Rogers. Pleas or See id. above, got As rioted before the trial under Expert’s Report Admission of way January Judge Rogers dis Appellants’ avér “the trial counsel, specifically cussed with arid upon court erred admitting relying counsel, Appellants’ the issue of now- testimony expert” Plaintiffs because having previously Branca represent “Judge Branca improperly key influenced Appellee. Most significantly, ed aspects of report.” Mr. Appel Dovell’s Rogers gave parties assurances lant’s Brief at 34. prior At no to this he had never discussed the case with time *18 Branca, Appellants Judge all unequivocal appeal specifically and counsel have averred ly agreed proceed Rogers. Judge expert’s testimony before that the was inadmissi-

126 ry corporate entity of: use court-not- the rendered Or As ble unreliable.13 one ed, 57 errors have said that whenever Appellants raised less. although We Relief, they did corporation their Motion Post-Trial of a uses that control assets, erred control, not that corporate assert or uses the on Ar- relying report. admitting and personal inter his or own further her are guments not below waived raised ests, corpo sepárate fiction of the 302(a). purposes appeal. Pa.R.A.P. See disregard identity may properly rate be preserved Accordingly, this issue was not ed. appeal.14 is therefore

and waived Id., (citations omitted). at 532-533 Piercing Veil Corporate strong presump is a “[T]here Pennsylvania against piercing tion in non-cash Appellants that maintain their Industries, Inc. v. corporate veil.” Lumax methods, pur accounting “made for 893, Aultman, 895 543 Pa. 669 A.2d tax pose minimizing personal Kravitz’s (1995). following consider factors We Cherry- no having] burden effect [and determining pierce when whether creditors,” its ability to could pay dale’s (1) (2) undercapitalization; corporate veil: Kravitz, Appellants not be used hold formalities; corporate to adhere to failure Andorra, judg Eastern for the liable (3) intermingling corporate substantial Appellants’ against Cherrydale. ment (4) affairs, personal of the use Gregory Helvering, Brief (citing at 37 v. corporate perpetrate forni fraud. See 465, 469, 266, 79 293 55 S.Ct. L.Ed. U.S. separate “legal corpo id. The (1935)). fiction 596 designed to conven entity was serve rate Piercing corporate pro veil justice, will be disregarded ience and assessing liability for vides a “means justice public policy or demand whenever against equity corporation acts of a rights parties are and when the innocent Village at corporation.” holder in the theory corporate nor prejudiced Inc. Property Owners Camelback Assn. entity Ashley v. Ash useless.” rendered Carr, Pa.Super. A.2d (1978) ley, 482 Pa. 393 A.2d (1990) (1988), 524 Pa. aff'd, A.2d omitted). (citations curiam). (per Appellants Gregory cite as illustrative legal corporation fiction that corporate can- position veil their legal entity separate distinct from be pierced not be cannot transactions designed its shareholders was to serve they are “mo- considered fraudulent when and will dis justice, convenience .pol the best regarded justice publie or tivated desire achieve whenever Appellants’ rights possible tax benefit.” Brief icy require and innocent where taxpayer parties prejudiced Gregory, “reorganized” are not nor the theo expert upon relied 13. In recusal motion for admitted or testimo- their motion for motion, Appel- ny. of the reconsideration gave lants asserted Branca opinion Appellee’s attorney report on the Moreover, even if issue had not been during telephone case. discussion about observed, waived,.as trial court “there prior appeal Appellants At no time to this did support an assertion that evidence argue report improperly had been else, Branca, anyone improperly in- -preclusion and did admitted not seek report. expert's content of the fluenced” the report expert's testimony. In. or the their . 30-31, 1/15/13, Opinion, Trial Court dated relief, again post-trial motion for argue improperly did the trial court *19 appli- profit her business with the than accordance more million. Had $2.1 cash cable statute to obtain from her busi- Springs Andorra retained monies it liability. ness avoid a tax The United made home sales rather than'lend tax Supreme States Court affirmed the those monies to Eastern Kravitz’s commissioner’s determination that the “re- entities, other Springs Andorra would organization” was without substance and have pay had sufficient funds to Cherry- tax for payer was liable tax as if she dale. Had [ Eastern not lent monies ] to been paid a dividend. The had United entities, Kravitz purposes other whose Supreme recognized States had to nothing do with constructing or taxpayer right has a legal to decrease the Reserve, selling homes Eastern amount what would be his or her taxes money had with have which to would together or avoid “by them all means pay Springs. per- . Kravitz ] Andorra [ which the law but permits” noted that sonally intercompany authorized the “rule excludes consideration loans, insolvent, companies declared the tax not pertinent avoidance is to the the capital distributed to himself and “reorganization” situation” because the at authorized the write-off of the loans—all been issue “elaborate devious for his personal benefit and to the detri- of conveyance form masquerading as ment of creditors like [Appellee]. corporate reorganization.” 293 U.S. H* i 470, 55 S.Ct. capacity his [ ]In as President sole- The trial findings court’s extensive shareholder, Kravitz was ... only meticulously fact detail numerous person Group within the Andorra Appellant transactions Kravitz orchestrat- authority corporations among Cherrydale, bind the ed Andorra Springs, Eastern, loans or other signed [He] and other entities so as to render contracts. Appellant alleged tax motive of the tax returns for Cherrydalef, Kravitz’s Andorra pertinent. As Springs, avoidance not through trial court for 1994 Eastern] observed: 1998 and caused the to be returns filed. personally [ ] Kravitz that An-

But Kravitz’s directed direction Andorra Springs money Springs’ loan dorra intercompany payables’ Eastern Kravitz’s other be cancelled. entities his subse-

quent direction that Andorra Springs repay Cherrydale not for its intercompa- properties [ ]As a his result-of sale loans, ny Cherrydale would real- have Pulte and others in Kravitz had profit $250,000 ized approximately significant taxable income 1996. [] Cherrydale profitable [ ] was Group’s Without Andorra bad debt returns, reflected the tax but it ulti- deductions, have been Kravitz would re- mately pay did not its creditors because quired pay a million over dollars paid by it was not Andorra nor Springs, tax. Group’s Because of the Andorra [ ] repaid it for loans made it deduction, paid bad debt Kravitz Kravitz other entities. An- [] $3,734' Adjust- in tax. [ The series ] Springs’ dorra tax return and ing Journal Entries the end of made planning papers Kravitz’s tax demon- that, companies’ 1996 was direction[ strate but Kravitz’s detriment ] apd Kravitz, in Eastern and the other benefit entities repay (1) Springs, pay their loans to Andorra entries allowed Kravitz Springs Andorra Group compa- have creditors the Andorra realized *20 128 Associates, (2) pany, Inc. Toll Naval 56 to retain the value of v.

