Local Division 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

732, AMALGAMATED LOCAL DIVISION UNION, Plaintiff-Appellee,

TRANSIT ATLANTA METROPOLITAN RAPID AUTHORITY, TRANSIT Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-7613. Appeals, United States Court of Eleventh Circuit.

Jan.

I. Transportation

The Urban Mass Act of (UMTA) agen- enables state and local cies to obtain federal assistance to finance mass transportation services in urban areas. 49 U.S.C. Section Act, 1609(c) (1976), the estab- U.S.C. § Kutak, Huie, Rock & Lawrence L. any lishes as a “condition of assistance ... Croft, Atlanta, Thompson, Lee Terrence equitable fair arrangements and are Ga., defendant-appellant. for made, by as Secretary determined of Labor, protect employees the interests of Orlove, Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Linda by affected such assistance.” The section Hirshman, 111., Chicago, Dix- R. Sinclair & requires further protective labor Ga., on, Sinclair, Jr., Atlanta, Clayton arrangements provisions include such as plaintiff-appellee. may necessary be to certain enumerated

objectives. Finally, 13(c) directs that the “terms and conditions of the ar- rangements” specified shall be in the GODBOLD, Judge, Before Chief TJO- authority contract between the local and VANCE, Judges. FLAT and Circuit government.1 the federal practice, protective arrangements pursuant made TJOFLAT, Judge: Circuit (13(c) agreements written agreements) negotiated appli- between the 732, Amalgamated Local Division Transit bargain- cant for federal assistance and the (the Union) brought Union this action ing representative employees of its and against Metropolitan Rapid Atlanta approved by then the Secretary of Labor. (MARTA) Authority seeking Transit to re- terminating strain MARTA from cost of MARTA, public body corporate provid- living represented allowances to MARTA Atlanta, ing Georgia, transit service in has employees pending arbitration of a new col- grants acquisition, received for the bargaining agreement. lective The district improvement, operation of its bus and court, F.Supp. prelimi- entered a system. grant applicant, rail transit As a nary injunction enjoining MARTA from 13(c) agreements MARTA has entered into withholding living the cost of allowance Union, at with the which is the collective bar- existing day the levels on last gaining representative for a unit of MAR- recently expired bargaining collective employees. TA’s The most recent such agreement. Because the district court agreement February was executed on 1977, and, lacked matter predecessors, over this like its was deter- case, we vacate its order and remand with by Secretary mined of Labor to be a instructions to equitable protective arrangement. dismiss. fair and 13(c) provides respect (4) employment; 1. Section in full: sitions with to their employment employees assurances of quired of ac- (c) any It shall be a condition of assistance transportation systems priori- mass under section 1602 of this title that fair and ty reemployment employees of of terminated or made, arrangements are as deter- off; (5) paid training retraining Labor, laid or protect mined programs. Such shall include employees interests of affected such assist- provisions protecting employees protective arrangements individual ance. Such clude, in- shall to, against worsening positions being provisions of their with re- without limited such necessary (1) preservation spect employment as to their which shall in no privileges, (including provide rights, and benefits con- event benefits less than those estab- pension benefits) rights pursuant 5(2)(f) lished to section of this title. tinuation existing bargaining agreements granting any or collective contract for such as- otherwise; (2) specify continuation of collective sistance shall the terms and conditions protection bargaining rights; (3) the of individ- protective arrangements. worsening po- employees against their ual (20) Paragraph agree- of the 1977 Alleging that cessation pay- of COLA provides ment that: provision ments para- would violate the dispute In case graph ... which 20 of the 1977 bargaining cannot settled collective all contract conditions remain undisturbed sixty (60) days, within dispute such arbitration, pending and would therefore controversy may be submitted at 13(c), violate UMTA the Union com- request party written of either hereto to menced this on action June seek- pro- a board of arbitration hereinafter ing enjoin discontinuing MARTA from by majority vided .... The decision vote payments pending COLA arbitration of the final, of the arbitration board shall be bargaining agreement. new collective binding and conclusive: all contract con- complaint predicated jurisdiction on the undisturbed, ditions shall remain there UMTA and on 28 U.S.C. lock-outs, strikes, shall be no walk-outs or Following hearings on Union’s motion interruption interference with or order, a temporary restraining the dis- operations during MARTA the arbitra- trict court treated the motion as a motion tion proceedings upset preliminary injunction for a orally en- Except award.. .. where arbitration is joined MARTA withholding from COLA requested hereinabove, provided as noth- 27, payments at June levels. The ing Agreement in this shall be construed court subsequently findings entered of fact enlarge party or limit the any preliminarily conclusions of law and utilize, upon expiration col- enjoined withholding MARTA “from COLA lective bargaining agreement, any eco- payments existing at the levels on June nomic measures that are not inconsistent day last or in applicable [labor conflict with laws. contract].” (Emphasis added.) points MARTA appeal: raises three on (1) that midnight subject

Until the district court on June lacked Un- jurisdiction; (2) ion and MARTA parties were also to a matter that the Union’s three-year bargaining agreement complaint collective failed upon to state claim which (the contract). labor The labor contract granted relief could be because there is no represented entitled employees to receive private federal cause of action to enforce quarterly twelve Living Cost of Allowances labor (COLA’s) computed with reference to the 13(c); (3) UMTA Norris-LaGuar- Consumer Price Index. precludes injunctive dia Act such relief as granted. the district court We conclude April On MARTA notified the that the district court Union that it lacked would matter terminate the labor upon Therefore, contract over its June 27 this case.2 expiration and negotiate that it desired to reaching a new without collective the Norris-LaGuardia is- bargaining agreement. 25, 1981, sue, On June we remand with instructions to dismiss. requested the Union arbitration

terms and conditions of new collective II. bargaining agreement, parties pro- and the of federal courts ceeded to arbitration. Also on June is, course, limited; the federal district MARTA informed the Union that since the court only exercise obligation COLA terminated upon expi- Congress contract, prescribed. has ration of Chicot MARTA would County Drainage paying cease on COLA’s June 27. District v. Baxter Elimina- State Bank, 371, 376, tion of the COLA would reduce the affected U.S.

employees’ by (1940); salaries approximately 25%. L.Ed. 329 Marshall v. Gibson’sProd- here, When, inquiry ally cognizable right as inevitably the essential merge. is wheth- of action implic- p. Therefore, er a although substantive enactment embodies an See text at infra. jurisdictional grant, question jurisdic- opinion on focuses in- question tion and the whether there is a feder- ucts, Inc., 1978).3 13(c) F.2d breach a is to vio- principle Congress UMTA, corollary Congress A to this is that late the implicitly did de- juris may withhold from the federal courts party injured by clare that a breach of a despite 13(c) diction over a class of cases agreement could seek his contract judicial inclusion that class within the remedy in federal district court. Under the power of the United States defined in arti theory, former the action is for violation of III, cle 2 of the Constitution.4 Sheldon a federal prohibiting statute breaches of Sill, How.) 441, 448, 12 (8 L.Ed. 1147 13(c) agreements; theory, under the latter (1850); America, Turner v. Bank of North 4 the action is for breach of contract —a claim (4 Dall.) 7, 11, (1799); 1 L.Ed. 718 cognizable rendered federal court Marshall, proceed 672. We Congress’ implicit grant jurisdiction. articulating in turn the theories of action below, For the reasons stated we con- complaint advanced in the Union’s clude that inquiry into whether determining to each implicitly provided 13(c) that breaches of prescribed has agreements are violations of federal statu- complaint alleges that MARTA’s ter- tory law would be misdirected and fruitless payments mination of COLA constitutes a and, part,5 for the most would not even 13(c) agreement. breach of the 1977 Even interest, serve the Union’s given our will- though inspired ingness inquire whether the UMTA im- agreement, dispute the Union does not plicitly grants jurisdic- to the district courts complaint alleging agree- a breach of the tion over actions for breach of ment, more, only without would set forth a agreements. reject We therefore the Un- private breach of a contract and would not theory ion’s prolonged analysis without invoke federal devote our serious consideration to the al- theory. ternative complaint alleges further that breach 13(c) agreement a violates UMTA First, the argue, Union does not and the 13(c). argues by The Union that condi- belies, legislative history that there is tioning financial assistance on the execution remedy, implied otherwise, for the statu- of fair as de- tory violation the alleges. Union un- Labor, by termined by theory, plaintiff der Union’s a alleging commanding grant specify that the contract 13(c) a violation of UMTA via a breach of the terms and conditions of arrange- such 13(c) agreement remedy can seek no other ments, Congress implicitly required that than the common law remedies for breach grant recipients comply pro- with the labor 13(c) underlying agreement. this, arrangements. tective argu- From irony theory apparent: of the Union’s is proceeds, ment it follows that there is an party aggrieved by 13(c) a breach of a implied grant jurisdiction of federal within agreement, being limited to common law or, least, “arising the UMTA at the under” remedies, allege contract will the statutory (1976) under 28 U.S.C. § solely violation as a device. 13(c). over actions to enforce § then, Functionally, implicit statutory provision

