*1
1064,
&
AFL-CIO ERNST YOUNG
LOCAL
RWDSU
16).
(Calendar
6,
Argued April
No.
Decided
99445.
Docket No.
July
1995.
AFL-CIO, brought
Wayne
in the
an action
Local
RWDSU
Hevelhorst,
against
Young,
and
Ernst &
Rick
Circuit Court
firm,
accounting
seeking money damages
members of the
other
Security
Michigan
equal
Employment
Com-
to the amount the
contribution rates
mission assessed the union
increased
required reports
to
of the defendants’ failure
submit
because
court,
J.,
Stempien,
through
R.
1988. The
Marvin
for
judgment, finding
summary
motion for
denied the defendants’
600.5805;
periods
27A.5805
of MCL
MSA
do
that the limitation
soüght damages only
apply
plaintiff
for
the
finan-
not
because
persons
injury
property.
not
The Court of
cial loss and
for
or
Jr., P.J.,
Appeals, D. E.
Holbrook,
and J. F.
and
Neff
JJ., affirmed,
applies
disagreed
Kowalski,
but
that
and,
only
physical injury,
rejecting
the
to claims
defendants’
applied,
malpractice
period
contention that the
limitation
held
5805(8),5807(8),
apply,
or 5813
but declined
determine
§§
133880).
(Docket
provision
controlling
was
No.
de-
appeal.
fendants
opinion
joined by
by
Brickley,
In an
Chief Justice
Justices
Supreme
Mallett,
Weaver,
the
held:
Riley,
Court
subject to
Because accountants are
common-law
period
600.5805(4);
liability,
two-year
the
limitation
of MCL
27A.5805(4)applies.
for
court to
1. Because was not error
the trial
conclude
action,
was.
the Court
this
not a breach
contract
Appeals
suggested
erred to
that it
that the breach of
the extent
statute, 5807(8)might apply.
contract
correctly
prescribes
Appeals
2. The Court of
held that §
torts, regard-
periods
limitation
for traditional common-law
damages sought
pecuniary
whether
less of
are
or
physical injury.
5805(4) provides
3. Section
relevant
limitation
for this accountant
action. Because
statute,
by
Michigan
no
law has
not defined
case
consid-
accounting
appropriate
malpractice,
look to
it is
ered
1064 v
Ernst
Opinion of the Court
common law as evidenced
decisions of other states to discern
malpractice.
of common-law
Courts and commenta-
tors,
recognized
applying
principles,
common-law tort
have
subject
traditionally
accountants as a
to common-law
malpractice liability.
*2
part
part.
Affirmed in
and reversed in
joined by
Cavanagh,
Boyle,
Justice
Justices Levin and
5805(4)
dissenting,
applies only
stated that
to medical and
legal malpractice.
Michigan
recognized
No
source
accountant
1961,
year
Michigan
actions before
the revised
enacted,
post-1961
statute of
was
limitations
and
sources are
entirely
determining
Legislature
irrelevant
in
the intent of the
enacting
Legislature
in
It
for
statute.
to extend the
malpractice period of limitation to accountants.
(1994)
App 445;
part
Dickinson, Moon, Van Dusen & Free- (by Campbell Mary man Kelly), Lawrence G. and Beth Young (by Gray)
and Ernst & M. Daniel for the defendants.