nies and 402, corporations (Pa.Super.2012). through 410 Group A.3d Andorra capital improvements, transfers distri- Damages Punitive to of loans made butions and write-offs the trial Appellants aver that court horse and his farm. himself awarding punitive damages erred be- 32-33, Liability at 35- Findings of Fact — no cause “there was evidence outra- (internal ¶¶ 135-139, para- 144-157 conduct,” willful, geous, wanton or reckless numbers, headings and citations to graph is not enough and fraudulent conduct alone omitted). Reproduced Record punitive damages. which base upon Ap- to thorough on our review Based also pellant’s They argue Brief at 41. that law, case we con and relevant record punitive damages award unconstitu- findings court’s of fact the trial that clude tionally to the disproportionate award of its by the record and conclu supported are damages.15 compensatory There of law contain error. sions reviewing challenges puni In to showing the record evidence sufficient awards, damage tive we determine wheth (1) undercapital had Cherrydale been that any the trial has committed er court abuse ized; (2) Kravitz had failed adhere complete after of discretion or whether a formalities; (3) there was exten corporate record, and exhaustive review of intermingling corpora various sive sense justice. award shocks the court’s (4) funds; Appellant used tions’ Co., Trucking Empire Inc. Reading See fraud, to perpetuate form a corporate Co., Anthracite A.3d Coal 71 938 assets specifically, remove from (Pa.Super.2013). creditors, Appellee. Lu reach like See Industries, Inc. max Punitive are awarded punish entity person a “out and/or arguments Appellants’ note that alsoWe rageous conduct.” Kirkbride v. Lisbon are against piercing corporate veil Inc., Contractors, 521 Pa. A.2d 555 recitation, self-serving entirely on a based (1989) (Second) (citing Restatement evidence, particular emphasis 908(1)). § Torts Conduct considered testimony corporate ac- of their “outrageous” where defendant’s actions countant, to be not court found shows either “an evil motive or reckless fact- It is well-settled credible. rights to the others.” indifference J.J. credibility may determinations finder’s Inc., DeLuca at 415- Company, A.3d reviewing long overturned (citation omitted). as there is sufficient evidence the record support those determinations. See “Reckless indifference the interests of (2012). others”, Merlo, 1, 58 it is re 619 Pa. A.3d or as sometimes referred misconduct”, to, means that credibility We court’s “wanton conclude supported by intentionally actor an act of are the rec- has done determinations erroneous, character, in “manifestly disregard ord are unreasonable con- risk to him or so arbitrary capricious flagrantly known obvious that he must to have been aware of trary J.J. DeLuca Com- be taken evidence.” addition, Brief, Appellants provide inapposite cite 15. In a three- argument non-precedential develop and fail al- case law sentence because CASPA We, thus, argument. damages, "penalty as a matter law their conclude this ar- lows for and, event, prohibited awarding gument is waived without the trial court was punitive damages.” Appellants’ law merit. common it, great highly proper legal so it that Appellants’ as to make conclusion probable harm follow. outrageous conduct was demonstrated reckless rights indifference Organi McClellan v. Health Maintenance Findings others. See Liability at Pennsylvania, Pa.Super. zation Fact — *21 1-64; Findings Attorneys’ (citations Fees (1992) of 604 A.2d 1061 omit Fact — Damages As and at 5-9. soon as ted). . $31,000 interim arbitration award of was of a determination whether against in Cherrydale entered Krav- person’s outrageous actions arise con began itz a steady persistent campaign and duct of the lies within the sound discretion paying to avoid Appellee. The campaign fact-finder and will not disturbed on has nearly that years continued for and review, provided that discretion has not has involved not only fraudulent transfers been Company, DeLuca abused. See J.J. above, of assets as but years noted Inc., 56 A.3d at 416. Our review in incessant use and litiga- abuse civil by formed following principles: processes. tion Under law the size of a Pennsylvania ' Appellants they contend were sim- punitive damages must be that award reason- using ply acceptable litigation ably strategies State’s related to the interest in their punishing rights, they within fail particular but to ac- deterring and knowledge many behavior of and not the of their motions the defendant and product of petitions procedurally were legally arbitrariness unfettered and/or support discretion. In with accordance this limi- without and have appear been tation, designed puni- under which to wear Appellée standard down with de- tive damages Pennsyl- lay expense. filings included, are measured These vania requires analysis following to, impermissible but were not limited in- (1) act; (2) factors: character terlocutory both appeals with this Court harm; the nature of the Court; and extent our Supreme peti- frivolous (3) the wealth of the defendant. to disqualify Appellee’s attorney; un- necessary days for demands for additional We review such an award an abuse addition, discovery, discretion. In the face of followed redundant and irrel- challenge, discovery requests; constitutional we evant a summary conduct de novo judgment “to completely review whether it motion which determine disre- comports garded with Due Process Appellant’s, prior -representation Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment questions pre- of law which existed United States Constitution.” summary judgment; cluded numerous re- quests delays; request trial for a Grossi v. Travelers Personal Insurance thirty-day review, post-trial Co., time 79 A.3d (Pa.Super.2013) passed with no all communication (quoting Hollock v. Erie Insurance Ex Appellants. change, (Pa.Super.2004)), 842 A.2d denied,

appeal Pa. A.3d 103 Moreover, Appellants though even had (2014) (citations omitted). been well-aware of Branca’s involve- ment in this case

-.Our since of the- record in review this informed prior case discloses the trial court that his rep- that the trial court’s award punitive damages resentation of sufficiently Appellee non-issue award supported respect proceeding to the trial the record. We need Montgomery County Rogers, reiterate trial extensive court’s before that, findings support detailed requested fact its nevertheless Here, compensa- bench close evi- court awarded of the entire after $200,601.61 tory damages in the amount of nearly 20 Appellants’ actions over dence. $601,804.83, punitive a ra- abuse Kravitz’s years, combined with n single- comports tio of This with the 3:1. accounting forms methods corporate digit light ratio. of the circumstances rightfully owed to paying to' what avoid case above and our review detailed paints pattern a fact Appellee, present law, relevant we discern abuse outrageous picture of conduct. very infirmity discretion constitutional trial court did not that the We conclude punitive damages. award of awarding punitive abuse'its discretion damages. Appellants also argue punitive damages awarded based *22 Appellants’ respect to claim With findings its fraudulent fraud and trans punitive dam proportionality the that fer, Live, in derogation Pittsburgh Inc. damages ages compensatory violated to Servov, 423, 615 438 Pa.Super. v. 419 A.2d process, Appellants to due ac right their (1992), Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fraud United Su knowledge that States Act, §§ ulent Transfer 12 Pa.C.S.A. 5101- to a preme “yet impose has hard- Court suppoi’t, Appellants 5110. In reiterate on ratio between and-fast limitation” witnesses’, essence, testimony. their In compensatory damages. punitive Apr argue Appellants the trial court erred that Brief, pellants’ Appellants at 50. neverthe accepting interpretation their contend, any defini less without citation to facts this case. court, pronouncements by federal tive Live, Pittsburgh Superior punitive “trial court’s award punitive reversed the trial court’s award damages federal Constitution exceeds the damages concluding although after Appellants’ 1:1 al limits of a ratio.” Brief there been conduct which had fraudulent grossly at 50. misstate supported damage compensatory law. award, there had been no acts which had Supreme Court has The United States vindictive, or which been wanton had stated: disregard rights showed a wanton for the support so as an award of others identify been con-

[W]e have reluctant punitive damages. See 615 A.2d limits on the ratio crete constitutional Here,' averments, contrary Appellants’ harm, harm, to potential between a punitive- were based on deter punitive damages plaintiff- and the they acted mination that wan again impose decline We award. disregard rights ton others. bright-line punitive ratio dam- which finding supported by This amply juris- ages cannot exceed. Our award argument record. Accordingly, prudence and it has now principles without merit. demonstrate, however, that, established Fees, Penalties, Attorney’s Inter- exceeding few sin- practice, awards , est gle-digit punitive ratio between

compensatory damages, significant interest, penal- The trial court assessed degree, process.. will due satisfy ties, attorney’s as follows: fees Judgment.$200,601.61 a. Partial State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance n 424-425, 123 pursuant Campbell, Judgment U.S. b. Interest Co. 538 - (2003) (citation (73 505(d))[ § 1513, 155 ] S.Ct. 585 CASPA P.S. L.Ed.2d omitted). Sep- Month per 1% from amount Id., (citations 30,- omitted). through April tember 502 n. CAS- 2011.$306,467.55 provides PA or litiga- “[i]f arbitration tion payment commenced to recover due Penalty on Judgment pursuant c. under this act ... arbitrator or (73 512(a)) § CASPA P.S. award, shall in addition to all dam- other

amount 1% per Sep- Month from due, a ages penalty equal to 1% per month 8,1998 through April tember amount that wrongfully with- was .$306,467.55 § held.” P.S. Attorney’s pursuant d. Costs Fees and ’ (73 512(a)(b)) § to CASPA from P.S. observed, As the trial court September through August action, instant underlying like the arbitra Í5,2007 .$273,037.65 proceeding, proceeding was “a to re Damages.$601,804.83 e. Punitive payment cover” under due CASPA. After the trial court determined piercing f. Interest shall pur- continue accrue corporate appropriate veil was suant to per at .1% order month CASPA judgment to execute May due owing, 2011 in the amount of was then final arbitration per day paid in award full. $131.90 until $200,601.61, 505(d) implicat Section Judgment against Final All Defen- *23 against Appellant ed Kravitz as owner of 30,2011: April dants as of Cherrydale and the other subcor involved TOTAL.$1,688,379.10 porations. The court’s trial calculations Damages, Sur: Order Assessment of dated properly were on based CASPA. See 73 (footnote April to case law omit- 505(d) §§ Accordingly, and 512. P.S. we ted). find error in trial court’s calculation court’s, Appellants contend that the trial penalties. and interest grant attorney’s fees, penalties and in- respect With attorney’s fees im- represent impermissible terest an modifi- court, posed by the trial the trial court’s cation the arbitration award and should of attorney’s award covers period fees not have been Appellee allowed because September after the arbitra- had not stated cause of action under issued, through August tion award was in CASPA instant Appel- case. See 2007, and those in includes incurred con- lants’ Brief at 51. They argue also with litigation. nection the instant Con- the interest should have calculated in been trary averment, to Appellants’ these fees panel’s accordance the arbitration di- not represent do a modification of the arbi- not panel’s rective and based on final tration award. award. Judgment affirmed. in 1994 CASPA was enacted abuses within building cure industry BENDER, President Judge Emeritus involving payments from owners to due LAZARUS, Judge Judge and WECHT contractors and subcontractors and “to en join this majority opinion. courage dealing among parties fair ato. Judge a concurring STABILE files construction contract.” Zimmerman v. dissenting opinion Judge in which I, Harrisburg L.P., Fudd 984 A.2d BOWES, DONOHUE, Judge Judge ' (citation omitted). (Pa.Super.2009) 500-501 SHOGANjoin. statute, Because “CÁSPA is a remedial we must accord it a Judge part liberal construction to ALLEN not take did objects effect its promote justice.” consideration decision this case. $30,913.00. paid AND contract balance After DISSENTING

