190 Iowa 278 | Iowa | 1919
— I. The parties were in dispute as to whether plaintiff had title to the land. The dispute began in 1890, and ended in May, 1914, when the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the claim of plaintiff that he had title. 233 U. S. 613 (34 Sup. Ct. Eep. 685, 58 L. Ed. 1121). After the
II. The answer set up that, as to the years 1890 to 1909 inclusive, plaintiff was barred from recovering any rentals because of Section 4198 of the Code. That statute provides:
“The plaintiff cannot recover for the use and occupation of the premises for more than five years prior to the commencement of the action. ’ ’
The appellee presents that there are four reasons why this statute is not applicable: (a) That this is so because the suit is an equity suit, and not an action by ordinary proceedings; (b) that said statute is but a limitation upon recovery “for the use and occupation of the premises, ’ ’ and therefore does not govern where, say, “mesne profits” due for a tortious withholding of lands from an owner who is entitled to possession are involved, because these differ from “rents and profits;” (c) that no general statute of limitation is available, for that the rights of the plaintiff did not accrue because of and during the pendency of litigation in Federal tribunals, and that, since title was settled in favor of plaintiff in those tribunals, not enough time ran, up to the institution of this suit, to invoke the bar; and (d) because the general statute of limitations is not pleaded, and therefore can in no event be relied on.
If -we shall be constrained to hold that the statute asserted
2-a
2-b
Appellant relies on this statute provision. He made tender of all that we find is due under its provisions. We are constrained to hold that no relief was due the plaintiff beyond what was tendered, and that the court erred in allowing more.
The appellee presents an emphatic argument against the general equities of such views as we are expressing. We are told that one who has wrongfully maintained possession should not be allowed to say to the true owner:
“I have nothing to lose by this venture, because all the rent that you can get is rent covering the past five years only. ’ ’
Since the statute permits just that, we are unable to see why here is not a ease of remedy by a legislature, rather than by the courts. If it be true that the statute permits what is not proper, the remedy is not with this tribunal. And so of the argument asserting it would be a “travesty to justice” to permit this defendant to assert the bar of the statute, where he took possession forcibly, kept the true owner out of possession for nearly a quarter of a century, and in that time compelled him to litigate title and possession through the Federal land department, the several state courts, and finally through the Federal Supreme Court; and that he should not be permitted to say:
‘ ‘ I now claim I, owe you practically no rent at all as damages for the wrongful detention of that land throughout that entire period. ’ ’
Persuasive as all this may be, were it addressed to the legislature, it does not destroy the statute.
The decree below must be — Reversed.