Amicus Curiae: Cooney, (by Oldani,
Plunkett & P.C. Christine D. Mary Ross, Massaron and R. Lawrence Donald- son), Michigan for the Association of Certified Public Accountants. Plaintiff, 1064, C.J. RWDSU Brickley, employed accounting
AFL-CIO, defendant firm of Young. Young provided Ernst & for the Ernst & services
plaintiff during years 1984, union fiscal provided and after which the firm no plaintiff. further services for plaintiff July 1988, In became aware that one of bookkeepers prepared the union’s had not and reports required Michigan submitted Em- Opinion the Court through Security ployment for 1984 Commission an increased result, the mesc assessed 1988. As a plaintiff in excess that cost contribution rate $21,000. plaintiff lawsuit, 13, 1989, this filed
On October seeking money damages in an from defendants required equal to the union what was amount pay alleges that the defendants Plaintiff mesc. they perform for were the duties failed including examining plaintiff’s paid, all hired and records, assuring auditing accounts, its agencies required by governmental payments all computed paid. properly were pur disposition summary Defendants moved 2.116(C)(7), contending to MCR suant plaintiff’s and there claim sounded two-year by the limitation fore was barred 27A.5805(4),1 600.5805(4); provided by MCL *3 malpractice, 5805 of the Judicature Act Relevant Revised § provides: (1) person bring A shall not or maintain an action to recover unless, injuries
damages claim first accrued to the the of persons property or after the through plaintiff or to whom someone claims, periods plaintiff the the action is commenced within prescribed by time this section. (4) period Except provided chapter, in this as otherwise charging malpractice. years limitations is for an action of [MCL 600.5805;MSA 27A.5805.] two-year period begins to run of accrual The date prescribed by from which RJA, 5838(1): § 5838a, Except provided in section a claim based as otherwise is, malpractice person who himself or on the of a or holds be, a state herself out to accrues at the tiff matters less of a member of licensed serving plain- person time discontinues professional pseudoprofessional capacity as to the in a or arose, regard- out of claim for which the plaintiff the time the or otherwise has knowl- discovers edge of the claim. 1064 v Ernst & Opinion of the Court discovery appli as well as the six-month cable to rule also 600.5838(2); actions, MCL 27A.5838(2).2 MSA summary
The trial court denied the motion for disposition and held that the relevant limitation period six-year period provided by was the MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813.3 The trial court con- periods cluded that the limitation contained in apply plaintiff § 5805 do not because seeks dam- ages only injury for financial loss and not for persons property. appealed. or Defendant
Although Appeals disagreed the Court of with applies only the trial § court that when there physical agreed injury, are claims of that sum- mary disposition improper. Rejecting was defen- dants’ contention that limitation period applied, Appeals the Court of held that the 5805(8) (three- applicable period may § be found in 5807(8) statute),4 year (six-year § “residual” tort 2RJA, 5838(2)provides following discovery § six-month rule for malpractice actions: Except provided 5838a, as otherwise in section an action involving any malpractice may a claim based on be commenced at applicable period prescribed time within the in sections plaintiif 5805 or 5851 to or within 6 months after the claim, discovers or should have discovered the existence of the 600.5838(2); 27A.5838(2).]
whichever is later. [MCL 3RJA, provides: personal All other actions shall be commenced within the
period years of 6 after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different is stated in the statutes. [MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813.] 5805(8) RJA, provides: *4 period years The of limitations is 3 after the time of death or injury damages all other actions to recover for the of death person, injury person property. a 600.5805(8); or for to a or [MCL 27A.5805(8).] Mich 322 Opinion of the Court (six-year period),5 § 5813 or contract of breach limitations).6 panel general The declined statute provisions among was three those decide which controlling.7 Appeals the Court of the decision of
We affirm applies to common- § as it held insofar alleged damages even when law tort claims pecuniary.8 solely However, reverse the we are Appeals it held insofar as of the Court of decision gov- malpractice claim is not that an accountant period pro- limitation erned 5805(4).9 vided in i A depends appeal initially on of this Resolution or a breach con- this is a tort action whether tract action. We read the opinion trial court’s as rejecting plaintiff’s this is an ac- contention that concluding By contract. tion for breach of period provided by applicable limitation was 5RJA, part: provides in relevant bring any person may or maintain action to recover No contract, damages specific performance for breach of or to enforce or sums due unless, any contract after the claim first claims, through whom he he by accrued to himself or to someone commences the action within the periods prescribed of time this section. (8) years of limitations is 6 for all other actions damages or sums due for breach contract. recover (1994). 445, 451-452; 516 NW2d necessary panel explained: is not that we Id. at 451-452. The "[l]t periods applies those three limitation because determine which of complaint periods.” years, brought within three the shortest of those was
8Id. at 448-449. 449-451.
9 Id. at *5 1064 v Ernst 327 Opinion of the Court 5813, the trial court believed that presumably § action, this was not a breach of contract otherwise 5807(8) would have that simply concluded § contract) (breach provided limi- controlling tation period. regarding We find no clear error trial finding court’s that this is not a breach of contract action.10
Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limita- actions, 5807, tions for contract does not apply § this claim. The Court Appeals erred to the 5807(8) extent it suggested that might apply. § B 5813, question next is whether rather § 5805, than controls this case. Section 5813 pro- general vides the period of limitation: personal All other actions shall be commenced period within the 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different 600.5813; is stated in the statutes. [MCL 27A.5813.]
Section 5805 is a more specific statute of limita-
tions than
5813 and therefore controls if applica-
Reeder,
Crane v
ble to this action.
22
Mich
Huron
v
(1871);
Twp City Disposal Systems,
Inc,
(1995).
