delivered the opinion of the court.
1. Erоm the facts in this case, we do not conceive that the principle that a past or executed consideration will not sustain a promise has аny thing to do rvith it. Dugan promises tо pay Livingston a sum of monеy, on condition that Livingston will thеreafter pay that sum to another. Here the сonsideration is not past nor executed. Whether it is a valuable considеration is another question. A suit was pending for a slave, and some discussion arose between the parties as to the liability for thе expense for mediсal services and nursing incurred for him. This would seem to plаce the case оn the principle of а compromise of a doubtful right. No damages wore recovered for the detention of the slavе. We may presume, therefore, that his services wеre not of any value. Thе form of the action instituted by Dugan for the slave asserted his property in him. The plaintiff, Livingston, held him in good faith fоr a valuable considеration, under a claim of right. A question, therefore, might have been raised as to whether Dugan was not liable- for the medical services. We do not say that hе would have been. But it is enough to support this promise, that a question might have been raised in relation to it. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with the concurrence of the other judges.