*1 LME VARS LME v ARS January 7, 2004, Docket No. 242681. Submitted at Detroit. Decided 16, 2004, March at 9:10 a.m. LME, public who is the mother of BME and relies on assistance child, County Family Independence Agency her and the Macomb petitioned support the Macomb Circuit Court for child from ARS. filiation, A York court had entered an order New of but had payment support, declined to order of child after ARS acknowl- edged paternity agreed jurisdiction to submit to the of the support. Macomb Circuit Court on issue of child BME was years twenty conceivedwhen ARS was fourteen old and LME was
years court, Maceroni, J., old. The Peter J. declined to order payment support, determining child that ARS was the victim of having LME’s criminal sexual conduct of sexual relations with a person age petitioners ap- who was below the of consent. The pealed. Appeals The Court of held-. subject-matter jurisdiction 1. The Macomb Circuit Court had pursuant Family Support to the Uniform Interstate Act (UIFSA), seq., support MCL 532.1101 et to determine whether child should in
be awarded this case. petitioners, by raising below, 2. The the issue have for- appellate continuing feited review of their claim that New Yorkhas jurisdiction jurisdic- over the issue of child and that such precludes making any tion the circuit court from determination regarding support. child court, dismissing petition sup- 3. The circuit for child port, give did not fail to full faith and credit to the New York Nothing court’s order of filiation. in the circuit court’s order set parentage. aside the New York court’s determination of equal protection rights 4. The circuit did not court violate the petitioners the minor child when it considered the conception declining circumstances of the child’s to order the However, payment support. child the circuit court erred refusing to award child on the basis that ARS was the victim of an act of criminal sexual conduct. Child is not imposed penalize parent. purpose or victimize either provide child is to for the needs of the child. The needs of overriding importance. important public the child are of This policy by requiring pay is furthered in this case AES to petitioners’ claim, they process *2 5. The that were denied due of request law because circuit court dismissed their for child support prejudice, need not be addressed because this case is being hearing rеmanded for a to determine the amount of child support paid by to he AES. petitioners’
6. The claim that the circuit court’s dismissal of parental rights the case constituted a termination of the of AES preserved appellate was not raised and below is not for review. In any event, AES, petitioners, proper party not the is the to raise this claim. Eeversed and remanded for determination child of amount of
support. J., concurring, stated that in the absence of Schuette, contrary by Legislature, public policy directive of this state provides support that child is for the benefit and needs the child respect requirement payment involved. With to the of child support, Michigan any exceptions law does not contain based on aсtivity consensual or nonconsensual sexual results a child conceived, being coerced, participant seduced, or on whether a was or victimized. Younger — — Support
Parent and Child Child Fathers than Sixteen Years. years age A male under sixteen who fathers child of an adult female, notwithstanding may that he be a victim of criminal sexual conduct, responsibility pay support is not absolved of the to child; support imposed penalize child is not to or victimize either parent, provide hut to for the needs of the child. Carl J. Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph Dillard, F. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, peti- for the tioners.
Peter L. A. Conway Patrick Keenan for the respondent. OWENS, RJ., JJ.
Before: BORRELLO, and SCHUETTE and LME VARS from the right Petitioners as of appeal EJ. OWENS, dis- motion for child denying order their contend Petitioners prejudice. the case with missing LME concluding that that the trial court erred the child was entitled to child because having a result of her criminal action conceived as he was respondent relations with when sexual boy. of child fourteen-year-old purpose child; it is awarded without for the needs of provide The trial parents. to the fault of either of the regard by refusing court therefore erred order technically the victim of an respondent was because conduct. reverse uncharged act of criminal sexual We hearing and remand for a the decision of the trial court an order of child entry and the PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LME in 1968 and Petitioner was born *3 1989, married, gave in In she 1974. while born husband, DLE, the to BME and listed her birth 2000, DLE in child’s father. In she and were divorced In or proceedings, New York. the course of the divorce immediately after blood tests granted, the divorce was father. biological that DLE was not BME’s established a hearing In York examiner entered New had indicating respondent appeared filiation order that father. The being counsel and admitted BME’s father, BME’s order therefore declared to be but, order, in declined to order child separate jurisdic- the to the respondent’s “based on submission entry support.” for the of an order of Michigan tion of on County prosecutor, the Macomb Subsequently, for child the trial court petitioners, petitioned behalf of Opinion Court (1) support.1 Respondent objected on the basis that BME was conceived as a result of criminal sexuаl conduct perpetrated against him LME when he was (2) years old, fourteen BME was conceived and born (3) while LME DLE, was married to respondent had no of BME knowledge commenced, until this case was (4) (in LME should not be to profit allowed the form of child support) by her misconduct.
