LOCKABY v WAYNE COUNTY
Docket No. 20075
Michigan Court of Appeals
August 12, 1975
63 Mich App 185
Submitted February 11, 1975, at Detroit. Leave to appeal applied for.
1. COUNTIES—PRISONERS—GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY—EXCEPTIONS—DANGEROUS CONDITION OF BUILDING—STATUTES.
Failure of a county to provide adequate psychiatric care, medical care, and supervision for a prisoner in the county jail does not result in a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the statute which creates an exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity in the case of a dangerous or defective condition of a public building; the thrust of the statutory exception is to provide redress for injuries sustained because of a structural fault or because of a failure to properly maintain a public building (
2. COUNTIES—PRISONERS—GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY—EXCEPTIONS—DANGEROUS CONDITION OF BUILDING—STATUTES.
Failure to provide a prisoner in a county jail with a padded cell, where the prisoner was evaluated as having a “mental” problem and placed in a ward designated for such individuals, does not bring an action by a prisoner for injuries suffered in his cell within the dangerous or defective public building exception to governmental immunity because that exception deals with the physical structure of the building and cell padding is not a part of the building (
3. COUNTIES—GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY—EXCEPTIONS—STATUTES—USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE.
A county is not liable, under the statute which provides for governmental liability for injuries resulting from the use of a motor vehicle, for injuries to a prisoner incurred in the course of his being placed in an ambulance for transportation from the county jail to a hospital for medical treatment where the ambulance was not in a state of being at work at the time and place the injury was inflicted (
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1-5, 7] 60 Am Jur 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 17, 19, 22-24.
[6] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 675, 676.
A municipally-owned hospital is engaged in a governmental function, not a proprietary function, and thus is clothed with governmental immunity, even though it charges fees for the services it renders.
5. STATUTES—GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The statute which establishes governmental immunity from civil liability is constitutional (
PARTIAL DISSENT BY N. J. KAUFMAN, J.
6. JUDGMENT—ACCELERATED JUDGMENT—QUESTION OF FACT—COURT RULES.
The grant of an accelerated judgment is not proper where the pleadings present a disputed question of fact (GCR 1963, 116.3).
7. COUNTIES—GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY—DANGEROUS CONDITION OF BUILDING—STATUTES—QUESTION OF FACT.
A question of fact as to whether a dangerous condition existed within the meaning of the statutory exception to governmental immunity in the case of a defective or dangerous condition of a public building was presented where a plaintiff, a prisoner in the county jail, alleged that the jail officials were aware of the plaintiff‘s mental instability, took affirmative steps to segregate such potentially unstable inmates, but took no steps to provide the minimum physical protections required for such prisoners (
Appeal from Wayne, George E. Bowles, J. Submitted February 11, 1975, at Detroit. (Docket No. 20075.) Decided August 12, 1975. Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by James H. Lockaby against Wayne County, the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, William Lucas, Sheriff of Wayne County, Frank Wilkerson, Administrator of the Wayne County Jail, the City of Detroit, and the Detroit General Hospital, for damages for injuries suffered while in the custody of the Wayne County Sheriff‘s Department. Summary judgments for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Aloysius J. Suchy, Corporation Counsel, and David J. Curran, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Wayne County, Wayne County Sheriff and Administrator of Wayne County Jail.
Kitch, Suhrheinrich & Getto, P. C. (by Michael L. Freeman), for the City of Detroit and Detroit General Hospital.
Before: DANHOF, P. J., and QUINN and N. J. KAUFMAN, JJ.
DANHOF, P. J. Plaintiff brought a suit to recover for injuries purportedly suffered while in the custody of the Wayne County Sheriff‘s Department and during transportation to and treatment at Detroit General Hospital. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants County of Wayne, Wayne County Board of Commissioners, William Lucas and Frank Wilkerson on April 5, 1974. A motion for summary and/or accelerated judgment was granted in favor of the City of Detroit, and Detroit General Hospital on April 9, 1974. These motions were predicated upon the affirmative defense of governmental immunity.1 Plaintiff appeals raising four issues; we affirm.
On June 29, 1971 plaintiff was picked up by the police while hitchhiking on an interstate expressway. He was arraigned and taken to the Wayne
On appeal, plaintiff argues that his complaint stated a cause of action coming within the public buildings exception of the statutory provisions establishing governmental immunity,
Plaintiff relies on Green v Department of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491 (1971), for the proposition that a correctional facility is a “public building” within the meaning of the statute. Recognizing that in Green it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the machine by which he was injured was a physical part of the building so as to be a “defective condition of a public build-
Plaintiff argues that the failure to provide adequate psychiatric and medical care, the failure to provide adequate supervision, and the failure to provide padded cells resulted in a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the statute. These deficiencies, with the possible exception of the last, have to do with providing human services, and not with the physical structure of the building. The statutory exception dealing in express terms with public buildings cannot be invoked under these circumstances.
