*1
Robert D. Gen., Cole, Hasson, Asst. for Attys. Richard Charles Com., UCBR. FLAHERTY, LARSEN, McDER- NIX, C.J., and
Before PAPADAKOS, JJ. MOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and OPINION NIX, Chief Justice. of whether question faced again
We are with ineligible are unemploy- in a work involved ment benefits under the terms of section 402(d) of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, amended, Act of December P.L. as § 802(d) (1964). P.S. The specific issue is whether our test for ineligibility as set forth in our decision in Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 440,163 A.2d (1960) is to be modified where the employer’s unilateral altering action the status quo represented a “benefit” employees.
Thе instant dispute arose when 258 employees,1 repre- sented Local 730 of the United Association of Journey- men and Apprentices Plumbing and Pipe-Fitting (“Union”), Industry had employed who been by appellant Trane Company (“Employer”) prior to a stoppage, were denied unemployment compensation benefits Office of Employment Security ground on the their *3 unemployment the result of dispute was a labor other than § 802(d) a (1964). decision, 43 P.S. lockout. That affirmed the by Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (“Board”), appealed was to the A Commonwealth Court. three-judge panel court, of that one judge re- dissenting, versed and remanded to the Board for the computation benefits. Local United Association Journeymen and Apprentices and Plumbing Pipe-Fitting Industry Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board Pa.Commw. A.2d 1055 We granted allocatur and affirm. now
I. facts, The referee, relevant as determined by the Board’s may be summarized as follows. Shortly expira- before the tion of an existing collective bargaining agreement (“Agree- ment”), the and the Employer began negotiations Union on Although new contract. the parties were to reach unable employees actually participated 1. Over 550 stoppage. in the work Claims for were initiated 258 claim- appeal ants and a mass was taken from the action of the Office of strikers, Employment Security. The case of one of the Robert Semi- an, representative was treated as of the cases of all of the claimants. to expiration, the Union offered to agreement prior a new of time under the period a reasonable working for continue the Agreement pending the expired terms and conditions Employer per- The negotiations. ongoing of the outcome the terms to work under to continue employees mitted the 15, 1979. On Agreement until June conditions the and the date, representatives, Union during meeting with that terms and changes economic a list Employer presented including an across-the-board of employment, conditions benefits, it fringe and enhanced wage increase hourly (June 18). The following Monday to the implement intended for a membership its the list to present refused Union as sched- vote, proposals its Employer implemented and the these сontinued to work under The employees uled. 20, 1979. On the July conditions until terms and changed having apprised been membership, the following day, Union them reject voted to proposals, economic Employer’s at a new ultimately arrived parties The stop and work. on and work agreement October collective 10, 1979. resumed on October wages on negotiations, centered dispute, during tenta- were appears parties It fringe
and benefits. prior items as to the non-economic tively agreement unilaterally date. The altered status April expiration 18, represented June Employer, effective imposed part of increases which were wage fringe and benefit rejected by and package offered June 18 negotiations.2 in the Betwеen point Union at that remained at work under 21 the July and in status change This improved wage fringe levels. *4 21, at July on membership the Union placed was before and the the offer membership rejected time the Union which stoppage began. work
II. 402(d) Unemployment Com- Pennsylvania Section pertinent part in as follows: provides Law pensation wage per cent hour across-the-board benefits consisted of a 55 2. These insurance, increase, pension benefits. vacation and and increases ineligible An shall be for for employe any week— (d) stoppage In his is due to which a
work, (other exists because dispute which a labor lock-out) than a factory, at the or other establishment ____ he premises at which is or was last employed: § 802(d) (1964) (emphasis supрlied). P.S. The test for determining stoppage whether a work is the result of a lockout or a strike is well-established:
Have the
offered to continue
working for
preexisting
time under the
terms and condi-
reasonable
tions of
so as to
avert
pending the final settlement of the contract negotiations;
employer agreed
permit
has
work to continue
preexisting
for a reasonable time under the
terms and
of employment pending
negotiations?
conditions
further
If the employer
expiring
refuses to so extend the
contract
quo,
and maintain the status
then the resulting work
‘lockout’____
stoppage constitutes a
Case,
Vrotney Unemployment Compensation
supra
444-445,
(1960).
