32 P.2d 94 | Okla. Crim. App. | 1934
The plaintiff in error, hereinafter called defendant, was convicted in the district court of Oklahoma county, of disposing of mortgaged property and was sentenced to serve a term of 18 months in the state penitentiary.
The prosecution is under section 1946, Okla. Stat. 1931, which in part is:
"Any mortgagor of personal property, or his legal representative, who, while such mortgage remains in force and unsatisfied, conceals, sells * * * without the written consent of the holder of such mortgage, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. * * *"
The amended information on which defendant was tried alleges that —
"* * * Lenora Little * * * did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of disposing of mortgaged property in the manner and form as follows to wit: That is to say, the said defendant * * * did then and there * * * sell certain personal property, to wit: a one story, two room frame house for the sum of 35 dollars, * * * to Art Hoover and Mrs. Art Hoover, which property was then and there mortgaged to the Gentry-Severance Lumber Co., * * * and which mortgage was then in force and unsatisfied * * * without the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee. * * *"
A demurrer to this information was overruled, and, after verdict, a motion in arrest of judgment was interposed; both the demurrer and the motion to arrest challenged the sufficiency of the information. Error in the *422 ruling of the court on this point is the principal contention made.
The amended information does not allege either directly or by inference that defendant is the mortgagor or the legal representative of the mortgagor and the argument is made that since the statute, section 1946, supra, in defining the crime sought to be charged, limits it to the particular class of persons who are mortgagors or the legal representatives of mortgagors, that an allegation that the person charged belongs to such class is essential. The state contends that only the material ingredients of the crime need be alleged and that the limitation to the particular class of persons is not of the substance of the offense and the omission of such allegation is not fatal. The state relies mainly on State v. Elliott,
It has been held by numerous decisions of this court that penal statutes cannot be enlarged by implication or extended by inference. Myers v. State,
It is also held in numerous decisions that where a statute provides that the doing of a certain act by a person of a certain class shall be a crime, the information must allege that the person accused is of the class designated *423
and an information failing to so allege is insufficient. 31 C. J. p. 694, § 240; Stout v. Territory,
DAVENPORT and CHAPPELL, JJ., concur.