CONCURRING interest, STABILE, at- compensatory damages, other BY J.: OPINION fees, torney’s costs added were insofar Majority’s1 opinion I as join balance, the arbitration award contract For liability affirms verdict. it judgment confirmed reasons, I the dam- following would vacate $200,601.61. Appellee then commenced for a new dam- ages and remand verdict judgment. this action to collect the These Judge from outside ages trial front were bifurcated between lia- proceedings County. Montgomery damages. bility The recusal issue view, my the Honorable Thomas P. damages this case concerns the County Montgomery Rogers Rogers the final Judge increased wherein denying Appel- erred of Common Pleas Appellee damages award arbitration to recuse the entire bench of lants’ motion $1,688,379.10. component A substantial County Montgomery Court of Com- of Judge of this award was the result hearing mon Pleas from his Rogers exercising discretion award This is so in this action. because the punitive damages of three times arbi- Branca, C. Judge Honorable Thomas $200,601.61 Appellee, tration award Montgomery Rogers’ colleague this, fees, attorney’s To he added addition- bench, County has substantial financial interest, penalties. statutory He al of this case outcome interest based Judge so at a time when he knew did representation Appellee. on his former Branca, judicial colleague Rogers’ do abili- I doubt While bench, County Montgomery directly verdict, impartial I ty to render a fair proportionally benefit from the size of he preside could also do believe over in the any increased award entered case. creating appear- this matter without Contrary prior statements that *24 of detrimental ance paid prior in full for his Branca had been impartial in the fair public’s faith op- Appellee, of it representation became of the circum- eration Under courts. during Judge testimony known Branca’s in case, of stances this same is true for in he was fact to judge Montgomery County of every contingent thirty-percent a fee of receive of Pleas.2 I believe Common any recovery. net ignored the in- dismissed Judge Appellants’ Rogers denied motion “appear- of dependent consideration an Appellants to recuse the basis that did of must be impropriety” ance consid- or prejudice actual bias on not establish motion. under a recusal ered proceed- these part presiding in over 12/31/08, originally Opinion, as 10. ings. This commenced Trial Court at matter any argument by Appellee rejected for an un- He that an further arbitration demand any opinion impropriety of one of opposing as of them 1. I will refer to the Majority opinion hearing based on our problematic. unanimous matter a this liability sense, affirmance of the verdict. requiring county entire recusal of the imputation the rule of bench similar assertion, Contrary Majority’s I be- whereby disqualify lawyers of a must firm all guidance, provides ample lieve this dissent of the from a if member firm is matter legal upon precedent, based to re- available doing, except pro- prohibited where from Montgomery quire entire recusal of the Coun- upon personal hibition is based interest per ty judges se bench. The number lawyer. prohibited See Rules of Profes- bench not determinative share common Conduct 1.10. sional Rather, explained, as it is the this issue. fixing in the “imputed appearance impropriety” lies the 1919 World Series.5 Many- felt at the pecuniary virtue of Branea’s inter- gambling time that bribery est a conclusion that were supports corrupting the na- country’s receive, pastime.6 or tional “cannot have received will The ABA was motivated of-Judge actions- impar- a fair- Eenesaw continue receive” Mountain Landis, accepted who job Id. Montgomery County-.' tial trial in as first of Major League commissioner Baseball serving while as a judge federal for the I the trial would reverse court’s District, Northern of-.Illinois. Major ruling the appearance impro- because League Baseball owners team appointed priety independent alone forms an basis in response Landis to the “Black bias, recusal even when actual un- . scandal, eight Sox” Chicago fairness, prejudice part is shown on the players White Sox accept- were accused of judge. a trial court I am mindful that ing professional from money gamblers to always our law has not spoken case lose the 1919 World Series the under- recusal, clarity as on the standard will dog Cincinnati Reds. A jury acquitted the discussed, Accordingly, I it find infra. eight players wrongdoing, criminal but necessary to review the evolution of the Judge Landis banned them for life “appearance of impropriety” our recusal major leagues. Judge Landis’ refusal explaining indispens- standard before to leave the drawing federal bench while why importance able this standard I large salary as baseball commissioner believe motion to- recuse the entire prompted a censure from the ABA and Montgomery County bench should have impeachment Congress.7 talk granted. been they Although strongly disapproved of History Appearance Judge Landis serving as a federal Impropriety Standard same drawing time he was- compensa mandatory “appear- avoidance of an Commissioner, as baseball’s- judicial ance impropriety” decision- detractors, Judge’s as well the United making long .history has and storied Attorney General, States were unable law,, accounts, By stan- nation. most identify any barring ethics rule judicial first was articulated as a Judge- simultaneously holding dard Landis from ABA’s standard Canons Judi- public and private employment.8 both under *25 promulgated Further, in Ethics 1924.3 The cial. there the was evidence 1924 judges Canons to avoid the Judge’s baseball his duties reminded interfered with n appearance profes- of in impropriety nonetheless, all judicial duties.9 ABA The impe- during personal Forty-Fourth sional and activities.4 The the course of An its 1921, for ABA promulgating Meeting tus this Canon proceeded the nual to pass McKoski, McKoski, 9, supra Raymond 3. See J. Disci- Judicial 6. 1922. note at pline Appearance Impropriety': the of Gets, Judge the Public Sees Is What the What 7. Landis served until as commissioner 1914, (2010). 94 Minn. L.Rev. his death in 1944. Id. 4. Id. McKoski, 9, supra 8. 1923. note 9, McKoski, supra 5. See note See at 1922. Morgan, Appearance also Peter W. Pro- Id. of Paradoxes, priety: Ethics and the Reform Blifil 593, (1992). 44 Stan. L. Rev. For- for Public criticism Justice condemning Landis indicted.16

resolution raising question about .employment re tas him engaging private while accused Court.17 salary governm appearance from federal the of virtue ceiving a the the Fortas, moved censure opinion, this was The ABA to Justice ent.10 In the ABA’s contrary to “unworthy finding his conduct be conduct it considered and, in particu to of Judicial derogatory dignity the Canons Conduct judge, office of undermining public to Bench, lar, contrary his was Can con conduct independence judic free that his fidence in the command conduct 4’s added). iary.”11 impropriety In (Emphasis appearance further from Again, response, ABA the 1924 Can response, impropriety.18 issued in. 4, can ons, encourage strengthen to ABA moved to judicial which included Canon 2, by moving 4 to Canon judges any-professional person ons Canon to avoid damage image adding impropriety perceived appearance al conduct to as enforce judge. adopted-by Canon as standard would now serve an the Code although ABA not stated in man able of conduct.19 In rule terms, again strengthen datory judge’s official was Canon “[A] advised amended substituting impropriety conduct be free “shall” “should” should impropriety.”12 appearance that the appearance eliminate doubt genesis mandatory prohibit was impropriety thus can see from the We now standard, Commentary to 2 of impropriety” ac ion.20 Canon “appearance provided ap prerequi tual mot a that “the test prejudice was Code or bias improprie pearance finding site whether would create reasonable minds ty. conduct ability judge’s perception In were the 1924 revisited Canons in judicial responsibilities carry out surrounding to a response controversy impartiality, competence is im tegrity, Supreme United Court Justice -Abe States paired.” Fortas.13 Justice Fortafe was receive $20,000 at- help activi after some deliberation and compensation foundation,14 ap- ties When the to demote the tempted Justice amendments paid, pearance guiding principle, standard to director was foundation’s a. ABA, adopted investigation rejecting approach, under by Securities -of Commission.15. Justice Fortas Rule 1.2 Model Code of Judicial Exchange provide his shall act consulting Discipline “[a] returned fee cancelled agreement promotes all in a manner that public after the director was times 10. Id. at n. 15.- Id. Id, interesting note that none other It 16. Id. convention, Pennsylvanian than a to the ABA Hampton Philadelphia, proposed L. Carson of *26 1927. 17. Id. at (cit- this resolution of See condemnation. id. Meeting Report Forty-Fourth ing . of the Annuae at 1928. 18. Id. 1, (September of the American Bar Association 1921) 61-67). 19. Id. 12. Id. at 1923. 1931. 20. Id. at

