Case Information
USDCSDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONrCALLY FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC# ---x DATE F~4LiJ:E:nD::-:---;;O\::'1-:-r/-:O::-:'I-1/~2D"'-'-~ ') ~ r I
WILSON LOJAN, 12 cv. 0320 (LAP) aintifC Memorandum & Order v.
SPENCER CRUMBSIE, WESTCHESTER
COUNTY, and C.O. JANE DOE
Defendants.
----x
LORETTA A. PRESKA
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Wilson an ("Plaintiff") brought this action against defendants Spencer Crumbsie, Westchester County, and Correctional Off ("C.O.") Jane Doe leging excessive force and a failure to protect under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negl , gross igence, respondeat or, and a violation of N.Y. Correction L. §§ 137(5) & - - " ' - - - - - 500-k. Pursuant to Rule of C 1 Procedure 12 (b) (6) , defendant Westchester County has moved to smiss the t Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted as to the County and Doe. [1] For the reasons Motion to Dismiss [dkt. no. 9J is GRANTED expla below, in and DENIED in
JURISDICTION s Court juri ction over Plaintiff's section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343. Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law cla pursuant to U.S.C. § 1367.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this Complaint on January 13, 2012. no. 1.) On 1 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. no. 4.) On 15, 2012, Defendant Westchester
filed the instant Motion to Di ss on lf of itself and de C.O. Jane Doe. Plaintiff fil her opposition on May 28, 2012. (Dkt. no. 14.) Defendant Westchester County fil its reply on June 5, 2012. (Dkt. no. 15.)
II. Nature of the Dispute
Plaintiff is a citizen of Ecuador, residing in the State of New York. (First Am. ("FAC ff ) ~ 11.) On 14, 2011, Plaintiff was arrest and deta at Westchester County Jail ("WCJ"). (FAC ~ 15.) process at the WCJ,
aintiff self identifi as a pre ive transgender female Id.) Following with implants 1 li as a female. ive
this sclosure, Plaintiff was aced in st ct custody. (Id.) in June 2011, ntiff was approached by an
Somet officer of the WCJ and inf that Plaintiff could request a transfer from strict protective custody to protective custody, which would provide equivalent ection but allow t freedom of movement. (Id. at ~ 16.) iff was transf to protect cust soon after, she remained in the same housing ass (Id. at ~ 17.)
On t 18, 2011, Plaintiff requested a broom from Defendant ie, who at the t was acting as a trustee of the prison. Id. at ~ 20.} Def ie retrieved a broom and either or asked Defendant C.O. Jane to open the to Plaintiff's cell. (Id. at ~ 23.) De Crumbsie then returned to aintiff's cell, handed her broom, and wat as Plaintiff the cell. (Id. at ~ 24.) When Plaintiff finished, she the broom back to Def Crumbsie, who then asked to see Pla iff's breasts. Id. Plaintiff re (Id. at ~1 25.)
Plaintiff identifies herself throughout the First Amended Complaint as a transgender female. See e . . (First Am. compI. ("PAC") ~;~1, 15, and 22.) In deference to Plaintiff's determination of her identity, the Court adopts the use of the feminine pronoun in referr to Plaint ff throughout *4 this opinion.
Defendant Crumbsie then stepped into the cell and ibly grabbed Plaintiff's breasts. (Id.) Plaintiff resisted, but Defendant ie proceeded to expose himself and direct
aintiff to orm oral sex on him. (Id.) iff aga refused, but De endant Crumbsie grabbed Plaintiff's hand and
aced it on s genitals. (Id. at ~ 26.) Plaintiff continued to resist, Defendant Crumbsie Plaintiff's
and att ed to rate Plaintiff from behind uring pI iff's knee in process. (Id.) Due to her ured knee, Plaintiff sat down on the bed. (Id. at ~ 27.) Defendant Crumbsie then grabbed Plaintiff's head and forced Plaintiff to orm oral sex, uring Plaintiff's mouth and throat. (Id.)
Eventually, Defendant Crumbsie released ntiff and exited the cell after warning Plaintiff not to the inci (Id.) Plaintiff did the assault and an
st ion was ed by the WCJ Special Investigations Unit. (Id. at ~ 28.) At some point during the course of that invest ion, a of the cial Investi lons Unit informed Plaintiff that Defendant Crumbsie had a of violent behavior and gang affiliation. (Id.) Plaintiff then
this action, claiming violation of her ri s by defendants Crumbsie, Westchester , and C.O. Jane.
