18 N.Y.S. 164 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1892
The plaintiffs are iron-workers. They agreed to furnish defendant, and place in its house, a hot-water pressure tank, the size, character, and style of finish of which was fixed by the written contract made, which contract further provided that all the work was to be done to the entire satisfaction of defendant, all for $235, and the work to be completed in from two to three weeks. The complaint alleges only part of the written contract. It does not pretend to set out fully the details thereof, nor is the plaintiff required by law to do so. It is sufficient to allege generally the contract terms, and upon the trial to prove its full performance. It further alleges the delivery of the tank; that it required slight alterations, which were rendered necessary because of the change of location of man-hole on said tank, as directed by defendant, and which they proceeded to make while said tank was in defendant’s house, but were prevented by defendant from completing the same. The answer is a general denial. At the trial, after close of plaintiffs’ ease, the learned trial justice dismissed the complaint, as follows: First, upon the ground that it appears both from the pleadings, the testimony, and the remarks of counsel that the contract alleged in the complaint was not completed by the plaintiffs, and therefore that until it was completed the plaintiffs cannot recover the contract price; second, that the contract, as proved, is entirely different from the contract pleaded, and therefore makes an entirely different cause of action, which the defendant is not now ready to meet; third, that the work done in pursuance of the contract which is in evidence is not shown to be done in accordance with the contract, and particularly in that it has not been shown that it was done to the satisfaction of the defendant,—to which plaintiffs duly excepted.
The proposition of Jaw applicable to this case is stated in Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. Rep. 442, as follows: “Where a plaintiff is nonsuited, he is entitled to the most favorable inferences deducible from the evidence, and in reviewing the nonsuit all contested question of fact are to