13. Id. at 1926.

14. Id. 21. Id.

135 independence, integrity, Pennsylvania Supreme confidence Court and this judiciary, impartiality repeatedly of the shall Court have the Judicial held is impropriety appearance and the of Code of avoid Conduct the standard motions, addition, recusal does impropriety.”22 impose In 5 substan Comment legal to provide judges, Rule 1.2 was “the tive duties on and does not added that standing provide anyone, including appearance impropriety test this Court, compliance to seek would or enforcement the conduct create in rea- whether of the Id. it is true Code. While that perception judge sonable minds a that the Pennsylvania’s Judicial Code of Conduct engaged' violated Code other does not rights litigants substantive -vest conduct that adversely reflects on the may only by Supreme be enforced our judge’s impartiality, honesty, tempera- Court Article 525 of ment, under the Constitution or fitness to serve'as a judge.”23 also, Commonwealth, of this it true is significant Pennsylvania’s It cur- ’ litigants right have a substantive re rent Code Judicial Conduct24 mirrors quest has litigant recusal when reason to 2, Rule 1.2 and' 5 to the Canon Comment question impartiality jurist. the Avoiding ABA appearance 2007 Code. 188, v. Casey, 528 Goodheart Pa. A.2d Pennsyl- under 2 to impropriety Canon 757, (1989), Reilly v. Southeastern mandatory. Code is This prohibi- vania’s Auth., Pennsylvania Transp. 507 Pa. further reinforced under Rule 1.2 (1985). “appear A.2d .The 1.2, Comment 5 to pro- Rule standard, while origi ance-of-impropriety” vides “shall avoid nating conduct, canons of judicial under impropriety.” Pa.Code adopted part has as a been of our substan Conduct, 1.2, Canon Rule 5. Jud. cmt. and, shown, as tive law will be ais neces can doubt, be no Accordingly, there sary process. component due of this light history, and the current status Caperton Massey v. A.T. Coal Com- Conduct, our Code Judicial Inc., pany, 556 U.S. 129 S.Ct. avoiding “impropriety” “appear- and the (2009), United States L.Ed.2d is not impropriety” only important, ance Supreme Court reviewed whether Justice mandatory also in Pennsylvania. but Virginia Brent Benjamin the West Su- Right Request The Substantíve preme of Appeals, Court received who ex- Jurist’s Recusal traordinary campaign contributions from Appellee dismiss this history chairman and officer of principal board appearance of impropriety appellant corporation, the- as irrele- the Due violated present vant resolution recu- Process Clause the Fourteenth Amend- dispute. argues Appellee sal Ju- ment when Justice denied guidelines Canons dicial serve for motion. The million contri- campaign $3 jurists and do not have the force of sub- bution to the Justice total exceeded Appellee’s Supplemental spent by supporters stantive law. amount all other .Appellee argues Brief 18. own both the Justice and Justice’s cam- Supreme § 22. Id. at 1935. 25.Article 10 vests the authority “supervisory administrative Id. at Pennsylvania. PA over courts of .Const. 10(a). V, > § art. 24. The Code Judicial Conduct has been revised, renumbered amended effective *27 1, July 2014.

136 imple- has been Virginia The Su- the Due Process Clause West paign committee. by objective that do not a mented standards Appeals reversed preme Court proof of bias. Id. require actual Under for against appellant judgment standard, found, objective this the Court vote to was 3 to reverse million. $50 Benjamin despite undertaking Justice majori- Benjamin with voted 2. Justice bias, extensive search for actual that when defense, Benjamin Justice reiter- ty. In his personal a stake in a person a with case direct, personal, substan- he had ated significant disproportionate a in- interest in the case. Id. tial, pecuniary or on a placing judge fluence a case Adopting 2252. a stan- at 129 S.Ct. a raising directing judge’s funds elec- concluded, he seemed appearances, dard is campaign when case imminent or subject to an invitation than little more pending, process is Id. due violated. at vaga- justice system the Virginia’s West 884, 129 2252. The Court S.Ct. dismissed Supreme Id. The Court day. ries process its due concerns that decision on disagreed. courts with recu- grounds flood its to the con- turning attention Before 887, 129 sal motions. Id. at S.Ct. 2252. decided, the Caper- to be issue stitutional facts presented extreme that cre- The case that, while it was first noted ton Court probability an unconstitutional ated in fair a fair trial tribunal axiomatic assuage Significantly, to fears bias. these process, most requirement due a basic further, Court, supra, pointed as noted judicial disqualification relating matters judicial imple- reforms States have Id. a constitutional do not rise to level. par- to eliminate mented implemented by the Judicial reforms tiality by adopting objective ABA’s appearance of even the states to eliminate impro- shall standard that avoid “[a] rigorous more impropriety, a standard appearance of priety impropriety.” and the of most make resolution process, than due In regard, at 129 2252. this Id. S.Ct. disputes process under due disqualification Court codes' held these conduct unnecessary. Id. at 889-90. standards integrity judi- serve máintain Clause demarks Process “The Due rule of Id. at ciary and the law. of judicial disqualifi- the outer boundaries power prerogative 2252. The S.Ct. states, Congress cations. principles a court elaborate law when course, impose rigor- free more remain end, rest, resolving upon in the disputes judicial disqualifica- for ous standards respect judgments. to its Id. accorded omitted). tion!;.]” marks (quotation Id. (citing Republican S.Ct. White, 765, 793, Party Minn. v. 536 U.S. first Supreme Court Caperton, (2002) 122 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 694 history of its recusal cases reviewed the J., (Kennedy, concurring)). The citizen’s inquiry un- that the demonstrate relevant judgments depends respect turn objective Clause is an Process der the Due issuing court’s upon probity. absolute 877-81, Id. S.Ct. standard. is, integrity consequence, Id. “Judicial necessary found due highest order.” state interest Id. judge’s actu- inquiring into difficulties of reasons, continued, For these the Court inquiry is often a private al bias when may adopt choose States stan- A one. Id. at S.Ct. process rigorous more due dards than re- then, bias, inquiry into “judge’s own actual Id. quires. easily superintend law can not one the ” Therefore, Caperton in lieu of It thus .... Id. clear when review bias, judicial request recu- judge’s actual confronted appellate review *28 Code, sal, tion the process ju due more the held this requires than Court would or her rights rist’s examination of his conscience not confer upon par- the substantive requires process more for bias. Due power ties. Id. at 762. The to address objective exceeding standard. mini While judicial violation of Code norms was a process requirements, appear due the mal matter entirely left Supreme the adopted almost impropriety, ance Court’s supervisory constitutional authori- code,26 every judicial state in its satisfies Id. ty.28 Notwithstanding lack of any Therefore, objective requirement. 3(C) rights substantive in Canon by the is Appellee litigants while correct that do litigants, the judge Court held when a standing not have to enforce our Code conducts required self-assessment Conduct, paints Appellee Judicial too recuse, addressing when motion Can- a brush by arguing appear broad that the 3(C) provides of the some factors bear- of impropriety ance our Code under also ing upon that though evaluation. Even a part upon of our substantive law judicial discipline province remains the litigants may presenting rely which when Court, Supreme the Court was careful Pennsylvania recusal motion. Su point that, out our under substantive preme Court’s of a announcement recusal law, a an still has party right action .to Goodheart, infra, proof standard request judge where the enough appearance of impropriety party has to question impartial- reason part of is a our substantive law. ity the judge in the case before the Goodheart, Court, upon Supreme Id. court. The' Court continued: reconsideration, a motion for was asked to there, question Where is'a of the im- jus- consider whether two of the Court’s partiality Justices, or .more one. tices, as members class of the before it is the responsibili- individual Justice’s challenging compensa- a two-tiered toty make a determination conscientious system judges, partici- should have whether he or impartially she can assess in the pated where Court’s decision it was question. issues in It is to be em- justices asserted the two had direct inter- phasized that this assessment two ti- in the Participation by ests case. the two First, ered. whether Justice would justices challenged was under the Due personal have a or interest bias Process Clause of the United States Con- preclude impartial would review. Pennsylvania’s stitution and Code of Judi- personal This is a and unreviewable cial Conduct. The process challenge due jurist decision that can make. rejected, was the Court reasoned the Second, participation in whether his justices of the surplusage. votes two were give appearance matter Goodheart, Disposition 565 A.2d 761-62. 3(C) impropriety. perform high func- challenge [T]o its under Canon of the tion in “justice also the best way, was must satis- Code Judicial dis- Conduct27 fy appearance Even if justice.” missed. there a clear was viola- Caperton As of the time Judicial Conduct that instructs "[a] decided al- .., every adopted most State had American appear- shall avoid and the objective Bar Association’s standard of the impropriety.” ance of impropriety. Id. at S.Ct. 2252. earlier, Supreme 28.As noted Court de- 5, § rives authority from Article 10 of the specific prior provisions Canon Const, V, 10(a). § state PA art. constitution. challenged in can found in cur- Goodheart rent Rule 2.11 to Canon of current Code *29 138 added) pearance of impropriety (quoting (emphasis

