84 P. 1044 | Or. | 1906
delivered the opinion.
The contention for the defendants is that a court of equity will not decree a specific performance of the contract in suit because (1) the plaintiffs have acted in bad faith and have been guilty of such laches and delay as will preclude them from relief in equity; (2) the defendant Johnston was solvent at the commencement of this suit and able to respond in damages for a breach of his contract and, therefore, plaintiff had a full and complete remedy at law; and (3) the court erred in allowing interest on the value of the hops from November, 1903, the time defendants deprived themselves of the power of specifically performing the contract by selling and disposing of the hops, and removing them from the jurisdiction of the court.
On the 30th and 31st of March, and before the receipt of the letter containing the checks, Johnston started from his home near Gervais to Salem, the place of business of the plaintiffs, to obtain from them the advances as stipulated. While on his way and in the town of Gervais, he met Boberts, with whom he had some conversation, -but not about the contract in suit. While traveling from Gervais to Salem on the train Johnston and Eoberts had some controversy, which, soon after reaching the
On March 31st, the day of this difficulty, or the following day, the plaintiffs wired the bank at Woodburn, with which Johnston did business, stopping payment on their check for $250 in Johnston’s favor and at the same time wrote him that they had stopped payment on the check because in looking over the contract they had ascertained that “the advance was to be made on or about April, May and June,” and not on April 1st as they originally supposed, but that they would “advance the money according to contract.” On April 1st and before Johnston received this letter he called at the bank at Woodburn to cash the checks previously received by him from the plaintiffs, and was informed by the cashier, as he testifies, that payment of the checks had been stopped. He did not, however, present either of the checks, or request to see the telegram stopping payment on them, but immediately telephoned the defendants Wolf & Son and arranged with them to advance money with which to pay the rent on the hopyard. On the nest day he returned the two checks to the plaintiffs and notified them that
It thus appears that plaintiffs tendered to Johnston the rent money before it became due and were at all times ready and willing to comply with their contract by making the stipulated advances. The only amount due on April 1, 1903, was the rent and a check sent in payment of it on March 28th was received by Johnston. No objection was made because the money was sent in the form of a check, and there is no pretense that payment of such cheek was stopped by the plaintiffs or that it would not have been paid had it been presented. The advances for cultivation were to be made “on or about April, May and June,” and presumably'as the same might be needed for the purposes stated. Payment was stopped of the $250 cheek sent for such purpose because the plaintiffs believed the money was not then due, or because they supposed from Johnston’s conduct that he might carry out his threat and misapply it. It was not because the plaintiffs did not intend to comply with their contract. In the letter to Johnston in reference to the matter it was expressly stated that the advances would be made “according to contract.” If the plaintiffs were mistaken as to the proper interpretation of the contract and the money was in fact due on the 1st of April, a failure to make the advances on the exact day specified would not justify Johnston in rescinding the con
Where the party who applies for the specific performance of a contract has been guilty of laches and unreasonable delay, or has not acted in good faith, he will be denied relief: Creath v. Sims, 46 U. S. 192 (12 L. Ed. 110); Kinney v. Redden, 2 Del. Ch. 46, 54; Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. 370 (7 Am. Dec. 484); Conrad v. Lindley, 2 Cal. 173. But this case does not fall within this rule. Much importance is given to the personal difficulty and encounter between Roberts and the defendant Johnston, but in our opinion it has but little, if any, bearing upon the merits of the- present controversy. It certainly was no ground for the repudiation of the contract by Johnston, and it does not appear that the plaintiffs refused to perform their part of the contract on that account. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs intended to repudiate the contract because of this difficulty. It may be that on account of Johnston’s conduct Roberts gave the terms of the contract a stricter and more technical construction than he otherwise would have done, and stopped payment on the check for advances because it was not then due, but it is clear that he intended to make further advances. If the plaintiffs had designed to repudiate the contract and not to be further bound by it, they most certainly would have stopped payment on the check for rent as well as the one for advances. The only security they had for the payment of either was the hop contract, and the right to deduct the several amounts from the stipulated price of the hops. It may be that Johnston sui3j>osed when informed by his banker that payment of the check had been stopped that the plaintiffs intended not to be further bound by their contract. He made no inquiry, however, to ascertain the truth of the matter, but immediately entered into negotiations with his codefendants Wolf & Son for money with which to pay the rent and the expenses of cultivating and harvesting his hop crop, and on the next day attempted to rescind the contract. It is undis
It follows that the decree of the court below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Affirmed.'