102 Pa. 481 | Pa. | 1883
delivered the opinion of the court, April 2d 1883.
_ The learned judge of the court below said to the jury in his charge, “ If the Building Association gave Mrs. Lochman credit for the amount of money which they would have had to draw from the sheriff, and which it is admitted on the part of the president they did not draw, but agreed with Mrs. Lochman that they would give her credit upon her own separate estate, they were at liberty to do so, and if she thus consummated the sale it would make a good title in her.” After referring to the testimony on the question whether Mrs. Lochman had a separate estate at the time of the purchase of the property in question, the judge instructed the jury positively that she had a separate estate, and then in the latter part of the charge, recurring to the subject, he said, “ You will in the next place inquire whether the Building Association when they made the arrangement alleged to have been made by the defendant, did give Mrs. Lochman the credit (I refer now to the arrangement by which they agreed not to demand the money they had to receive from the sheriff from him but entered into this contract with Mrs. Lochman) and whether they gave her that credit on the strength of her separate estate. If you find it proved clearly, fully and satisfactorily that they did, then that branch of the case will be decided in favor of Mrs. Lochman, the defendant.” The learned counsel for the plaintiffs in error complain that the court charged the jury “ that a married woman under no circumstances can purchase upon credit,” and then to convict the court of error, they cite the decisions of this court that a married woman may purchase property wholly upon
This doctrine has been held in many cases and we certainly do not mean to abarfdon it yet. In Barringer v. Stiver, 13 Wr. 129, it was well expressed by Mr. Justice Agnew : “We adhere to the settled doctrine, that it is only where the property acquired after marriage has been paid for with her own separate estate, clearly and satisfactorily established, it is hers, and is protected from her husband’s creditors. To suffer a wife to purchase upon credit, is to open a wide door for fraud. Its effect is to throw upon the creditors the burden of proving whose fund afterwards entered into the payment. For starting with title founded on her credit, she can stand upon it, until the husband’s means can be shown to enter into the purchase.” We do not understand the answers to the plaintiff’s fourth point and the defendant’s second point, to be obnoxious to the criticism made upon them by the learned counsel for plaintiffs in error. Evidently what the court meant to say, and in reality did say, was that a purchase by a married woman upon her bare credit, unsupported by a separate estate, would give her no title. This is manifest by the concluding clause of the answer to defendant’s second point: “ The purchase must have been upon the credit of her separate estate.” This is exactly what we said in Sixbee v. Bowen, 10 Norr. 149. “ She is not precluded from buying on credit, but
it is incumbent oh her to show that her separate estate was the foundation of her credit.” And in Seeds v. Kahler, 26 P. F. S. 262, it is said, “ It is well settled, that when the wife has a separate estate, and she buys property on the credit of that separate estate, she may7 hold it against the creditors of her husband.”
It seems to be contended for the plaintiffs in error that if a
Judgment affirmed.