It is necessary distinguish hypothesizes which the between the Union (“The theory just parties Union’s as we have paraphrased arrangement pur- to an made it and an alternative theory, namely, that suant to this subsection comply shall with though Congress implicitly did not declare arrange- terms and conditions of such quiry, point precedent employs we discuss MARTA’s second Fifth Circuit the first

necessary. person plural discussing Fifth Circuit cases. Exceptional self-executing grant jur- is the by by 3. We are bound decisions rendered Supreme III, isdiction in article Appeals Court of for the Fifth Circuit before 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution. See Marshall v. September the close of business on Products, Gibson’s 584 F.2d at n.4. City Prichard, Bonner v. 661 F.2d 1206 1981). opinion This therefore relies on 5. See note infra. ment; any Finally, breach thereof shall be viola- by the method which we would subsection”) equivalent tion of this is to the implies ascertain whether the UMTA a stat- implicit jurisdictional grant.6 alternative utory violation for breach of agree- persuade This give alone would us to seri- ment is the same method we will only theory. ous consideration to the latter implies ascertain whether the UMTA feder- al over an action for breach of a Our is reading view buttressed a close 13(c) agreement. instances, Amalgamated of Local Division In both we Transit District, Union Greater Portland Transit legislative history would examine the 1978) There, (1st (Portland). congressional determine legis- intent. The Circuit, Appeals the Court of for the First history lative of the UMTA does not offer holding noncompliance while with a smoking gun the kind of that would make protective arrangement violates what, precisely clear if anything, Congress 13(e), id. at was thereafter imply intended to into statute. If we incapable speaking in terms of a statuto- legislative were to conclude that the history ry violation rather than in terms of a manifested the intent a party injured breach of contract. The Portland court 13(c) agreement breach of a be able to stated: court, sue in federal profit it would Having concluded that § contem- nothing jurisdiction7 Union in terms of plates grant recipient that a up live us conclude further in- the labor arrangements upon tended that the action be a statutory conditioned, which its and that Indeed, violation. it would be ludicrous to noncompliance 13(c), therefore violates § Congress, conclude solely in order to aspect inquiry next is whether create federal over this class there is a federal remedy availa- cases, chose the implic- convoluted route of ble to the Union for breach of such an itly commanding compliance with arrangement. agreements and implicitly granting then added). And, Id. (emphasis jurisdiction over cases alleging violations We ... conclude that the Union does command, that preference to the direct a action, have implied federal cause of route granting jurisdiction over actions 13(c), from UMTA to pro- § enforce labor 13(c) agreements. breaches arrangements.... tective reasons, For these we decline to entertain (footnotes omitted) Id. at 16 (emphasis add- further theory the that breach of a ed). The language italicized demonstrates agreement violation, a statutory is and we that the recognized, Portland court despite proceed to consider straight the more for- the holding, formulation of its that a law- ward contention that arising Congress, suit out in order of a breach of the terms of 13(c) agreement a ensure that is at bottom an action on a with, contract and complied not an action on a statutory implicitly provided a fed- violation. eral forum remedy for suits to their breach. inaccurate; 6. The equivalent Union maintains that since breach of a rejecting prop- is the 13(c) agreement is a violation of UMTA agreement osition that breach of vio- 13(c), § the Union has an action under 42 lates the UMTA we an foreclose award of attor- (1976) according § U.S.C. neys’ to the rule of fees under § U.S.C. 1988. This con- Thiboutot, Maine 448 U.S. 100 S.Ct. analysis sideration does not influence our (1980), 65 L.Ed.2d 555 as well as under the Congress’ enacting UMTA; intent the yet affording UMTA. In addition to the Union contend, repudi- Union does not and we would jurisdictional theory, p. infra, another see frivolous, as ate that intended that argument this is also the basis of the Union’s 13(c) agreements statutory breaches vio- attorneys’ Rights claim for fees under the Civil attorneys’ so lations fees could be award- Attorney’s Fees Awards ofAct 42 U.S.C. ed. (1976). respect, this limited our theory statement that the Union’s 6, supra. 7. See note theory functionally and the alternative plaintiffs right bring Ana- III. ate suit.8 however, lytic precision, demands that our before us is whether The issue implicit grant jurisdiction be on the focus private party the 13(c) gives to a UMTA § implicit rather than on the creation of a remedy for breach of a right to seek a instance, right of action. In this there is no district court. in a United States private but there is a cause of question and, some ex parties The briefs of 13(c) agreement. action for breach of a tent, confusion concern the case law reflect That action is the common law action on a subject relationship between federal ing the contract, independent of con- exists private jurisdiction implied matter intent.9 The Union’s contention gressional is under rights of action. The confusion it has a federal cause of action there- because, of our in the context standable fore reduces to the contention that the fed- concepts are inex present inquiry, the two jurisdiction eral district court has of an question is tricably intertwined. undeniably extant cause of action. private intended that a whether 13(c) agree question is not whether aggrieved by breach of a Since party in federal court. Union has a cause of action for permitted ment be to sue 13(c) agreement, four-step of a Congress implicitly granted to the feder breach If Ash, analysis of Cort v. jurisdiction al district courts over class eases, as refined its necessarily that it would follow controlling.10 appropri- progeny, jurispru- is not Congress implicitly granted to the Products, Inc., analysis pose 10. The Cort would a more for In Marshall v. Gibson’s 1979), midable obstacle to the Union than does the analysis we held that the dis- F.2d 668 inquire simply subject we undertake. We trict court lacked matter legislative history Secretary UMTA and its whether the of Labor to over an action clearly Congress’ inspection manifest intent to fed enjoin employer an to submit to Safety this case. The factors Occupational eral over premises of its determining enumerated in whether a 8(a), 657(a) Cort Health Act 29 U.S.C. private remedy implicit not commented, is in a statute ex reaches The dissent “The court (1) plicitly providing one are: jurisdic- result in terms of matter [its] plaintiff is a member of the class for whose not tion. While I think ... this is created; (2) especial the statute was benefit all, ques- question but rather legislative whether there is indication of Secretary’s complaint alleg- tion of whether the deny remedy intent either to create or upon es a which relief could be state of facts (3) sought; implication whether the of such a granted, the same the court must still answer remedy sought is consistent with the un question. question That is whether the Occu- derlying statutory purposes; (4) whether the pational Safety gives and Health Act of traditionally rele cause of action is one that is gated to file a suit in of Labor 95 S.Ct. at to state law. U.S. at compel United District a inspection States Court 415, infra, p. Supreme 2088. As we note at 657(a) requires of the Act appears telescoped the test to have Cort perform.” 584 F.2d at 679 inquiry legislative into intent. The first into an J., also, (Tuttle, dissenting). See Local Division of the four Cort factors continues nonetheless 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater applying applied, it have to be and courts District, 1, Transit F.2d 16 note 12 Portland 589 sought Congress intend to determine whether (1st 1978). Cir. right of the ed to create a federal plaintiff by focusing in favor duty-cre “right- or on the regard, sharply In this this case differs from ating language” statute as “the most of the most cases which have turned on whether Con- impli propriety accurate indicator of the of gress private intended to create a cause of of action.” v. Uni cation of cause Cannon of statute. action for violation a federal 677, n.13, versity Chicago, 441 690 99 of U.S. cases, Congress’ creation of the those absent 1946, n.13, (1979); 560 1954 60 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. action, lawsuit, no cause of there could be Bros., Inc., Capeletti States v. 621 F.2d United See, e.g., either in state or federal court. Inc., Frito-Lay, (5th 1980); Rogers v. 1309 Cir. Advisors, Mortgage Transamerica Inc. v. Lew- denied, 1074, (5th Cir.), 449 611 F.2d 1079 cert. is, 11, 242, 444 146 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 889, 246, (1980). 115 U.S. 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d (1979); Reddington, Touche Ross & Co. v. 442 necessity analysis spares the Union the of Our overcoming (1979); U.S. 99 S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 82 so, hurdle, properly since University Chicago, of 441 U.S. Cannon v. of action and the sole the Union has a cause question (1979). 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 560 bring is where it it. 1334 implied private rights

