Locke v. LaddLocke v. Ladd
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Grimes
This case began with a petition by Bruce A. Locke under
The Court (DeClerico, J.) transferred without ruling the following questions:
(A) Whether the provisions of New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 460:29 are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of *138 Part First, Article Second of the New Hampshire Constitution; and
(B) Whether it is within the discretion of the Court under New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 460:29 to issue orders relating to child support and visitation rights.
The equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of part I, article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution do not require complete equality, but they do require that persons similarly situ ated be similarly treated .See Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 222, 223 (1975); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975). If the persons are notsimilarly situated, however, no equal protection .problem is involved. Tigner v. Texas. 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
Defendant argues that the statute denies equal protection because a mother may not file a petition for legitimation under the statute, and because RSA ch. 168-A, which permits a mother to petition to have a putative father charged with the support of a child born out of wedlock, prescribes in section 12 (Supp. 1977) that such a petition must be brought within two years from the date of birth of said child, while
Unlike
A petition under RSA ch. 168-A may be brought not only by the mother, but by public authorities and others, including private agencies that have furnished expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, or support. The statute’s purpose is twofold: to establish the father’s obligation for child support and the reasonable expenses of the pregnancy; and to enforce compliance with that obligation. The *139 limitation on the time within which such a petition may be brought serves among others the purpose of limiting the time of anxiety for a man who may or may not be the father of achild born to awoman with whom he has been intimate. It gives the woman and others a reasonable time in which to charge the man with responsibility; but at the same time, it provides a reasonable termination point beyond which men may assume that they are not responsible. The time limit further serves to minimize the special proof problems inherent in paternity actions. See Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978).
Proceedings under
Nor is the mother denied equal protection because she cannot bring a petition under
Moreover, even if the persons were similarly situated, which they are not, it is not the lack of atime limitation in
The second question asks if the court has discretion under
The problems resulting from the separation of the increasing number of unwed parents who have been living together for a period of time as man and wife are rapidly emerging. The legislature has seen fit as yet only to deal in partial fashion with these problems in
Nevertheless, the plain tiff here does notseek custody but only visitation rights, which he claims are being denied him. This court has held that visitation rights of parents are important rights that should not be denied without good cause. Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 99 N.H. 399, 403, 112 A.2d 61, 64 (1955). These rights are based on factors unrelated to marriage between the parents of a legitimated child, and should not depend upon the existence of divorce proceedings where there never was a lawful marriage to be dissolved.
In the circumstances of this case, the child’s relationship with her father during her first three-and-a-half years of life was no different than it would have been if the parents had been lawfully married. The child can be assumed to have come to look upon the plaintiff in the same way as a child born in wedlock looks upon her father, and to have developed the same emotional needs for the father’s companionship and support. Complete denial of visitation rights could have serious adverse effects upon the child. See Starkeson v. Starkeson, 119 N.H. 78, 397 A.2d 1043 (1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
To deny all visitation rights to the child and the plaintiff, as the mother requests, is fair to neither the child nor the father, unless there are unusual circumstances, the existence of which is a matter for determination by the trial court. Absent such circumstances, the right of the child and the father to a continuing relationship should not depend upon legislative enactment. It is a right that has its foundation among those “natural, essential, and inherent rights” thafare recognized in N.H. Const., pt. I, art. 2. The existence of these rights entitles *141 their holder to “a certain remedy.” N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 14. This right to a remedy being a constitutional one, its protection is not dependent upon legislative enactment or grant of authority to the judiciary. The authority of the judiciary to provide a remedy guaranteed by the constitution stems from the constitution itself and is inherent in the very nature of the judicial function.
We hold, therefore, that following legitimation of the child under
The legislature did not include in
Remanded.
Douglas and Brock, JJ., did not sit; the others concurred.