In the very
negotiations
delicate and sensitive
development
are involved
of a
collective
new
bar-
gaining agreement
replace
one that
is
its
nearing
expiration,
parties
all
must
sincere in their desire to
be
operation
maintain the continued
of the employer’s enter-
prise. The law
contemplates
collective
*5
faith,
to
purpose
with a sincere
in good
will be conducted
an adamant attitude
Neither
agreement.
find a basis
emplоyees,
the
part
on the
contract, no work”
“no
that work
employer
the
laid down
ultimatum
nor an
terms, are
(employer’s)
on his
only
will be available
opera-
continue the
desire to
a
serious manifestations
enterprise.
tion
443-444,
Id. Corporation Unemploy- stated Philco As this Court Review, supra: ment of our purpose the Since has when work an individual compensate is to
system
own,
the
logically
of his
through
him
no fault
denied
been
or
from a strike
stoppage
a
resulted
test of whether work
side, union or
us to determine which
requires
a lock-out
under
operations
refused to continue
management, first
expired,
technically
the contract had
quo
the status
after
continuing.
negotiations were
but while
103,
Moreover,
situation from
urged
distinguish
are
to
this
we
the
an
insti-
setting
employer unilaterally
traditional
where
The
contends
wage changes.
tutes detrimental
coercive,
insidious or
rather
its motive was not
but
taking
to
the employees by
emanated from a “desire
benefit
wage guidelines
of the window in the
advantage
magni-
increases of that
otherwise would have barred
3
tude.”
good
The
latter
is to
argument
interject
effect of the
Vrotney
accept-
in
formula. The initial
faith element
easy applica-
standard
based on its
Vrotney
ance
was
it
the administrative level and at the same time
tion on
Vrotney
concerns involved.
was
policy
served the basic
the continuation of the work relation-
designed
encourage
during
previously agreed
parties
under terms
ship
agree-
of the old
expiration
that difficult period between
had
terms of
been
ment and before
new
v. Commonwealth
agreed upon. Fairview School District
Compensation Board
Pennsylvania, Unemployment
of
521;
Review,
Unem-
A.2d at
supra
Equally
one of the
must inure
change by
parties
that the unilateral
to the detriment of the other. The determination what is
one than it
complex
may appear
a “bеnefit” is a much more
at first blush. The coercive effect of well-timed unilateral
in
an
has
employer
aptly
increases
benefits
been
describ
suggestion
as “the
Supreme
ed
the United States
Court
glove.”
Exchange
of a fist inside the velvet
N.L.R.B. v.
457, 460, 11
405, 409, 84
Parts
375 U.S.
S.Ct.
Company,
(1964). The
of such a “carrot on the
potential
L.Ed.2d 435
approach
stick”
as a device to erode
resolve
See,
apparent.
is
employees during negotiations
readily
322,
Co.,
N.L.R.B., 623 F.2d
326
J.P. Stevens &
Inc. v.
e.g.,
Cir.),
1077,
856,
(4th
denied, 449
101 S.Ct.
66
cert.
U.S.
424
(1980);
Co.,
Bonck
F.2d
L.Ed.2d 800
N.L.R.B. v. J.H.
634,
(5th Cir.1970);
Trucking,
N.L.R.B. v. Stafford
(7th Cir.1966);
Katz,
Inc., 371 F.2d
N.L.R.B. v.
cf.
1107,
4. ring of its concern for the interests of the hollow because employees representative the facts of this case. Once the was under consequences wage price guidelinеs possible of the aware offer, negotiation posture rejected upon their and then it stretches credulity appellant’s solely by to believe that insistence was motivated bargaining position employee. its concern for the In of the fact that spite the Employer was unques tionably which “first party refused to opera continue tions under quo the status after the contract had technically expired, negotiations but while were continuing[,]” Philco Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of supra 430 Pa. at A.2d at the Employ er attempts to shift the the Vrotney standard to the onus Union. The argues that the continuation of work membership Union for a thirty-three day period after the Employer’s implementation unilateral wage and bene fit increases and the employees’ failure protest those changes evidences the Union’s acquiescence in a “new sta tus quo.” Under this theory the Union’s ultimate work stoppage is to be viewed as a refusal to maintain this “new quo” status for a reasonable time. aWhile modification by agreement mutual of terms and conditions of employment pending the outcome of on-going negotiations would not be inconsistent objectives with the Vrotney, instant record support does not the existence of such an agreement. The negotiators Union’s explicitly rejected the Employer’s proposals prior to implementation and declined to present them to the Union membership. employees’ ac tacit ceptance of paychecks which reflected an hourly wage increase does support not itself the conclusion that the Union agreed to or that the employees were even aware of the numerous changes insurance, annual vacation and pension benefits implemented by Moreover, the Employer. *8 the time elapsed between the implementation of those changes the and Union’s work stoppage is insufficient to agreement. establish an The Union’s representatives clear required ly sufficient time in which to ascertain the consen sus of the membership regarding the difficult decision whether or Further, not to stop work. the Employer’s implementation changes of its did signal not an end to pre-strike negotiations. contract Toward the сlose of the thirty-three day period question, parties conducted a negotiation meeting at which the Union representatives to agreed submit the Employer’s proposals to the member The ship. that a possibility settlement might still be justify reached would further the Union’s to de- slowness The evidence stoppage. supports clare a work the conclu- sion parties’ positions apart that the were not so far that such an have expectation would been unreasonable. On facts, these acceptance of the Employer’s “acquiescence” encourage a union theory would to call a work upon implementation any change unilateral an employer protect right in order to its membership’s a unemploymеnt compensation. Such rule defeat would encouraging crucial Vrotney’s objective continuation situation during good negotia- faith tions.5