denee of action preme of application Court modified the appropriately nonetheless informs our view four-factor Cort test13 announcing that of this case. In addition to the close rela- the task implied federal court in of cause tionship private right between the of action of action solely cases was to determine inquiry and the inquiry,11 the Congress intended to create the right private of action cases are our most asserted; private being of action right authority instructive on the courts’ views on declining to consider the third fourth legislation by implication. Cort it factors when found the first two unsatisfied, The recent the Court jurisprudence implied pri- plain rendered the rights vate of action tiff’s task manifests two undeni- more difficult because the third First, Supreme able trends. Court has considerably fourth factors are easier implied rights treated of' action with in- satisfy than requiring are the factors creasing parsimony, and the trend is dis- proof of legislative affirmative intent. years in cernible even the few since the Noe, Supreme 644 at 436. The F.2d Court First, Seventh, Appeals Courts of for the further availability restricted the implied Eighth Circuits decided the issue now causes of in Mortgage action Transamerica Second, before us.12 Appeals the Court of Advisers, Lewis, Inc. v. 100 U.S. Circuit, light the Fifth Supreme in (1979). There, S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 146 Court developments, implemented has a re- Court to recognize implied refused cause implied action, strictive view of causes of of action §in the Investment Advis and has in several instances refused to infer ors solely Act based on the fact right of action which its sister courts have factor, second Cort that there be an indica recognized. A brief review of these two legislative tion of intent to create a trends will set stage for our excursion action, satisfied; was not that the legislative into history of the UMTA. first Cort was factor satisfied was immate Displaying what has been described as a Noe, rial. See 644 F.2d at 437. The most change attitude, drastic Supreme recent Supreme Court cases reiterate this imposed has increasingly severe re- legislative concentration on intent to the on the availability strictions implied exclusion See, other Cort factors. causes of action under statutes. e.g., County Middlesex Sewerage Auth. v. Note, Implied Rights oí Action in Fed- National Ass’n, Sea Clammers 453 U.S. Legislation: eral Harmonization within the -, (1981); 69 L.Ed.2d 435 Scheme, Statutory 1980 Duke L.J. 928. The Industries, Inc., Texas v. Radcliffe Materi Appeals Court of for the Fifth Circuit has als, Inc., repeatedly phenomenon, see, noted this e.g., Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Au- court This has taken to heart thority, (5th 644 F.2d 434 1980); Cir. Rivers restrictive mandate of Supreme Court.14 Co., v. Rosenthal & We have principles articulated 1980); decision Rogers Inc., v. Frito-Lay, implied right of action cases ap 1980) J., (Goldberg, dissent- propriately guide our ing). consideration of the The accurate account Supreme jurisdictional question implied Court’s before us. Noe, cause of action If we are cases in 436-437, F.2d conclude that need not be meant restated more than here. In summary, however, it said statute, when Touche enacted we must Ross Reddington, & Co. v. do so on the basis that actually 2479, S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 82 legislate Su- intended See, we e.g., infer. 8, supra, 1287, accompanying See note Amalgamated text. Transit Union v. Kansas City Transp. Auth., (8th Area 582 F.2d 444 Cir. 714, 12. The cases referred to are Local Division 1978). 422, p. infra. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Port- District, (1st land 1978); Transit 589 F.2d 1 Cir. 10, supra. 13. See note 519, Amalgamated Local Division Transit Un- Municipal Utility, ion v. LaCrosse Transit 585 3, supra. 14. See note (7th 1978); F.2d 1340 Cir. and Local Division

1335 mind, Bros., Inc., principles 621 we turn our considera- Capeletti v. United States 1312, (5th 1980); Rog- tion to the UMTA. 1309, Cir. 1313 F.2d 1074, Inc., 1078 611 F.2d Frito-Lay, v. ers IV. whether, 1980). The issue is not (5th Cir. balance, judicial remedies advocates of Transportation The Urban Mass Act of