The trial court determined that BME was a child born out of wedlock within the meaning Paternity of the 722.711(a). Act, MCL The court provision found no the Family Act, Support MCL 552.451 et seq., that entitled LME to her requested relief or that prohibited refusing court from to grant relief under the cir- presented cumstances in this case. The court then applied equitable principles deny petition for child support. After the trial court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, petitioners appеaled Court.
II. THE TRIAL COURT’S SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION Petitioners that, first claim where the New York court had already determined the filiation issue had sent the case to Michigan specifically a child support determination, the New York court acted improperly because it was required by New York law to order child support, and Michigan court acted improperly be- appear Petitioners to assert this case was initiated filing petition pursuant Macomb Circuit Court with the of a to the Family Support Uniform Interstate MCL 552.1101 et seq., Act (uifsa), requesting parentage that New York determine of the child and order nothing There is in the record that has been submitted to event, this Court to substantiate this claim. In find we this assertion *4 if —even correct —irrelevant to our decision. 277 Opinion Court than the child issue rаther support it resolved cause disagree. the case to New York. We returning claim waived this Initially, petitioners we note trial court’s to the they expressly acquiesced because determine child un- jurisdiction to exercise Carter, 206, 215; 462 Mich Michigan People der law. (2000) (waiver 144 is the intentional aban- 612 NW2d right extinguishes of a and it donment known error). Indeed, it who petitioners petitioned appropriate trial court to determine the Michigan intentional to the amount of This resort claim that child Michigan appellate courts waives their York should have been decided the New court.
However, also claim that the trial court petitioners jurisdiction try lacked to case subject-matter be- York required cause New York statutes New court to determine child rather than send the “Subject- a determination. Michigan case to for such it jurisdiction subject matter is not to waiver because try to a case of the power concerns court’s ‘abstract pending’ kind or character of the one and is not on the facts of the case.” Travelers dependent particular Co, 185, 204; Ins Co v Detroit Edison 465 Mich 631 (2001) omitted), (emphasis quoting Camp- NW2d 608, 613-614; bell v St John Hosp, NW2d We will therefore review this issue for the purpose determining limited whether the trial court decide to subject-matter jurisdiction lacked whether support.2 award child claim, citing any authority and Petitioners also without relevant issue, presenting this claim in their statement of the that the
without judicata raising any doctrine of res barred from defense duty Michigаn to the determination in New York that he had a will not consider this claim because it is not included his child. We Photo, issue, 7.212(C)(5); petitioners’ statement of the MCR Guardian
278
261 Mich
273
We review de novo the issue whether a trial court has
subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Atchison,
Atchison v
256
(2003).
App 531, 534;
Mich
matters not
appellate jurisdiction from
all inferior courts
except
provided by law;
and tribunals
Dep’t Treasury,
App 270, 281;
Inc v
(2000),
243 Mich
The circuit court’s
or
denied
constitution
statute.