366;
448 Mich
(4) chapter, provided in this Except as otherwise years limitations for an action period of the' malpractice. charging *6 (8) years after the limitations is of injury all other actions or for time of the death person, or for damages the death of a for recover 600.5805; property. person or injury to a [MCL MSA 27A.5805.] apply § 5805 does not held that
The trial court
plaintiff seeks
cause of action because
to this
physi-
damages only
not for
financial loss and
for
property.
injury
persons
We, like the
or
cal
disagree.
Appeals,
Court
Sand, Inc v
in Nat’l
the reasons stated
For
Nagel
Inc,
332-
Construction,
182 Mich
(1990),
§ 5805
that
we conclude
337; 451 NW2d
periods
prescribes
traditional
the limitation
regardless
torts,
the dam-
of whether
common-law
ages
physical injury.
sought
pecuniary
or
are for
Goldfarb,
v
for Pretrial Justice
also Citizens
See
(1982).
it
We find
255;
In controls here._ 5805(3) (malicious 5805(2) (false prosecu E.g., imprisonment), § § slander). 5805(7) (libel
tion), § Ernst Opinion of the Court II governed Having this action is determined that finally by the two- must decide whether § we 5805(4), year actions, § limitation for 5805(8) provided by three-year period con- or the trols. Balardo, 405; 308 411 Mich NW2d In Sam v 5805(4).
(1981), considered the this Court by noting malpractice was not defined After the Revised Judicature thoroughly Act, the Court legislative history of the statute considered the and, statutory construc- consistent with rules tion, definition of concluded that "the liability determined and resort to the common see no therefor are be supra Sam, 424. law.” at We the retreating compelling basis for from prescribed by princi- analytical Sam; framework ples it. favor our adherence to See of stare decisis Boyd Shows, 515, 525; 505 vWG Wade (1993).12 NW2d concluding
In that accountants are not encom- passed limita- within the statute of *7 dispositive Appeals tions, found it the Court Michigan reported no cases of 1961. The Court of of there were accounting malpractice Appeals before reading peculiar
analysis a is based on phrase: in "the common law” as used Sam v supra. phrase Balardo, "the common law” has general in senses. In most been used different its usage, it means: country, precepts any rules or of law in [T]hose equal is of body jurisprudence,
or that of its 12 495, Balardo, supra, by 1978 PA v 5805 was amended § Since Sam PA 115. believe those amendments are at 1986 PA and 1988 We Legislature’s acquiescence in this Court’s indication of the least some construction statutory support our adherence to the of 5805 and therefore § Corp, analysis Chrysler v 434 offered Sam. See Dean (1990). 655, 664; 455 NW2d 449 Mich op Opinion the Court application places, distinguished in all as from CJS, Law,
local laws and rules. Common [15A § 41.] P distinguished legislative enactments,
As from common law refers to: principles embodiment of in and rules "[T]he reason,
spired by jus natural an innate sense of tice, convenience, and the dictates of and voluntar ily adopted by government men for their in social authority relations. The pend of its rules does not de enactment, positive legislative on but on general reception usage, tendency and the accomplish justice.” the rules to the ends of [Gar Co, 420, 423-424; wols v Bankers Trust (1930).][13] NW Michigan guide If case law were our sole to the law, common the common law would cease to embody general precepts import of universal usage reason, custom, are derived from and be reduced instead to the mere rule of decision particular simply case. We do not believe that Sam supra Balardo, envisioned that the common law occupy superficial juris- would such status our prudence. Michigan Thus, while case law is cer- tainly determining particu- relevant whether a subject malpractice lar under the origin law, common the traditional nature and the common law make clear that a consideration judicial jurisdictions decisions from other is not prohibited here.14_ CJS, Law, 1, p See also 15A Common 41. CJS, Law, 21, pp explaining: See also 15A Common 78-79 determining is, In what the common law the courts will evidence, conclusive, although textbooks,
consider as not as subject. commentaries and other standard works on the Judi- cial decisions also constitute evidence of what the common law *8 1064 v Ernst op Opinion the Court by Construing statute reference the instant by explained law, other state it is as the common concept. In v St decisions, Kambas is not a novel Hosp Joseph’s Mercy 249; 205 Detroit, (1973), the statute considered the Court NW2d not en- that nurses were here and held at issue malpractice period. two-year compassed within the explained common law as looked to the The Court Supreme that and concluded Court the Ohio traditionally subject to were not nurses because encompassed by liability, they are not quot- two-year Id. at statute of limitation. the ing 370; Doe, 176 St 199 NE2d Ohio Richardson (1964). Thus, Sam, this Court 878 recognized even before may of other states the decisions ascertaining play of the statute a role in at issue. Home, 428 Mich Funeral
In Dennis v Robbins (1987), followed the 698; 411 the Court NW2d prescribed by analytical and held Sam framework encompassed by funeral directors were not no statute of limitation. There was subject suggestion malpractice liability represented by were that funeral directors law as under the common states, treatises, decisions of other encyclopedias. Indeed, hornbooks, the Court or expressly noted: of action no common-lawcause Since there was malpractice, or funeral home
for funeral director we Legislature intended find no indication that the states, is, accordingly, even decisions of the courts of decisions, may properly though contrary English con- be sulted. (cid:127) course, Michigan expressly rejected or modified a has Of common-law where doctrine, applying other states reference to decisions of improper. In the context of law would be the common liability, however, appears Michigan’s the com- law consistent with mon law. *9 332 Mich 322 Opinion op the Court meaning
to include such action within the of malpractice 27A.5805(4). 600.5805(4); as it is used MCL at [Id. 702.]
