ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
for the Court:
¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.
¶ 2. J.C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lock-hart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also own a life estate in the same property, and they maintain the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who have a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart’s petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, we affirm the chancellor’s ruling.
PERTINENT CONVEYANCES
¶ 3. The following conveyances reveal the parties’ current interests in the 160 acres.
¶ 4. In 1947, R.T. Ray conveyed the property to W.E. Lockhart and Bolin Hamilton as tenants in common. W.E. was the father of Orene Hamilton and J.C. Lockhart, and the father-in-law of Bolin Hamilton. In his Last Will and Testament, W.E. devised his undivided one-half interest to his two children, J.C. and Or-ene. At that point in time, Bolin Hamilton held an undivided one-half fee-simple interest, and Orene and J.C. each held an undivided one-fourth fee-simple interest in the 160 acres.
¶ 5. In 2007, J.C. Lockhart and his wife Betty conveyed his fee-simple interest to his son (Betty’s stepson), Joel Lockhart. This conveyance reserved a life estate in the Lockharts. Around the same time, Bolin and Orene Hamilton conveyed their combined three-fourths fee-simple interest in the property to their daughter, Peggy Collins. They also reserved a life estate in their combined three-fourths interest. In 2008, Joel Lockhart conveyed his undivided one-fourth fee-simple interest to Richard and Peggy Collins, subject to the life estate of his stepmother, Betty Lockhart. Peggy Collins then quitclaimed her remainder interest in the property to herself and her husband, Richard.
¶ 6. Accordingly, Lockhart has a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest; Bolin and Orene Hamilton have a life estate in the remaining undivided three-fourths interest; and Richard and Peggy Collins have the remainder of the entire 160 acres.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 7. With the death of her husband in 2007, Betty Lockhart left the property and filed a complaint against the Hamiltons and the Collinses (the “Defendants”) seeking to partition by public sale the 160 acres in which she has a life estate. The Defendants opposed the complaint, and asserted that Lockhart lacked standing to seek partition by sale. Additionally, the Defendants asserted that the property was not subject to partition, since it was homesteaded by the Hamiltons. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Lockhart’s complaint, which the chancellor granted, in part.
¶ 9. Lockhart appeals and claims that the chancellor erred in ruling that Section 11-21-1(2) acts to prevent partition, unless by written agreement, when the partition is not between spouses, but, rather, couples.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
¶ 10. This Court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings of fact unless such findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.
Whether partition by sale can occur by decree of the chancery court where more than one couple share a right to use and possess the property.
¶ 11. In Mississippi, the right to partition is absolute, however inconvenient it may be, with the exception of the limitation placed on homestead property.
¶ 12. Lockhart’s complaint specifically prays for the chancery court to partition the land in question by public sale and to
¶ 13. A tenancy in common occurs when “two or more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares,”
It is not essential to the right of partition that the cotenants shall have estates that are equal. One may have a term, another an estate for life, and another an estate in fee. All that is necessary is that they shall be cotenants of what is proposed to be partitioned. A remainder or reversion will not be partitioned, but that does not hinder an estate in possession from being partitioned among the co-tenants, and the fact that there is a remainder or reversion is not a bar to partition among those having an interest in possession.10
“Cotenant” is defined as a “tenancy with two or more co-owners who have unity of possession,” such as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common.
¶ 14. Next, because Lockhart had standing to proceed against the Ham-iltons for partition, we address whether Section 11-21-1 is applicable. Section 11-21-1 provides that “[p]artition of land held by joint tenants, tenants in common, and coparceners, may be made by agreement, which shall be evidenced by a writing, signed by the parties.... ” Subsection (2) of Section 11-21-1 states that “[h]ome-stead property exempted from execution that is owned by spouses shall be subject to partition pursuant to the provisions of this section only, and not otherwise.” A plain reading of these two statutes reveals that when property is owned by spouses, and those spouses maintain the property as their homestead, partition is available only by written agreement between the parties. “When a statute is plain on its face, there is no room for statutory construction.”
¶ 15. We cannot agree with the chancellor’s application of this statute, because the entire parcel of property was owned by the Hamiltons and Lockhart, not by spouses.
¶ 16. Nevertheless, the chancellor found that, in the event a partition of the subject property should become available, a sale of the property in the first instance was not warranted under Section 11-21-11. This statute requires that, before the court may order a sale in the Erst instance, it must find that a sale of the lands will better promote the interests of all parties than a partition in kind, or the court must be convinced that an equal division cannot be made.
CONCLUSION
¶ 17. Section 11-21-1(2) is inapplicable to the present facts. Nevertheless, we agree with the chancellor’s alternative ruling. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 18. AFFIRMED.
. Section 11-21-3 provides that "[p]artition of land held by joint tenants, tenants in common, or coparceners, having an estate in possession or a right of possession and not in reversion or remainder, whether the joint interest be in the freehold or in a term of years not less than five (5), may be made by judgment of the chancery court of that county in which the lands or some part thereof, are situated....” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-3 (Rev. 2004).
. Section 11-21-1(2) provides that "[hjome-stead property exempted from execution that is owned by spouses shall be subject to partition pursuant to the provisions of this section only, and not otherwise." Subsection (1) of Section 11-21-1 provides that ‘‘[pjartition of land held by joint tenants, tenants in common, and coparceners, may be made by agreement, which shall be evidenced by a writing, signed by the parties....” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-1(2) (Rev. 2004).
. Mississippi Code Section 11-21-11 (Rev. 2004) provides for a partition sale where a chancellor determines (1) “a sale of the lands, or any part thereof, will better promote the interest of all parties than a partition in kind;” or (2) "an equal division cannot be made[.]”
. Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams, 864 So.2d 926, 930 (Miss.2003).
. Id.
. Cheeks v. Herrington, 523 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Miss.1988); Daughtrey v. Daughtrey, 474 So.2d 598, 601 (Miss.1985).
. Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-23 (Rev. 2004).
. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-3 (Rev. 2004).
. Black’s Law Dictionary 1506 (8th ed. 2004).
. Black v. Washington, 65 Miss. 60, 3 So. 140 (1887).
. Black’s Law Dictionary 1505 (8th ed. 2004).
. Cheeks, 523 So.2d at 1036.
. "It is generally held that a life tenant or tenant for years can maintain a suit for partition as among his or her cotenants for life or for years. The holder of a life estate or an estate for years cannot sue the remaindermen or reversioners for partition in the absence of statutory authorization.” 68 C.J.S. Partition § 69 (2011).
.Camp v. Stokes, 41 So.3d 685, 686 (Miss.2010).
. Solomon v. Solomon, 187 Miss. 22, 192 So. 10 (1939).
. Id..; see also Carter v. Brewton, 396 So.2d 617, 618 (Miss.1981) (quoting Dillon v. Hackett, 204 Miss. 464, 37 So.2d 744, 746 (1948)).
. Id.
. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-11 (Rev. 2004).
. Overstreet v. Overstreet, 692 So.2d 88, 90-91 (Miss.1997).
. Unknown Heirs at Law of Blair v. Blair, 601 So.2d 848, 850 (Miss.1992).