The mire that will from a deviation of the well result argues against defined standard most Vrotney strongly suggested modifications. In Unemployment Compensa tion Board Review Sun Oil Company Pennsylva nia, supra, rejected we a modification of the rule which require finding would a that the Union work stoppage was motivated failure to solely employer’s maintain the quo. status compel
Such rule would the Unemployment Compensa- tion Board of and the Review Commonwealth Court to fathom underlying, subjective motivations for a stoppage and would thus and rela- clarity undermine tive in the predictability embodied standard set forth our Vrotney and Philco decisions. Corp. Additionally, the rule of and Philco tends to Vrotney Corp. encourage employers and alike to maintain the status quo negotiating while agreement. departure new from legitimately argued Vrotney 5. Nor can it be that the rule is unfair to conceivably require employer in that it could preexisting continue perpetuity. under the terms of the contract into Vrotney by express language qualified length its during of time quo stating: employ this status must be maintained "has the agreed permit er work to continue for a reasonable time under the preexisting employment____” Vrotney terms conditions of Unem Case, ployment Compensation 163 A.2d impasse good Where it is evident an has been reached or faith impossible, Vrotney by is inapplicable. its own tеrms is *9 Oil, rule, urged by this Sun would salutary weaken this effect.
Id.
It must be employment relationship during maintain the the difficult and delicate period following expiration prior bargaining agreement during collective the negotiations In replace encouraging for one to it. the continuation of Vrotney employment during periоd, this standard insecurity avoids the economic due to unemployment is the fundamental of the objective Unemployment Compen sation Law. insecurity
Economic due to is a serious health, morals, menace people to the and welfare of the Commonwealth____ § 43 P.S. addition, climate,
In
designed
during
the rule is
to foster a
contracts,
period
good
nego-
conducive to
faith
between
basis. Fairview
District v.
on an equal
School
tiations
Commonwealth
Pennsylvania Unemployment Com-
pensation
supra
We was a quo of the status as a result of the Employer’s tion actions 18. We also are satisfied that this disruption on June was Vrotney Moreover, envisioned rule. type character of the action of Employer’s unilateral June 18 *10 was not into a transformed mutual agreement simply be- cause the Union waited thirty-three days before the work stoppage.
Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
McDERMOTT,J., concurs in the result.
HUTCHINSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion which FLAHERTY, J., joined.
HUTCHINSON, Justice, dissenting. case, facts this as Referee,1 found by the plainly establish that the cause of this work stoppage was a strike begun by Trane’s employees and not a lockout by Trane. Dissatisfied with the improved conditions the in- employer stituted two and one-half months after their old contract had expired, under which improved conditions they had worked for 33 days, these workers withheld their labor. Therefore, I would reverse Commonwealth Court and rein- state the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board denying Review benefits to the employees.
The Referee determined that the parties were bound aby collective agreement which was effective from 26, June 1976 until expiration date, 1, its April 1979. Be- tween 27, February 1979 and March 1979 the Union and Employer held many bargaining sessions but failed to reach agreement. At the collective bargaining session on March 29, 1979, the Union’s chief negotiator submitted a written offer to the Employer, Trane, to continue working for a period reasonable of time under the terms and cоnditions of the old contract after it expired April 1, on 1979. Although the Employer’s negotiator indicated this offer was not agreeable, the employees did report for on April 2, 1979 and continued to work under the terms of the expired contract until June period of two and one-half Unemployment 1. The agreed Board of Review with the Referee’s determinations and affirmed his decision in a brief state- ment and order. time, continued to Employer During months. expired provisions all of the and maintain observe contract. on June bargaining session
At a collective negoti- to the union’s changes a list of presented Employer changes improved one of these team. Each ating None made men in the unit. conditions of the working refused to negotiating team Thе Union’s them worse.2 for a vote. membership changes to the Union’s submit implemented proposals, On June and an wage increases hourly across-the-board including *11 package.3 improved benefit practices law of unfair labor Although I not believe the federal do
2.
