Case Information
*1 Before P OSNER F LAUM Circuit Judges , A LONSO , District Judge. [*]
A LONSO District Judge
. Plaintiff, Livell Figgs, convicted murder sentenced years’ imprisonment Illinois Department Corrections (“IDOC”). served 15 latter part of his sentence Logan Correctional Center was released on June 28, 2012 after having survived summary judgment in mandamus proceeding in he alleged had been miscalculated. Figgs then brought § 1983 action against prison officials Logan, alleging, among other things, they had been deliberately indifferent possibility he being held unlawfully. Figgs now appeals from district court’s grant of summary favor defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND On July 21, 1989, arrested on a drug offense. He committed murder on August 5, while on bond for drug offense. After pleading guilty drug offense, Figgs sentenced on April 23, Circuit Court Cook County year term incarceration with credit days he already served. On March 24, 1992, arraigned Circuit Court Cook County on charge for August murder. On December 4, 1992, Figgs completed prison term drug sentence began term Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). Because he charged with murder, however, transferred day IDOC custody directly into Cook County custody pending trial.
On September 11, 1993, jury convicted first degree murder. sentenced October 25, to years’ imprisonment with credit served custody since January run consecutive drug offense. On November Figgs returned IDOC custody.
On November 1993, Figgs received “Violation Report” IDOC indicating on December (the his MSR began on the drug conviction), he had violated the terms MSR committing the murder for which he was serving the year sentence. Figgs signed report acknowledged receiving it. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”) entered order on the same date, declaring that had violated MSR December by committing murder. The PRB’s order also stated: “Offender contends he incarcerated on violation date (12/4/92). subsequently pleaded guilty poss controlled subst. found guilty murder.” The form order did not box checked indicating parole or revoked, nor did indicate consequences determination had MSR. The order also not indicate whether hearing had been conducted or would scheduled. The violation report PRB’s order were entered error; murder occurred well before Figgs’s conviction drug case, time when he on MSR.
After PRB issued its order, IDOC’s chief record officer sent multiple letters Cook County State’s Attorney requesting he review mittimus (the order directing jailers carry out judgment) for murder conviction. letters noted completed drug offense December released two year MSR term, revoked sentenced murder conviction. The officer explained sought clarification regarding whether circuit intended Figgs’s year “run consecutive any mandatory supervised violation the inmate is required to serve a consequence the Prisoner Review Board’s order revoking mandatory supervised release,” if so, asked the State’s Attorney ensure a corrected mittimus issued. record does not reveal what prompted the requests why chief record officer sought clarification Figgs’s sentence from State’s Attorney, opposed seeking clarification directly from PRB about basis for its order.
While record officer awaited a response her letters, requested a transfer a medium security facility (at time, incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center). In October an IDOC official, assistant deputy director adult institutions, responded a letter stating that ineligible transfer projected release January 2011.
Two months later, December circuit court issued “corrected mittimus” murder case, which stated year sentence “to run consecutive to any imposed after violation mandatory supervised release” drug case. It is clear why corrected mittimus phrased way, but document evidently perpetuated mistaken belief within IDOC that MSR term drug offense.
IDOC calculations are prepared facility inmate first assigned. When an inmate is transferred different prison, new prison does usually perform new calculation but simply checks previous accuracy. If questions arise 15 ‐ about inmate’s sentence, record office at the facility where inmate is housed will review sentence calculation, it may refer matter to IDOC record office in Springfield, Illinois, which oversees each institution’s record office. Each inmate’s master file is kept at facility at inmate is housed.
In January and again in May before transferred Logan, IDOC employees prepared handwritten sentence ‐ calculation worksheets pursuant December “corrected mittimus.” The calculations were prepared on form used specifically inmates who declared to MSR. projected release date, according these worksheets, November 2013. It appears this release date computed adding year sentence year term resulting (assumed) revocation MSR in drug case then adjusting time served good time credit. same repeated on subsequent worksheets prepared December May although projected release changed due later adjustments good credit. arrived Logan 2005. says became
aware Logan officials miscalculated projected release date. In months leading up January thereafter, submitted several inmate request slips various officials Logan, including defendants Lori Fishel, who supervisor, Alex Dawson, who warden, complaining about a miscalculation projected date. Copies these slips are record, but undisputed Figgs submitted them. ‐
Fishel looked Figgs’s existing calculation and believed it correct because in her view, Figgs on MSR when he sentenced for murder, so appeared he had violated MSR. Fishel understood “corrected mittimus” ordering Figgs to serve year after the (nonexistent) two year term violating MSR. Because the matter seemed complex Figgs raised “so many questions” complaints her, “didn’t do too much it” instead let IDOC’s chief record office Springfield handle it. Fishel referred matter Ona Welch, who then the assistant chief record officer. Although Fishel sent some pertinent documents Welch, including an inmate request slip, corrected mittimus, PRB’s order, sentence calculation worksheet completed prior Figgs’s arrival at Logan, Fishel send Figgs’s entire master file, nor did Welch request it. According Fishel, Welch told her current correct, therefore informed determination. Although projected release changed during incarceration due revocation good credits, all previously revoked good time credits were restored August 2011.
