Hakeem NEAL v. THE STATE; Lokari BOYD v. THE STATE
A26A0535, A26A0579
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
APRIL 8, 2026
PADGETT, Judge.
FOURTH DIVISION. MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk‘s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
These companion cases concern two co-defendants, Hakeem Neal and Lokari Boyd. Following a joint trial, a jury found Neal and Boyd guilty of home invasion and armed robbery. In Case No. A26A0535, Neal appeals from the trial court‘s denial of his motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. In Case No. A26A0579, Boyd asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that plain error was committed when the trial court admitted a statement he claims violates the Confrontation Clause. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both appeals.
With these principles in mind, the evidence shows that K. D. and R. M. worked at the same gas station convenience store and lived together as roommates in a Greensboro residence. On April 17, 2022, R. M. closed the store around midnight and went home, where K. D. was asleep in his room. At some point between 2:00 a.m. and 3:30 a.m., R. M. was washing dishes in the kitchen after eating dinner when he heard a “loud sound” at the front door. Suddenly, two men wearing ski masks burst into the house. One of the men brandished a handgun at R. M. and the second man demanded money. The noise jarred K. D. awake. He overheard R. M. say, “Take
Meanwhile, R. M. handed the men $640 dollars and they left. As they were leaving, R. M. noticed a third man standing by the front door. Because he was “very scared,” R. M. did not make eye contact with the assailants; he described the man with the gun as a tall black male and the man who demanded money as a slim, young black male.
Law enforcement responded to the scene. The responding officer, a fifteen-year veteran of the Greensboro Police Department, was familiar with K. D. and R. M. from his patrol of local 24-hour stores. When K. D. described the man with the gun, the officer suspected Boyd, who the officer knew to be about six feet five to six feet seven inches tall.2 The officer testified that two months prior to this incident, he had warned Boyd and his “good friend[]” Neal not to return to the convenience store where K. D. and R. M. worked. The officer indicated that typically “[i]f you saw
The investigator developed a third suspect, J. W., a then-juvenile who was a known associate of Boyd‘s and Neal‘s. After receiving permission from J. W.‘s parents, the investigator searched their residence and retrieved a pair of Nike Air Force One tennis shoes. According to the investigator, the size, ridge pattern, and markings on the sole of J. W.‘s Nike shoes matched the shoe imprint that was left on K. D.‘s and R. M.‘s door.
J. W. was arrested and questioned by police. He told the officers that on the night of the robbery, he met up with Boyd, whom he knew as “Tall,” and Neal; they walked over to the victims’ house and Boyd told him to kick in the door. When Boyd and Neal went inside the house, J. W. stood outside by the front door as a lookout.
Boyd and Neal were subsequently arrested and charged, along with J. W., with home invasion and armed robbery. At trial, the victims testified as to the events on the night of the home invasion. J. W., however, recanted his prior statement. Although he acknowledged that he incriminated Boyd and Neal in his statement to law enforcement, he testified at trial that he “made the whole thing up,” and that he
Boyd and Neal were each interviewed by a detective and their recorded interviews were played for the jury. Boyd denied any involvement in the home invasion; nor did he implicate Neal. Neal, likewise, disclaimed responsibility for the home invasion. He told the detective that on the night of the incident, he arrived at his girlfriend‘s house at 12:30 a.m. and did not venture out the rest of the night.4 The detective spoke with the girlfriend to corroborate Neal‘s alibi.5 According to the detective, the girlfriend confirmed that Neal was at her house “all night,” but then contradicted herself. When pressed about the nature of the contradiction on cross examination, the detective explained that the girlfriend said that Neal was at the house when she left around 2:00 a.m. and that he was still there when she returned home at 4:00 a.m. On redirect, the detective expounded, without objection, that the girlfriend was involved in another incident when she left the house and that another officer followed her home in his car and, in so doing, the officer saw Neal.
Case No. A26A0579
1. Boyd contends that the testimony that he had previously shoplifted at the convenience store amounted to inadmissible character evidence under
Under the familiar standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LEd2d 674) (1984), to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “a defendant must prove both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 481(IV) (807 SE2d 350) (2017).
On direct examination, the following line of questioning occurred between K. D. and the prosecutor:
Q: Did you see the person — did you see the person who pointed the gun at you that night in your store before?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he do anything in the store that made him familiar to you?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was that? How did you know him from the store?
