| Iowa | Dec 10, 1875
It is claimed that this conveyance was fraudulent in fact, and that the property still remained liable for the subsequent debts of John B. Long.
It is proved that John B. Long, at the time of making the conveyance said that he would put that property into the hands of his wife, so that she would have something provided anything turned up. It does not appear but, at that time,. Long had other property enough to pay his debts. Brentner testifies that he owed himself, and owed McCartney, $1400, and that he could not tell how much he owed at Cedar Falls and Dubuque. But, it is not at all probable that Brentner, to whom Long was indebted, would have become an instrument of placing his property in the hands of his wife for the purpose of defrauding creditors. The only reasonable sup
The defendants introduced records of certain judgments against John B. Long, in the District Court of Cerro Gordo county. Ten of these judgments, amounting to $468.87, are upon debts existing at the time of the conveyance to Anna Long. These are satisfied upon execution, except as to the sum of $147.00.
The remainder of the judgments, amounting to $4106.92, are upon debts contracted subsequently to the conveyance to Anna Long. Of this amount there, has been satisfied, upon execution and foreclosure of mortgage, $2,724.33. Part of this sum was satisfied by a conveyance of, a portion of the property transferred to Anna Long, but, after making due allowance for this, it seems that debts were .contracted and paid, after the conveyance to Anna, vezy lai’gely in excess of all that John B. is shown to have been owing at that time.
For aught that appeal’s, John B. Long, at the time of the conveyance to his wife, had property remaining abundantly sufficient to pay all his debts, and the evidence tends veiy strongly to make that fact affirmatively appear.
The defendant has not shown such a state of facts as would justify the setting aside of the conveyance as fraudulent as to an existing, much less a subsequent, creditor.
This deed is a quit-claim, is dated December 30, 1861, and was filed for record April 7, 1865. It describes the lot and. block but omits to state the town, county or state. The evidence shows clearly that the intention was to convey the lot in controversy, and through the contract and conveyance Julia R. Ruggles acquired the equitable title thereto. On the 18th of July, 1874, and during the pendency of this action, Anna Long executed to Julia R. Lloyd another quit-claim deed,,
III. On the 11th of November, 1857, Henry Anderson. obtained a judgment against W. W. Stackhouse before a justice of the peace for $107.07, and John B. Long became surety on stay of execution.
On the 11th of February, 1858, judgment was rendered by the justice against Long on the stay bond, and afterward a transcript was filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court of Cerro Gordo county, and on the 13th of April, 1859, execution issued, and on the 31st of May, 1859, the property in controversy was sold thereunder to one Jarvis S. Church. In the return upon the execution, the notice of sale, and the sheriff’s deed, by mistake the property was described as lot 8, instead of lot 4. Church assigned the certificate of purchase to Caroline E. Bumgardner, and on the 23rd of May, 1860, she procured a sheriff’s deed.
On the 26th of January, 1865, Caroline E. Bumgardner and her husband conveyed by warranty deed the lot to Spencer G. Bryant, which deed was recorded on the same day. November 20, 1865, Bryant conveyed one-half the premises to Tyler Blake. April 16, 1866, Bryant conveyed the other half to one Cole. July 19, 1866, Cole conveyed his half to Blake. October-15, 1867, Blake conveyed to the defendant, George L. Bunce. Under this conveyance defendant claims the property. It will be seen that his title is based upon a claimed sheriff’s' sale of the property under a judgment against John B. Long. Before this judgment was recovered the property had been conveyed to Anna Long, and the conveyance, as we have seen, is not shown to be fraudulent. 'The property was not liable to the judgment, and the sheriff’s sale vested no rights in the purchaser. Hence it becomes unnecessary to consider the effect of the mistake in the return, notice and deed, and the subsequent alteration of the deed and record.
IT. Defendant, however, claims that the sheriff’s sale at least gave color of title, and that Caroline E. Bumgardner immediately went into possession of the premises, and that
The action of Jtilia R. Lloyd was commenced on the 28th day of April, 1871.
V. The deed of Anna Long to Julia R. Lloyd was not recorded until April 7,1865, and when recorded it was so defective in description as not to be notice to. a subsequent T)ona fide purchaser. Bryant purchased from Caroline E. Bumgardner on the 20th of January, 1865. Defendant insists that the title vested in him absolutely, he being an innocent purchaser without notice, and that this title vested in his grantees even if they had notice. This would all be very well if Bryant derived his title under Anna Long. But all his title is derived from John B. Long, under the sheriff’s sale. Long had no title and Bryant acquired none.
VI. Nothing remains to be considered but the tax title. On the 23d of May, 1860, Caroline E. Bumgardner claims to have acquired title to the lot in controversy through the sheriff’s deed. In 1863 this lot was sold for the delinquent taxes of 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859 and 1860.
Before the assignment of the certificate of purchase, to-wit: on the 20th day of January, 1865, Caroline E. Bumgardner and her husband, by warranty deed, conveyed the property in controversy to Spencer G. Bryant, and he caused his deed to be recorded on the same day. It is claimed by plaintiff that, as Martin Bumgardner joined in the conveyance with covenants of warranty to Bryant, he is estopped from setting up any interest acquired through the certificate of purchase, and that, as it was assigned after Bryant’s deed was recorded, the assignee and the subsequent grantees took no higher title than Bumgardner held. If Bumgardner ever in fact owned the certificate of purchase, the position would probably be correct. But he never paid for the certificate of purchase, and never owned it in fact. It was made out in his name, but the purchase money was paid by Parker, who sold to Garner. All that Bumgardner seems to have had'to do with it was merely to assign to Jane E. Garner.
And, as no objection is made to the validity of the sale, or the regularity of the proceedings, Jane E. Garner, by the treasurer’s deed which was afterward made to her, acquired a valid tax title to the property.
On the 22d of March, 1866, Jane E. Garner conveyed, by quit-claim, the lot in controversy, to Spencer G. Bryant, with the exception of 22 feet front by 80 feet back, in the southeast corner thereof. This title, by the subsequent conveyances, vested in the defendant, George L. Bunce, and it is conclusive against the right of the plaintff, Julia R. Lloyd.
YII. The evidence shows that $1,000 of the loan which was made to John B. Long, on account of which the lot in controversy was conveyed to Julia R. Ruggles, was derived from a policy of insurance on the life of the father of William Ruggles, who • died in 1856, leaving no debts, and William his only child. No administrator of the estate nor guardian of William was ever appointed.
At the time of the tax sale he was, and now is, a minor, and he claims the right to redeem from the tax sale.
The court below granted him the right to redeem to the' extent of two-thirds the value of. the lot.
Upon the appeal of the plaintiff, William Ruggles, the judgment is
Reversed.