on opponents, but prompted by Congress’ case than was awareness have a better 1964 legislative deteriorating intent to ur- long neglected we can find a Noe, remedy. system country. in this judicial a federal ban mass transit recognize 1963, Congress us to infer a had concluded that a new By In order for 644 F.2d at 439. action, jurisdic- program of financial aid to facilitate right or federal tion, remedy, Rivers v. Rosenthal & 774, 783 we must intended to Congress (5th Cir. have before us 1980), such a provide clear evidence if the Co., 634 F.2d legisla- was revitalization Code Cong., necessary. H.R.Rep. Cong. & Ad.News 1st Sess., of the mass transit reprinted in 2569, No. ^[1964] 2572. The 204, industry 88th U.S. of that determination was the Urban result provides no clear indication one history tive Transportation Mass Act of 1964. other, so that clear evidence of way or the lacking, congressional intent affirmative Although it was not the intent of the bill legislat- infer that has we cannot bargaining rights, to curtail collective Con- silently. at 792.15 ed Id. instances, gress recognized that in some employees might adversely transit af- implementation of the practice, In our equip- of new fected the introduction principles yielded more restric stated has existing reorganization ment or the tran- our sister courts have tive results than operations promoted by legislation. sit v. Rosenthal Compare, e.g., Rivers reached. particular, since the Id. 2583-2584. 1980) (no Co., (5th 634 F.2d 774 Cir. & grants Act was to authorize or loans of action under Com implied private right of public federal funds to state or local author- Act), with Leist v. Exchange modities Sim acquire private ities to enable them to tran- 1980), (2d grant cert. plot, 638 F.2d 283 Cir. compa- companies, employees sit of those Mercantile Exch. v. ed sub nom. New York foreseeably employees would become nies Leist, 450 U.S. S.Ct. public agencies. passed When it (1981) (implied right of action L.Ed.2d 332 Act, Congress was concerned that such em- Act), Exchange exists Commodities might bargaining collective ployees lose Pierce, Fenner Lynch, and Curran v. Merrill strike, pension and rights, Smith, 1980), (6th Cir. cert. & 622 F.2d 216 retirement benefits. Section granted, 451 U.S. S.Ct. designed protect employ- Act is affected (1981) (implied right of action ees from such losses. Id. Exchange Act). exists under Commodities Compare Capeletti also United v. States legislative history includes Bros., Inc., 1980) (no 621 F.2d 1309 explicit no reference to federal private right action; under Davis- implied of action private right congres- or a Act) University Bacon with McDaniel v. sional debates on the Act included no dis- Chicago, 1977), cert. enforcing cussion of the means of denied, Amalga- agreements. Local Division (1978) (implied right action Jackson Transit L.Ed.2d 780 mated Transit Union v. Auth., (6th Cir.), Act). With these 1384-85 exists under Davis-Bacon Congress expressly pri- say juris- to consider a This is not can infer a failure of that we remedy inevitably grant only point is not inconsistent with dictional if the Union is able to vate remedy part explicit legislative an intent on its to make such a to an statement in the histo- appear implicit- ry available. Such an intent to the effect that intended to ly language anything in the or structure of the statute or the absence of “[W]hile legislative history its enactment.” Trans- indicates an inten- in the circumstances of in the Lewis, Mortgage private right of action is america Advisers tion to confer (1979) hardly helpful party asserting right], 62 L.Ed.2d [the (citations omitted). automatically posi- it does not undermine his Supreme] tion. Court has held that [The cert. granted, - U.S. -, S.Ct. state Commerce Act. In addition to the (1981) (Jackson). 70 L.Ed.2d 613 suggestive similarity language, of UMTA legis the our task is to determine whether 13(c) explicitly refers to § 49 U.S.C. history unspoken lative manifests an intent 5(2)(f)19 legislative history § and the of by Congress to in the 5(2)(f) § refers to as a model.20 § private courts over actions en founders, argument The Union’s how- 13(c) agreements. force ever, the on fact that at the time of the intent,16 legislative In its of discussion the UMTA, enactment 5(2)(f) neither § argues language Union first of of Interstate Commerce Act nor 13(c)17 language parallels UMTA § of 5(2)(f) arrangements § had been be held to 5(2)(f) former of Com- § Interstate privately enforceable. The principal case Act,18 5(2)(f) merce and that arrange- § by proposition cited the Union for the privately ments are enforceable in federal protective arrangements 5(2)(f) are § follows, Union, It argues court. enforceable at protected the instance of the have must intended that employees law, and arise under federal Nor- agreements privately enforceable in fed- Ry. Nemitz, folk & Western Co. v. eral court. (1971), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 198 was The that enacted the 7 years UMTA decided after the passage of the was indeed aware of of 5(2)(f) the Inter- Bhd. of Locomo- § UMTA.21 The cites Union misrepresenting posi- 16. To avoid proposing Union’s first that some kind of labor 20. tion, protective legis- Act, we arrangements note that the Union discusses the in included the history arguing Secretary in the 5(2)(f). lative course Labor Hearings of Wirtz referred to § 13(c) implies S.6, § UMTA cause of ac- on before a Subcommittee of the tion, jurisdic- implies Banking and not Currency, that the statute Senate Committee on grant. noted, Cong., (1963), tional For reasons we have 88th 1st Sess. at 310. Thereaft- arguments er, respects appo- Union’s site in the are in Amalgamated most the General Counsel of the present p. supra. context. See Transit Union reiterated that the antecedents instances, however, legislation In some proposing we have for the trans- kind of he was posed guage arguments provi- Union’s from the in lan- were contained sions of the labor rights language 5(2)(f). S.6, Hearings supra, action into the § on at Report compares Senate Committee language 17. referred to “It shall be a is: proposed protective provision compa- any chapter condition of assistance under this arrangements transportation rable try. S.Rep. in the indus- equitable made, arrangements fair that as determined Sess., Cong. No. 88th 1st at 12. Labor, floor, In debates water, on Senate Senator Gold- protect employees the interests of affected attempting in to defeat the enactment of protective arrange- such assistance. Such protective provision, the labor read into the shall ments include ...” 5(2)(f) record § of the Interstate Commerce example development Act as an kind approval, 18. “As a condition of its under this he foresaw if were § not defeated. 109 paragraph involving paragraph any transaction Cong.Rec. a carrier or carriers railroad sub- ject provisions chapter, Although to the of this the Com- our treatment of Nemitz renders require superfluous case, mission shall a fair and ar- extended discussion of the apposite rangement protect highly the interests of the rail- doubtful that the case is employees ap- road affected. In order its event. The issue Nemitz proval the Commission shall include was mission terms and whether the Interstate Com Commerce 5(2)(f) (1976). conditions ...” 49 U.S.C. § could be held to have reviewed 5(2)(f) 5(2)(f) agreement § incorporated U.S.C. has been revised and § recodified and to have (1979 agreement Supp.). 49 U.S.C. authorizing into its order a rail merger. only road reviewed and there which of If and if the had so I.C.C. 13(c), 1609(c), 19. incorporated U.S.C. states was provi- . . “. sions Such shall include under 28 U.S.C. protecting employees against grants individual to the district courts worsening positions respect See, their with civil actions to enforce I.C.C. orders. employment pro- Nemitz, their which shall in no event 404 U.S. at note 3; pursu- (Black vide benefits less than those established note 404 U.S. at 92 S.Ct. at 193 5(2)(f) mun, J., dissenting). ant to section of this title.” 13(c) Congress’ agreements intent that be Chicago and North West Engineers v. tive Co., (8th Cir.), cert. similarly necessarily F.2d 424 enforceable would not Ry. ern 55, 11 denied, Congress follow. the view that 5(2)(f) that proposition for the that enacted the UMTA in 1964 must have § privately 13(c) held en agreements agreements privately had been to be intended passage of years” before forceable “for enforceable in federal court because it mod- 13(c). The cited case does not 13(c) UMTA after privately § eled another statute § 5(2)(f) agreements privately are hold that § enforceable in federal court is untenable.22 enforceable question in the case was whether way and the union were proposed consolidation of (45 yards, or whether tion” entered into under 49 U.S.C. §§ proved by the Interstate Commerce proval mission in its order follow the tion volves the ployees approved by the Interstate Com federal Act.” merce on an court collective “The procedures U.S.C. § 5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act problem quickly Commission the district court’s conclusion Since statutory interpretation, agreements, interpretation procedures in federal court. the issue raised was one of is not one of 151 et challenge, noting disposed for the they 5(2)(f) and approving set out in a but seq.) Railway required to follow Section were and effect of protection .. . interpretation parties two railroad primarily required effecting defendant’s 5(11). Labor Act 5(2) there was with “stipula the rail merger Com basic that em sec ap ap in that legislative history of UMTA vant Senate determine that Ad.News 2584-85. tary ployees able Sess., reprinted ments S.Rep. treatment of local great Next, feasible to enumerate or set forth in The committee does not believe that it is necessary to assure the fair and the basic conditions treatment. also Congress protective arrangements. respect, No. Labor, bargaining negotiation, subject be the Union detail the made, H.Rep. protected standard normally Report whom intended that affected em- 88th it is employees statutorily proper arrange- has No. correctly ^[1964] provisions Furthermore, states: promulgated expected that specific Congress Cong. of fair by privately will be U.S.Code in each case. 1st 88th asserts that the § that authorized to Sess. product Cong. The rele- rules equitable Cong. enforce- Secre- shows 1st & regulations nego- which rely upon privately federal 314 F.2d at 428. agreements.23 tiated Furthermore, the Union does not offer a indisputable Congress It is that relied on Congress shred of evidence that that privately negotiated protective arrange- 5(2)(f) thought enacted the UMTA that § position ments to secure the of affected arrangements privately were enforceable. sug- employees. And would be absurd pre-1964 authority Even if there were some private 5(2)(f) gest contemplate did not that for the enforcement of ar- § court, therefore, arid, rangements arrangements be honored in federal such would (a) (1) argument employees represented 22. A variation on the Union’s is that If affected are organization expected pro- even if the a labor it is enacted arrangements product 5(2)(f) arrange- tective shall be the was not aware that negotiation, pursuant guidelines. privately to these ments are enforceable in federal court, they is, by analogy, the fact that are persuasive agreements reason to hold (b) Upon receipt application feder- of an [for similarly Even if it were clear enforceable. 