LOCAL LODGE NO. 1424, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
No. 44
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 11, 1960.---Decided April 25, 1960.
362 U.S. 411
Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Rothman, Thomas J. McDermott and Dominick L. Manoli.
J. Albert Woll, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioners.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question we decide in this case is whether unfair labor practice complaints, whose charges against these petitioners were sustained by the National Labor Rela-
“Provided . . . no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made . . . .”
On August 10, 1954, petitioners Bryan Manufacturing Company and the International Association of Machinists, AFL, entered into a collective bargaining agreement for a unit of Bryan‘s employees. The agreement, as later supplemented in certain respects not material to this litigation, contained the conventional provisions, of which two are relevant here: the “recognition” clause, by which the Union was recognized as “the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all employees” in the unit; and the “union security” clause, by which all employees were required, subject to a 45-day grace period, to become and remain members of the Union. On August 30, 1955, a new agreement was entered into, with Bryan, the Union, and petitioner Local Lodge No. 1424, IAM, as signatories, replacing the old agreement and applying additionally to employees at a newly opened plant as well as to those covered by the original agreement.
When the original agreement was executed on August 10, 1954, the Union did not represent a majority of the employees covered by it.1 Under
In June and August 1955, 10 months and 12 months after the execution of the original agreement, charges were filed with the Board and served upon the petitioners, alleging the Union‘s lack of majority status at the time of execution and the consequent illegality of the continued enforcement of the agreement. Complaints were thereafter issued by the Board‘s General Counsel against the Union and the Company. Petitioners contended before the Board that the complaints were barred by the limitations proviso of
We first note the opposing contentions of the parties. The Board starts with the premise that a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union security clause valid on its face, but which was entered into when the Union did not have a majority status, gives rise to two independent unfair labor practices, one being the execution of the agreement, the other arising from its continued enforcement. Conceding that a complaint predicated on the execution of the agreement here challenged was barred by limitations, the Board contends that its complaint was nonetheless timely since it was “based upon” the parties’ continued enforcement, within the period of limitations, of the union security clause. It is then said that even though the former was itself time-barred, the unlawful execution of the agreement was nevertheless “relevant in determining whether conduct within the 6-month period was unlawful,” 119 N. L. R. B., at 504; and that evidence as to it was admissible because
On the other hand, petitioners contend that, standing alone, the union security clause and its enforcement were wholly innocent; that they were tainted only by virtue of the original unlawful execution of the agreement; and that since a complaint based upon that unfair labor practice was barred by limitations, that event itself could not be utilized to infuse with illegality the otherwise legal union security clause or its enforcement. They say, in short, that to apply in this situation the doctrine that
It is doubtless true that
The situation before us is of this latter variety, for the entire foundation of the unfair labor practice charged was the Union‘s time-barred lack of majority status when the original collective bargaining agreement was signed. In the absence of that fact enforcement of this otherwise valid union security clause was wholly benign.7 The
“The General Counsel concedes that the 6-month limitation of Section 10 (b) of the Act precludes currently finding the execution8 of the 1954 agreement to be an unfair labor practice, and also precludes currently finding its enforcement to be an unfair labor practice . . . at any time prior to the . . . periods beginning 6 months prior to the . . . charges . . . . However, this concession in no way detracts from the crucial nature of the earlier events, because at the core of the General Counsel‘s contentions as to all of the unfair labor practices is his fundamental position that, because of the circumstances prevailing when made, the original union-security agreement of 1954 has never been valid or legal, since it has never met certain overriding requirements of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 530. (Emphasis added, except as indicated.)9
Our view of the matter is lent support by the attitude of the Board itself, whose previous decisions, albeit not always with unanimity among its members or even perhaps with perfect consistency, have recognized that evidentiary rules as to past events must be regarded differently in the two situations we have already depicted. Compare, e. g., Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N. L. R. B. 1193, where evidence as to events during the barred period was used to illuminate current conduct claimed in itself to be
The applicability of these principles cannot be avoided here by invoking the doctrine of continuing violation. It may be conceded that the continued enforcement, as well as the execution, of this collective bargaining agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice, and that these are two logically separate violations, independent in the sense that they can be described in discrete terms.
“. . . the circumstances which cause the agreement to be invalid existed only at the point in time in the past when the agreement was executed and are not thereafter repeated. For this reason, therefore, the continuing invalidity of the agreement is directly related to and is based solely on its initial invalidity, and has no continuing independent basis.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 516.