The absence of a action, common-law cause of conjunction with the absence of any decisions on point from this jurisdiction, justified the Dennis Court’s conclusion that funeral directors were not protected by the two-year malpractice statute of limitation. prior
To read our decisions construing the mal- practice statute of limitation as prohibit- somehow ing looking courts from beyond the Michigan ap- pellate reports when determining whether par- a ticular profession was subject mal- common-law practice unprecedented, and contrary to the traditional role of "the common law” in shaping our jurisprudence. In the absence of published opinion state, in this it is entirely appropriate indeed to look to necessary the common law as represented other by decisions, states’ hornbooks, treatises, and journals to discern common-law malpractice. To hold otherwise would 5805(4). impose an arbitrary limit on § When one looks beyond Michigan’s appellate reports, is clear accountants have been subjected to common-law malpractice liability with increasing frequency since at least the mid-1900s. See, e.g., Crosland, Atkins v 263, 406 SW2d 264 (Tex 1966), App, Civ rev’d on grounds other 417 (Tex, SW2d 150 1967); Bancroft v Ins Co Indemnity America, North (WD La, 203 F Supp 1962), 49 (CA aff’d 309 F2d 959 1962); Carr v Lipshie, 8 330; AD2d 187 (1961); NYS2d 564 Cochrane v York, American Surety Co of New 108 So 315 2d (Fla App, 1959); Duro Sportswear, Inc Cogen, v (NY Ct, NYS2d 20 Feldman 1954); S Granger, L B Laboratories, 288; Md (1969); A2d 421 1064 v Ernst & Cavanagh, Dissenting Opinion 56, 60-63; 244 P2d Mitchell, 39 Cal 2d Inc v Cowboys Wilch, (1952); Ass’n v Rodeo Professional P2d 510 30; 589 Brock, 42 Colo Smith (1978); Inc, Watkins, 127 So v Moss Ronaldson (La Country 1930); Wilmington App, Club v (ED 1969); Pa, Horwath, 46 FRD Horwath & liability negligence of ac- Hawkins, Professional (1959); 2d, 1 Am Jur countants, LR 797 12 Vand (discussing pp com- 15-19, 365-368 Accountant, § accountants). liability com- Courts and mon-law liability recognizing for the mentators of an accountant action, principles new cause not created a have applied merely the common-law have *10 but gener- malpractice actions in articulated ally. traditionally accounting is a
That liability malpractice subject is not to common-law Legislature proposition. fact, In the a remarkable accounting recognized practice since the has regulate the to' it a statute when enacted public PA 353. Conse- accountants. 1925 work limi- quently, relevant statute the we hold 27A.5805(4). 600.5805(4); MSA tations is MCL and, were, it clear that accountants Because is liability, subject to common-law are is the conclusively unnecessary construe in this case 600.5805(4); precise MSA of MCL 27A.5805(4), the whether or to decide against applies to actions limitations statute of professions. We so licensed of all state members limit our holding. part. part and reversed
Affirmed JJ., concurred Weaver, Mallett, Riley, Brickley, C.J. with (dissenting). here is The issue J. Cavanagh, may assert an accountant
whether Mich Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, period of limitation as an affirmative defense to liability. majority someone, holds that if some- how, sometime, somewhere, source, and in some against labeled an action a member of the same occupation "malpractice” as defendant a claim, two-year malpractice period then the of limitation apply. premised will Statutes of limitation are on bright-line the idea that there should be a cut-off potential litigation. date to I dissent because I majority’s holding unnecessarily believe that litigation confuses and obscures the rules of in the Michigan. State of meaning
At issue here of MCL 600.5805(4); 27A.5805(4), provides: "Except provided chapter, as otherwise in this years charg- of limitations 2is for an action ing malpractice.” provision This was one small section in the Revised Judicature Act of 1961.1The provided two-year Judicature Act of 1915 mal- practice period physicians, of limitation for sur- geons, 12323(3). and dentists. 1915 CL Because the provision physician, surgeon, deleted the language, Michigan struggled dentist courts have malpractice period with whether the of limitation applies professions. to other Joseph’s