Unemployment Compensation Law’s definition of “lock-
controls our
out,"
Employer’simplementa-
in this record that the
there is not a hint
changes
with the
was an unfair interference
these beneficial
tion of
rights
guarantees
Management
Act
to the
Labor
Relations
the federal
Indeed,
Employer’s
appear con-
actions
or their Union.
workers
Specifically, the United States Su-
labor law.
sonant with federal
here
unilat-
distinguished
at issue
from
preme Court has
the increases
during
higher
any
to the union
than
offer submitted
eral increases
employ-
negotiations,
implementation of which demonstrates
example,
good
in N.L.R.B. v.
bargain
faith. For
er’s refusal to
Crompton-Highland
in
217, 224-25,
960,
Mills, Inc.,
S.Ct.
U.S.
69
337
963-64,
(1949),
holding
implementation
after
unilateral
FIRST YEAR EFFECTIVE 12:01 a.m. June INSURANCE Raise From §9,000 §10,000 -Life Insurance to §9,000 -AD&D §10,000 to ; -(Employees with Life Insurance will have that raised Supplemental amount) like and Lab Maximum -X-Ray §175/yr. §200/yr. and Lab Schedule Remove Schedule -X-Ray -Surgical §600 §650 Maximum (Reasonable & Customary) §350 max. to -Hospital Maternity same as other hospi- talizations (New coverage -Home Care Benefit Nurse's in the home) §105/wk. §112/wk. -Accident & Sickness *12 -Major Medical §100,000 to Lifetime -§25,000/disability per person §100 §100 in 3 months to deductible/disability deductible/person per (Special feature) -§250 deductible new family per year
-§2,000 annual restoration to restore major medical used any previous VACATION (Will -Add six weeks after 30 of service be effective this years vacation yеar) PENSION §8.50 §9.00 -Raise formula from to -Add retirement reduction factors early (Can ages 2% retire at and 64 at reduction benefit only per reduction) as year opposed 5% previous per year WAGES (EFFECTIVE 6-18-79) ACCROSSTHE BOARD -55$ holding Employer’s implementa- that the The majority’s was, and of employment terms conditions tion of superior lockout, that action dis- simply because constructively, ante, for purposes undermines the quo turbed the status Unemployment enacted the Assembly our General intent under- ignores legislative and Compensation Law of 402(d). majority’s application The pinning Section again case shows once to the facts of this rule Vrotney4 rule, adopted for per extension of a se the insensible how courts, inappropriate can lead to an of the сonvenience arbitrary mechanical and fashion. in a applied result when rule, on the disturbance emphasis with its The Vrotney lockouts, may strikes from separate quo the status ante It is not a reasoning. aid to sometimes be a valuable bargain- The of collective reasoning.. world substitute universe. encased a clockwork ing comfortably is not Unemploy- of the purpose has stated the Legislature Our in that statute’s “Declaration ment Law Policy”: Public is a serious unemployment due to insecurity
Economic health, morals, people and welfare menace to and its unemployment Involuntary the Commonwealth. crushing force falls with resulting indigency burden of worker, ultimately upon and upon unemployed in the form political and its subdivisions Commonwealth unemployment Security against assistance. poor relief indigency provided can best be spread and the used financial reserves to be aside of setting systematic employes during wages by for loss of compensation as no through unemployed when become periods they fault of finan- of the accumulation principle The their own. of cial risks, payment and the reserves, sharing meets the unemployment respect with hazards of against protection need of therefore, declares indigency. Legislature, *13 Case, 440, Vrotney Unemployment Compensation 400 Pa. 163 4. See ' A.2d 91
495 public gener- in and the judgment good its considered of the citizens of this require al welfare Commonwealth police of of powers the exercise the Commonwealth this аct for the compulsory setting the enactment of aside unemployment of reserves to be used for the benefit of no their own. unemployed through persons fault of § 43 752 (emphasis supplied). repeated- P.S. Our Court has “ ly emphasized per- that this declaration ‘is not merely is, rather, functory preface, keystone upon but sections of the interpreted individual must be and Act ” Penn Hills School District v. Unemploy- construed.’ Review, ment Board 620, 625, 496 Pa. of 1213, (1981) 437 Department Labor (quoting A.2d 1215 of Industry, Bureau Employment v. Unem- Security Review, ployment Compensation Board 471, 418 Pa. 476, 463, 211 [1965]). A.2d 466 Accordingly: (section
“Subsequent provisions
401,
as to eligibility
43
§
§
801),
(section 402,
802),
P.S.
or ineligibility
43
for
P.S.
compensation must all be read
subject
and construed as
to this basic and fundamental declaration.
