52 Ga. App. 843 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
In his petition as amended W. S. Loftis avers that Allen Plumbing Company and thirty-nine other defendants (some of them being designated as individuals, some by names importing partnerships, and many by names importing corporations) are defendants “individually and as members of an unin
“Now come Wm. A. Manning & Son, defendants in the above entitled case, and file this their answer to. the petition of file, and for answer say: 1. These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph one, two, and three of said petition. 2. For further answer these defendants say that they nor either of them were members of said association at the times stated in said petition; and that they are not indebted to the plaintiff either individually or as members of any association, in any amount whatever.” Twenty-five of the other defendants named in the petition answered as follows: “1. These defendants deny paragraph one as alleged. 2. These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs two and three, and require strict proof thereof. 3. For further answer, these defendants say that they are not indebted to the plaintiff in the amount sued for, nor in any amount whatever, and that on September 30, 1932, the plaintiff was paid all balance due him by the Master Plumbers, Piping & Heating Contractors Association, of Atlanta, by paying to Huitt-Williams Company, the agent of the plaintiff, one hundred dollars, which was the balance due at that time.”
We are satisfied that the very meager plea in paragraph 3 of the answer of the majority of the defendants, that “on September 30, 1932, the plaintiff was paid all balance due him by the Master Plumbers, Piping & Heating Contractors Association of Atlanta, by paying to Huitt-Williams Company, the agent of the plaintiff, one hundred dollars, which was the balance due at that time,” did not' warrant the defendants in going into the matter of the alleged credit of $1305. Indeed, we find no pleading in the case to warrant it. We therefore hold that the court erred in overruling ground 4 of the motion for new trial.
It is substantially averred in ground. 5, that, over the plaintiff’s objection, the court “required the plaintiff to assume the burden
Having reversed the judgment on the general grounds of the motion-for new trial, the special grounds are not for consideration at this time.
Judgment reversed.