Leslie Lockhart (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by MVM, Inc. (respondent), as to all four of appellant’s causes of action against respondent. The trial court’s ruling was based on its determination that appellant’s state law claims were barred because they arose on a federal enclave. We affirm.
CONTENTIONS
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the evidence supported her position that the pertinent events occurred outside the federal enclave. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in overruling her evidentiary objections to (1) a declaration offered in support of respondent’s summary judgment motion; and (2) respondent’s documentary evidence tending to show that appellant worked on a federal enclave.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the relevant time period, respondent was a federal contractor providing detention (unarmed guard) staffing for United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the San Pedro ICE facility, a federal correctional facility at Terminal Island in San Pedro, California. The San Pedro ICE facility is located on federal land which was acquired by the United States government from the Los Angeles Harbor authorities in or about September 1927.
Appellant commenced employment with respondent as a custodial officer trainee on or about January 17, 2006. She began performing contract work on February 4, 2006. Appellant’s last date of work was a little over a month later, on March 10, 2006. Her employment was terminated prior to the expiration of her 90-day probationary period.
The decision to terminate appellant was made by Jeffrey Poplin, her supervisor at the San Pedro ICE facility, in conjunction with Dina Evans, a human resources manager based at respondent’s headquarters in Vienna, Virginia. 1 Lockhart received her termination letter, dated March 20, 2006, at her home in Long Beach, California.
On February 21, 2007, appellant filed and served her complaint against respondent for (1) disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (2) disability discrimination in violation of public policy; (3) retaliation for requests for accommodation in violation of FEHA; and (4) retaliation for requests for accommodation in violation of public policy. 2 Appellant alleged that her disabilities included, but were not limited to, occipital neuralgia and depression. She further alleged that respondent knew of her protected status under FEHA, refused to accommodate these disabilities, and made decisions adverse to her which were motivated by her disabilities.
On March 13, 2008, respondent filed its motion for summary judgment. Respondent argued that the state law claims for disability discrimination and retaliation set forth in the complaint were barred by the federal enclave doctrine because appellant was employed by a federal contractor in a federal enclave. Appellant opposed the motion on the following grounds: (1) there was no admissible evidence that the facility is a federal enclave; (2) there was no admissible evidence that the pertinent events occurred on a federal enclave; and (3) appellant established a triable issue of fact that the pertinent events occurred away from any potential federal enclave.
The motion was heard on May 29, 2008. At the hearing, the trial court overruled appellant’s evidentiary objections. 3 The court announced its intention to grant respondent’s motion because “this is what the authorities would require.” The court entered a minute order granting the motion on May 29, 2008. Final judgment was entered on July 16, 2008.
On September 12, 2008, appellant filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of review
The standard of review for an order granting a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001)
A party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Aguilar, supra,
Generally, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ... A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.]” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851, fns. omitted.)
The trial court’s rulings on appellant’s evidentiary objections are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
(Carnes v. Superior Court
(2005)
II. The federal enclave doctrine
“A federal enclave is land over which the federal government exercises legislative jurisdiction. [Citation.] The federal power over such enclaves emanates from article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the power ‘[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever’ over the District of Columbia and ‘to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.’ ”
(Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2000)
“An enclave is created when the federal government purchases land within a state with the state’s consent, which may be conditioned on the retention of state jurisdiction consistent with the federal use. [Citation.] Unlike those
In support of its summary judgment motion, respondent filed a request for judicial notice. The request for judicial notice contained a copy of a grant deed, dated September 6, 1927, from the Los Angeles Harbor authorities to the United States of America. The deed conveyed the land to “have and to hold the same unto and to the use of the United States of America for public purposes forever,” with the reservation of certain portions of the land to the City of Los Angeles for public highway and public ferry purposes. The land was accepted on behalf of the War Department of the United States of America. The deed specified that the transfer was authorized by the State of California, pursuant to an act passed at the Fortieth Session of the Legislature, which authorized municipalities “to grant portions of such lands in accordance with the terms of said act, to the United States for public purposes of the United States.” (See Stats. 1913, ch. 250, § 1, p. 437.)
The request for judicial notice also contained various articles showing that the land had been used as a federal prison in the decades following the transfer, as well as documentation showing the current owner of the land to be the United States government. 4
This documentation shows the required “voluntary cession of land by a state to the federal government,” resulting in “an actual transfer of sovereignty. [Citations.]”
(Taylor, supra,
III. Applicable enclave law
“When an area becomes a federal enclave, Congress assumes the power of legislation over that area. Federal law thus applies, although not
Appellant’s claims are based on FEHA, a state statutory scheme which was not enacted until 1980.