13(c)] involving al assistance to section 5(2)(f) arrangements privately en- employees represented affected a labor or- court, argument by in federal ganization, Department forceable of Labor will refer increasing analogy copy application organization would fail because of the to that notify applicant to infer remedies. disinclination of referral. 414-415, pp. supra. (c) Following See discussion at and notification ... referral good parties expected engage in faith will be mutually acceptable efforts to reach part: 215.3 states in relevant 29 C.F.R. through negotiation. court; necessary, required if enforced in as we have protective arrangements (or noted, private there ais cause of action even arrangements the would neces- 13(c) agreements. p. breach of sarily contracts). take the of form As the supra. simply But it excerpt does not follow that from S.Rep. p. supra, No. 82 at states, Congress such enforceable in presume feder- did not to enu- statute, al court. We search the the anticipate provi- com- merate or otherwise to the reports, mittee congressional and the de- grant recipients sions which and their em- bates in vain for an ployees intimation that Con- negotiate. would The instant dis- gress intended that federal pute courts resolve is alleges illustrative. The Union disputes contractual between municipal MARTA is in breach of the term of the employers. 13(c) transit workers their agreement providing that contract conditions unchanged pend- would remain The Court of Appeals the First Cir- ing Congress arbitration. could not have cuit concluded that it would be anomalous foreseen the provision inclusion of such a in fifty to leave to the the courts of states the 13(c) agreements, and therefore could not 13(c) enforcement of agreements that were anticipated have alleging lawsuits breaches approved by of Labor and a provision. of such specified whose terms were in the federal Portland, grant contract. 589 F.2d at We 13. do not find anomalous a reluctance to disagree. We Particularly impute since actions grant intention to such as the one before us require neither to federal courts over a class of interpretation nor vindication of cases raising unpredictable array of UMTA, there is no reason to believe case-specific issues whose resolution does courts, state in performance of their require not interpretation of the federal role, traditional common law cannot decide statute. The disposition of this case re- private these breach of contract cases as quires a meaning determination of the of suitably as See, can federal courts. agreement Jack- between the parties, son, (Merrill, J., at F.2d dissent- a such independent determination is ing).24 meaning 13(c). of UMTA § arising Private actions out alleged vio- The Union further contends that lations of express statutory commands provision dif- UMTA makes for no alternative fer in two significant respects from actions federal 13(c) agreements, enforcement of First, such as this typical- one. such actions argues therefrom that there must be ly turn on particular conduct falls federal employees’pri- over the Second, within the statutory proscription. vate enforcement action. The Union’s questions factual raised premise actions con- Appeals debatable. The cerning given a typically statute display a for the Sixth recently Circuit did hold that uniformity that was foreseeable by Con- the Secretary neither of Labor nor the Sec- gress.25 When enacted retary Transportation has statutory UMTA, hand, on the other duty could not have agreements enforce on behalf foreseen particularity with the terms of the employees, of transit so that an action analysis might alleged Our program differ if activity it were receiving educational or Fed- 13(c) agreement was not a fair and eral pri- financial assistance.” The sorts of equitable arrangement provide mary disputes or did not private which characterize ac- necessary objectives for the 901(a) enumerated in tions to enforce § were foreseeable 13(c). But see enacting Congress discussion of Kendler statutory and involve Wirtz, 1968) p. interpretation: 388 F.2d 381 programs which and activities infra. statute; are “educational” within the persons Act; are beneficiaries when does example An meaning. will program illustrate our activity an educational receive Fed- 901(a) assistance, Section of Title IX of the Education eral financial and so on. The Su- (1976), preme Amendments University U.S.C. Court held in Cannon v. provides part, person Chicago, “No in the United shall, sex, States on the basis of person aggrieved by excluded L.Ed.2d 560 that a in, participation of, 901(a) from be denied the benefits a violation of § has a subjected or be to discrimination action. withdrawn; might funds the United Amalgamated Transit local division of the contract; sue for breach of enforce States could compel the Union to Secretaries and, circumstances, appropriate a federal Divi not lie. Local does specific performance of require court could 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union v. sion condition. Auth., contract Transit Jackson Cir.), granted, - U.S. -, cert. necessity spared We are of determin Jack (1981). As the mecha ing whether there exist recognized, 650 F.2d at court son nisms, private enforcement ac other than dictum in Port holding was at odds with tions, 13(c) agreements by our to enforce land, con supra, in which the First Circuit premise even if the conclusion that Union’s Transportation Secretary of cluded that the accurate, jurisdic does not follow to enforce the could sue in federal court private over enforcement actions lies in tion 13(c) agreements.26 and conditions of terms court. search is for some clear federal Our court offered its Ironically, the Portland Congress grant indication that intended argument in as a decisive interpretation jurisdiction over these cases to the federal federal cause of inferring private favor of district courts. We have conceded that Thus, in of the Union. action behalf Congress contemplated compliance with Union, apparently persuaded 13(c) agreements, private and that enforce in 1978 that of First Circuit lie in state court. indisputably ment actions 13(c) agree Transportation can enforce presence explicit While the alternative governed by in federal court in suits ments statutory remedies would contraindicate law, and that the Union’s federal contract see, any implied grant, e.g., Till v. Unifirst should therefore be enforcement actions 152, 160 Ass’n., Fed. and Loan 653 F.2d Sav. well, argues cognizable in federal court (5th 1981); Capeletti Cir. United States v. in 1981 that since the Secretaries of Labor Bros., Inc., Transportation play have no role to in 1980), logic the converse follows neither in 13(c) enforcing agreements, the Union must in law. would infer nor We not from remedy have a in federal court. absence of alternative federal remedies for 13(c) agreements breach of an intent MARTA contends that there are in fact remedy there be such a alternative enforcement mechanisms par federal court at behest of rights. contract Because terms of ties. the mandated specified grant finally principal must be in the contract be- Turning to the discussion grantee, protection and the of transit workers in tween United States MARTA, H.Rep. portions relevant of which argues the United States has a No. margin,27 in the we find no range of contract remedies: are set out broad years enjoyed protection have Federal 26. If Portland and Jackson are reconcilable in for against upon respect, adverse effects attendant rail- Jackson it is on the basis that held problems duty agree- road consolidations. The of work- that ments, was no to enforce there protection presented by the bill are not er necessarily while Portland found that there was presented identical to those discretionary authority. enforcement believes, The how- other laws. ever, committee Although problem protection of worker that workers for whom a standard cases, already may only arise in a limited number of benefits has been established under equally the committee nevertheless believes that the other laws should receive favorable proposed program. impact per- treatment under the new overall of the bill should not be also believes that all workers mitted obscure the fact in certain The committee by adjustments groups adversely affected effected communities individual workers or fully protected adversely in a affected as the under the bill should workers manner, equipment and that Federal of new fair and result of the introduction existing oper- reorganization be used in a manner that is funds should not directly or the transit indirectly legitimate protecting principle detrimental workers ations. rights adjustments of such workers. in an interests and affected as a result of industry bill, specific accordingly, aegis contains a Feder- carried out under that, new, provision particularly in communities where the trans- al law is not portation industry. bill, employees projects are to be assisted under the fair railroad support position. for the Union’s The Un- Y. recogni- ion’s cause is not advanced our The Union that the federal contends dis- tion that intended to trict court had over this case already affected transit workers benefits (1976)28 under 28 U.S.C. because since, enjoyed by employees, railroad at the controversy public between agency transit enactment, time of the UMTA’s railroad and a involving labor union an alleged employees enjoyed no to enforce in breach of a agreement arises under private arrangements federal court conclud- the laws of the United States. All five pursuant 5(2)(f). ed to 49 U.S.C. § Circuits which have held there is feder- supra pp. 417-418. The committee’s ac- al over private actions to en- knowledgement problems that the of work- 13(c) agreements force have done so on the protection er presented by the bill were not “arising juris- basis that there was under” necessarily presented the same as those un- See, diction under 28 U.S.C. Divi- der other laws would indicate that absent 587, Amalgamated sion Transit Union v. Congressional some additional indication of Seattle, Municipality Metropolitan intent, obliged we go would not be be- 1981) (Seattle); Jackson, F.2d 875 yond language equalize of the statute to 1383; Portland, 8; 650 F.2d at 589 F.2d at the benefits extended to transit workers 519, Local Division Amalgamated Transit with those extended to railroad workers. v. Union Municipal LaCrosse Transit Utili- The statement that Federal funds should ty, 1340, 1978) (La- 1346 not be used in a directly manner that is or Crosse); 1287, Local Amalgamated Division indirectly legitimate detrimental inter- City Transit Union Transp. v. Area Kansas rights ests and of sug- affected workers Auth., 444, 582 1978) F.2d 450 gests, anything, if the focus of Con- (Kansas City). gress on the possible was withholding of Our of treatment ques the uncooperative federal funds grant ap- from tion under 28 governed by U.S.C. 1331 is plicants, rather than on alternative reme- our opinion determination in Part II of this dies. alleges the Union common law Having carefully the reviewed stat breach of contract a statutory rather than history, ute and its having and pp. 412, considered violation. supra. Gully See In 411 — arguments parties Bank, of 109, and v. First the views National 299 U.S. 112- courts, 13, 96, 97-98, of our sister we 57 simply do not S.Ct. 81 find L.Ed. 70 requisite congressional Supreme indication of in Court said: tent to vest in federal courts How and when a case arises “under the over actions for agreements. breach of Constitution or laws of the United We therefore hold that the UMTA does not has States” been much considered in the contain implicit grant an books. Some are well tests established. over such actions to the federal courts. bring To statute, a case right within the