Id. at 764 and/or Offutt 11, 14, in States, public to undermine confidence tend 348 U.S. 75 S.Ct. v. United personal (1954)); This 11, judiciary. also is a 11 see Common the 99 L.Ed. 108, Pa. 661 A.2d únreviewable decision that Travaglia, v. 541 wealth Thus, (1995). jurist 352, one can see that can make. 370 appearance of incorporated the Goodheart (citation omitted) (emphasis add- Id. 89at part a sub our impropriety standard ed).29 in repeated The recusal standard as in second of its tier test. stantive law since, contains and cited Abu-Jamal ever Supreme with the This is consistent from unexplained a distinction subtle Caperton, ap as the Court’s discussion in Supreme pronounce- Court’s earlier supplies pearance impropriety standard this standard in The ment of Goodheart. satisfy objective due a review level with no Court cited Goodheart Abu-Jamal . requirements The trial process ..court explain apparent disapproval, but did by disregarding in this standard and erred non-reviewability its transposition focusing solely,upon actual bias. to the first applicable only tier standard — tier of of Goodheart —to the second Proper Application Appearance test, ap- Goodheart where review Impropriety Standard impropriety is pearance standard sufe- Unfortunately, subsequent cases ject abuse It to an of discretion review. attempted to its Goodheart that have cite transposition appears this is certain to con have standard contributed mistake, because the evolution judge’s a decision fusion whether trial approach long standing. is two-tiered subject in may Notably, review. law, v. Abu- appear ‘of Commonwealth oft-cited case Under substantive Jamal, 485, (1998), our enough 553 Pa. 720 A.2d 79 is impropriety ance alone Supreme Court stated: appropriate under circum warrant recusal rule, law general

As a a motion for recusal stances. Our has established case yield initially judge’s must when to and decided self-evaluation directed present. feeing jurist-whose impartiality chal- 24, McFall, For 533 Pa. example, re lenged. considering -In recusal re- (1992), judge 617 was jurist must first a con- A.2d 707 quest, make cooperating investigators with F.B.I. seek or her scientious determination his- gifts ing judges accepting information ability impartial case in an assess the manner, promise for the F.B.I.’s di bias or interest return persohal free e vulge event jurist cooperation her in th then in the must outcome. gift she ac judge prosecution faced his or her continued consider- whether Id. cepted potential litigant. ap- case creates an involvement - (2004); v. Mel Pennsylvania commonly L.Ed.2d 736 fre Commonwealth Courts vin, 1, (Pa.Super.2014); 23 103 A.3d Com as well quently cite Abu-Jamal standard 51, (Pa.Su Flor, See, Kearney, v. 60 606 monwealth 92 A.3d e.g., v. settled. Commonwealth 763, denied, 384, 606, (2010), per.2014), appeal 627 Pa. 101 cert. 641-42 Pa. 998 A.2d Lin, (2014); 941, 2102, denied, & Co. v. 102 Rohm Haas 131 S.Ct. 179 A.3d 563 U.S. Miller, 132, (2011); (Pa.Super.2010); 149 Overland 992 A.2d 900 v. L.Ed.2d Commonwealth Enter, Partners, L.P., 333, 322, (2008); 950 A.2d v. Gladstone 597 951 A.2d 328 Com Pa. 1015, White, 642, (Pa.Super.2008); 1021 Commonwealth Pa. A.2d monwealth v. 589 910 (Pa.Su Bonds, 414, (2006); 418-19 Tharp, v. A.2d 890 657 Commonwealth denied, (2003), appeal Pa. per.2005), 588 906 cert. 574 Pa. 830 A.2d (2006). denied, A.2d S.Ct. U.S. White, judge At personal the same time the was shared F.B.I., family information from with cooperating pre- she the bench which, juvenile get potential cases her- defendant offered to siding over during pizza her prosecutors prosecuting appellees defendant incarceration. were expressed trial court also frustration argued in an appellant action/ The *30 existing applied to ability with the law as the judge’s impartiality trial to maintain expressed ease and defendant’s her intent appellees was not the influenced because into treating not to be this like a “boxed had not the judge demonstrated trial White, normal case.” 910 at “direct, substantial, 657. A.2d personal, in- pecuniary Majority30 The concluded the trial court presided,” terest in in the cases which she in denying erred the re- words, Commonwealth’s appellees in failed to dem- other - petition, reasoning trial cusal the they prejudiced. at 714. onstrate were Id. system of court’s “denouncement the very Supreme Court held circum Our the jurist impartial which an of in is one that it stances were such need reach key components appearance creates the of of it process issue due because con impropriety.” Id. at 658. court’s The trial appearance impropriety cluded the of “questionable conversation” de- compelled grant proceed alone it to new to of appearance also added fendant ings in potential view of the blatant conflict impropriety. Id. trial M' at judge. of interest of the 712. Dairush, In v. 501 Commonwealth Pa. stated, The “In integ Court for the order (1983), 459 A.2d the defendant 729 rity judiciary be compromised, we alleged judge derogatory the trial múde a judge’s have held that behavior is not about remarks defendant while the actual, required to a preju rise level judge attorney. was a district trial dice, appearance impropriety but the judge deny declined admit or added). Id. (emphasis sufficient.” statement, claiming made the had no he he appearance prejudice “The can bias Id. 732. also recollection. The court public as damaging be in confidence assured the defendant he receive a justice administration as would Supreme fair trial. Id. The Court dis- actual presence of either -of ele these con- cerned evidence was bias.and (citing ments.” Id. at 713 Commonwealth in- judge complete vinced the acted with Goodman, v. 454 Pa. A.2d Nonetheless, tegrity. Id. at 732. (1973)). expressly Court held there Court resentencing remanded for before ap no need actual prejudice; to find judge: different pearance is sufficient to warrant a trial. Id. at new There However, 714. considering circum- all the fore, possibility stances, the mere trial especially the trial ina- court’s judge may prosecutor’s treated the bility affirmatively have deny admit or way office in a so signifi- maximize her making from which remarks leniency minority lay community chances for all that was need cant impro ed to reasonably question establish could im- the court’s priety. showing Id. A partiality, largely actual bias was we feel unfettered required. sentencing judge is discretion afforded a opinion gard Justice Eakiri authored the an- to the the Commonwealth’s merits nouncing judgment in White. petition Court requesting the trial court to recuse. majority He wrote for a four-Justice with re- Id. The by one without first be allowed to be exercised.” exercised hint

better impartial- asserted his animosity appellant. judge toward Druee ity, public interview and both added).31 (emphasis Id. response petition the bench hand, in On Commonwealth the other Supreme Our Id. at 110-11. recuse. (2004), Druce, Pa. 848 A.2d judge’s denial Court affirmed the affirmed Supreme motion. recusal Id. at motion aof where court’s denial to an Associat- gave the court interview Similarly, Travaglia, the PCRA prior imposing ed writer sentence Press pe- disparaging comments about the made widely prosecution publicized petitioner’s trial: titioner after the close-of interview, legislator. state years “I it takes 11 in our am shocked that *31 claims judge some the defendant’s called an excuse to avoid judicial system to find also indicated that inter- but “strange,” anyone If deserves penalty. the death sway would public sentiment not view that die, petitioner [the these two individuals Id. case. at 106-07. handling for killing do four codefendant] and his. before immediately imposing On the bench Travaglia, for fun.” 661 A.2d at people sentence, trial court told defendant opinion addressing In 369 n. 37. an bias, illor will prejudice against he held request, judge wrote: recusal PCRA him. at 107. Id. [cjourt highly is say “to that dissatis- present system perpetual fied Supreme create

