Little v. SullivanLittle v. Sullivan
By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which comes to us with the certificate of the
The ultimate question to be decided is whether
The certifiсate of the District Court makes it unnecessary for us to explore jurisdictional facets of the problem presented. We proceed dirеctly to the merits. Susco Car Rentals v. Leonard, Fla., 112 So.2d 832.
A complaint for damages was filed by respondent Sullivan against the petitioners Little on December 6, 1961. The cause procеeded through preliminary pleadings. According to a stipulation, the last “action” in the prosecution was a pre-trial order entered May 23, 1962. On Junе 10, 1963, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the action for failure to prosecute over a period of one year. A motion to reinstate was filed by Sullivan on June 18, 1963. The trial judge entered an order reinstating the cause on July 10, 1963. The motion to reinstate was grounded upon the following:
(1) Sullivan‘s original attоrney moved to Fort Lauderdale in November, 1962;
(2) The handling of the case was then taken over by an attorney who was a member of the Florida Legislature which had been in session from the first week in April 1963, to the date of the motion;
(3) Under
The trial judge concluded that the motion presented facts which constituted a “good cause” sufficiеnt to justify the reinstatement of the action under
The cited statute is оbviously intended to promote the expeditious disposition of litigation. It contains two basic component elements. It provides for dismissal upоn inaction for a year showing a lack of prosecution for that period. It further provides for re-instatement after dismissal “upon good cause shown” by petition filed within one month.
In regard to dismissal, the requirements of the statute are mandatory if it is demonstrated to the court that no action tоwards prosecution has been taken within a year. The trial judge has no discretion in the enforcement of this aspect of the statute. When the essential inaction is established, dismissal necessarily follows. May v. State, Fla., 96 So.2d 126; Adams Engineering Co. v. Construction Products Corp., Fla., 156 So.2d 497.
However, within 30 days after the order of dismissal, a party in interest may obtain reinstatement upon a showing of “good cause“. In Adams, supra, we held that the statutory standard of “good cause” for reinstatement requires the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. This is not an arbitrary or unrestrained discretion. It
When a judicial discretion is allowed a trial judge, his exercise thereof will not be lightly regarded. On the other hand, the exercise of a judicial discretion is controlled by applicable principles of law and equity. Discretion is not available as a support for a conclusion in the face of a positive rule of law to the contrary. Ellard v. Godwin, Fla., 77 So.2d 617; McWhorter v. McWhorter, Fla.App., 122 So.2d 504.
The motion for reinstatement was grounded essentially on the contention that Sullivan‘s lawyer was a member of the 1963 Legislature, and that by virtue of
“All pending litigation before the courts of this state shall stand continued during any session оf the legislature and for a period of time fifteen days prior to any session of the legislature and fifteen days subsequent to the conclusion of any session of the legislature where either attorneys representing the litigants are members of the legislature, when motion to that effect is made by such member.”
We recognized the justification for this statute in Brooks v. Pan Am. Loan Co., Fla., 65 So.2d 481. It is intended to relieve lawyer-legislators of the pressures of attention to the litigation of their clients during the period when they are busily engаged in the public‘s business in the Legislature. It serves a valid and important function. However, the statute is certainly not self-executing.
By the very language of the statute the privilege of obtaining a continuance is available only “when [a] motion to that effect is made by such member“. Pending litigation is not automatically continued by the act. The Legislature itself has made this relief available to its lawyer members only when relief is requested. Our conclusion in this respect is buttressed by the history of the statute as it passed through the legislative process.
By
When stripped of the claimed self-executing aspect of
We do not disregard the policy of the law to dispose of litigation on its merits rather than upon the niceties of procedural requirements. However, it is equally important that litigation proceed in аn orderly fashion and expeditiously to a prompt and just conclusion. The statutes which we have discussed are aimed in that direction.
The decision under review is quashed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceeding consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
DREW, C.J., O‘CONNELL and ERVIN, JJ., and WIGGINTON, District Court Judge, concur.