33 N.W.2d 598 | Minn. | 1948
Respondent suffered a compensable accident June 13, 1925, which resulted in permanent total disability. He was paid compensation by the employer and the insurer in the sum of $10,000 in installments as provided by law. The last installment was paid November 1, 1939, and thereafter he received from the employer and the insurer certain medical supplies and $12 weekly for nursing expenses. On April 22, 1941, the legislature enacted L. 1941, c. 384, which provided "that all employees who are now receiving, or who may hereafter become entitled to receive, compensation for permanent total disability, whether from the employer or from said special fund, after receiving the full amount of $10,000 for such disability, shall be paid *487
from said fund an additional sum of not to exceed $2,500, * * *." Respondent's petition for benefits under said c. 384 was denied on the ground that he was not receiving compensation on April 22, 1941, within the meaning of the act, and this denial was affirmed by this court in Loew v. Hagerle Bros.
Subsequently the legislature enacted L. 1947, c. 247, which modified M. S. A.
"All employees who by reason of a compensable accident have been totally and permanently disabled for a period of 20 years prior to passage of this act but whose weekly compensationpayments terminated subsequent to July 1, 1939, and prior toJanuary 1, 1940, thereby depriving them from participating in any way in payments from the special compensation fund prior to the passage of this act, * * *." (Italics supplied.)
Respondent's petition for payments out of the special compensation fund was contested by relator, as custodian of the fund, on the ground that L. 1947, c. 247, is invalid as special legislation in violation of Minn. Const. art.
1. May relator as custodian of the special compensation fund be heard to question the constitutionality of the statute? As an application of the general rule that a litigant will be heard to question the constitutionality of a statute only when his rights will be prejudiced by its enforcement, the courts uniformly refuse to permit a public officer to assail the constitutionality of a law to avoid the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by it upon him. State ex rel. Clinton Falls Nursery Co. v. County of Steele,
2. Is L. 1947, c. 247, invalid as special legislation? The constitutional prohibition against special legislation (art. 4, § 33) does not prevent the legislature, with whom the responsibility of classification primarily rests, from dividing a subject into classes, and a classification made pursuant to a public purpose,3 which has a rational *489 basis upon any conceivable state of the facts,4 although the court does not perceive all the facts justifying the classification,5 will be held proper if:
(a) The classification uniformly, without discrimination, applies to and embraces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants justifying appropriate legislation6;
(b) The distinctions which separate those who are included within the classification from those who are excluded are not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful, but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis in the necessity or circumstances of the members of the classification to justify different legislation adapted to their peculiar conditions and needs7; and
(c) If the classification is germane or relevant to the purpose of the law, i. e., there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law purports to provide.8
3. Any formulation of the applicable principles cannot be expected to reflect all facets in their application to an infinite variety of circumstances. The fundamental principles are clearly set forth in State ex rel. Bd. of Courthouse, etc., v. Cooley,
We come to the application of these principles. The amendment was admittedly drawn to extend the benefits of §
Although respondent is in dire need of relief and should receive every possible consideration, such relief cannot be afforded by special legislation in violation of Minn. Const. art.
Writ discharged and order of industrial commission reversed.
Reversed.