In any real sense, then, the complaints in this case are “based upon” the unlawful execution of the agreement, for its enforcement, though continuing, is a continuing violation solely by reason of circumstances existing only at the date of execution. To justify reliance on those circumstances on the ground that the maintenance in effect of the agreement is a continuing violation is to support a lifting of the limitations bar by a characterization which becomes apt only when that bar has already been lifted. Put another way, if the
It is apparently not disputed that the Board‘s position would withdraw virtually all limitations protection from collective bargaining agreements attacked on the ground asserted here. For, once the principle on which the decision below rests is accepted, so long as the contract---or any renewal thereof---is still in effect, the six-month period does not even begin to run. Cf. Bowen Products Corp., supra, at 732. In Lively Photos, Inc., 123 N. L. R. B. 1054, the Board unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of the case at bar to an attack upon an agreement executed more than three and one-half years prior to the filing of the charge. The cease-and-desist order entered in that case directed the severance of a bargaining relationship which had been initiated five years earlier. A doctrine which does such disservice to stability of bargaining relationships could be upheld, in light of the language and evident purpose of
Four years prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, of which the
“The principal substantive change in this section is a provision for a 6-month period of limitations upon the filing of charges. The Board itself by adopting a doctrine of laches has to some extent discouraged dilatory filing of charges, and a rider to the current appropriations bill (which if this amendment was adopted would no longer be necessary) contains a 3-month period of limitations with respect to certain kinds of unfair labor practices.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 26. (Emphasis added.)
This language cannot be squared with an interpretation of
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
While agreeing with my Brother WHITTAKER‘S grounds for dissenting, I should like to add confirming considerations for his conclusion. At a time when the union did not represent a majority of employees, union and employer entered into a collective bargaining agreement, containing a “union security” clause compelling all employees to become members of the union. Under principles accepted by the Court, this constituted an “unfair labor practice,” for it tended “to restrain or coerce employees” in the exercise of their right “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” Union and employer continued to carry out the terms of
Ten months after the collective agreement was first entered into, but while its terms continued to be actively carried out, an unfair labor practice charge against the union and employer was filed with the Board. Plainly, the continuing unfair labor practice of maintaining the collective agreement illegally entered into did occur within six months of the filing of the charge. The Court accepts this as true. But the Court holds that a charge based upon that continuing unfair practice is time-barred.
The applicable statute of limitations provides: “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.” The Court relies on the fact that the active carrying out of the agreement, concededly an unfair practice occurring within six months, is revealed as unlawful only by reason of the unlawful character of the agreement at its inception, specifically, the fact that the union did not represent a majority of employees at that time. The Court concludes that the action is barred because the inception of the unlawful agreement was outside of the statutory period.
Such an interpretation, I respectfully submit, is not to enforce congressional legislation, which is our task, but is to fashion linguistic legislation and then apply it. Instead of barring only those complaints “based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge,” the statute is made to read “based upon any unfair labor practice having had its inception
I see no justification for such rewriting of what Congress wrote. The legislative history recited by the Court makes no such demand. Congress no doubt wanted to put stale claims to rest, and it did so by a relatively short statute of limitations for permitting claims to be brought to litigation. If six months are allowed to pass by without a charge against an unfair labor practice being filed, Congress said that is an end of the matter, and a charge cannot be filed thereafter. But Congress did not say that if a charge is filed within six months of the occurrence of an unfair practice, that cannot be halted, that cannot be proceeded against, if such labor practice had its inception more than six months before. On the contrary, what I deem a controlling analogy leads me to apply the statute as I find it, and to bar complaints only when based upon active occurrences not falling within the six-month period. I find that analogy in the treatment of the same kind of problem in cases where a conspiracy is entered into before a statutory period but is actively kept alive within that period.
The essence of the unfair labor practice involved in this case is the making and maintaining of an illegal agreement between union and employee. Suppose that Congress, having defined such an agreement to be an unfair labor practice, had subjected it not only to civil remedies but had also made it a misdemeanor. That is by no means a fanciful supposition. The federal antitrust statutes are a prominent instance of the use of the criminal law,
To find a cognate statute of limitations to be a bar to such a case would be to ignore the applicable precedents. The rules set out by this Court for applying statutes of limitations to conspiracy cases are clearly otherwise. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601; Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 367-370; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392, 400-401; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 216; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 396-397. “The statute of limitations, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy.” Fiswick v. United States, supra, at 216. And these cases show that this principle applies even when, as here, the overt acts within the statutory period derive their illegal significance only when interpreted in light of an illegal agreement which was initiated prior to the statutory period for bringing a charge. Certainly, the illegalities committed within the six-months period in this case, to the same degree as overt acts in pursuance of a conspiracy already formed, represent “a renewed affirmation of the unlawful purpose,” expressed in an agreement which Congress has outlawed as an unfair labor practice. A conspiracy is kept alive by an overt act within the period of the statute of limitations not by reason of some dogmatic postulate relevant to conspiracies, but as a result
I am baffled to understand why the present case should be different from what it would be were it a prosecution for criminal conspiracy, rather than a civil proceeding based on an agreement giving rise to an unfair labor practice.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins, dissenting.