On October filed petition habeas corpus against Logan County Circuit Court. In that petition, alleged he “never a[n MSR] revocation hearing … told mandatory supervised release” drug case. also alleged that IDOC erred “starting sentence credit run after this alleged [MSR] violation.”
On October 31, 2011, filed formal IDOC grievance, marking it an emergency asserting that he should have released custody January 16, 2011. further asserted that corrected mittimus murder conviction ordered year sentence “to run consecutive ANY sentence imposed after violation mandatory supervised release” drug case, but there “was never parole revocation violation [MSR]. Accordingly, there no [MSR] violation run this sentence consecutive too [sic].” A counselor discussed concerns with Fishel, who reported previously looked into calculation Figgs’s determined it correct. Fishel not recalculate sentence point check again with office. counselor indicated appeared correct because had stated “[MSR] time stopped when [Figgs] committed offense. Sentence then ran consecutive … [MSR] term. Forwarded Warden Dawson.” Dawson reviewed Figgs’s grievance, but master file, determined on November 8, emergency after consulting Fishel, who confirmed calculation correct.
On November moved dismiss Figgs’s habeas petition basis serving term MSR committed murder therefore being legally detained, rendering unavailable habeas corpus relief. On December dismissed Figgs’s habeas complaint reasons set forth Dawson’s motion. The court subsequently granted Figgs’s motion reconsider and leave amend his petition seek mandamus relief, and Figgs restyled his petition as a mandamus complaint.
In meantime, grievance officer who handling IDOC grievance reported November 30, 2011: “The records office supervisor contends inmate’s corrected mittimus adhered directed by Judge James Flannery [who issued mittimus]. Fu[r]thermore, clinical service supervisor and directing record and law office in Springfield concurred with Logan’s Record Office interpretation of mittimus.” grievance officer recommended grievance “withheld” (stayed) pending outcome habeas petition. On December 13, 2011, someone acting authority concurred recommendation, grievance stayed.
In November 2011, while grievance case were pending, also wrote IDOC’s record officer, stating personnel Logan had miscalculated his release date factoring a nonexistent parole violation. reiterated during all years incarceration, he never MSR violation hearing. Along letter, submitted corrected mittimus October IDOC letter denying request transfer from Menard noting January projected release date. On December 2, 2011, Welch responded Figgs, attaching copy PRB’s order stating: “Your current tentative mandatory supervised November 3, 2013, as indicated your work sheet dated May because August all your revoked time disciplinary issues has been restored … . The sentence has completed per Order sentencing court and Order [PRB].”
On March 6, 2012, filed motion summary in mandamus proceeding, arguing PRB revoked Figgs’s MSR thus Figgs was lawfully incarcerated could released until consecutive sentences were completed. Fishel submitted an affidavit in support motion in which stated IDOC had released December 1992, then picked up on Cook County warrant, after murder conviction, PRB issued an order declaring to have MSR December 1992. On June 2012, court issued order denying Dawson’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning Fishel’s statement about projected release date “conclusory” because calculations set forth attached worksheet were “not self explanatory Defendant has failed otherwise inform court manner Plaintiff’s projected discharge date determined.”
The day after denied Dawson’s motion, PRB vacated, without comment, its November violation order. According Fishel, someone IDOC’s record prompted PRB review its order. The following day, recalculated release January 11, immediately released prison. The 15 ‐ Logan County Circuit Court subsequently dismissed mandamus proceeding moot.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January Figgs filed complaint in the instant case against Austin Randolph (a former warden Logan), Dawson, and Fishel. Figgs alleged Dawson and Fishel Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. also brought ‐ law claims for false imprisonment and negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and moved for summary on Eighth Amendment claim against 11 Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Dawson. On August district granted defendants’ motion summary judgment, and entered judgment in their favor, on federal claims. court then declined exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Figgs’s law claims dismissed them without prejudice. filed this timely appeal, challenging grant of summary judgment favor of Dawson on the Eighth Amendment claim deliberate indifference the grant of summary judgment favor of on Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.
