94 Kan. 137 | Kan. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This appeal involves the correctness of certain allowances for attorney’s fees and expenses growing out of a trusteeship. The record is volumi
It appears that for about five years the trustee devoted much time, attention and labor to the trust dur
“The position occupied by the defendants was not without a sanction of authority. Mrs.-and her associates have been advised by Mr. H. M. Jackson, a lawyer of high standing, that their position in the matter was correct, and the District Court of Atchison County had so adjudicated as between the original trustee and the corporation organized to act as a permanent trustee. There was some acquiescence in this disposition of the matter on the part of the officers of
The court, as already stated, expressly found that the trustee “was an attorney at law at Atchison, Kan., of high standing and many years experience as a lawyer,” and we have neither cause nor disposition to overturn this finding or go counter to these views.
That a trustee acting in good faith may be paid a • reasonable allowance out of the fund seems not to be disputed, but it is urged that the sum allowed is too large in any event. But the rule is well supported that when the trustee renders professional services for the benefit of the estate he is. allowed such compensation as is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. (Nelson v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 779, 132 Pac. 1188; Perkins’s Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 314, 56 Am. Rep. 208; Williams v. Gibbes et al., 61 U. S. 535, 15 L. Ed. 1013; 28 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 1044; 39 Cyc. 485.)
Per cents deemed reasonable by other courts under other circumstances are adduced, but they are merely persuasive. Here we have a fund derived from an estate on the Pacific coast, whither the trustee once journeyed in pursuit of knowledge touching the real value of the property. The accounts themselves found in the record give evidence of multifarious transactions, and the matters and mutations not mentioned in the foregoing statement of facts are numerous and full of variety. The trial court, with far better opportunity to weigh and correctly determine the evidence and its effect, deemed the allowance reasonable, and no ground is apparent for disturbing this conclusion.
Notwithstanding all the conflict and rivalry over the fund in controversy, it is pleasing to observe that the entire record sounds no note discordant with the sin
Various questions of law and equity were propounded to the trial court and are argued in the briefs, but their further consideration is unnecessary, for enough has been said to show that the real matter in issue — the trustee’s allowance — is free from material error of which the plaintiffs can complain.
The items going to others for expenses and attorney fees are of still less difficulty and are approved.
Complaint is made that the trial court, under the guise of retaxing costs, changed the judgment or decree as to these allowances, after the term. But the court stated that the decree was prepared by plaintiffs’ attorneys “and was signed by the court without consideration of the matter of costs, and there is undoubtedly authority to retax the costs at the present term.” It it proper at any time to make the journal entry speak the truth, and the motion was to correct the record of the judgment so as to make it speak the truth. (National Bank v. Wentworth, 28 Kan. 183; Chemical Co. v. Morrison, 76 Kan. 799, 92 Pac. 1114; Graden v. Mais, 83 Kan. 481, 112 Pac. 107; The State v. Linderholm, 90 Kan. 489, 493, 135 Pac. 564.) While so correcting the entry the court retaxed certain costs, and in this there was no error. (Linton v.
The decree is affirmed.