pects by ees. tect the interests of affected Labor and with his concurrence. bill, only will ing are fair and The committee providing normally specific equitable arrangements, provision, after consultation with that the ^[*] Administrator, to the basic standards set forth in the negotiation. determining conditions ^[*] the Administrator Administrator with technical wishes ^[*] product The committee within the must be made to for ^[*] worker Labor, of local point transit as determined ^[*] Secretary meaning protection must act out bargain- addition employ- also ^[*] that, pro- ex- 28. “The district diction 2584-85. 000 exclusive of under the United States.” H.Rep. controversy in [1964] U.S.Code protected veloping sure that worker assistance, may No. all civil Constitution, criteria 204, arise. in the different be considered as exceeds will assume courts 88th 28 interest and actions wherein the matter in U.S.C. the sum or value Cong., Cong. to the interests shall have laws, responsibility types 1st types & Ad.News 1331(a). or costs, necessary are Sess., reprinted treaties of original juris- of situations adequately and arises provisions for de- to in- 2569, $10,-

1341 given immunity created Constitution construction to the federal law or must be an pivotal or laws of the United States will particular case. element, one, essential and an emphasized, As we have the Union’s com- v. plaintiff’s cause of action. Starin New plaint alleges a cause of action based not on 248, 257, York, [31], 28 29 115 U.S. 6 S.Ct. right law, created but on a 388; v. L.Ed. First National Bank Wil right common law created contract. As 512, 372, liams, 252 40 S.Ct. U.S. noted, 419-420, we have pp. supra, also see right immunity 64 L.Ed. 690. The controversy resolution of the merits of the supported must be such that it will be if between the Union and MARTA will not or laws of the United the Constitution 13(c). turn on the construction of UMTA § given one construction or ef States any federally right Nor is created an essen- fect, they if receive and defeated another. action; tial element of the Union’s cause of Id.; King County v. Seattle School Dis right remedy to a for breach of a trict, 361, 363, 364, 263 U.S. is a common law genuine L.Ed. present 68 339. A Congress surely recognized but did not cre- controversy, merely possible not or con 13(c). ate when it enacted UMTA § one, jectural must exist with reference 418-419, pp. supra. (New Benjamin, thereto Orleans v. 153 Hood, The Union relies on Bell v. 411, 424, [909], U.S. 14 905 38 L.Ed. S.Ct. 764; S.Ct. L.Ed. 939 Bell Defiance, Defiance Water Co. v. [66], damages brought by pri- was action U.S. 48 L.Ed. S.Ct. 140; Louis, parties against Joy agents alleged 26 vate FBI St. U.S. 776; City County 50 L.Ed. plaintiffs’ S.Ct. violations of the fourth and fifth Co., Denver v. New York Trust rights. amendment The lower courts dis- [662], 57 L.Ed. jurisdic- missed the case for want of federal 1101), controversy and the must be dis reversed, Supreme tion. The holding upon complaint, closed the face of the complaint that because the squarely sought by by petition unaided the answer or recovery ground agents on that (Tennessee removal. v. Union & Constitution, violated the question federal Bank, 454, 14 Planters’ 152 U.S. S.Ct. jurisdiction regardless existed of whether or 511; 38 L.Ed. Louisville & Nashville R. not there was a federal cause of action or v. Mottley, Co. 211 29 U.S. S.Ct. complaint alleged whether the also a state 126; 53 L.Ed. The Fair v. Kohler Die & jurisdic- law claim. The Court stated the Co., 22, 25, Specialty 228 U.S. 33 410 S.Ct. tional rule: 716; Anderson, [411], Taylor 57 L.Ed. v. here, complaint, as is so [W]here 1218). 234 34 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed. recovery directly drawn as to seek under Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail the Constitution or of the laws United as a basis of in so far as it States, court, the federal but for two goes beyond plaintiff’s a statement of the possible exceptions ., . . must entertain cause of anticipates replies action and the suit. probable a defense. Devine v. Los . .. The .. exceptions . are that a suit Angeles, 202 U.S. 26 652 S.Ct. may sometimes be dismissed for want of 1046; [657], 50 L.Ed. The Fair v. Kohler alleged where the claim ... Co., Specialty supra. Die & clearly appears to be immaterial and For a recent reaffirming princi- case these solely purpose made for the obtaining ples, Phillips see Petroleum Co. v. Texaco jurisdiction or where such a claim is whol- Inc., 415 U.S. 39 ly insubstantial and frivolous. (1974). generally Wright, See C. A. 681-83, Id. at 66 S.Ct. at 776. Cooper, Miller & E. Federal Practice and Although purports the Union’s claim Procedure The essential in- § 13(c), seek enforcement of quiry is thus UMTA we complaint, § whether the on its face, alleges have recovery a cause of action based on a seen that the claim seeks no law, statute, created federal and whether necessarily but seeks only remedy law common for breach of It would be anomalous indeed ... underlying 13(c) agreement. p. suggest that an action “arises under” an supra. complaint Union’s does act that impliedly rejects jurisdiction to satisfy predicate test, not of the Bell bring specific the action. The preclusion complaint be so drawn as to seek general grant. controls the

