117 Va. 752 | Va. | 1915
(after making the foregoing statement), delivered the opinion of the court.
We are of opinion that it was error to permit the appellants to file their petition, that the.court had no jurisdiction of the matters arising thereon, and that all proceedings thereunder were null and void. The objection to the fifing of the petition, and the demurrer thereto, were both good and should have been sustained.
The petition could not have had any other effect than that which it actually produced, namely, to. call into requisition the court’s judgment upon a dispute regarding the title and boundaries of land. That courts of equity are without jurisdiction to settle such a dispute, in the absence of some peculiar equity (not existing in this case) is perfectly well settled. Stuart Heirs v. Coalter, 4 Rand. (25 Va.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 731; Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh (32 Va.) 192; Carrington v. Otis, 4 Gratt. (45 Va.) 235; Steed v.
It is true that the appellants invoked the jurisdiction of the court, and that the appellees (after they had resisted the filing of the petition, however, and had entered a demurrer thereto) expressed in their answer a willingness to have the two tracts surveyed as prayed for in the petition. But this is a controversy which belongs exclusively to a court of law, and no acquiescence or consent could create a jurisdiction over it in equity. Merwin’s Eq., sec. 108, p. 59; Stuart’s Heirs v. Coalter, 4 Rand (25 Va.) 74, 79, 15 Am. Dec. 731; Boston Blower Co. v. Carmen Lumber Co., 94 Va. 94, 100, 26 S. E. 390; Freer v. Davis, supra.
In his Notes on Equity Jurisprudence, at p. 8, Prof. W. M. Lile says: “It is settled, save possibly in Masachusetts, that consent cannot confer jurisdiction—that is to say, if a suit which properly belongs to a court of law be brought in equity, even though the defendant make no objection, and be willing that equity shall adjudge the matter, the chancellor himself will take notice of the defect of jurisdiction and the cause will be dismissed.”
At section 105, page 56, of Merwin’s Equity, the author says: “In England and in the United States Supreme Court it is settled by^repeated decisions that this is an objection which cannot be waived, because it goes'to the jurisdiction, and the court is bound to take notice of it, sua sponte, although it is not presented in the pleadings nor even suggested orally by counsel.”
In Freer v. Davis, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, with striking relevancy to the present case, says: “While the court had no jurisdiction to pass
This is not the case of a plaintiff coming in an irregular manner into a proper forum and seeking later to take advantage of errors committed at his instance or through his default or acquiescence. The difficulty here is that the proceedings were had in a forum having no jurisdiction of the subject matter. It is not contended that the provisions of Sec. 2562 of the Code, conferring on courts of equity jurisdiction to settle all questions of title that may arise in a partition of lands, have any application to the questions arising upon the petition in this case, and we are of opinion that if such contention were made, it could not be sustained.
This brings us to the question as to just what disposition should be made of the cause at its present stage.
It is to be observed that the appellants are only parties to the suit by reason of their petition. They are not affected by anything done in the cause before they intervened. No partition of the Moore tract was ever made, but the suit was regularly and properly on the docket and the court had jurisdiction to enter the decree of July 26, 1907, which left certain adjustments to'be made between some of the original parties to the suit. These adjustments cannot prejudice the rights of appellants and they cannot here complain of them. It follows, we think, that the decrees appealed from should be reversed, the petition of Geo. W. Litz, W. L. Dennis and Louisa S. Day dismissed, all proceedings thereon cancelled and annulled, and the
The costs in this court, however, will be decreed against the appellants. The cause is brought here by them, and the appellees having prevailed on the issue out of chancery are not now complaining, but the reversal, though at their instance, is not upon any error assigned by them but upon an error which they invited and which was committed over the protest of the appellees. Clearly, therefore, the appellants are not the parties substantially prevailing, and they should be required to pay the costs on the appeal. See Freer v. Davis, and Railroad Co. v. Swan, cited above, in both of which cases the conclusion here reached upon the question of costs is approved.
Reversed.