The Court correctly recognizes (1) that it is violative of employees’ rights guaranteed by
Despite the foregoing, the Court holds, I think, with deference, quite inconsistently and erroneously, that
The Court, noting the employer-union contention that the contract was “tainted” only by its “unlawful execution,” and that “since a complaint based upon that unfair labor practice [would be] barred” by
Surely the fact that a prosecution for the making of a “tainted” contract is barred by limitations does not “infuse” the “tainted” contract with legality. Moreover, I respectfully submit that the complaint here was not based upon the “tainted” contract, and that its unlawful execution was not utilized “to infuse [the always illegal contract] with illegality.” Rather, the complaint here was based upon and limited to independent acts of the employer and the union, committed within six months preceding the filing and service of the charge, that deprived the employees of rights guaranteed to them by
It is important carefully to note what it is that
But the Court holds that, although
In Federal Trade Comm‘n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, this Court held it to be:
“well within the established judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent transactions, which for some reason are barred from forming the basis for a suit, may nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 46-47; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 43-44.” 333 U. S., at 705.
In the Katz case, almost identical with this one on the point in issue, the Court specifically rejected the contention that, inasmuch as more than six months had expired from the date of the execution of the tainted contract, the complaint, based upon acts occurring within six months of the charge, was barred by
“While . . . the mere execution of the agreement on December 17, 1948, constituted an unfair labor practice, there is no doubt but that the continuous enforcement of the agreement thereafter within the six months period prior to the filing of the charge, was an unfair labor practice, and with respect to this continued and continuous enforcement of the illegal union shop agreement, the prosecution of the proceeding was not barred by limitations.” 196 F. 2d, at 415.
In the Gaynor case, the Court, after pointing out that although the tainted contract had been executed more than six months prior to the filing of the charge, and its execution was therefore barred as an independent subject of punishment by
Although still recognizing that enforcement of a tainted labor contract “is a continuing violation” of the law, the Court further says that this is true “solely by reason of circumstances existing only at the date of execution“; and it therefore concludes that evidence of the taint is inadmissible in a proceeding to punish unlawful conduct occurring from enforcement of the contract within six months of the filing of a charge. I respectfully submit it is plain that this reasoning negates the conceded rule that enforcement of a tainted contract is “a continuing offense.” The Court‘s reasoning, inconsistently, would at once both recognize, and deny any means of proving, the “continuing offense.”
Analytical curiosity provokes the query whether such an illegal contract, openly posted in the plant but not made effective in practice until the first day of the seventh month, would then become so “infused” with legality as to be unassailable by the employees---not because its enforcement is not “a continuing offense,” but, rather, because, under the Court‘s rule, there can be no competent evidence of its illegality. If so, the rule of “continuing offense” is utterly destroyed. If not, the Court‘s rule that there can be no competent evidence of the continuing violation must give way. The two theories are diametrically opposed and self-destructive.
But there is even a more fundamental consideration which, for me, settles this issue beyond all controversy. While it is the burden of the General Counsel of the Board
The Court attributes to its rule the virtues of quieting “stale claims” and of “stabiliz[ing] existing bargaining relationships.” I cannot agree that it would do either, for employee rights, occurring within six months of the filing of the charge, are not “stale claims,” and deprivation of those rights which, as the Court of Appeals said, “rankles at least once a month in the mind of [the employees] offended,” is not conducive to industrial peace and would not---certainly not legally---“stabilize existing bargaining relationships.” At all events, and however this may be, these matters were for Congress; and the cardinal pur-
Believing that the Board and the Court of Appeals correctly decided this case, I would affirm the judgment.
Notes
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).”
“(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer---
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
“(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . .
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, . . . if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made; . . .
“(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents---
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: . . .
“(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) . . . .”
The most frequently cited Board expression of this principle is that found in Axelson Mfg. Co., 88 N. L. R. B. 761, 766:
“As I interpret the statute however, Section 10 (b) enacts a statute of limitations and not a rule of evidence. It forbids the issuance of complaints and, consequently, findings of violation of the statute in conduct not within the 6 months’ period. But it does not, as I construe it, forbid the introduction of relevant evidence bearing on the issue as to whether a violation has occurred during the 6 months’ period. Events obscure, ambiguous, or even meaningless when viewed in isolation may, like the component parts of an equation, become clear, definitive, and informative when considered in relation to other action. Conduct, like language, takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it occurs. Congress can scarcely have intended that the Board, in the performance of its duty to decide the validity of conduct within the 6 months’ period, should ignore reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as to the meaning and the nature of the conduct. Had such been the intent, it seems reasonable to assume that it would have been stated.”