unless
presumed
Goecke,
442, 458;
457 Mich
This case was initiated in the circuit court by a petition for child support on the basis that had acknowledged paternity, an order of filiation had entered, been and LME was on relying public аssistance of her child. Under plain language of the statutes, above-mentioned the circuit court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the question of child support. contend, Petitioners however, that court’s “ordinary” jurisdiction was lacking because this case brought as an action under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), MCL 552.1101 et seq. The stated general purpose for adopting the UIFSA
Michigan was “to make uniform the law with respect to subject of this act among states it.” enacting MCL 552.1107.3 The UIFSA contains a number of definitions relevant to the resolution of the question presented in 552.1102(e) this case. MCL defines the “home state” as the “state in which a child lived with parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately preceding the time of petitioning for support. ...” MCL provides, 552.1103 in relevant *7 part: (c) “Initiating state” means a pro- state from a which ceeding is forwarded proceeding or in which a is filed for
forwarding responding to a state under this act or a law or procedure substantially act, similar to this the uniform Michigan 1, took effect in on June UIFSA 1997. MCL similarly 552.1901. The part enacted in New York as UIFSA of the Family seq., § Court Act et 31, 580-101 effective December (fca), Family 1997. See NY Ct 580-904. act, uni- support or the revised of reciprocal enforcement 8, act, PA of reciprocal enforcement form to 780.183. MCL 780.151
(d) tribunal the authorized “Initiating means tribunal” initiating in an state.
(e) a tribunal in which “Issuing means the state state” determining judgment a support order or renders a issues parentage.
(f) a tribunal that issues “Issuing means the tribunal” determining parent- judgment a support order or renders supplied.] age. [Emphasis part: provides, in relevant
MCL 552.1104 (c) pro- a means a state which “Responding state” forwarded for proceeding a is ceeding filed or to which is or a law or initiating under this act filing an state from act, substantially the uniform to this procedure similar act, the revised uni- or reciprocal enforcement act, PA reciprocal form enforcement to 780.183. MCL 780.151
(d) the authorized tribu- “Responding tribunal” means responding state. nal court, agency, or
(j) administrative “Tribunal” means a establish, enforce, or entity quasi-judicial authorized parentage. modify support or determine orders court circuit “[t]he provides MCL 552.1108 provides MCL 552.1221 for this state.” the tribunal initiаting an may serve as “this state’s tribunal that: another state and as proceedings tribunal to forward in an- initiated proceedings tribunal responding Proceedings for the establishment other state.” are both parentage and the determination 552.1301(2)(a) and the UIFSA. MCL the ambit of within 552.1301(3) (f). autho- proceeding that a provides MCL initiating in either the may filed rized the act be *8 Opinion of the Court tribunal or “in tribunal a of another state that has or jurisdiction can obtain personal over the respondent.” Here, filing the commenced a proceeding by was petition in seeking the Macomb Circuit Court determi- regard nations to respondent’s and paternity4 552.1301(2)(a) obligations. noted, child support As MCL (f) provide authority for such proceedings and MCL 552.1301(3) or permits petitioner “[a]n individual a begin enforcement a agency” proceeding to for purposes by “by authorized the act filing petition an initiating for forwarding tribunal to a responding tribunal.” this statutory Given clear con- language, we clude that the Macomb Circuit Court —“a tribunal subject-matter jurisdiction state” —had to enter- tain and decide petitioners’ support petition child under the UIFSA.
Despite the the plain language of petitioners UIFSA, argue that the trial court precluded from address- (raised ing the child support by issue a petition that court) petitioners filed in trial because the York New court did not follow New York entering law an order of child support when it determined that respondent was the child’s father. LME Petitioner did appeal the New York decision; court’s instead she came to Michigan sought child support obtain a order in this state. If petitioner LME was dissatisfied with the issuing decision of the tribunal concerning the order of entered, filiation it or with its refusal —in a separate order —to order support, child she should appealed have that decision within the appellate system. New York We do not sit appellate as an court to review the decisions of our sister states. 4 Although question paternity already had been resolved in New
York, petitioners’
complaint initiating
requested
form
this action
that
“responding jurisdiction”
paternity.
