(Pro Tempore)
This is аn action on an alleged oral contract stated in two counts. The first count seeks to recover unpaid wages and the second count seeks to recover the reasonable value of certain equipment sold to defendant. The case was tried to the сourt upon a waiver of a jury trial. From a judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff is a mechanic, mаchinist and heavy equipment maintenance man with many years of experience. Plaintiff contends that an oral contract was made between the parties in the fall of 1967 and that by the terms of that contract he was employed to perform maintenance work in the Philiрpine Islands for defendant. Defendant was involved in numerous corporate structures in both the United States as well as in the Philippine Islands. Plaintiff’s duties under the employment contract required him to get heavy equipment to the Philippine Islands, to maintain the equipment and to train native Filiрinos in its main *351 tenance. Defendant was to pay plaintiff’s transportation costs to the' Philippine Islands and return to the United States. Defendаnt was to supply housing and groceries to plaintiff and plaintiff was to he compensated at the rate of $1,700 per month. This compensаtion was to he paid by having $750 per month paid to plaintiff’s wife here in the United States and the balance to be paid to plaintiff upon his rеturn to the mainland. Pursuant to the agreement plaintiff took with him when he traveled to the Philippine Islands an accumulation of machinist’s tools and parts, for which he was to be compensated upon his return to the mainland. Plaintiff acknowledges he had received certain sums for his еmployment but alleges that there is still due and owing the sum of $7,600 in wages and he has received no compensation for the tools and parts whiсh he alleges are worth the sum of $4,000.
Defendant in response to plaintiff’s complaint has filed a general denial.
Plaintiff’s first assignment of error сontends that the trial court erred in its finding that defendant acted not personally but as an agent for one or more corporate еntities and suggests that evidence of agency may not be presented under a general denial. No Oregon cases have been cited to us on the question of whether an agency may be proved under a general denial. Other jurisdictions have, however, decided the question. See
Scone v. Amos,
38 Minn 79,
“* * * This was admissible under the answer, for if the fact was as defendant so endeavored to prove, then defеndant did not make the contract alleged in the complaint as a party nor become bound. The contract was not his, but that of the railroad company, and he did not agree that he would pay for the work. The evidence was a denial, in effect, of the allegatiоns in the complaint that defendant hired and employed plaintiff, and agreed to pay him. * * 38 Minn at 80.
We conclude that under a general deniаl a defendant may offer evidence that he was. acting as the agent of a corporation not only to disprove any individual liability оn his part, but also to show that the contract alleged by plaintiff is not the contract of the parties, or to show that, in fact, no contrаct at all was made. Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Plaintiff’s second and third assignments of error will be considered together. The thrust of the allegеd errors is that the court was wrong in finding in favor of defendant on the issue of whether he was contracting with plaintiff on his own account or as agеnt of one or more corporations and that there was no satisfactory evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant was acting as agent of a disclosed principal. The resolution of these assignments of error requires an examination of the evidenсe. It appears to us from such examination that plaintiff’s oral evidence and defendant’s documentary evidence are in serious conflict. Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that he was being employed by defendant, personally, although
*353
his contract with defendant was very minimal and most of the negotiations for the employment were carried on between plaintiff’s brother-in-law and defendant. Plaintiff testified that he knew nothing of two of defendant’s Philippine corporations, P. D. Bautista Enterprises, Inc., and Baler Forest Products, Inc. However, the evidence discloses that plaintiff had in his possession for more than three months before he left for the Philippine Islands an unsigned employment agreement with Bautista (Defendant’s Ex. 1) and plaintiff signed an employment agreement with Baler on February 15, 1968 (Defendant’s Ex. 2). Defendant’s Exhibits 3 through 9 are cash advаnces or travel allowance from Baler. Plaintiff’s wife received eight monthly payments pursuant to the employment contract from Nоrthwest Machinery Sales, one of defendant’s domestic corporations. According to defendant’s bookkeeper, defendant’s personal financial records revealed no disbursements to plaintiff or his wife. From our review of the evidence, which is conflicting, we find that thеre was sufficient probative evidence for the trial judge to find that the employment contract alleged by plaintiff was entered into with defendant acting as an agent for a disclosed principal and not with defendant personally. Our review is limited to whether the trial judge’s decisiоn was supported by any competent substantial evidence and in such review we do not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, or weigh thе evidence, and we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant.
Sexton v. Kelly,
Plaintiff’s final assignment of error asserts that the trial conrt failed to make general findings of fact on the issues in the case and in particular on plaintiff’s second cause of action. There was no request by plaintiff prior to the commencement of the trial for the court to make special findings of fact. ORS 17.431 authorizes the trial court in the absence of request for special findings to make either general or special findings. We construe the trial сourt’s memorandum opinion filed in the case to constitute general findings of fact and conclusions of law which were incorporated in the court’s judgment. And we further find that the court did not ignore the issue raised by plaintiff’s second cause of action but did in fact in the last paragraрh on page 2 of the memorandum decision decide such issue adversely to plaintiff and on the same legal premise as the first cause of action had been determined.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.