In
Mercy Hosp
Kambas v St
Detroit,
(1973),
253;
A civil malpractice action for may be main- thorough For legislative a more discussion history, my of the see dissenting opinion Balardo, 25-27; Sam v (1978). NW2d 522 Ernst Cavanagh, Dissenting Opinion holding or person professing against any
tained licensed of a state to be a member himself out applica- common law rules of the profession. The licensed of a state against members to actions ble against applicable malpractice, are for profession, any person to be a member himself out who holds profession. of a state licensed that argument the rejected specifically Kambas at 253. action. Id. cause of new any 2912 created Com- explicit Committee on the The Court relied the statute: from the drafters ment physicians only to pertained "The source section broadening of this the that surgeons. Note of action. a new cause not create does section are liable professions state licensed Members of law, unlicensed as are common malpractice at persons. What un- hold the does is this section to which of care to the standard person licensed member held, be profession would licensed of the state lay- of a of care of to the standard instead held at persons are man, unlicensed to accom- Comment [Id., quoting Committee present.” Kambas).] added in (emphasis panying § extended merely that The Court held pseudoprofessionals cause of action malpractice subject already that were serving professions concluded Kambas actions. Id. malpractice subject were not nurses because Act of Judicature under actions could fall that nurses not intend did Legislature We of limitation. within subsequently Legislature recognize should legislation current related statutes amended extend actions that medical provides li- are who professionals care health to licensed the Public 15 of under article registered or censed *12 336 322 Mich Dissenting by Opinion Cavanagh, J. Code,2
Health and licensed health care facilities or agencies who are licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code. MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838a. The statute expressly excludes sanitari- 5838a(l)(b). ans and veterinarians. § factor, Another for consideration has been a Committee Comment the drafters of the 1961 statute submitted with 5805: "Section [5805] is a compilation of the limitations on the general tort remedies. Existing periods time have been used.”31 relied on this comment my dissenting opinion in Balardo, Sam v 85 Mich App 29-30; 270 NW2d (1978), legal case, in which I concluded that the Legislature intended to limit the malpractice period of limitation to physicians, surgeons, However, and dentists. on appeal, majority of this Court held that the analysis should focus on the definition of malpractice by resort to the common Balardo, law. Sam v (1981). 424; 308 NW2d
Dissenting, Justice Levin astutely predicted that this holding would litigation leave rules uncertain:
The majority’s construction has the effect of rendering cable uncertain the appli limitation any given profession. After today, only legal (in members of the cluding professions medical nurses) can know with confidence which period applies court, until a and probably not until Court, this reported has decisions, searched trea tises and relating statutes to actions for negli gent practice of that to ascertain whether with "malpractice” word has been used regard to it with sufficient frequency for the Court to conclude that such an action was consid applies chiropractic, dentistry, medicine, Article 15 nursing, optometry, osteopathic surgery, pharmacy practice, medicine and physical therapy, podiatric surgery, counseling, psychol medicine and ogy, occupational sanitarians, therapy, veterinary occupations. 3Reprinted as an annotation to 5805. Ernst & Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, at common law. "malpractice” action at [Id.