III. Legal Standard e :2 (b) (6) , Court
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to accepts as true all factual allegations In the complaint
draws reasonable inferences ~n favor of the pla nt ff. Ltd./ 493 F.3d 87/ 98 (2d Cir. See ATSI Commc'ns v. Shaar the motion, the compla must allege " 2007). To acts to state a claim to relief that is plaus Ie on its Bell Atl. . v. Twombl , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), ~~~~~~ ... ~~ .. ~~~~~--~~--~
that "the plaintiff pleads content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference the += is liable .L for the misconduct alleged." _____ roft v. I I, 556 U.S. 662, _~~~~d- ___ 678 (2009). Conversely, a pI that only "0 fers 'labels conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" is not sufficient. Id. (quot Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION
I. Sovereign Immunity and Municipal Liability
State governments may not be in federal court unless have waived their sovereign immunity under the Eleventh or Congress has abrogated the immunity Section 5 *6 of Fourteenth . Tennessee v. Lane, 54 U.S. 509, 518 (2004); ides v. Bd. of s, 535 U.S. 613, 618-19
--~----.--~~~~~~~-- v. Rondout Va Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd of (2002) i see also Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) Municipa entities,
5 however, cannot claim sovereign ty. See Monell v. New Ci . 0 . f Soc i a I S e rv 4 3 6 U. S. 6 5 8 [1] 6 9 0 n. 54 ( 19 7 8) . ion is liable Nevertheless, a municipality or munlC only if a plaintiff can a sufficient showing as to two elements. First, the aintiff must the existence of a municipal policy or custom." lis v. ViII. of Haverstraw 768 F.2d 40 / 44 (2d Cir. 1985)i Jones, 557 F.Supp.2d at 41617.
"Second l the aintiff must establish a causal connection an linkl 'affirmat between the policy and the deprivation of h[er] constitutional s." Id.
A. Municipal Policy or Custom cipal policy or custom be shown where a plaintiff A successfully leges (1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the munic litYi (2) actions or decisions of government officials responsible for establishing the policies that violated the aintiff/s civil all Si (3) a tice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a 'custom or l usage and implies the constructive knowl of policy-making *7 officialsi" or (4) a failure by officials to train or se subordinates that amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff/s s. Jones, 557 F. .2d at 417. A munic lity is equally ibl "whether [an] action only once or to be taken repeatedly" so long as is to be t those who establish governmental the "action is directed
6 of Cinc 1, 475 U.S. 469, 480 81 po icy." Pembaur v. Ci (1986) .
In the sence of a policy, a plaintiff may re on theory that conduct of a given offici represents \\ official policy,U if the plaintiff can "establish that element law. u Id. at 57-58. An i as a matter of munic 1 policy may also arise from "informal acts or omissions supervisory municipa officia s.u Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995); let, 619 F.2d 196, ~---~~~~~ ....... ~~~ 200 (2d Cir. 1980). Issues of "authori zat ion, approval, or encouragement U are questions of fact. Turpin, 619 F.2d at 201.
Here, the degree of supervision accorded to trustees within a correctional faci i is determi by chief
administrative officer of faci ity.4 See N.Y. Compo R.
& Regs. tit. .... a , § 7003.3(d) ( " ]he chief administrative officer *8 shall determine the and manner of supervision to be
ded to trustees while such trustees are confined in a *9 liab l~ H Batista v. Rodr z, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d
r. 1983) (cit ng Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n. 58). Causat for purposes of MOLell 1 ility is mate causation in tort law. Cash v. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 342 (2d Cir. ------~ .............. ----~,~~-.---- 2011), cert. den ed 132 S. Ct. 1741; see also Oklahoma C v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 833 n. 9 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)
Even ~f mun c_pal pol cy set ~L mot on the events that culminated ~n the harm t Plaintiff, more is red to establish the requis te causal link. See Deskovic v. C of 11, 673 F.Supp.2d 1 4, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A - - .......... ~-----
municipality is liable under section 1983 only if the "moving force behind that violation was an official policy or custom." Moray v. City of Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94). Although Defendant Crumbsie's intentional misconduct was facilitated by his status as a trustee of the prison, it cannot be said - and Plaintiff does not allege - that the municipal policies governing trustees was a moving force behind the violation of Plaintiff's rights.