should establish
failed to
this Court
point
Petitioners have
the circuit courts of this
gives
of the UIFSA
provision
of a
state to
authority
to order
courts
sister
state
action,
ordering
such as
perform
particular
*9
authority
will not search for
to sustain
support. We
Co,
v Macomb
458 Mich
argument. Mudge
petitioners’
104-105;
(1998),
Mitcham v
quoting
III. FORFEITURE OF CLAIM
RES JUDICATA EFFECT
REGARDING
OF NEW YORK PATERNITY DECISION
argue
farther
the trial court’s dis-
Petitioners
has
petitioners’ petition
prejudice
missal
with
resulted
in “effectively barring [petitioners]
having [respon-
from
father,
legal
barring [petitiоners]
as the
as well as
dent]
establishing
from
child
in
York. The child
support, New
in
child at
legally
the case at bar is
fatherless
this
time.” Petitioners contend that
the dismissal of their
the trial
support petition by
“effectively
court
set aside
3,2001,
3,2001
April
April
Order of Filiation and the
declining
Order
order
to determine child
[the
Short
This contention is
incorrect.
support].”
simply
by
An order of filiation was entered
the New York
court;
did not contest
appealed. Respondent
it was not
York,
state,
that he
in New
and has not contested
this
father of the child. The trial court’s dismissal of the
child support petition
change
did not
the fact —nor did it
even
to address —the
determination
purport
prior
of the
York
New
court that
is the child’s father.
Petitioners nevertheless claim that
the doctrine of
judicata
res
prevented
trial court from adjudicating
the issue of child support.
argue
Petitioners
that New
York
continuing jurisdiction
had
regard
to the
issue of child
precluded
this
the trial court
making any
from
concerning
determination
this issue
—despite the fact that
presented
issue was
in an
action commenced
petitioners.
simple
answer to
this claim is that petitioners did not raise
claim
court; instead,
the trial
they asked the court to consider
question
and to order such support.
To preserve
review,
this claim for appellate
petitioner
objected
should have
on this basis in the trial court.
Failure to do so
constitutes
forfeiture of the claim on
*10
appeal. Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ Michigan Bd.
of
(1993).
211,
444
Regents,
234;
Mich
III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT Petitioners next contend that the trial court failed to give full faith and credit5 to the York New court’s Const, § US art 1. IV claim that when again Petitioners of filiation. order “it petition prejudice, court dismissed trial 3, 2001, April and set aside the effectively vacated acknowledged in his Respondent of Filiation.” Order he had been that pleadings to petitioners’ answer fail and pеtitioners the child’s father determined to be order that in the trial court’s any language to to point parent- York court’s determination aside the New set age. in their an- this issue
Moreover, raised petitioners file. This the court motion seal respondent’s swer to the trial court two months was filed over answer after denying and order opinion entered its raised before Therefore, timely was not the issue Booth, it. at supra decline to consider trial court and we unpreserved to consider this Even if we were 234-235. that it is with- claim, we would conclude constitutional out merit. IY Clause, Const, art US
The Full Faith Credit “Full Faith and part, in relevant that provides, § Acts, Public in each State to the given Credit shall be Proceedings every other State.” Records, judicial Faith and Credit Clausе “is of the Full purpose in one state that have of issues prevent litigation Martino v Cottman already decided another.” been Inc, 54, 58; 554 Mich Systems, Transmission concluded, the trial court As we have NW2d court’s order to the New York full faith and credit gave the trial underlying fact, premise In of filiation. father, is the child’s court’s decision is for child not to be liable ought that he but child’s surrounding the of the circumstances because did not York court Additionally, the New conception. *11 therefore, there was child support; the issue of decide no decision regarding support to which full faith and credit given. Therefore, could be petitioners’ argument is meritless. IV EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE APPLICATION OF
THE CHILD SUPPORT LAWS TO A MINOR MALE WHO IS A VICTIM OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH AN ADULT FEMALE Petitioners next contend the trial court violated their rights to equal protection,6 well as the child’s equal protеction rights because the trial court refused to order child on the basis that the child was born out of wedlock as a result of LME’s act of criminal sexual conduct. argue Petitioners that the statute con- cerning child support does not differentiate between children born as a result of noncriminal sexual inter- course and those resulting from acts criminal sexual intercourse. Petitioners claim instead that this Court has repeatedly indicated that the child support laws apply to all children, regardless of the way in they which were conceived, and that the purpose of these laws is penalize not to anyone, but instead to obtain support for these children from their noncustodial parents. We disagree petitioners’ right to equal prоtection was violated, but we find that the child support does, law indeed, apply to respondent despite the manner which the child was conceived.
