L.N.D., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deena DeGenova, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
FULMER, Judge.
L.N.D. entered a plea of no contest to the charges of resisting an officer without violence and possession of paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. We reverse because the State did not carry its burden of showing that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the investigative stop of a car in which L.N.D. was a passenger.
*516 At the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that he stopped the vehicle after he observed it coming out from behind a closed business at 3:30 a.m. The business "had been burglarized or had had a series of burglaries in the past week or two weeks." However, there was no report of a burglary that night. When asked what the factual basis was for the stop, the officer stated that "[t]he vehicle was in an area at that time when most normal citizens aren't there and I wanted to determine what his presencewhat he was doing there." The officer indicated that he suspected the vehicle occupants of committing a burglary.
The question here is whether the officer's suspicion was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Case law indicates that being in an area of past criminal activity during late and unusual hours is not enough to justify a founded or reasonable suspicion. See Errickson v. State,
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to grant the motion to suppress and discharge L.N.D.
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