A: When they came to [sic] store, they used to steal from the store.
Q: You had seen them do that before?
A: Yes.
Q: Is that why you recognized that person?
A: Yes, that is correct.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not object to K. D.‘s testimony because he did not think that the prior shoplifting was “very significant“; nor did he want to “dwell on any past stealings.”7 In its order denying Boyd‘s motion for new trial, the trial court found that evidence of the prior
While
evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense is not “extrinsic” under Rule 404(b) . . . [but rather “intrinsic“] when it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. Evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.
Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711, 714(2) (838 SE2d 289) (2020) (citation modified). “[I]ntrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant‘s character at issue.” Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 25(3) (860 SE2d 509) (2021) (citation modified).
In this case, evidence of the prior shoplifting — which occurred a mere two months prior to the home invasion and which led to Boyd being banned from the store — was not only relevant to show K. D.‘s familiarity with and ability to identify Boyd, but also provided the possible motive for the home invasion. Accordingly, the
2. In two related arguments, Boyd maintains that plain error was committed when the investigator was permitted to make a certain statement at trial that Boyd claims violated the Confrontation Clause, and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a curative instruction to “mitigate the harm done” by the supposed violation. We find that Boyd cannot be heard to complain about the alleged
(a) At one point during cross-examination, the following exchange took place between Boyd‘s counsel and the investigator:
COUNSEL: Did [ J. W.‘s] parents say anything about where he was the morning of April 17?
PROSECUTOR: Objection, hearsay.
COURT: Response?
COUNSEL: Well, did anyone tell you anything about the whereabouts of any of the alleged perpetrators?
INVESTIGATOR: Yes.
COUNSEL: Who told you that?
INVESTIGATOR: I had several people tell me different things of where these perpetrators were which includes the victims’ house.8
Notably, our Supreme Court has held that
[a] defendant generally cannot complain on appeal about the admission of evidence that he introduced himself. . . . Although we may take notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights even when an error is not brought to the attention of the trial court, where invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.
Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153, 156(2) (800 SE2d 341) (2017) (citation modified). Because the testimony by the investigator about which Boyd complains was evoked by his counsel, he cannot complain now that the evidence was heard by the jury. See id. at 156–57(2).
(b) Regarding his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not requesting a curative instruction to the purported “improper comment” by the investigator, the record shows that trial counsel was not asked at the hearing on Boyd‘s motion for new trial about the failure to request the curative instruction. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, trial counsel‘s decision not to solicit a curative instruction is presumed to be strategic and consequently Boyd‘s claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 222–23(2)(a) (892 SE2d 744) (2023).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Boyd‘s motion for new trial.
Case No. A26A0535
3. In two correlated enumerations of error, Neal contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury‘s verdict and that the trial court erred by denying
Under
While the evidence corroborating J. W.‘s testimony was not particularly robust, the evidence adduced at trial, at minimum, provided slight corroboration of his statement implicating Neal in the commission of the home invasion and armed
Moreover, according to the detective, the girlfriend could not account for Neal‘s whereabouts in the two-hour timeframe when the home invasion occurred. Neal‘s statement that he arrived at the girlfriend‘s house (which was within walking distance of the victims’ residence) at 12:30 a.m. and did not leave for the rest of the night conflicted with the detective‘s testimony that another officer saw Neal sometime between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. Lastly, the investigator testified that “several people” told him that “these perpetrators” were seen at the victims’ house the night of the home invasion. Insofar as the detective‘s and the investigator‘s testimony in this regard constituted hearsay, see
“[A]lthough taken individually, each of the pieces of evidence do not corroborate every detail of [ J. W.‘s] testimony, taken together, the evidence sufficiently supports [his] testimony because only slight evidence of corroboration is required.” Bowdery, 321 Ga. at 898(1) (citation modified). See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 22(1) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (while not conclusive, evidence of motive can be considered in the determination of whether an accomplice‘s version of events inculpating a defendant is corroborated); Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 66(1) (525 SE2d 683) (2000) (defendant‘s own statement can be used to corroborate an accomplice‘s testimony against him).
Accordingly, we find no merit in Neal‘s claim that insufficient evidence supports his convictions.
Judgments affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.