Both in the trial court and on appeal, petitioners have failed to make a coherent, case-law-supported argument establishing that the trial court’s consider- ation of the circumstances surrounding the child’s conception constituted a violation of their right to equal protection. Ordinarily, is not “[i]t enough for an appel- lant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it toup this Court to discover
6 US § Am Const, Const art 2. XIV; 1, *12 287 Opinion of the Court claims, or unravel the basis for his and rationalize for and then search arguments, him his elaborate Mit- reject position.” оr his authority either to sustain treat- cham, inadequate Because of at 203. supra we could by petitioners, argument given ment Univ, 222 State Wayne it. v Meagher decline to consider (1997). 700, 716; 565 401 Mich NW2d App is that Nevertheless, argument essential petitioners’ To child law. failed to follow the the trial court appeal, raised on properly was not the extent this issue to “address issue may we choose have held that we be consid- justice requires that, opinion, in the court’s (On Industries Paschke v Retool ered and resolved.” 702, 705; 453 Mich 499 NW2d App 198 Rehearing), 502; 519 (1993), 445 Mich NW2d grounds rev’d on other (1994). one of claim here is first underlying 441 great importance. of We in this state is impression it for us appropriate conclude that is therefore correctly court decided not the trial determine whether conceived because the was to order child in which an act of criminal sexual conduct as a result of respondent was victim. of an act of argued that he was victim
Respondent LME he conduct committed because criminal sexual him to have old when she induced years was fourteen that because he was intercourse. He reasoned sexual legally consent, his was age participation under the legal confuses two distinct involuntary.7 argument This time of the sexual age at the concepts. Because his in the the adult conduct, permit the law refuses to 7 plied promise Respondent alcohol and the claimed that LME him With engage him to in sexual intercourse an older woman to induce of sex with her; allegatiоn for this so we need is no in the record there 670; Murphy, App NW2d 222 Mich 565 not consider it. Hawkins v respondent’s However, not assist note that this claim does 674 we relationship argument not consensual. that the sexual App 261 288 Mich 273 claim consent defense. relationship People (1922) (“Proof Gengels, 632, 641; 188 NW defense, of consent is no for a female child under the statutory legally consenting.”); age incapable Bennett, 127; People v Mich NW2d (1973) (fourteen-year-old boy incapable legal of giving liberties). taking Therefore, consent to act of indecent even if respondent willing were a participant in the intercourse, sexual LME have been charged could still with, least, at third-degree criminal sexual conduct. (victim 750.520d(1)(a) MCL years at least thirteen *13 age, years but under sixteen of age).
However,
issue presented by
the
not
case is
culpability
LME’s criminal
conduct,
for criminal sexual
or whether
could
respondent was—or
have been —a
participant
activity.
“consensual”
in that
Rather,
arewe
concerned
whether respondent may
with
be
for
liable
child support
the child
for
that resulted from the sexual
activity. Child support
imposed
is not
to penalize or
victimize either
“The
parent.
of child
purpose
support is
to provide for
needs of
the
the child.”