ered a 440.][4] *13 to re- necessary it states that is majority
The in order "to discern sources search all available malpractice.” the of common-law Brickley, that C.J., reasons ante majority at 332. The "[t]o limit impose arbitrary an hold otherwise would Id.5 This of limitation. period malpractice on” the recent most in with this Court’s is conflict analysis Home, Funeral in Dennis v Robbins approach (1987), in which we held 698; 411 Mich NW2d not directors could funeral homes and their of limitation. malpractice period use the shorter Michigan to cases. Dennis only looked specifically 702, n 1. We Id. at stated:_ argued: Justice Levin malpractice since the former involves between actions If there is a difference that, negligence ordinary actions it is profession, applicable negligence practice stan- of a the the member of the of care is that of a reasonable dard layman. If the Court’s construction rather than of a reasonable has extending malpractice limitation the effect of the higher required, professionals standard of care is all of whom a explain why Judicature it will difficult to the Revised then Act of 1961 did not extend be malpractice period to limitation professionals. all state-licensed malpractice period applies to all If limitation the shorter applies only physicians professions, then it not state-licensed and surveyors, planners. foresters, also, taxidermists, example, lawyers but contractors, community landscape architects and 5805(3) adjudication of § If that is to be the course of Otherwise, 5805(4)], openly should be overruled. Kambas [now nothing alone nurses, left of the Kambas decision save will be among professionals, will be denied state-licensed period. limitation [411 benefit of the shorter 442.]. are, by very limitation their 5 I would counter that statutes of Legislature example, purpose, arbitrary. has For nature and must be commenced of contract action decided that a normal breach 27A.5807(8). Therefore, 600.5807(8); six years. MCL within six years lines, Legislature draws and two weeks is too late. place them. not our to alter Mich Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, against Since a action a funeral recognized home or funeral time the not at the director was Legislature enacted the Judicature Act of 1915 and the Revised Judicature Act of as amended, Legisla we find no indication that ture intended to include this cause of action meaning within the1 of the statute of limitations. at [Id. 703.] majority’s approach
Now, in contrast to the in in opinion Sam, and in contrast to the unanimous apparently Dennis, this Court will consider sources Michigan after the date that the revised Brickley, C.J., statute of . limitations was enacted. post-1961 ante at 332-333. I believe that sources entirely determining Legisla- are irrelevant tbe ture’s intent when it enacted this statute. govern
Statutes of limitation are rules that liti- *14 gation predictability and are intended to establish certainty lawyers, judges, and contrast, and clients. In majority’s approach
the seems to leave regard no limit with to who can fit into the shorter majority statute, and, therefore, the predictable totally. has shaken uncertain. After rules and left them
today, lawyer safely no can advise actionable, a client that a claim is or that it is barred, unless the defendant a health care professional, lawyer, engineer, architect, land sur- veyor, judge contractor, or accountant. No can confidently rule on a statute of limitations motion involving profession researching another without every printed any source available from and all jurisdictions. goes beyond Kambas, Sam, This far accept majority’s and Dennis. Even if we the Sam approach, inquiry of our is limited to Michigan Legislature what intended by Michigan as evidenced law under the Judica- ture Act of 1915. approach
I believe the correct to a statute of v Ernst by Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, by has been demonstrated limitations issue Bogue, Marysville Inc, Pate, In Hirn & PA 115. NW2d (1986), 655, 661; 397 application panel of the affirmed the against profes limitation to a claim responded engineering Legislature firm. sional The provides: pe enacting by "The 5805(10), against a state of limitations for an action riod professional engineer, architect, land sur licensed improvement veyor, on an or contractor based provided property in section shall be as real (Second Analysis, SB 5839.”6 See Senate Fiscal Legislature Analysis), 22, 1988. ex June malpractice period pressed intent its apply particular li limitation does not to these professionals.7 censed Legislature
I maintain that the can read- would malpractice period ily professions limitation to extend the recognized being not as sub- that were by Michigan ject law in actions respect it has done to health care as with professionals expressly and as it has not done with respect engineers, surveyors, architects, land Therefore, and consideration of this issue here. We would then should end our contractors. we bright-line litigants have rules that all and courts continuously Otherwise, can follow. we will face issue each time a asserts this different malpractice period defense, of limitation as a supra Sam, as foretold Justice at 441. Levin. uncertainty purpose of the statute Such belies the of limitations. *15 applies
Therefore,
5805(4)
I would hold that
actions.
discovery
lature has
professions are covered and which are not.
Therefore,
Section 5839
rule
acquiesced
I
exception,
disagree
generally provides
with
and a
having
ten-year ultimate limitation for all
the courts
majority’s
a
six-year
assertion that
pick
limitation,
and choose
a
one-year
Legis
action this in 1961. Michigan recognizing Because there is no source an accountant action I before Appeals.8 affirm would the decision of the Court of Boyle, JJ., Levin concurred with Cavanagh, J._ panel two-year malpractice period held that of limitation apply. unnecessary
did not It further found it to determine which apply complaint did because the was filed within the shortest periods. of the alternative 451-452.