The Board, however, has developed certain limits on the applicability of this principle. See p. 421, post, and note 13.
The Examiner‘s Report shows the pertinency of this statutory purpose in the present case. In his analysis of the evidence, he observed:
“It is evident that with many witnesses testifying as to numerous different matters, it would protract this report greatly to summarize all of the testimony, or to spell out fully the confusion and inconsistencies therein, much of which is not too surprising, in view of the fact that, with respect to the events of August 1954 [the events ‘at the core’ of the allegations of illegality], there had been a lapse of almost 15 months before testimony was given in November 1955.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 529.
In Bowen Products an employee recalled from layoff was discriminatorily placed at the bottom of the relevant seniority list. He unsuccessfully attempted to obtain his proper seniority rating, and several months later was included in an economic reduction in force. Had his seniority originally been properly computed, he would not have been laid off at that time. The charge was filed and served within six months of the layoff, but more than six months after the original determination of seniority status. Finding that the only basis for a holding of unlawful layoff would be a finding that that determination had been a violation of the Act, the Board dismissed the complaint.
Greenville Cotton Oil (American Federation of Grain Millers) dealt with an alleged discriminatory refusal to reinstate strikers. Conceding that the respondent had engaged permanent replacements, the strikers demanded reinstatement on the ground that the strike had been caused or prolonged by an unfair labor practice committed by the employer prior to the hiring of the replacements. The acts alleged to have constituted such unfair practices having taken place more than six months prior to the filing and service of the charge, the Board held
The complaint in News Printing Co. alleged that a refusal to grant wage increases to certain employees had been motivated by displeasure at their union activities. As a substantive matter, this allegation turned on the respondent‘s motive at the time of the refusal, which was within the limitations period. However, the General Counsel was unable to produce sufficient evidence, from within that period, to prove discriminatory motive, and the Board refused to permit reliance on evidence relating to acts occurring prior to the six-month period. The contention that such earlier acts could be referred to in order to justify the inference that the “pattern of unlawful conduct . . . continued on into the present situation” was rejected. 116 N. L. R. B., at 211. Compare Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 119 N. L. R. B. 785, 786, 799, enforcement granted, 260 F. 2d 109, where the presence of substantial post-limitations evidence was held to justify resort to evidence of earlier conduct.
The Universal Oil Products and Tennessee Knitting Mills cases concerned allegations that respondent employers had dominated or assisted labor organizations. Here again, the material issue was as to the relationship of the respondents to the unions involved, as of the date of the charge. Yet in both cases, because the evidence from within the statutory period was too sketchy to warrant a finding of unlawful conduct, the Board refused to permit reference to evidence from the earlier period, declining to rely on an inference that earlier unlawful relationships continued.
While it is true that in Paint, Varnish & Lacquer Makers Union (Andrew Brown Co.), 120 N. L. R. B. 1425, the Board found union
picketing during the six-month period to have been undertaken for the unlawful purpose of obtaining recognition, although the only affirmative evidence of such purpose was based on acts done prior to that period, the decision is not inconsistent, so far as presently relevant, with the cases discussed above. Substantial evidence of purpose from within the limitations period was found in reliance on the inference that the earlier motive had continued unchanged. Id., at 1428, 1438. While the permissibility of an inference of this nature was rejected in the preceding cases, we need not now inquire into this seeming disparity of treatment, for it affects the minor premise only, and does not impair the accuracy of the proposition that, however marshalled, acts within the limitations period must under Board doctrine yield some substantial evidence of unlawful conduct.
Katz v. Labor Board, 196 F. 2d 411, and Labor Board v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F. 2d 719, relied on below and in dissent here, arose under provisions of the Act (
We think the rule in conspiracy cases, where the statute of limitations only begins to run upon the commission of the last overt act in furtherance thereof, does not furnish a useful analogy in this case. The statute in question here bars issuance of a complaint “based upon any unfair labor practice” which occurred more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge; it does not merely bar proceedings against an unfair labor practice which are not commenced within six months after that unfair labor practice has been committed. Cf.Adoption of a six-month period of limitations, criticized by opponents of the legislation as “the shortest statute of limitations known to the law,” S. Rep. No. 105 (pt. II), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (Minority Report), was resisted on the ground that it gave “unjust assistance to employers or unions which commit those types of practices which are easily concealed and difficult to detect.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4905 (remarks of Sen. Murray).
It need hardly be pointed out that we are not dealing with a case of fraudulent concealment alleged to toll the statute. See 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 110, 264 F. 2d, at 583 (dissenting opinion).