Rather, the reasonable conclusion is that Defendant Crumbsie took advantage of his superior position within the prison to commit the assaults in question. Because Plaintiff does not *10 sufficiently allege a causal link between a municipal policy and the violation of her rights, Plaintiff's claim for excessive force (Count I) must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim for a failure to protect (Count II), however, which turns on a failure to fulfill a protective duty, survives scrutiny under Monell. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court must assume that Westchester County and c.o. Jane fulfilled the duties imposed by municipal policy and custom with respect to supervision and regulation of inmates and trustees. Because Plaintiff alleges that this policy was the cause of her injuries, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged causation with respect to Count II. The Court next considers the substance of this claim.
II. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim for Failure to Protect 0:;: a of action; the
"Section 1983 is only a substantive right ris to the action must co~e from another source." Si v. Fulton . Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Adi v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150 (1970)) In this case, Plaintiff a claim :;:or a t, implicitly reI ng on the Eight Amendment. s failure to
licable the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment proscribes "cruel and *11 unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Rhodes v.
452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981). As a corollary, the Eighth
Amendment also requires son officials to "t reasonable es," measures to guarantee the saf of the v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 984), and i~poses a duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other prisoners.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Hendricks v.
Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109, 1 3 (2d Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff must demonstrate two conditions in order to state a cognizable failure to protect claim under § 1983, (1 ) " [slhe [wals incarcerated under conditions pos a substantial risk of serious harm" and (2) that Drison officials acted with Technically. the Eighth Amendment may not control here because it appears Plaintiff was a pretria detainee at the time of the al violation. This distinction is of no moment, however, as "an unconvicted detainee's rights are at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner. n Okst, 101 • F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) i see also Mercado v. of New York, No.8 CIV~2855, 2011 WI, 6057839, at *4 (S.D.K.Y. Dec. 5, 2011).
10 H Warren v. Goord, 476 fference to h[er] s "deliberate H F.Supp.2d 407,410 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832) v. New York Ci 't of Correct~ons, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996). Deliberate indifference means that the relevant official was "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substanti risk of serious harm exist[ed]H and in fact "dr[e]w the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837. In other words, the prison official must "ha that an inmate face[ a substantial risk of serious knowl harm and he dis failing to take led] that risk reasonable measures to e t ~ .. ~_~s, 84 F.3d at 620. H
Plainti f alleges that officials at the WCJ acted th deliberate indifference to saf because jail officials knew t she was a like victim and allowing De endant Crumbsie access to her as a trustee a s ficant risk to
r safety. (FAC ~I~ 41-42.) Def West er County that it was not y foreseeable Defendant Crumbsie would att Plaintiff. See Def.'s Mem. of Law in
. of Mot. to smiss at 3-4.) As an initial matter, the argument that more than mere edge of Plaintiff's transgender status was required to Dut Defendant on notice of Plaintif 's vulnerabili is spurious. Cf. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In our view, it was as
ous in 1991 as it is now that under certain circumstances 11 d place that inmate transsexual ism
the disclosure of of the WCJ's in harm's way."). This is especially true in I ective custody decision to place Plaintiff in special Moreover, even if gang affiliation immediately following int t on PIa iff, a his 1S not foreseeably related to an as *13 o violence certainly is. all inferences in favor of the non-movant, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a failure to protect.
III. Plaintiff's Supplemental State Law Claims tion to cIa under sect 1983, pla iff also
In alleges state law claims predicated on a violation of N.Y.
Correction L. §§ 137(5) & 500 k and state tort claims for negl e, gross negl . The Court and respondea:t=: -~--- cons these in turn.
A. N.Y. Correction Law Section 137(5) of the N.Y. Corrections Law des, in relevant part, that" [n]o inmate in the care or custody of the department be ected to ng treatment, and no officer or other employee of the department shall inflict any blows whatever upon any inmate, unless in self defense, or to suppress a revolt or insurrection." rd. (McKinney 2012). Section 500 k makes this ition icable to all county jails as well. N.Y. Correction L. § 500 k (McKinney 2012). pIa iff
12 or of state law f claims Defendant Crumbsie f acting under sion. violated this
Irrespective of the merits of the parties' arguments f Plaintiff herself has foreclosed relief as to this claim.