The Court declined to say is not that activity appellate in light recusal of the per requiring se rule [cjourt vent its arbi- would frustrations violation of Canon ostensible court’s Conduct, trarily appellant’s] current ar- 3A(6) giving [the of Judicial of the Code guments complete the full about less than public pend- comment prohibiting required by law.” Id. The ing per noted that a se attention case.32 The Court introspective it could any dis- court therefore believed rule “remove PCRA would preside Id. over the collateral review without jurist.” at 109. cretion “[Tjhis creating impropriety. an appearance must continue Commonwealth in, Supreme to Id. The Court was satisfied with give faith due deference reserve addressing the opinion them to PCRA court’s jurists, our and allow address recuse, deeming it “thoughtful” challenges. petition Their these initial discretion reviewed, but The Court therefore may it must and “detailed.” Id. of course minority "significant lay of a of the com- 31. revised Code Judicial Conduct de- dard impropriety munity” as follows: in Darush. Pursuant fines described Armor, 263 rel. Armor v. Commonwealth ex. appearance impropriety The test (1978) banc) Pa.Super. {en 398 A.2d would the conduct create rea- whether text, analysis in I my (plurality), main perception judge that minds sonable present of this believe the circumstances case engaged in this Code or other con- violated appearance substan- under adversely judge’s an on the duct reflects that governing law recusal. I temperament, tive state do honesty, impartiality, or fit- judicial adoption “rea- judge. that as a believe ness to serve Conduct, 1.2, Canon minds” standard Code Jud. Rule sonable Pa.Code opinion, elsewhere in this cmt As noted that result. alter authority enforce the Code of Court has no event, governing public provision comment In I Conduct. do not Judicial re- pending has been cases revised whether and I need address to what believe of the Code of Judicial 2.10 minds” numbered Rule extent "reasonable standard Conduct, previous from the stan- Code differs Code in denying Supreme discerned no abuse discretion that the Pennsyl- ment Court of petition. promotes recusal vania standard actual prejudice or in reviewing bias pro- foregoing, To our summarize courts ceedings. Opinion, 12/31/08, Trial Court consistently have held recusal war- 10. From this the denied Ap- actual impropriety ranted when is shown motion, pellants’ recusal concluding the or, part jurist appropri- on the when record did not prejudice show or bias or ate, solely impro- when full, did not receive a fair words, I priety present. other be- impartial trial. Id. lieve the standard set forth in Goodheart governs analysis, standard is The trial court either these read' cases grounded history well and law. Abu- , narrowly too or read them improperly. Jamal altered Goodheart standard The issue in Municipal Publications was I without but explanation, do believe the trial judge whether should be disquali- change created substantive Abvr-Jamal ruling fied from a recusal motion when analysis.33 Numerous cases ana- the trial was called' as a material herein, lyzed pre- post-Abur-Jam- both gave testimony witness concerning his al, support this conclusion. own conduct. These were unique circum- heard, upon stances were application, Appearance Impropriety in this Case *32 under the Supreme plenary juris- Court’s I turn now to the trial court’s recusal here, diction. Unlike the issue the Court guid decision this case. The standard emphasized it was not deciding whether if ing judge is a or review feels he she judge trial disqualified the be should from dispose fairly can hear case presiding underlying over the matter. It will, prejudice, decision fi be without that was concerned with the whether nal is unless there abuse of discretion. an. judge upon could rule the motion. The Goodheart, Abu-Jamal, Reilly, supra; See is, therefore, inapposite. case Estate, see also In re 307 Pa. Crawford’s (1931). 102, 160A. 585 Publications, Reilly, unlike Municipal concern prefaced trial court did a motion The its recusal anal- recusal. The Publications, ysis, citing Reilly Municipal Court found Inc. v. the recusal Crawford Pleas, Court still Common Pa. 489 standard to be controlling. Craw- of (1985), Reilly, A.2d 1286 with its the state- Court wrote: ford pending It seems the "final controversy sensible treat ... our caselaw is language pertaining to jurist's unreviewable” as that clear decision on whether same jurist’s personal of his or examination her (citing is exists unreviewable.” Id. Arnold own motives and biases rather than the Arnold, (Pa.Super.2004)). 847 A.2d judge’s appearance on decision whether an of The Overland Court’s on reliance Arnold is impropriety Caperton, exists. See 556 U.S. at . misplaced appellant argued The in Arnold ("The 129 S.Ct. 2252 difficulties of in- against rulings the trial court’s him evinced bias, quiring into and the actual fact that the Arnold, the court’s bias. 847 A.2d at 680. one, private' inquiry simply often under- merely rulings This held adverse that rules.”). objective score the need for bias, are especially alone not evidence of Nonetheless, three-judge panel least one of rulings legally where- those were not errone this Court has treated trial court’s decision . ous. Id. at The circumstances of Arnold appearance impropriety of as unre- are therefore distinct from Overland Overland, viewable. 950 A.2d at 1021. The appeal. disapprove the matter on I would wrote, question Overland Court "As to the of panel’s Overland statement on the reviewabili judi- specter appearance whether ty appearance impropriety. by cial nature raised case, show may but he plea prej- instant practice proper n . counsel, or ill or application personal an will to client is to address udice judge before whom petition temperamental particu- on the prejudice may involved,. He being tried. proceedings litigation are or lar class in the question first determine the ground. recognized other ordinarily instance, disposi- added). A. Crawford, (emphasis at 587 be unless disturbed of it will analysis of the inter- Court’s Crawford of discretion. there an abuse avoiding appearance play between given be should Due consideration (or affórding while impropriety) unfairness that adminis him fact to jurists remains appropriate deference beyond justice should tration be hold, It did not as the trial prescient. But, unfairness. for an suggests, appear- review of courts based while the mediation may dispensed of impropriety ance be judicial impartiali upon the principle long preju- so as the record did not show disinterestedness, per and fairness ty, or bias did dice system judicature, vading whole full, impartial fair trial. receive possible as may so 'that courts near Turning of the now circumstances is, suspicion, above there on the fol- appeal, record reflects the instant side, important issue at other lowing exchange Appellants’ between may stake; is, not be that causes Judge Branca on the second counsel and delayed, unfairly unduly prejudiced, final day through un created discontent prompted the issue: charges prejudice founded or un against given Q. you You mentioned were fairness made great impor It is of updates trial of a cause. Appellee’s counsel]? [from *33 justice to of tance the administration A. Yeah."' such not occur. If the that should for Q. And the reasons what were judge feels he can dis that and hear updates? these fairly pose the case of without A. I had an in the interest Because prejudice, will be final his decision case, in I have financial interest there is of discretion. unless an abuse case, ato referral I have—I’m entitled security This must so for the of the be to that I’m fee. And so the extent enti- bench and the successful administration fee, I’m to tled a referral entitled (cid:127) Otherwise, justice. of unfounded something what’s happening know about charges during made ofttimes malicious case, only my informa- unscrupulous the trial bold advo my purposes tion disclos- also but .of cause, qr might litiga cates be fatal to a I. if ing might disclose whatever need might unfairly improperly be get I and when a fee. of up awaiting the decision- such held Q. is of finan- the nature What of assignment or the another question Your arrangement, cial Honor? try the case [ ]. one, interesting I very A. It’s a charge disqualification of is When a. happened what was when against hearing judge, guess, because made a trial Rosen, I told I Paul produce referred case must évidence party tendency bias, sit work that he should down and show him which has Roy they anything think prejudice or To sustain out with unfairness. for a fee. fair referral exceptant appropriate is not limited charge, the And, ultimately, just as now presiding judge. I under- It was our conclusion that Lomas, stand from sent a pub- it- Mr. he action would to weaken such tend if, in letter to Rosen to tell Rosen that lic in Important- confidence the court. Id. fact, they money,-I would, any ly, collect should we also held that such action get a of proceeds pursuant third referral the net to Canon 1 of the of Judi- Code Conduct, contrary as a fee. cial be appear- ance of impropriety independence N.T., 9/6/07, at 21-22. the judiciary that we are- charged with above, clearly As exchange recited this Likewise, preserving. Id. we held that that Judge Rogers presided demonstrates such action judged would violate the obli- damages phase proceed- over the these gation promote in public confidence ings at a time when Bran- Judge he knew integrity impartiality the judiciary ca, judicial colleague his on Mont- pursuant to Canon 2.34Id. County bench, gomery directly and benefit proportionally any Armor, from the size Given the facts in I cannot dis- increased award entered the case. tinguish result from its what should occur facts, I Upon prior these en banc find disqualifying in this case. The feature in persuasive. decision Armor be this appearing case before Branca colleague Montgomery County Armor, In very under circum- similar Every bench. member of bench case, stances to the instant identical, placed would be circumstances Montgom- mandated recusal entire Judge Rogers know- decide (or ery change County trial court bench ing Branca would benefit di- venue) spouse where the one rectly the size of proportionally judges had a financial interest in a child appearance award. improprie- support pending Montgomery case . ty perceived judicial favoritism a County. here, here — As is claimed the record colleague adversely judge’s on a —reflects “bias, evinced no prejudice evidence integrity judi- impartiality and part unfairness” on the of the presiding fact, ciary. I find a bench recusal here judge, but this Court found the Armor, compelling more than since overriding to be an concern: judicial perceived here favoritism. of.a judicial system kept, [T]he must colleague,.as opposed judicial to that wife, reproach. like Caesar’s above Un- *34 member, family as case in Armor. was the der presented, the circumstances here In this I regard, judge’s the trial also find the of appearance appellee before the Judge focus on of Branca be the conduct bench of Montgomery County, involving on recusal. the decision irrelevant remarriage as it her must to a member representation prior While Branca’s bench, of that a demands case such may of Appellee have formed factual the by any not be of judge-hus- heard the motion, predicate ap- for the recusal the colleagues. band’s pearance impropriety of be reviewed Armor, A.2d at Accordingly, 398 174. this upon Rogers, had focus whether procedure Court refused to a approve trial in of judge, judgment the should sit whereby Montgomery County of any the this case. judges Common Pleas mat- could hear the All judges county ter. of the of that -again jurist’s Armor that a illustrates the same problem necessary protect have recusal is the then- sometimes currently obligation is That codified in Canon 1.2. Rule

