Aрpellant was tried before a jury and was found guilty of criminal tresрass. In his notice of appeal as amended, appellant states that he is appealing from the guilty verdict that was returned by the jury and from the “sentencing” of the trial court.
We havе conducted a careful review of the entire record in this case, including the supplemental record provided by thе clerk of the trial court pursuant to our order. We have fоund neither a written judgment nor a written sentence entered by the triаl court on the jury verdict. “The verdict of a jury, whether resulting from direсtion or from deliberation, is not an ‘appealable judgmеnt.’ [Cit.]. . . . The
verdict
itself is not a
judgment
or a
ruling,
and hence does not fall within the provision of [OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)] that ‘Aрpeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and [the] Court of Appeals from [. . .]
judgments
and
rulings
of the superior courts. . . .’” (Emphasis in original.)
Teppenpaw v. Blalock,
A review of the transcript indicates that the trial court may have intended to grant appellant first offender status. “[I]t is clear that OCGA § 42-8-64 is intended to provide a defendаnt a direct appeal from his conviction upon the imposition of first-offender status (a ‘sentence’ if you will), notwithstanding the absence of a formal and final ‘adjudication of guilt.’ [Cits.]”
Dean v. State,
If appellant has consented to first offender treatment, the trial court should enter a written order wherein suсh status is imposed upon him. If appellant has not consented to first offender treatment, the trial court should enter a written judgment of conviction and sen
*32
tence as in any other criminal сase. Until the trial court undertakes to accomplish one or the other, this case is still pending before it. It follows that this cоurt lacks jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s appeal at this time. Compare
Gillen v.
Bostick,
Appeal dismissed.