DISCUSSION We review de novo district court’s grant of summary judgment, considering all facts reasonable inferences light most favorable Figgs, nonmoving party. See Boss v. Castro , F.3d (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is proper only where there are no genuine issues of material fact movant entitled judgment a matter law. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2014)). We may affirm any basis fairly presented record. Ellis v. CCA Tenn. LLC 640, (7th Cir. 2011).
A. Deliberate Indifference
When reviewing grant summary § claim, we focus “‘(1) whether conduct complained committed by person acting under color law; (2) whether conduct deprived person rights, privileges, immunities secured Constitution laws *12 12 15 ‐ 2926 United States.’” Armato v. Grounds , 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527, (1981)). Incarceration beyond date when a person is entitled be released violates Eighth Amendment if it is the product deliberate indifference. Burke v. Johnston , 452 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2006); Campbell v. Peters , 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001).
Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even gross negligence; plaintiff must show that defendant was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored known risk. Armato , 766 F.3d 721; McGee v. Adams , 721 F.3d 474, 480 81 (7th Cir. 2013). A officer is deliberately indifferent when he does nothing, Hankins v. Lowe , F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2015), when takes action is so ineffectual under circumstances deliberate indifference can be inferred, Burke F.3d (citing Moore v. Tartler , F.2d (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Arnett v. Webster (7th Cir. 2011) (noting prison doctor demonstrates deliberate indifference pursuing treatment “so blatantly inappropriate evidence intentional mistreatment”).
It is undisputed knew possibility was being held beyond when he entitled released, but it is disputed whether their conduct amounted deliberate indifference. As for Dawson, district court first noted it undisputed warden responsible calculating prisoners’ release dates. responsible, however, reviewing emergency grievances, designee’s decision treat grievance non emergency withhold review until action resolved. district court concluded the undisputed evidence showed that Dawson checked whether Logan’s release date matched most recent sheet, asked the Logan record office whether date was correct, and confirmed Fishel reviewed Figgs’s file she believed correct. Dawson therefore took some steps address Figgs’s grievance, district court reasoned, so could not establish Dawson was deliberately indifferent. The court further held Dawson’s decision let court determine validity Figgs’s claims, was made after consultation with record office determination that grievance not an emergency, was not evidence deliberate indifference. district correctly granted summary for
Dawson claim. Dawson’s conduct does not demonstrate sufficiently culpable mind. disregard grievance its designation emergency; rather, he consulted Fishel, supervisor, make sure looked into problem, relied her determination calculations Logan using were correct. That reasonable response emergency grievance, designee’s ensuing decision stay grievance pending resolution mandamus proceeding. See Johnson v. Doughty F.3d (7th Cir. 2006) (warden deliberately indifferent where he investigated situation, ensured medical staff monitoring addressing problem, reasonably deferred medical staff’s opinion); Greeno v. Daley (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate indifference where grievance appeals examiner investigated plaintiff’s complaints referred them to medical providers who could be expected to address plaintiff’s concerns). Top level administrators like Dawson are entitled to relegate to prison staff like Fishel primary responsibility specific prison functions. See Burks v. Raemisch (7th Cir. 2009) (a prison warden is entitled to relegate to medical staff provision medical care). contends that what Dawson did “not really anything substance,” but this argument is misplaced because not Dawson’s responsibility to calculate, investigate calculation of, Figgs’s date, consulted with individual who responsibility. See id. (“Public officials do not free floating obligation to put things to rights … . Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do another’s job. The division labor is important not only bureaucratic organization but also efficient performance tasks; people who stay within their roles can get more work done, more effectively, cannot be hit damages under § not being ombudsmen.”).
Fishel’s conduct another matter. The district court held cannot prove Fishel deliberately indifferent risk prolonged detention because took “numerous steps” determine whether Figgs’s concerns were warranted. explained Fishel did ignore suppress complaints, but took following steps: (1) relied upon calculation made prior arrival at Logan; (2) forwarded certain documents record office; (3) relied upon office’s determination correct. On appeal, plaintiff points out personally attempt calculate Figgs’s until June contends that her act of forwarding few documents from the master file to someone who was thus not fully equipped evaluate the problem so woefully inadequate it amounted deliberate indifference. Fishel, the other hand, asserts she “thoroughly investigated” Figgs’s complaints.