Plaintiff has indicated the she seeks a declaratory and does not pray for damages. (FAC at 9; pl. fS Mem. of ] Law in to Mot. to Dismiss at 13.) Defendant Westchester county argues that declaratory judgment is inappropYiate when the alleged wrong has al been committed. The County is ]eclaratory relief is intended to operate correct. "
pro ively. There is no basis for declarat relief where
past acts are involved. 1I Natfl Union FiYe Ins. Co. of Pitt v. Int'l Wire Inc., No. 02-CIV 10338, 2003 WL 21277114, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2003) i see also Gianni __ _ Ltd. v. Metallica, No. 00 CIV-0937, 2000 WL 1773511, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2000). Because Plaintiff seeks only
declaratory relief f t claim for a ation of sect 137 (Count IV) must be smissed.
At the outset, Defendant Westchester County argues that section 137 contains no express or ied cause of action. See ~ef.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot to Dismi s at 5.) The Court notes that other courts have allowed challenges on this statute. §ee, e.9~, Abreu v. Nicholls, Ko. 04 CIV 7778, 2007 WL 2111086 at *6 7 (S.D.N. Ju 24, 2007), ""ff'd inpar 2 vacateU!1. par::! 368 F . .l\pp'x 191 (2d Cir. 2010) (treat a claim on N.Y. Correction L. § 137(5) as a standalone state aw claim); Martinez v.
Robinson, No. 99 CIV-1191 ,2001 I"L 498407 at *4 (S.D.K . . May 10(2001) (same); Parker v. , No. 85-CIV-177, 1994 WL 49696, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 994) (same); HoI v. State, 728 N.Y.S.2d 567,569 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) , however, the Court need not decide whether a right of action exists under sect on 37.
B. Official Immunity Under State Law Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has adequately *15 pled her remaining state law claims, these claims must still be dismissed because the relevant parties are shielded by the doctrine of official immunity. "[O]fficial immunity is designed to promote the effective administration of government affairs by ensuring that government officials are 'free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits.'n Murray v.
Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., 444 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
Exercises of discretion by government officials are absolutely immune from liability, except for purely ministerial actions.
Pryor v. State, 937 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (quoting Metz v. State of New York, 927 N.Y.S.2d 201 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011). Qualified immunity shields the actions of government officers given a reasonable basis and the absence of bad faith.
Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-CIV-9009, 2003 WL 22203727, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2003) see also Kravitz v.
Police Dept. of City of Hudson, 728 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
[1] respect to Plaintiff's state law claims. A municipality may not assert This discussion pertains only to absolute and qualified immunity with official immunity as a defense to the violation of a constitutional right.
See Owen v. City of Indepe I1 dence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980). *16 and gross neolioence on the I alleges negl
Count I part of Defendants Westchester County and C.O. Jane Doe. In New authority of [prison] employees act under
"where and in full compliance with the gove statutes and . their actions constitute discretionary conduct regulations of a quasi judicial nature for which the State has absolute immuni ty." Art v. State, 27 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (N.Y. 1988) This immunity extends to cases where prison employees rtook functions t were judici or al in nature. See Cuoco, 2003 WL 22203727, at * (collecting cases) .
\\ [D]iscretionary decisions in furtherance of general policies and purposes where t exercise of reasoned judgment can produce different acc results," E>:rteaga, 527 N.E.2d at 1198, however, are also entitl to absolute immunity. See Holl v.