The entire thrust of the statutory exception is to provide redress for injuries sustained due to a structural fault or to the failure to properly maintain a public building. Any laxity in the present case is in the failure to provide additional restraining equipment, and to diagnose the plaintiff‘s condition as potentially hazardous. As to the failure to provide a padded cell, cell padding has not been shown to be more a part of the building than the “mini-trampoline” which was held in Cody v Southfield-Lathrup School District, 25 Mich App 33, 38-39; 181 NW2d 81 (1970), not to come within this exception. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff‘s claim did not come within the dangerous or defective public building
The next issue raised by the plaintiff involves the assertion that the trial court erred in ruling that the motor vehicle exception to the governmental immunity provision did not apply in this case. Plaintiff contends that he suffered further injury as a result of the ambulance ride from the jail to the hospital and that he may maintain an action under the terms of
Although plaintiff was allowed to file an amended complaint, he merely reasserted a general allegation of negligence. He “did not set forth facts sufficient to reasonably apprise the defendant of the nature of the cause he was called upon to defend“. McLaughlin v Consumers Power Co, 52 Mich App 663, 668; 218 NW2d 122 (1974), GCR 1963, 111.1.
The only specific statement of fact related to plaintiff‘s allegation that he was injured by a motor vehicle, consists of his assertion that he was placed in the ambulance “carelessly and with excessive force“. Under the test set forth in the case of Orlowski v Jackson State Prison, 36 Mich App 113, 116; 193 NW2d 206 (1971), the ambulance was not in operation within the meaning of the statute because the ambulance was not in a “state of being at work * * * at the time and place the injury is inflicted“. See also McNees v Scholley, 46 Mich App 702, 706; 208 NW2d 643 (1973).
Plaintiff maintains that his cause of action against defendant Detroit General Hospital is not barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity because the hospital is engaged in a proprietary function in that charges are made for the services it renders. This argument was considered and
Lastly, while conceding that the question has been decided by this Court, plaintiff contends that the statute establishing governmental immunity,
Affirmed.
QUINN, J., concurred.
N. J. KAUFMAN, J. (dissenting in part, concurring in part). The trial court granted defendant an accelerated judgment based on the provisions of GCR 1963, 116.1(2), that “the court lack[ed] jurisdiction of the subject matter“. The procedure for determining a motion based on this rule is provided in GCR 1963, 116.3 which states in relevant part:
“As to defenses and objections based upon * * * (2), * * * in sub-rule 116.1, the court may order immediate trial of any disputed questions of fact, and judgment may be rendered forthwith if the proof shows that the moving party is entitled to judgment upon the facts as determined; or the court may postpone the hearing on the matter until the trial on the merits.”
I find that plaintiff‘s pleadings presented a disputed question of fact for jury determination, viz. whether plaintiff‘s injuries arose from the dangerous condition of defendant‘s (Wayne County‘s) building. The statute under which plaintiff asserted an exemption from defendant‘s claim of governmental immunity,
“Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The pleadings showed that the jail officials were aware of plaintiff‘s mental instability. They show that the jailers placed plaintiff in an area reserved for individuals with such propensities and that the jail officials took affirmative steps to recognize and segregate such potentially unstable inmates. Plain-
I cannot agree with the majority‘s statement that “as to the failure to provide a padded cell, cell padding has not been shown to be more a part of the building than the ‘mini-trampoline’ which was held in Cody v Southfield-Lathrup School District, 25 Mich App 33, 38-39; 181 NW2d 81 (1970), not to come within this exception“. First, the plaintiff in Cody did not, as did plaintiff here, allege any facts to show that defendants had allowed a “dangerous condition“, within the meaning of the statute, to exist. As the Cody court noted:
“Their action was based solely on the alleged negligence of the defendants. They assert the injuries were caused by the child‘s use of the ‘mini-trampoline‘, an object in the building, but in no way attached to it. * * *
“A ‘mini-trampoline‘, which plaintiffs have never alleged to be improperly manufactured, negligently erected, or dangerously maintained, is not within the exception.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id., pp 38-39.
Plaintiff here, by alleging the facts I noted above, has presented enough to constitute a factual dispute within the statutory exception. Second, bare walls or iron bars are clearly as much a part of the Wayne County Jail as was the machine which the Supreme Court, in Green v Department of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491 (1971), found to be part of the building. Finally, Cody stressed the portion of the statute which relates to
I concur in the majority‘s disposition of the other issues involved here. I would remand this case to the trial court for a trial to determine the applicability of the building exception to defendant‘s (Wayne County‘s) statutory immunity. I agree with the learned trial judge‘s dismissal of claims against all defendants except for Wayne County.