Dep’t
Macomb Co
Westerman,
Social
v
Services
377;
Guidance regarding this determination de- may be rived from the decisions of sister states that have confronted this issue. The that courts have considered 8 securing This Court has concluded that the for children is important parent voluntarily so that has held it that even a where rights, parental pay support releases his he is still to hable for the child long custody biological parent. as the child’s remains with other Evink, supra at 176. Opinionof the Court that the fact that concluded uniformly have this issue act of an adult sexual the criminal from child results the minor not absolve male does a minor female with pay to the responsibility from Minor, 582; Colo in Schierenbeck example, For (who female (1961), twenty-year-old P2d 333 man) with the relations had sexual to another married The a child was born. that the result plaintiff any suggestion rejected Court Supreme Colorado adult femаle by the third-degree rape plaintiffs of his for the provide to liability his excused child and stated: the illicit act does his to it is that assent Certain crime, statutory but it has of the
exclude commission youth relating progeny. His nothing assent as to do with question in the crime; a factor to the it is not is basic Lynn. Sherrie the father of whether he is bastardy proceed- may liable in putative father be “The child, even maintenance of his ings * * * q.j.s. 53,§ Bastards .” though he is a minor adjudged be the father of page 152. If Schierenbeck hearing upon Lynn proper sufficient after a Sherrie fundamental evidence, support her under this he should 586.] at [Id. doctrine. Paternity in In re of Appeals Court Wisconsin (1989), rejected
JLH, 349; 2d 441 NW2d 149 Wis *14 had inter- boy who fifteen-year-old the claim that female was eighteen-and-a-hаlf-year-old an course with child the resultant to responsibility of absolved the assault and of a sexual he was a victim because from her to benefit permitted not be female should The court stated: crime. paying child reject argument that his appellant’s
We her crime. permit to benefit from her support to L.H. would appellant, criminally assuming assaulted that L.H. Even child, the custodial paid to benefit the is 290 273 parent. parent support payments The custodial receives [Id. 358.] trust to be used for the child’s at welfare. rejected The Illinois of Appeals Court a similar claim JS, Parentage 563; in In re the 193 Ill App 3d 550 of 257 The NE2d that case claimed public policy him, minor, that Illinois protected from the consequences “improvident of his conduct.” The court disagreed stated: contrary respondent’s position,
We note that to the public policy protection Illinois has never offered blanket time, public policy reckless the minors. At same Illinois has recognized right every physical, the blanket child to the mental, emotional, monetary support of his or her parents. public protecting has an interest in children becoming from wards of the state. case,
In the public policy instant we find that the mandating parental support of children overrides policy protecting improvident a minor [Id. from acts. at (citations omitted).] Juvenile, See also Commonwealth v A 387 Mass (1982) 680; NE2d 1155 (juvenile required illegitimate child; his or her illegitimate “The Commonwealth.”). interests, child has as does the M, In Mercer Co Dep’t Sоcial Services Alf 703; 2d (1992), Misc 589 NYS2d county the family rejected respondent’s court the argument that because (he he technically was victim aof crime sixteen when he had sexual mother, relations with the child’s time), who was at twenty-one he should not be held legally responsible to child. The court responded: Respondent father’s under recourse as to law matter,
mother of the child in this was to file criminal charges against penalize her. To this child for the mother’s contrary actions would purpose run to the fundamental *15 291 LMEvARS Opinion the Court of statutory and case law. proceeding as established this the child’s mother’s not concerned with This Court is protecting interests of rather the best actions but for, the provision will be made insuring adequate that 705-706.] at [Id. child’s needs. JS, and Common- supra,
Citing Parentage In re Juvenile, Court Supreme the Kansas supra, v A wealth 646; 252 Kan Seyer, in State ex rel Hermesmann require could (1993), held that the state P2d 1273 for the juvenile pay thirteen-year-old father from his sexual intercourse the child that resulted The Court seventeen-year-old babysitter. with his stated: requiring parents to interest in minor
This State’s competing children overrides the State’s their acts, juveniles improvident protecting in from even interest activity part may criminal on the when such acts include persons directly parent. Considering the three the other involved, Shane, Colleen, Melanie, the interests of superior, public policy, to those Melanie are as a matter child, only parents. of her This minor of either or both truly party, support from bоth her innocent is entitled to ages. at parents regardless [Id. 654-655.] of their Obispo in San Luis Appeals The California Court of J, 842; Rptr 4th 57 Cal 2d App Co v Nathaniel 50 Cal father (1996), a case where the considered thirty-four when their consen- fifteen and the mother of a child. The relations resulted in the birth sual sexual sexual intercourse mother was convicted of unlawful that he was the father then claimed with a minor and because he was pay not required claim. rejected The court statutory rape. victim of a engaged that the father consen- The court observed five times over two-week sexual intercourse sual injured as a result of noted that who is period, “[o]ne he willingly participated conduct in which criminal Opinion op the Court victim,” a typical crime and concluded that he was not a victim of sexual abuse. Id. at 845. After taking cognizance of the decisions other states upholding orders for child support involving minor males who had *16 been the victims of unlawful sexual intercourse, court concluded that it agreed with the reasoning and holdings of those decisions. Cichos, (Minn
In
Jevning
Statutory nonconsent under some definitions of crimi-
nal sexual conduct does not translate
holding
to a
that on
support,
civil issue of сhild
minors can never be held
responsible for
resulting
their children
from sexual con-
Generally,
duct.