(Taylor, supra,
Because respondent has established that appellant worked on a federal enclave, and because the federal enclave doctrine bars appellant’s state law claims, respondent has established a complete defense to appellant’s causes of action. The burden switches to appellant to create a triable issue of fact.
IV. Appellant’s claims were properly dismissed under the federal enclave doctrine
Appellant’s main argument against application of the federal enclave doctrine is that the pertinent events of appellant’s termination did not occur on the federal enclave. Appellant argues that her evidence shows that the termination was decided and implemented at respondent’s headquarters in Virginia—a site admittedly not on a federal enclave—and that she was informed of her termination at her home—also, not on a federal enclave. Appellant points to case law holding that, in order for the federal enclave doctrine to apply, the claim must “arise” on the enclave. (Taylor, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 480-481.) 6
Taylor
does not support appellant’s position. The case involved a former employee of Lockheed Martin Corporation, a civilian contractor providing
Appellant argues that, under Taylor, this court should focus on where the termination decision was made. Appellant takes the position that the decision to terminate appellant was made exclusively at her employer’s corporate headquarters in Virginia. Preliminarily, we note that the evidence does not support appellant’s position. Respondent presented evidence that the decision to terminate appellant was made by both Jeffrey Poplin, appellant’s direct supervisor who worked on the enclave, and Dina Evans, the human resources manager who was located in Virginia. In addition, the decision in Powell v. Tessada & Assocs. (N.D.Cal., Mar. 10, 2005, Civ. No. C04-05254JF) 2005 U.S.Dist. Lexis 46922, provides persuasive authority that, even if the termination decision was made exclusively in Virginia, appellant’s argument cannot prevail. In Powell, the plaintiffs were previously employed by a contractor providing janitorial services at the NASA Ames Research Center at Moffett Federal Airfield. When they were not rehired, they filed an employment discrimination action. In an effort to avoid application of the federal enclave doctrine, the plaintiffs argued that the adverse decision was made at the defendant’s corporate headquarters in Virginia, not on the federal enclave. In rejecting this argument, the district court noted that the plaintiffs’ argument was inconsistent with Taylor, and concluded that “regardless of where the decision not to retain Plaintiffs was made, the decision reflects Defendants’ employment practice on the enclave. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their state law claims.” (Powell, supra, at p. *7.)
Taylor
and the federal authorities cited by appellant emphasize the plaintiff’s place of employment as the significant factor in determining where the
Appellant was, at all relevant times, employed by a federal contractor working on a federal enclave. She has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her employment claims arose outside of the federal enclave.
V. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s evidentiary objections
Appellant’s evidentiary objections were directed towards respondent’s evidence tending to show that the ICE facility was located on a federal enclave. Appellant first takes issue with the declaration of Dina Evans, wherein she states on information and belief that “the San Pedro ICE is located within a federal enclave.” Appellant cites
Lopez v. University Partners
(1997)
Appellant also takes issue with respondent’s documentary evidence, which came in the form of newspaper articles and a grant deed. Appellant argues that none of these documents describes the land in question as a federal enclave, that the documents are inadmissible hearsay, and that they have not been authenticated.
The grant deed is judicially noticeable under Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (g). (See
Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc.
(1994)
Because the grant deed was judicially noticeable, and establishes the boundaries of the federal enclave in question, we decline to address appellant’s remaining arguments as to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Even if these rulings were erroneous, they were not prejudicial. Therefore we may disregard them. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [no judgment shall be set aside on the ground of evidentiary error unless error resulted in miscarriage of justice]; Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [reviewing court disregards nonprejudicial error and presumes that trial court error is nonprejudicial].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Boren, P. J., and Ashmann-Gerst, J., concurred.
Notes
Respondent admits that MVM’s headquarters in Vienna, Virginia, is not on a federal enclave.
Appellant’s two causes of action which cited violations of public policy were based on the public policies set forth in FEHA.
The court also overruled respondent’s evidentiary objections, with one exception: it sustained respondent’s objection to paragraph 11 of appellant’s declaration in support of her opposition to respondent’s motion. Appellant does not appeal this evidentiary ruling.
In addition, respondent invited the court to review the official Web site for the ICE facility, which stated that the facility is on a “federal reserve.” The referenced Web page is no longer available.
The federal enclave doctrine does not leave appellant without a remedy for her disability discrimination claims. Federal antidiscrimination law is applicable to claims arising on federal enclaves.
(Taylor, supra,
Both parties also cite to federal district court opinions regarding the federal enclave doctrine. (See
Snow
v.
Bechtel Constr., Inc.
(C.D.Cal. 1986)