When evaluating Fishel’s conduct, it important consider substance Figgs’s complaints. In his emergency grievance, was not complaining about simple arithmetic, but his projected was premised falsehood he was MSR when he committed murder serving sentence. asking prison officials verify basis addition two years sentence. Although copies inmate request slips are not record, can reasonably inferred from Fishel’s deposition testimony made same kind substantive complaints several months earlier request slips. In response, Fishel admittedly did not perform any calculation, nor did she review all documents Figgs’s master file. In Fishel’s own words, she responded those complaints “let[ting] chief records handle it” because raised “so many questions” multiple request slips, matter “complex,” she sure about calculation. Fishel only one who Figgs’s master file, yet when she referred matter record office, sent only inmate request slip Figgs, previous sheet, corrected mittimus, PRB’s order. send anything else from file (such Statement Facts would have indicated when murder committed) would enabled the chief record office to determine whether Figgs’s complaints any merit or whether further investigation needed. There is no evidence Fishel had discussions the chief record office, contacted the PRB, or sought legal guidance any officials such IDOC attorneys, Circuit Court, Office of Attorney General, even when matter resurfaced way of the emergency grievance. Furthermore, Julia Bickle, who succeeded Ona Welch assistant chief record officer in Springfield, testified at her deposition the responsibility chief record officer facility where an inmate housed contact PRB for clarification orders are necessary properly calculate sentence.
The record belies Fishel’s assertion her investigation Figgs’s complaints “thorough.” Her reliance upon previous calculation, done long before complained, did not constitute step taken verify its accuracy (nor did her reliance upon record office’s determination). only action she took prior state court’s denial Dawson’s summary motion forwarding selected portions Figgs’s master file chief record office after receiving several inmate request slips. In response emergency grievance, Fishel relied 15 same prior determination by without further investigation. Given circumstances, jury could find that this minimal action so ineffectual that rose level of criminal recklessness and thus constituted deliberate indifference. Therefore, we will vacate grant of summary judgment Fishel on this claim remand for trial.
Fishel argues even if reasonable factfinder could conclude she Eighth Amendment rights, summary her favor proper alternative ground, qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability civil damages insofar their conduct does violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would known.’” Pearson v. Callahan , U.S. (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald U.S. (1982)). “In general, once defendants raise qualified immunity defense, plaintiff must show two things: first, there has violation one more 15 2926 her federal constitutional rights, second, the constitutional standards at issue were clearly established at the time alleged violation.” Campbell 256 at (citations omitted). The law is “clearly established” when “various courts have agreed certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts distinguishable fair way facts presented case at hand.” Id. at (emphasis internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz U.S. (2001)). The right allegedly violated must defined appropriate level specificity before can determine if it clearly established. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Layne , U.S. (1999)). contends “no clearly established constitutional rule established [she] violated Eighth Amendment by failing recalculate response concerns by referring it to” office. This argument is flawed because it does address broader deficiencies Fishel’s chosen course action, we discussed above. appropriate inquiry here whether clearly established Fishel’s failure investigate substance complaints constitutional rights by requiring him serve more time than sentence required. See id. (“[W]e must determine whether it clearly established defendants, revoking good conduct credits computing new after recommitment, were violating Campbell’s constitutional rights requiring him serve more than law required.”). 15 ‐
At time presented his complaints, it clearly established decisions in closely analogous cases that the failure to investigate claim inmate is being held longer than lawful term of violates Eighth Amendment if is result of indifference. See Haygood v. Younger , 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 ‐ 55 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding the Eighth Amendment is violated when prolonged detention is result of deliberate indifference, where prison officials failed to investigate claims prisoner’s letter questioning the method used to compute date); Sample v. Diecks , F.2d 1099, 1108 10 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding same, where senior record officer failed to take substantive action prisoner’s claim being held despite expiration of his sentence); Alexander v. Perrill , 916 F.2d 1397 99 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendants’ qualified immunity argument and concluding right to be free from incarceration beyond expiration one’s clearly established, where prison officials failed to investigate prisoner’s claim he incorrectly denied credit served foreign jail). While, be clearly established, “a right must be specific the relevant factual context cited case generalized with respect Amendment basis claim,” “very action question” need have previously held unlawful public official reasonable notice illegality some action. Viilo v. Eyre , 710 11 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen U.S. (2004) Anderson v. Creighton U.S. (1987)). Viewing light most favorable Figgs, evidence supports claim Fishel’s conduct established constitutional right free cruel 15 ‐ unusual punishment. Thus, entitled qualified immunity.