recovery directly under the Constitution or (footnotes omitted). 584 F.2d at 677 laws of the United States. Even if we holding Our in Part IV opinion of this accepted the Union’s assertion that its com- premise was based not on the plaint recovery 13(c), seeks under UMTA § 13(c) UMTA impliedly rejected abundantly is clear that the Union’s as- jurisdiction over 13(c) actions enforce serted 13(c) claim under UMTA imma- agreements, but rather on our conclusion solely terial and purpose made for the the Union had not shown that Con- obtaining jurisdiction; alleged statuto- gress affirmatively intended UMTA § ry violation purports to add to the Union’s jurisdictional grant. Since Marshall is complaint nothing predicate but a for feder- respect distinguishable in this from al case it does dispose not Nor does the fact that the Union’s question under 28 U.S.C. now be- complaint interpretation necessitated the However, fore us. Marshall does foreclose in Part opinion IV of this the contention that complaint Union’s somehow “arising render this an under” states a arising claim under UMTA § Products, Inc., case. Marshall Gibson’s because it requires exploration an 1978),29 stands for the meaning history of that statute. proposition a complaint which necessi tates a determination in urges Union that Int’l Ass’n of Ma- particular tended that a federal statute con Airlines, Inc., chinists v. Central fer over a class of cases does 682, L.Ed.2d 67 not, more, without arise under that statute. compels by analogy the conclusion that this The issue in Marshall was whether the fed action arises under federal law. In that eral juris district court had matter case, adjustment board had been estab- diction over suit of La lished between Central enjoin bor an employer to submit to an Airlines employees’ and its pursuant union inspection premises of its Occupa under the Act, to section Railway Labor Safety tional and Health princi Act. The (1976), U.S.C. 184 provides which § in rele- there, pal inquiry here, was whether the part: vant Act itself implied congressional included an It shall duty be the every of carrier and grant of We held that it did employees of its ... to establish a board complaint not. The had alleged alternative adjustment of jurisdiction of not exceed- jurisdiction matter under 28 U.S.C. ing jurisdiction the which be lawful- provides 1337 pertinent § ly by system, exercised group, regional or part: “The district courts origi shall have adjustment, boards of under the authori- jurisdiction nal any pro civil action or ty of section 153 of this title. ceeding arising any Act of regulating The airline to comply commerce ...” refused summarily We with an disposed adjustment the argument award of the board on the predicated on 28 1337: ground U.S.C. § the board had exceeded its Regarding binding authority 29. Workers, of this Fifth and 1314 of Int’l. Bhd. of Elec. 508 3, precedent, supra. (3d Circuit 1975), see note F.2d 687 Cir. cert. denied sub nom. Jersey Light EEOC, Central Power & Co. v. 425 jurisdiction premised (1976); 30. That 96 48 Marshall was L.Ed.2d 823 Co., on 28 1337 Carlson v. § U.S.C. rather than on 28 Coca-Cola U.S.C. 279 immaterial, 1973); Ry. principles 1331 is § since the Florida same East Coast Co. v. Jackson govern Co., “arising (5th Cir.), under” ville Terminal under both F.2d 720 cert. Jersey denied, Light statutes. Central Power & Co. v. 379 U.S. 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 38 327, 749, 1289, 1298, (1964). Local Unions assistance. in the Labor as a condition authority as set forth Indeed, recognizes the the statute Secre- Int’l Ass’n parties. between Airlines, Inc., competence to determine what ar- tary’s v. Central of Machinists equitable” and rev’d, rangements are “fair and 1961), (5th Cir. F.2d statutory objectives. “necessary” to the 956, 10 83 S.Ct. reason, judgment of the Secre- sought en For the union arose when litigation arrangements are tary of Labor as to what court. the award in federal forcement held to be con- has been that the action fair Court held Supreme trolling, inappropriate so that it would be law under federal the award arose enforce judgment for court to substitute its jurisdic for a gave rise to federal therefore Wirtz, 388 F.2d Secretary’s. Kendler v. at 964. at 83 S.Ct. tion. 372 U.S. 1968). underlying were on all Airlines If Central Airlines, that federal of Central premise us, it would with the case before fours enforce awards adjudication of actions to However, the decision. govern our course adjustment necessary is boards § and is not readily distinguishable case is mandate, statutory of the the vindication in Central controlling here.31 The Court here.32 inapplicable emphasis on the no placed great Airlines Second, the decision in Central Airlines federal law “the statute and the tion that significant aspects on of the part ar rested in whether the contractual determine must legislative history of 45 184 which § are suffi U.S.C. parties made rangements not share. The 204 and UMTA does Su- discharge § the mandate of § cient to Airlines that pur preme Court noted in Central Act and its with the are consistent Railway Congress extended the Labor at 961. when at 83 S.Ct. poses.” 372 U.S. transportation industry in the Act to the air comply with Central must “Whether extended the whether, instead, impeacha it neither it is award or Adjustment National Railroad Board to ble, by federal law the questions controlled nor created regard transportation industry the air with due and are to be answered Id., analogous industry. In- at board for purpose.” scheme and statutory stead, provisional pending measure of a as a In the event 83 S.Ct. anticipated establishment of a national contract or controversy concerning a industry, Congress board, necessary board for the airlines adjustment system, group, arrangement required the formation harmonizing regional adjustment boards of in 45 U.S.C. only occur statutory purpose could with the 685-86, at 958- 184. 372 U.S. at Railway through litigation process; leg- Following further discussion provides federal over Labor Act no other history, the Court stated: islative Quite sight private arrangement. 13(c) arrangements. contrary is true of no hiatus believe intended [W]e Act, Railway statutory post- when it Unlike the Labor in the scheme the fulfillment of the establishment of a National poned seeks to ensure equita Adjustment Board and in- statutory Transport mandate of a fair and Air system, approval provided compulsory arrangement by requiring the stead ble Although the group, regional or boards. arrangements by the of such courts, noted, majority though 32. As we have Central Airlines had re- 31. of our sister Airlines, adjustment comply relying board’s fused to with the to some extent on Central controlling. on the basis that the board had exceeded See Jack award have found it less than authority son, sup (“... and under the 204 § its 650 F.2d at 1383 lends further parties. Portland, agreement conclusion”); the Since 204 port § between 589 F.2d at to our adjust- expressly by limits the (“Our ... is reinforced [Cen 8 conclusion boards, 425, supra, appears p. that ment see ]”); City, at 450. Kansas tral Airlines particularly required (“direct the harmoniza- see, LaCrosse, the case 1346 585 F.2d at But the and statute which tion of contract emphasized. authority”). explicitly court con The Portland Here, that is no assertion there on all fours that Central Airlines is not ceded 13(c) agreement may impeached be- be at n.6. with the instant case. 589 F.2d discharge the mandate it is insufficient to cause 13(c). § of UMTA 1344

system adjustment be tem- expected statutorily required boards were board in arrangements, we cannot believe Central porary Airlines. period Congress intended interim reasons, For these Central Airlines does of confusion and chaos or meant to leave not dissuade us from our that an conclusion the establishment the Boards to action for breach a does Instead, parties. it intended whim not arise under federal law. statutory legally command to en- be The Union’s contention that this in the courts and the boards to forceable action arises under the law federal common organized operated and consistent similarly unavailing. It is correct that a purposes with the the Act. case “arises under the laws of the United at at 961. Id. for purposes States” of 28 if U.S.C. § Thus, interpretation the Court’s of 45 disposition of the issues set out in the by 184 was influenced its conclu- § U.S.C. complaint requires application of feder sion that the statute was an interim meas- al common City law. Illinois v. of Milwau Congress accomplish ure which intended to kee, 1385, 1391, purposes National Railroad Ad- However, this is not justment pending Board the establishment such case. Transport of National Air Adjustment competence MARTA’s to enter into a pertains Board. No such consideration contract, agreement, is a mat- here. ter of local law. MARTA’s authority to Significantly, statutory gov- scheme agree perform particular to and contractual erning Railway Adjustment the National governed conditions is by likewise law. local specified, observed, Board as the Court persuasive The Union offers no reason for the Board’s awards were to be final and interpreting according to federal common binding. Id. at 83 S.Ct. at 960. This law its contract entity with an whose exist-