If it
clear
is
person’s
is
the result of his оwn
fault, he is
eligible
not
under the Act.”
Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Review,
Board
43, 49,
336, 340,
356 Pa.
cert.
50 A.2d
Co.,
denied sub nom.
Seifing
Barclay White
332 U.S.
(1947)
68 S.Ct.
(quoting Department
(1968) of Security reau v. Com- Employment Unemployment of Review, pensation Board of 471, 478, 211 463, 418 Pa. A.2d [1965]). provide 467 “It is not intended to addi- certainly Philco, strike 430 tional union members.” Pa. benefits 110, 242 at at 459. A.2d Vrotney in
Before rule first enunciated became en- law, in trenched our courts had defined “strike” and our common “lockout” in terms which reflected the practical § words. See (in 1 1903 usage of the Pa.C.S. the construc- of shall construed phrases tion statutes “words be ... according approved usage”). their common and For v. Company Unemployment Armour Leather in example, Review, Compensation Board of 190, 192 Ct. Pa.Superior 195, 772, (1960), Superior 159 775 defined a A.2d Court as: “strike” understanding
the act of work done mutual quitting of body enforcing compli- a a means of workmen as ance made on their Webster’s employer. with demands (2nd Edition). New International Dictionary (Footnote omitted.) recognized the courts that Similarly, counterpart the lockout of a strike. employer’s is Products, Unemployment Compensa Tube Inc. v. Small Review, Board 315, tion 308, Pa.Superior 198 Ct. 181 854, (1962). recognized Our have A.2d 858 courts further present factual situa “may varying that lockout be tions, can all manifesta comprehend and no definition of its Id. However, consistently the courts have ob tions.” of a is an with gist employer’s served lock-out “[t]he holding gain from his order employes Westinghouse Corpora Electric concession from them.” v. Board Review Unemployment Compensation tion Case), 187 Pa.Su (Hughes Unemployment Compensation Burle (1958) 259, 685, 144 252, (quoting Ct. A.2d 688 perior Case, Compensation Unemployment son Pa.Superior 173 See Small Tube 762, 527, 533, [1953]). 98 A.2d 766 Ct. Products, Compensation Bоard v. Unemployment Inc. Review, 198 Arm- 315, 858; at 181 A.2d at Pa.Superior Ct.
497
195,
192
Company,
Pa.Superior Ct. at
159
our Leather
775;
A.2d at
Estates v.
Hershey
Unemployment Compen-
Review,
191 Pa.Superior Ct.
155
sation Board 470,
(1959),
446,
A.2d
473
employer employees evince a reasonable desire and operations effort to maintain the and the em- employer’s status. ployment contract,
Neither an of “no adamant attitude no work” on the of the nor an laid part employees, ultimatum down that work on employer only will be available his terms, are of a (employer’s) serious manifestations desire to continue the operation enterprise. (quoting at 485
Majority Com Vrotney Unemployment Case, [1960]). 163 A.2d pensation cаse, In employees the instant Trane’s worked under the terms same and conditions two and one-half months expiration of their following collective bargaining agree- ment. The then Employer proposed increases in hourly wages improved and an benefit package. The Union refus- ed to the proposals submit to its membership whereupon the Employer unilaterally implemented them. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the used Employer attempt coercive tactics an get accept Union to new terms and conditions. There is likewise no evidence Employer that the issued an threatening ultimatum to with- hold work until the employees agreed to a new contract incorporating Moreover, its only proposals. the majority’s contention that implementation changes beneficial is inherently non is sequitur simply coercive on the facts of the case.