After dismissing federal claims, district court declined exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law false imprisonment claim against Dawson negligence claim against Dawson Fishel. Because we are vacating judgment Eighth Amendment claim against Fishel, state law claims relate same set of operative facts, we reinstate those claims all defendants they are asserted against. See Edwards v. Snyder , 478 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Albany Bank & Trust Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 310 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2002) Armstrong v. Squadrito , F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 1998)).
B. Procedural Due Process also challenges district court’s grant of summary favor Dawson Fourteenth Amendment claim violation procedural due process. constitutionally protected liberty interest being released prison before end term good behavior. See Toney El v. Franzen F.2d (7th Cir. 1985) (citing McKinney v. George (7th Cir. 1984)). To prove deprivation procedural due process, Figgs must show: (1) deprivation occurred; (2) occurred without due process law; (3) subjected him deprivation. See id. “In section actions challenging mistakes made by employees rather than state procedures those mistakes were made, Parratt requires consider adequacy availability remedies under law before concluding deprivation ‐ of life, liberty, property violates due process of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Armato (noting that Toney ‐ El , this court found that state ‐ court remedies such right seek writ of mandamus cause of action for false imprisonment are “adequate available” remedies for inmate claiming he was held beyond term his incarceration, precluding a claim for violation procedural due process).
Figgs claims Dawson his procedural due process rights by deferring action grievance until resolution state ‐ court mandamus proceeding. In granting summary Dawson’s favor, district court relied Toney ‐ El Armato held not only did Figgs available adequate state ‐ court remedies, he took advantage them filing mandamus proceeding. Figgs asserts appeal, he did before district court, that mandamus proceeding inadequate because pending for several months until he able obtain ruling led his release.
In Toney El court found state ‐ court habeas corpus remedy adequate despite fact prisoner plaintiff held for days past his lawful term incarceration. Like Toney El, did utilize court remedy until well after point when he maintains he deprived liberty. cites no authority proposition because obtain immediate relief, mandamus remedy inadequate. Accordingly, we agree district court remedy, utilized, precludes claim against procedural due process.
CONCLUSION We AFFIRM grant summary judgment favor Alex plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Fourteenth Amendment claims. We VACATE grant summary favor Lori plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim deliberate indifference, VACATE dismissal law false imprisonment negligence claims, REMAND case district further proceedings those claims.
[*] Of Northern District Illinois, sitting designation.
[1] does maintain inmates’ master files. They are kept institution where inmate incarcerated.
[2] Although defendants do appear dispute correct date, we some reservations about it. original mittimus for (continued...)
[2] (...continued) murder conviction stated was to receive credit for time served since January 1991 (when he still serving sentence drug conviction) while same stating sentence to run consecutive to drug sentence. Illinois law, ILCS 5/5 ‐ ‐ 4(d)(8) (which section 4(h) relevant time), requires consecutive sentencing where defendant is charged felony commits a separate felony while pretrial release. The “corrected” mittimus muddied waters by omitting any reference drug providing murder run consecutive nonexistent “sentence” nonexistent MSR violation. It is possible newly calculated January release fact incorrect in would allowed have served partially concurrent sentences contravention consecutive sentence requirement. does not enable us confidently draw a conclusion about correct date.
[3] No claims against Randolph are involved this appeal, record does disclose why not dismissed action. Although name included caption complaint there are certain factual allegations against him, plaintiff attempt any claim against him.
[4] Although clinical services counselor who reviewed responded grievance stated response “the law office Springfield concurred with” Logan Record Office’s “interpretation” mittimus, does reveal who contacted “law Springfield.” testify her deposition did.
[5] It should be noted, however, even if proves Fishel acted with deliberate indifference, must also prove deliberate indifference caused him be held beyond lawful term incarceration. See, e.g., Armato 721. Causation could difficult prove for reasons discussed above footnote 2. Still, we are persuaded by Fishel’s causation related arguments appeal. They are myopically focused itself ignore specific issues raised Figgs, problems PRB’s order, admittedly confusing “corrected” mittimus. Although points out she no authority disregard PRB orders, she fails acknowledge that other courses action such making inquiries PRB court seeking legal guidance.