fact, coupled with the Court’s conclusion ence, competence contract, authority and intended no in hiatus agree perform to and particular contrac- scheme, statutory implies that awards tual entirely conditions are controlled adjustment similarly boards would be local law. binding; courts, final and two of our sister The Union cites Indemnity, Industrial discussing Airlines, in Central have in fact Landrieu, Inc. 615 F.2d 644 Railway understood the Labor Act to so 1980), Trans-Bay Builders, and Engineers & Portland, 8; provide. LaCrosse, 589 F.2d at Hills, Inc. v. (D.C.Cir.1976), F.2d 1346. If indeed in- support of its assertion that enforcement of require tended to adjustment 13(c) agreement is a matter of federal board awards be final binding, predi- common law. Indemnity Industrial cate for federal would exist Trans-Bay are inapposite. Trans-Bay held counterpart has no here. general that a against contractor’s suit Finally, adjustment board federal insuror a federally financed hous- sought whose award the union ing project enforce in arose under federal common law Central Airlines was expressly required by where the alleged obligation of the insuror noted, U.S.C. as the Court was rooted not in a contract between the the board was a of federal parties law.” but rather rights gen- “creation[ ] “on Id. at 83 S.Ct. at 13(c), 962. UMTA erated course of activities [the insuror’s] hand, on the other nowhere pursuant mandates that statutes, including required sponsored, contracts it .. . prescribed embodied a contract others, between a as a condition of federal aid.” recipient employees. Portland, and its 551 F.2d at Glaring dispositive 589 F.2d at 12. respect, 13(c) that a Trans-Bay differences between and our is not a creation of federal law apparent: case are of Labor is a less suitable candidate for federal is party not a obligation this case and no enforcement than was the award of the rooted in rights generated by congressional is asserted. infer a intention that we Labor’s activities Department stated, Furthermore, Trans-Bay 13(c) court agreements. fashion a federal law of jurisdic question See, 1276, 1278 federal ruling against Meyer, (2d “In Nolan v. 520 F.2d this ease as a court treated tion, denied, the district Cir.), cert. U.S. S.Ct. Lindy It relied on on a contract. mere suit (1975). 46 L.Ed.2d 408 1974), 1367, 1369 (3rd Cir. Lynn, v. 501 F.2d We have considered also the interpreta with the but was concerned weighed factors other courts have in deter binding admittedly valid and tion of a set of mining applicability of federal common case, unlike Trans- Id. Our contracts.” congressional particular law in situations: interpretation of admit Bay, deals with intent; right which the as the extent Industri tedly binding contracts. valid and congressional enact serted is a creature of nothing to Indemnity al relies on and adds ment; activity whether the area of involves requires no Trans-Bay, 615 F.2d at functions; government essential additional discussion. federal law or of a the effectiveness of Union v. Lin- Nor does Textile Workers a nation program federal demands uniform Mills, coln 77 S.Ct. U.S. rule; right, duty, al whether the asserted or (1957), leading Supreme a L.Ed.2d 972 state; status is created and whether application decision on the of federal following a state law would frustrate feder law, position. common advance Union’s See, 1A, policy. al Moore’s Federal Practice juris- That case held that a federal 0.323[22], (2d 1981). ¶ at 3397-98 Ed. Our implying fed- diction could be basis consideration of these factors fortifies our remedies, the Lincoln eral substantive but interpretation conclusion that deciding Mills Court was a choice of law 13(c) agreement in this case is a matter of state or federal question apply —whether local, federal, not law.33 law to suits for violation of labor con- in which tracts —in a context VI. question courts was clear. The Finally, that 42 us, course, the Union contends jurisdiction; we before jurisdictional grant predicate have no from which to affords a U.S.C. § methodology opinion right- duty-creating language differs in favor of the of our Ap- supra. markedly Union. See note from that of the five Courts of Although peals the result we have reached and the which have decided the issues we have implied right inquiry Generally, of action would result an yield addressed here. those courts have respects equivalent, inquired jurisdic- in most see note is federal first whether there text, supra, accompanying one distinc tion over the case under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and holding rationales, the district held, tion should be noted: a varying have on that there is. See, Seattle, 878; Jackson, court lacks matter abso 663 F.2d at 650 F.2d lutely precludes enter 1383; Portland, 8; LaCrosse, the district court from at 589 F.2d at taining pendent state claims. See Jackson v. 1346-48; City, F.2d at Kansas 582 F.2d at 450. Stinchcomb, (5th 1981); 635 F.2d 462 Silva held, They varying degrees have then with Vowell, 1980), v. 621 F.2d 640 cert. paradigm, reliance on the Cort v. Ash Silva, sub nom. Johnston v. denied implies private of action. 67 L.Ed.2d 111 See, Seattle, Jackson, 878; 663 F.2d at disposition our of this case is to vacate 1386; Portland, 16; LaCrosse, 589 F.2d at toto, to the the district court’s order even (Kansas City, 582 F.2d 585 F.2d at 1350. might be construed as extent that pertaining that order implied right did not address the of action is- state law contract to the Union’s sue.) claim, A failure to state a claim. dismissal for adopted methodology Even if we hand, the same on the other absolutely would not have likewise concluded that an action to enforce pendent preclusive effect state on law, 13(c) agreement arises under federal we However, proper procedure in since the claim. complaint the Union’s failed to would hold that pendent all cases is to dismiss state almost grant- upon relief could be state a claim claims are dismissed claims when the federal imply does not ed because UMTA private right Gibbs, trial, Mine Workers v. before United action. This conclusion would 715, 726, 86 16 L.Ed.2d analysis nearly compelled by identical Smith, (1966); Pharo opinion, and would be in Part IV of this 1980), practical limited this distinction is of Cir. importance. in UMTA fortified the absence jurisdiction. proceeds The Union v. federal Jackson Authority, Transit 650 F.2d 1379 premise again that breach of a from Cir.), (6th granted, - U.S. -, cert. 13(c) agreement constitutes a violation of 632, 70 L.Ed.2d 613 (1981); S.Ct. Division argues and that 42 U.S.C. § 1235, Amalgamated Met Transit Union v. provides cause of action under the § ropolitan Authority, Transit 650 F.2d 1389 Thiboutot, 1, rule of Maine v. 448 U.S. 100 (6th 1981); 714, Cir. Local Division No. 2502, (1980), 65 L.Ed.2d 555 Cuyl- S.Ct. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Adams, er v. 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. District, (1st Portland Transit 589 F.2d 1 (1981). Jurisdiction L.Ed.2d 641 would then 1978); Cir. Local Division Amalgamat 1331,34 lie under 28 U.S.C. since the action ed Transit Union Municipal v. LaCrosse would arise under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Our Utility, (7th Transit Cir. rejection of the assertion that breach a 1978); Division Amalgamated Transit 13(c) agreement is 13(c), to violate UMTA § v. Union Kansas City Transportation Area pp. 411-412, supra, disposes see of the Un- Authority, 1978). (8th F.2d 444 Cir. argument jurisdiction ion’s federal These courts have each found that a suit to based on a violation of 42 U.S.C. enforce a 13(c) agreement section is a suit that “arises under” federal law and is thus

VII. subject jurisdiction of the federal above, For the reasons stated we hold They courts. have also found that a union district court lacked brings such a suit states over the subject matter this case. cause of action.1 Therefore, we vacate the order of the dis- trict court and remand the case with the split This newborn between the circuits instruction that the Union’s complaint be may be of short duration. Supreme The dismissed for lack of granted Court has certiorari the Jackson VACATED and REMANDED with in- Transit Authority case and presumably will structions DISMISS. meanwhile, resolve the issue. In the we are bound Supreme extant authority. Court VANCE, Judge, Circuit dissenting: In International Association of Machinists panel majority has decided that fed- Airlines, Inc., v. Central 372 U.S. eral subject courts lack matter 956, 10 L.Ed.2d 67 Supreme over a suit to provisions enforce the of a Court held that a suit enforce a protective agreement signed by appel- mandated federal law lant as a receipt condition to the of federal brought in federal court. The five other funds under section of the Urban Mass circuits have cited Central Airlines as au Act, Transit 1609(c). U.S.C. ma- thority finding jurisdiction here, jority reaches this despite decision the exist- nothing majority in the opinion persuades persuasive ence of authority from the five me otherwise. other circuits that have considered this reasoning Based on the question of the other cir- opposite reached the conclu- cuits, I would also sion. See find that Amalgamated Division union Tran- sit Union v. Municipality case stated a Metropolitan federal cause of action Seattle, 1981); F.2d 875 that the Local district court did not abuse its Division Amalgamated Transit Union by issuing discretion injunction. 28, supra. 34. See See, note e.g., 90 L.Ed. 939 Division Amalgamated City Transit Union v. Kansas Auth., panel Transp. majority, 1. Unlike the Area each of five other 1978) (“The question question particular circuits has addressed the whether a considering matter case is one before that ‘arises the exist under’ Constitution implied ence of an entirely cause of or laws of the action United under sec States ... 13(c). separate tion question That order of consideration and distinct is man from the by Supreme precedent, plaintiff’s complaint dated Bell whether the states claim Hood, 678, 682-83, 773, upon granted ”). which relief can ....

Case Details

Case Name: Local Division 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date Published: Jan 29, 1982

Citation: 667 F.2d 1327

Docket Number: 81-7613

Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.