173 N.E.2d 690 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1961
These cases grew out of an accident that happened on December 29, 1956, on Erie Avenue, where Erie Avenue becomes a bridge as it crosses Red Bank Road, both of these streets having been duly dedicated.
The facts in the case are that the plaintiff Pauline G. Lohmann was driving in a westerly direction on Erie Avenue, on December 29, 1956, and, as her automobile entered on the bridge above referred to, the automobile skidded and hit an iron utility pole. As a consequence the plaintiff Pauline G. Lohmann sustained serious injuries. In her petition she asked for damages on account of these injuries and for her loss of employment. In Carl J. Lohmann's petition, he asked for damages for expenses incurred as a result of his wife's injuries and for loss of his wife's services.
To these petitions, the defendant demurred on the grounds that the city is not liable for a nuisance in the highway, unless that nuisance is intimately connected with a defect in the highway construction, and unless reasonable notice has been given to the city that such nuisance has existed. Thus, the giving of reasonable notice to the city is treated in Bello v.City of Cleveland,
"The liability of a municipality under Section 3714, General Code [Section
Now, the only notice given to the city according to the amended petition was as follows: "During the afternoon of December 28, 1956, the highway maintenance department of the defendant was given three written notices by the meteorologist in charge of the United States Weather Bureau, Cincinnati, Ohio, warning the defendant of the fact that the snow would melt on the highways in Cincinnati with no accumulation expected or icy conditions developing except on the bridges and viaducts in said city and that such places would probably ice up when the temperature was expected to drop during the evening."
However, there is no assertion here that a responsible official received any notice; moreover, whatever notices were given in this case referred to the future; and in order for the notice to the city to be effective, it must have reference to the present.
For the city to be held liable, there must be a defect in construction or otherwise. Thus it is held in the case ofStandard Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Fremont,
"* * * The scope and application of such statutory provisions to streets or highways are limited to conditions affecting the actual physical structure of the streets or highways and to the physical obstructions or hindrances to travel thereon."
Thus, in order for liability to descend upon the city, there must be two elements: Defect in construction or otherwise and notice to the municipality. Neither of these two elements was present in the cases before us.
Moreover, 27 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 394, Section 292, treats slipperiness as follows: "A slippery condition of a street or other public way may, under some circumstances, constitute an actionable defect therein, although a mere slippery condition due to natural causes is not ordinarily so regarded."
Nor does the mere accumulation of snow and ice constitute *356
a nuisance and make the city liable for damages. Although, as it is held in Schroeder v. City of Hartford,
"1. In the absence of a special statute, a municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from the usual and natural accumulation of snow and ice on its streets or sidewalks.
"2. Section 3714, General Code [Section
It is likewise so held in the syllabus in Village of Leipsic
v. Gerdeman,
Therefore, since a mere accumulation of snow and ice does not constitute a nuisance, since notice must be given to the city of any defect constituting a nuisance in the street, and since the defect must have something to do with faulty construction, we are of the opinion that the city of Cincinnati cannot be held liable in these cases.
The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in each of these cases is, therefore, affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
MATTHEWS, P. J., and LONG, J., concur. *357