144 at 1201 n. judicial system. of the This Court. Id. 3. Pursuant Ar- integrity the mor, appeal the facing this this Court certified the theme for courts ais common Supreme Court, believing appear- that an is or fair unfair. “A tribunal either issue. impropriety precluded ance of this Court prejudice, to find actual There is need deciding per In appeal. the Id. rather, prejudice of appearance but order, Supreme curiam Court remand- grant pro- new to warrant sufficient hearing to this Court without ap- ed judge only not A should ceedings. trial Brockerman, In re 504 Pa. peal. must but also avoid impropriety avoid (1984). this, From A.2d 1016 McFall, impropriety.” appearance Supreme Court’s disap- court inferred the trial court I believe erred A.2d at 714. proval of Armor. ap- of the consideration by disregarding focusing in- impropriety pearance analysis in The its trial court erred only on whether stead by Armor as Brockerman affected sev- prejudice bias actual demonstrated First, important, most reasons. eral Judge Rogers. per binding curiam do not orders create precedent. Consumer Dis- Beneficial Supreme Not Court Has Our Vukman, count 621 Pa. Co. A.3d Disapproved Armor’s (2013). Supreme 549 n. 3 Court's Rationale in order Brockerman is authoritative court dismissed Armor believ- substantive issue that case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ing treating per trial court erred cu- rejected “imputed appearance impro- its rejection riam Brockerman as a order that Court re- when priety standard”35 I speculate of Amor. as to will Brockerman, Pa.Super. In re versed refusing Supreme Court’s reasons this (1984). Trial Court A.2d Court’s certification of the I appeal. be- 12/31/08, Appellee at 10.36 Opinion, , lieve, nonetheless, that the circumstances arguing subsequent ig- cases have agrees, very of Brockerman were different from held that evidence nored Armor have Second, those of Armor. as evinced bias, unfairness neces- prejudice throughout opinion, plainly Armor of a non-presiding sary the interest before apply appearance not the case to judges of all of the judge requires A rejection standard. thorough Based review same court. occurred, Amor, if even one would not be appearance recusal and law rejection of improprie- disagree. impropriety, I ty seriously It cannot standard. con- Brockerman, alleged intended, party Supreme one tended that our order, who, attorney through time per of an curiam negligence create a Superior change sea this area of law. appeal, Final- ery County readily apparent underlying how the trial has an interest It is not *35 appearance refer the of party Judge court came to The is not even a in case. the "imputed.” impropriety as For standard precedential authority case. Armor is present purposes, I difference in discern no Supreme rejected by been the and has my the to the standard from that of reference Moreover, fails to set Court. Armor forth trial court. the substantive law and bur- articulate proof applied den to be on a motion of as 36. The trial court wrote follows: recusal. of exists or is No 12/31/08, Opinion, Trial at 13. Court Judge presumed simply to exist because Montgom- of of of the Court Common Pleas