This was not the usual situation in employees are presented with Hobson’s choice. Here they enjoyed higher wages and fringe better benefits for thirty-three days be- fore voting to strike. At no time during period this did the threaten to implement terms worse than those the had under expired collective or agreement suggest any action which would *16 pose otherwise a threat to their job were security. They neither intimidated nor aby enticed “carrot on the stick” offered the in the form of better employment They terms. the eventually rejected new terms and went strike, out on until apparently they obtained a contract containing terms more from point desirable their of view. case,
The facts of Referee, this as found the show that the Employer made a sincere effort to continue both its operations and the employment workers’ status. The em- hand, on the other ployees, stoppage initiated a work to gain further concessions from their Employer. They walked off their jobs voluntarily; they would lost have nothing had remained. they unemployment Such resulted from their gain will and desire to concessions from their It Employer. involuntary was not an result or the fault of An Employer. employer’s implementation of beneficial changes wages in or working negotiations conditions after fail a contract does not later produce to convert a a strike to unemploymеnt from a lockout for where men and purposes women choose to those more improved work under conditions for than a Services, month. See Food Inc. v. Unemploy- Gladieux ment (1978) (in reason determining A.2d for a
claimant’s our Court must our in- “confine quiry to the immediate cause and avoid the maze that would attempt result from an to ascertain indirect or chronologi- causes”). cally remote
The states that majority formula was “de- Vrotney signed encourage to the continuation of the work relation- ship under previously agreed terms the parties during period expiration agree- difficult between the of the old ment and before new terms been [have] agreed upon.” Majority at 486. The further majority that, addition, explains rule is designed to foster а “[i]n climate, during period contracts, between conducive to good equal on negotiations faith an basis.” Id. at 490. Act, federal Labor Management Relations 29 U.S. §C.A. seq., Pennsylvania et and the Labor Relations § Act, 43 P.S. 211.1 seq., et were enacted for the purpose promoting which policy objectives majority focuses on in this unemployment compensation case. By engrafting federal and state labor our unemployment compen- law into statute, courts, sation our their decisions since Vrotney, goals and, have time, fostered the of labor law at the same have lost increasingly sight policy those objectives Legislature prompted the the Unemployment enact Com- pensation Law. circumstances,
It may appropriate, be under certain courts to look appropriately analogous principles labor law relating provisions to collective applying *17 of the Compensation Law. This is not such Unemployment indeed, and, a case the arguably appropriate of analogy “impasse” the other points way. unemployment com- pensation proceeding proper is not the place which to 500 either violations of state or federal labor
adjudicate alleged promote affirmatively policies by addressed law or See, e.g., D 'Amato v. governing labor relations. statutes Review, Compensation Pa. Unemployment 196 (1961) 680, 173 A.2d (“[t]he principle Ct. Superior Unemployment Compensation Law is objective cases[;] distress in individual ... alleviatе economic [t]he designed implement impede is not or intended to or to Law employers”); between unions and bargaining collective Unemployment Compen Inc. v. Colteryahn Dairy, Carl Review, 319, sation Board of 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. (1979) 71, (“a compensation is proceeding 407 A.2d an place adjudicate alleged not the collective or á unfair agreement practice”). violation claimed labor Unemployment Compensation also v. See Burleson at 98 A.2d at Board of Pa.Superior Ct. Compensation Board Review Unemployment 766; Homsher, 579-80, 347 A.2d 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. comes today
I majority believe the result reached at misplaced policy on considerations emphasis from a labor expense express the concerns addressed Under Unemployment Compensation Law. language 402(d) that result is anomalous at best. Section law this “lockout,” “disrup- not of work” and speaks “stoppage the statute quo.” provision in the status This tions striking ineligible unemploy- for simply employees makes in this Employer benefits. Had ment the terms of indefinitely continued its under operations case employees a work expired agreement, stoppage as a “strike” even under the Vrot- characterized would be and, therefore, have standard, employees would ney ¡the wrong to ineligible benefits. It is been does, hold, initiate majority as the who implement- has properly when those and conditions of than ed terms better bargaining agreement, have the old collective contained place employ- “locked of their constructively out” been *18 Today ment. the majority ignores meaning and, terms “strike” process, and “lockout” in the distorts purpose basic of the Unemployment Compensation Law which is to compensate workers whose loss through own, occurs no fault of their not those who choose to temporarily withhold their labor in order to force their into employer additional economic concessions.
For reasons, I foregoing dissent. respectfully FLAHERTY, J., in this joins Dissenting Opinion.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Sept. 1984. Sept.
Decided 1984. Jr., McCaney, Counsel, Michael J. Dept, Transp., Asst. Harrisburg, for appellant. Jr., Retos,
George Washington, Mark G. Shultz and Appalachian Pipeline, Inc. Keener, Nalitz, M. Sayers, King,
Robert Keener & Waynesburg, for Harold L. Mitchell.