Randy McDaniel left the employ of American General Life & Accident Insurance Company on May 27, 1994. On October 23, 1995, he sped his former manager, Alton Lively, for slander, intentional infliction of еmotional distress, and tortious interference with business relations. He alleged that after his departure, Lively had misrepresented facts to three individuals concerning McDaniel’s actions as an insurance agent. Lively moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitation had run on the slander claims and that the evidence did not show the elements needed to sustain the various causes of action. His interlocutory application having been granted, Lively appeals the denial of his motion.
Construed in favor of McDaniel, the evidence shows that Lively telephoned Nancy Cole on three occasions, once in September or October 1994 and twice some months later. He told Cole that (i) McDаniel had left American General on bad terms and taken valuable documents with him, (ii) McDaniel was soliciting American General’s clients, which he was forbidden to do, and (iii) any problems she was experiencing with her American General policy were attributable to McDaniel.
*133 During the summer of 1994, Lively told James Browning that McDaniel had made the worst decision of his life in leaving the company, and that the insurance policies of some widowed and elderly clients previously serviced by McDaniel wоuld probably lapse because McDaniel had left the company no records of them.
During that same summer, Lively told Reverend William Daugherty that McDaniel had been talking to a lot of people who would be “messed up and hurt” and who would lеave the Reverend’s congregation as a result. Daugherty interpreted the comments to mean McDaniel had beеn lying to people about American General.
1.
Slander.
Contending the remarks were false and calculated to injure him in his profession, McDaniel sued under OCGA § 51-5-4 (a) (3) for slander per se, for which no special damages need be shown. See OCGA § 51-5-4 (b);
Baskin v. Rogers,
(a)
Statute of Limitation.
Under OCGA § 9-3-33, a party has one year to bring a suit for slander, which begins to run once the slanderous statement is uttered.
Jacobs v. Shaw,
But the evidence is disputеd whether the statements to Cole occurred in the summer of 1994 or at some time after October 1994. As to the statute of limitatiоn defense on this portion of the slander claim, the court properly denied summary judgment.
(b)
Opinion and Truth.
Lively argues that the statements to Cole were either true or merely opinion and thus unactionable. See
Elder v. Cardoso,
There is no wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion. To say otherwise would ignore the fact that expressions of opiniоn may often imply an assertion of objective fact. . . . The pivotal questions are whether [Lively’s] statements can reasonably be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about [McDaniel] and, if so, whether the defamatory assеrtions are capable of being proved false.
*134
(Citations and punctuation omitted.); see
Harcrow v. Struhar,
Regardless of how one may characterize the other statements to Cole, the statement that McDaniel had taken valuable documents, which led to difficulties with Cole’s policy, imрlied that McDaniel had stolen and retained important documents belonging to the company, which is provably false. Thе evidence showed McDaniel returned any company documents in his possession immediately after terminating his employment, and thus such could not be connected to Lively’s statements or to any difficulties with the Cole policy some months latеr. The statements are actionable.
2.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
None of the statements to the three individuals suffices to sustain a cause of аction for intentional infliction of emotional distress. First, “even malicious, wilful or wanton conduct will not warrant a recovery for the infliction of emotional distress if the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff.”
Ryckeley v. Callaway,
Moreover, even if directed toward the plaintiff, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous (i.e., atrocious and utterly intolerable).
United Parcel Svc. v. Moore,
The court erred in denying summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress count.
3.
Tortious Interference with Business Relations.
The essential features of a cause of action for tortious interference with business relations arе that the defendant, acting improperly, without privilege, and with the malicious intent to injure plaintiff, induces a third party not to еnter into or to continue a business relationship with plaintiff, which causes plaintiff financial injury.
Jenkins v. Gen.
*135
Hosps. of Humana,
Moreover, just as in
Jenkins,
McDaniel is unable to identify a single client that he has lost or failed to acquire due to the actions of Lively, nor is he able to show аny other financial loss.
The court erred in denying summary judgment on the tortious interference count.
Judgment affirmed in pari and reversed in part and case remanded.