145 out, parties Supreme the trial court ly, Appellants point as the were unaware of Court, Brockerman, Judge a per after also issued Branca’s financial interest in the Materials, Highway curiam order in Inc. of Judge outcome this case until Branca’s Montgomery v. Court Pleas testimony Common on day and last the second of of of 2010, 2010 County, No. 156 MM Pa. LEX- damages Any analysis trial.37 of the (Pa. 14, 2010), where it or- 2874 Dec. IS of Appellee’s timeliness motion must there- full bench recusal dered trial fore that date. commence This would court. seem at odds with Citing Lokuta, In re 608 Pa. 11 not, It Court’s action in Brockerman. (2011), A.3d. Goodheart Reilly, however, for the same reason Brockerman Majority that it states is well settled that here; does not control neither case creates party “a seeking disqualification or recusal binding precedent. objection required] [is to raise the at the Appellants’ Timing The moment, possible earliest party Motion Recusal will consequence being suffer the time Majority argues Appellants’ The recusal Majority Opinion at 120 (empha- barred.” they motion untimely as had two op- Majority).38 sis added IWhile do they portunities to seek recusal before not quibble general this proposition, motion; liability filed their first before none of particularly helpful these cases is second, January trial in on Sep- in addressing the timeliness issue raised immediately tember Judge after Lokuta, Majority. Goodheart disagree. Branca I testified. Reilly, the recusal motions were all untimely held to moving The because the parties’ January consent at the litigants in waited until outcome of pretrial proceed their conference front filing cases Judge Rogers is before their motions. In Lo- moment for two First, kuta, trial, appellant, sought I after re- reasons. result advocate judges of one liability would not disturb the verdict from cusal of the Court of Second, proceedings. Discipline these Judicial basis bifurcated Majority proceedings. Appellee’s 37. The states that could Memorandum Judge Opposition have learned financial in- Re- Branca’s Defendants’ Motion for cusal, 10/24/07, by taking deposition informally pretrial terest his At the confer- him,” ence, (1) asking "just Majority Opinion Judge Rogers at 120- Judge disclosed Bran- Majority (2) any 21. The prior representation Appellee, fails to cite information ca’s Appellants’ possession prompt any in' that would the absence of discussion of this cases inquiry. Branca, Appellee Rogers such Judge Judge did not reveal at between January pretrial whereupon agreed Judge Rogers conference that all counsel however, Judge contingent Branca preside. retained one-third key point, could The Id. disclosure, Ap- fee any prior Judge interest the outcome of the case. absence pellants’ trial, Support testimony Law during Memorandum Branca’s Recusal, 6/24/09, the Motion at 3. Branca’s financial interest Nonetheless, outcome of case. this the Ma- jority’s permissible reliance on waiver Majority argües Appellants' 38. failure may any this Court affirm the trial court request immediately recusal after basis, including valid waiver. See right Common- testimony Branca’s awas waiver Tunnell, 345 A.2d request wealth Pa. recusal. record reveals motion, (1975) ("While question response Appellants’ of waiver has Appellee’s litigation, only objection propriety by any party this not.been raised may. Appellants’ being affirm an if it is motion before the order correct *36 Korvette, reason.’’) any any right (citing court Appellants was Gilbert v. that waived to for (1974)). request upon January pre- recusal based the 457 Pa. 327 A.2d 96 n. 5 found that Supreme 1300. The to on the court. ineligible serve’ was right trial and raise recusal this issue after counsel waived to appellant raised argument in other trial by timely responding this not to the had included not Lokuta, 11 for recusal. pre-trial requests raising grounds and for new judge’s order Goodheart, Citing the Lokuta appeal at this complete A.3d trial was to after this appellant waived Lokuta, the Court held Goodheart Although Court. Id. it the having raised earliest not speak issue for to Reilly all the timeliness . Id. opportunity. motion, provide guidance little they recusal present the grounds situation where Goodheart, they after appellants, the In in fact raised for recusal before were Court, Supreme our in an appeal lost on by trial was entered court. verdict the reconsideration, moved for application for they alleged would of two-Justices recusal Judge September Branca testified on in that case. by claim asserted' the benefit day two-day damages the last the opposition application, In the their Appellants them recusal motion trial. filed “[Ajppellant the (cid:127)appellees asserted that not Appellants did on October silent, resorting the chose to remain damages verdict before await the adverse reprehensible tactic unconscionable filing their motion. retained waiting the laying grass, until deci the sought Judge Rogers’ counsel and new raising disqualification the sion and then damage prior to the trial court’s recusal Goodheart,' only they lost.” issue if Thus, Appellants verdict. have not violat Although this at 763.39 characteriza A.2d precedent mo recusal prohibiting ed the “florid,” Supreme tion was somewhat Appellants’ after an result. tion adverse say it the charac could Court held thirty-day during their filed motion or unfair. either inaccurate terization was granted by hiatus the trial post-trial disqualifica suggesting facts Id. Since permit Appellants whether determine known when case was called were they needed a forensic accountant re was argument, the issue deemed for attorneys’ view fee invoices submitted waived. beginning Appellee Certainly, surprise revelation trial. Similarly, ap Reilly, counsel contingent Branca retained SEPTA, pellant, grounds raised recusal this case to fee the outcome interest a) eight months after the judge colleague, by his momen five gave days file decided counsel con carefully matter had to be motion, b) tous asserting numer recusal Appellants. decision to ap recusal sidered grounds for while ous new Rogers, Reilly, only A.2d at seek but this Court. recusal pear to they if lost.” quotation disqualification issue Majority’s use of from 39. The added). By indicating the (Emphasis Id. Goodheart-inexplicably adds to and .truncates moving party until the decision was waited regarding the court’s statement timeli- omitting "only if words "imminent” and Majority of a- recusal motion when ness lost”, impermissibly they Majority "Appellants] silent ... chosé remain states changes import' of this statement imminent], waiting [was until decision fact, Majority's In statement Goodheart. then'raising disqualification issue[.]” incongruent result with the facts becomes fact, fully Majority Opinion at 121. motion was in that case where above, quoted statement Goodheart appellants waited deemed waived because "[A]ppellant to remain silent provides chose was issued before court’s decision until the requesting raising then recusal. waiting the decision and ... until *37 bench, in Montgomery County priety Judge of this Branca the entire inherent case. required assuredly that has a judgment. counseled testified he one-third in interest - entirely This is case, situation distinct from a proceeds any net of in the this award evidentiary objection common that re Judge Rogers, presiding over a bench immediate quires trial, trial action afford the was responsible detérmining for the n perceived court an a opportunity correct of amount the award. that Appellee notes Moreover, error. mo filed Judge Rogers liability issued a on verdict (as any days before additional of trial arose, this before issue and the of amount none) or courtroom there were resources compensatory damages had been estab to this were devoted matter and before the through point lished arbitration. This damages. decision on court’s Under well-taken, damages but at the in phase circumstances, these I do not believe Judge Rogers action this had to determine Appellants’ motion untimely filed. extent, whether and what in his discre tion, punitive reject damages I Majority’s appropriate. also were claim that Judge Rogers’ judge loss of the ‘trial made the award of than more credibility punitive of $600,000.00 decisions and damages essentially observations may witnesses and other at trial will colleague evidence award his on Montgom prejudice to cause extreme the Appellee. County $200,000.00 bench ery more than This Appellee’s contention belied own on this damages item alone.41 In Ar of judge mor, concession another trial could we ordered the recusal entire upon decide the a trial based Montgomery County bench a where existing Rog- if Judge review record judge’s spouse had direct financial inter ers he found that himself recuse est I outcome. believe same from Appellee’s this case. Memorandum here, must judge result obtain where a has in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion a direct financial interest in the outcome of Recusal, Moreover, 10/24/07, 14.40 being a case heard one decided Majority’s applies contention colleagues. bench case a trial judge finds he or where demonstrated, As appearance of im during she must recuse course may propriety properly alone form the price proceeding. paid Such is the to be bench, judge, basis for guarantee for the a fair and the hearing Rogers Judge improp matter. preservation of public’s trust erly has dismissed consideration justice. judiciary’s administration appearance of this case Conclusion solely on Appellants produced basis conclusion, bias, unfairness, I prejudice do not believe this Court evidence can Judge Rogers’ disposition part Judge Rogers. defer to To so do Judge Rogers disregards gatekeeping recusal motion. failed á critical function impro aptly Reilly, account As courts. observed acknowledge Judge I Rogers that after va- 41. The refer- record not clear as what a recovery ral fee of considering one-third Appellee’s cated his recusal after net agreement include under Branca, between Appellee response, has maintained that client, and the referred firm. Rogers not abuse his did discretion in refus- say, Suffice it the increase in award matter, ing to recuse himself from eight more times than award arbitration Appellee objects being now to another Judge Rogers’ because of on dam- decision assigned to hear this case. ages is substantial. *38 fairness, Judge Rogers, concerning im- a col- outcome.

Questions of the trial league, Judge or bias court al- Branca’s cred- assess partiality, of justice ways affect the administration ibility and determine whether issue a system judi- can cloak the whole damages punitive substantial award suspicion and distrust. Be- cature with knowing that Branca benefit would question requests call into recusal cause upon contingent his based proportionally they fairly, raise ability to mediate in the of the award entered interest size public in which the issues important Judge Rogers. unique facts These are perceived If our courts are concerned. case, anticipate I will not biased, ability our future be unfair and any with replicate themselves untoward adjudicate public’s grievances said, in our courts. I frequency With threatened, wrongs because we will emphasize, again, that I also to once wish thing brings one liti- all lose the Rogers’ ar- ability do doubt justice our halls gants into —their impartial My rive at a fair and verdict. people’s trust trust. Without impro- analysis rests malice, are made without our decisions impropriety. priety, not actual ill-will, bias, personal interest or motive outset, I join As set forth at submitting against those to our affirming liability verdict, Majority in system judica- jurisdiction, our whole Majori- respectfully dissent ture will crumble. Judge Rogers ty’s conclusion that did not is, integrity in con- Id. at 1301. “Judicial in denying Appellant’s recusal motion. err sequence, highest a state interest at 556 U.S. Caperton, order.” (citing Republican Party DONOHUE, S.Ct. BOWES, Judges

Minn., 536 U.S. S.Ct. Concurring join this SHOGAN (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Dissenting Opinion. Majority’s with

Finally, I take issue analysis my require would

contention county entire bench when

recusal has a financial interest a case county,

pending her even in home large benches such as Alle-

counties Majority gheny Philadelphia. Opin- Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH I ion, Majority’s 1. believe the n. and an unwarranted claim is overstated I result advocate.

exaggeration MASON, Joseph Appellant. extraordinary circum- presents This case stances, my analysis would create Pennsylvania. Superior Court The outcome blanket rule. involving judges future case motion Argued Oct. county depend still same Filed Dec. court’s facts and assessment it, in before accordance with circumstances governing In- recusal motions.

the law was a wit-

stantly, Judge Branca material trial, of this phase

ness in the significant financial interest had a

and he

Case Details

Case Name: Lomas, R. v. Kravitz, J.
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Dec 21, 2015
Citation: 130 A.3d 107
Docket Number: 2391 EDA 2011
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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