responsible
minors are
actions;
for their
exceptions
principle
to that
instances,
are rare. For
minors
generally
are
accountable for their
transactions,
economic
sued,
allowed to sue and can be
are accountable for acts of
juvenile delinquency,
may
be certified to be tried as
adults, depending on the
[Id.
circumstances.
at 518.]
TM,
(Ala
See also SF v State ex rel
1186, 1189
So 2d
1996) (the
App,
child is an innocent party and the
purpose behind the state
act
parentage
is to provide for
the welfare of
child;
“any wrongful conduct on the
part of the mother should not alter the
duty
father’s
to
provide support
child”);
for the
Hamm v
Child
Office of
Support Enforcement,
391, 398;
336 Ark
Opinion the Court The record indicates authorities. these agree We inter- in the act of sexual respondent participated that BME. Respon- conception in the course that resulted support to responsibility from the is not absolved dent an technically committing LME was because the child of this public policy conduct. The sexual act of criminal to Contrary children. to secure state seeks from her view, “profit” LME does respondent’s for the bеn- imposed is not criminality. “Child satisfy rather to but parent, efit of the custodial Pellar.; at 35. We supra the child.” needs of present of the child are of that needs recognized “[t]he in Pellar important public Id. This overriding importance.” child pay by requiring respondent furthered policy is child by refusing court erred award The trial the “victim” on the basis therefore sexual conduct. We of an act of criminal remand denying the order reverse *17 the hearing for a to determine this case to the trial court re- should be amount of proper quired contribute.
V DUE PROCESS
of due
because
process
Petitioners also claim a denial
request
trial court
dismissed
of the
disposition
previ-
Because of our
prejudice.
to address this constitu-
issue,
unnecessary
ous
it is
Inc,
at 234. In
suрra
claim. Booth Newspapers,
tional
have failed to cite
event,
petitioners
we note that
any
due
authority
under-developed
for their
any supporting
reason,
and,
additional
we decline
claim
for this
process
232, 243; 577
457 Mich
Taylor,
to consider it. Wilson
(1998) (“a
authority
mere statement without
NW2d 100
Court”).
bring an issue before this
is insufficient
Concurring
Opinion by
J.
Schuette,
VI. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
finally
Petitioners
claim that
the trial court’s dis-
missal of the case constituted a termination
respon-
dent’s parental
rights. Petitioners did not raise this
issue in the trial court and therefore it is not preserved
for appellate review. ISB
Cakes,
Sales Co v Dave’s
Mich App 520, 532-533;
Reversed and remanded for determination of the proper amount of child support due from respondent. We do not retain jurisdiction.
BORRELLO, J., concurred.
SCHUETTE, J.
I
(concurring).
join in
opinion
Judge OWENS, which
reverses
trial
decision,
court’s
remands for a hearing, and requires the entry of an
order for child support. In the
absence of
cоntrary
directives
the Legislature,
the public policy of the
state of Michigan provides that child support is for the
benefit and needs of the child involved. Macomb Co
*18
Dep’t
Westerman,
Social Services v
372,
Mich App
377; 645
(2002),
NW2d 710
citing
Evink,
Evink
Mich
175-176;