Appellant, Chris Little (Little), appeals the trial court’s grant of defendants Roland and Mildred Williamsons’ (Williamsons) motion for summary judgment. 1 Little claims the summary judgment was error as a matter of law because negligent infliction of emotional harm absent contemporaneous рhysical injury is compensable in certain circumstances under Indiana law.
We affirm.
The record shows Little, his older sister, and their puppy were walking along a road in their neighborhood whеn they were confronted by a Great Dane owned by the Williamsons. The girl grabbed the pupрy in her arms in an effort to protect it, but the Great Dane ripped the puppy out оf her arms and killed it, in the process biting the girl’s arm, breaking two bones, and causing numerous lacerations. Little was present during this altercation. The parties stipulated Little did not suffer any physical injuries as a result of the incident. Mental anguish and fear are the only injuries he clаims to have suffered.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we use the same standard as the trial court. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56;
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co.,
(1982) Ind.App.,
*975
Indiana adheres to the general rule damages for emotional distress are recoverable only when accompanied by and resulting from physical injury.
Baker
v.
American States Ins. Co.,
(1981) Ind.App.,
However, an exception to the rule has been made in certain cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress where there are:
“certain tort actions involving the invasion of a legal right which by its very nature is likely to provoke аn emotional disturbance. False imprisonment and assault actions are examples of instances in which a disagreeable emotional experience would normally be expected to be inextricably intertwined with the nature of the deliberate wrong committed, thereby lending credence to a claim for mental disturbance. The conduct of the defendant in such circumstances is characterized as being willful, callous, or mаlicious, which may produce a variety of reactions, such as fright, shock, humiliation, insult, vexation, inconvenience, worry, or apprehension.”
Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile v. Smith,
While we are aware of thе recent dissent by Justice Hunter to the denial of a petition to transfer on the issue of the parameters of this exception in regard to intentional infliction of emotionаl distress,
Elza,
Little urges us to overrule this existing case law and recоgnize negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort. However, this responsibility we must leave to our supreme court or legislature. Further, considering the evolution оf Indiana law concerning recovery for infliction of emotional distress, we believe any erosion of the impact rule must first occur in cases of intentional rather than negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2
The record shows the parties stipulated Little suffered no physical injuries from the incident with the Great Dane. 3 Therefore, *976 given our impact rule, there was nо genuine issue of material fact and the trial court correctly applied the law in granting Wil-liamsons’ motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Little appeals after trial and judgment in favor of the other plaintiff, his sister, in the amount of $65,000.
.
But see Kroger Co.
v.
Beck,
(1978)
. We offer no opinion whether there would have been an issue of material fact if the Great Dane had knocked Little down but not harmed him, i.e., if our impact rule requires actual harm or if mere physical contact is sufficient.
See Kroger Co. v. Beck
(seems to indicate injury must occur although need not be permanent or substantial). Although the complaint alleged the dog knocked Little down, whether that happened is not in issue for, as William-sons point out in the brief supporting their motion for summary judgment, Little admitted in his published deposition hе was not knocked down. Although on a summary judgment the pleadings are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party,
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co.,
(1982) Ind.App.,