State, 728 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (N.Y. Div. 2001) ding a "cell frisk" was entitled to absolute immuni
Plaintiff al"eges igence on the basis of (1) the decisio:-l to Plaintiff to enter protective custody i (2) the des ion of Defendant ie as a trustee de te his gang affiliation and violent historYi and (3) decisio:-ls related to t degree of sion accorded Defendant Crumbsie in performance of s trustee duties. (See FAC ~~I 44 - 53.) "It is Plaintiff also all tha~ C.O. Jane was igent fai ing to remain alert a~ hee post. (FAC ~ 47.) The First Amended Comp~aint, however, offers only ecture to support this cIa
:5 *17 well established that with respect to its correctional facilities, the State [of New York] has a duty to use reasonable care to protect its inmates from foreseeable risks of harm, including risks of attack by other prisoners." Colon v. State, 620 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The discretionary decisions identified by Plaintiff, however, are entitled to absolute immunity and cannot form the basis of an action for negligence or gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to find that these decisions fell outside the discretionary scope of absolute immunity, they are entitled to qualified immunity. "Under New York law, qualified immunity shields the actions of government officers from tort liability 'except where there is bad faith or the action taken is without [a] reasonable basis. '" Cuoco, 2003 WL 22203727, at *5 (quoting Artega, 527 N.E.2d at 1194). In order to defeat liability, "[t]he defendant must establish that he [or she] had an objectively reasonable belief that his [or her] act violated no clearly established rights." Kravitz, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (quoting Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff does not allege bad faith or claim that Plaintiff's transfer to protective custody was without any reasonable basis. [9] State law also recognizes qualified immunity with respect to the discretionary selection of Defendant Crumbsie as a "trustee".
Cf. ttino v. S,;::ate, 692 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (N.Y. App. Div. argues ~hat Gaines' ent
1999) ("To the extent that cl propensities and inmate disciplinary history rendered him
table for duties as a 'feed up worker', the State's scretionary decision to oy Gaines in that capaci is insulated a qualified immunity."); C. v. State, 591 K.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that the selection and assignment of an inmate to erR and " eed-up" the duties in ed unit of the prison was a scretionary act a s ected by ified immunitv). Consequently, Plaintiff's claim for igence or gross negligence (Count III) must be dismissed.
Count V alleges that Westchester is liable for all torts committed by C.O. Jane in the exercise of her oYDent.
Under New York law, however, "the and function of keeping a jail are plainly and properly rnmental in character, and fall within the rule that municipal ions are not liable for acts done and powers exercised in that capaci v. R vill. of Ellicottville, 54 N.Y.S. 800, 804 (N.Y. App. Div.
1898). "[W]hile the trustees and other officers , by ill and unwarranted exercise of power, render themse s individually liable, that would not render the town liable." Id.
(quoting Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353, 356 (1871)).
17 Accordingly, PIa iff's re rlor claim (Count v) .. ~~ ...... ~ ...... ~- against must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION In light above scussion. the Court finds t t Plaintiff has :ailed to state a claim as to Counts I, III. IV.
and V because these allegations do not "plausibly rise to an entitlement to relie:,ff I I. 556 U.S. at 679. However. ~"---~ Plaintiff has stated a claim as to Count II. Acco the def s' Motion to ss the First Amended Compl nt [dkt.
no. 9J is hereby GRANTED as to Counts I. III, IV. and V and ~ENIED as to Count II.
SO ORDERED:
LORETTA A. PRESKA CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: New York. New York
January 25. 2013
18
[1] The County is not representing defendant Spencer Crumbsie, who despite being served - has not filed any responsive in this action through counselor pro se. (See Dkt. 8.) , a certificate of default was entered as to Defendant Crumbsie on June 12, 2012. (Dkt. 16.)
[3] It is unnecessary to analyze Plaintiff's claims under a "failure to train" n:bric because Plaint ff' s complaint contains no such allegations. See ci of Canton Ohio v. s, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Jenkins v. Ci of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 007).
[4] Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a legal question answered reference to state law. See Jeffes . Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000) (cit McIvJilli v. ,520 U.S. 78:,786 (997)). The official need be "responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the municipali 's business." rd. (c ting ci of St. Louis v. 485 U.S. 12, 174 (1988)) is in original). The chief administrative officer of the county satisfies this criterion. facili hous area housing only trustees. H ) ; id. at § chief nistrat officer 1 deterrdne the 7003.4(d) type and manner of supervision to be p to trustees while areas. ") . such trustees are outside t ir facility hous Drawing al inferences in favor of the non movant, the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to support the inference that defendants Westchester County, C.O. Jane, and - to the extent that his conduct was in accordance with that expected of a WCJ trustee - ie acted pursuant to munic 1 policy or custom during relevant times. B. Causation PI iff must so y allege causat , however. "Absent a of a causal link between aL official policy or custom and the pI nt ffs' injury, Monell ~ts a finding of
[9] Indeed, Plaintiff herself made the decision to transfer to protective custody on the basis that she would enjoy greater mobility.