¶ 1 Johnnie Little appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the state and its denial of her cross-motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action for the wrongful death of Little’s daughter, Shawntinice Polk. For all of the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ 2 “On appeal from a summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered and draw all justifiable inferences in [her] favor.”
Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc.,
¶ 3 When Little came to Tucson from her home in California for Polk’s memorial service, she was approached by Len Johnson, a local television reporter, who was planning to make a documentary film about Polk’s death. Little authorized Johnson to obtain Polk’s medical records and investigate the circumstances surrounding her death. 1 After obtaining those records, Johnson consulted with four different physicians regarding Polk’s symptoms and the medical care she had received.
¶ 4 On July 1, 2007, Johnson filed on Little’s behalf a complaint against Dr. Porter with the Arizona Medical Board (the Board), 2 asserting that Porter had been medically negligent in his care of Polk. The complaint stated it was “authorized and urged by Polk’s mother, Johnnie Little”; that Little was working with Johnson; and that Johnson was “writing in conjunction with and on behalf of the mother.” The complaint set forth a number of the symptoms Polk exhibited before her death and asserted, “We have concluded that while clots are not easily detected, the warning signs and symptoms in this case [we]re too numerous and obvious to ignore and that Dr. Donald Porter fell below the standard of care when treating this patient.” Little authorized Johnson to prepare and file the complaint as well as to appear and testify at the ensuing Board hearing. 3
¶ 5 On February 7, 2008, the Board ruled that Porter’s care of Polk constituted “unprofessional conduct” in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1401(27)(q). It issued a letter of reprimand for Porter’s having failed to consider and pursue a diagnosis of pulmonary embolus, to perform an adequate examination, and to measure vital signs. On May 15, 2008, Little filed a notice of claim with the state pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01. In recognition of the 180-day time limit for filing such claims, see § 12-821.01(A), Little asserted her claim had not accrued until the date of the Board’s February 7, 2008, decision. She alternatively claimed the time limit should be equitably tolled.
¶ 6 The state moved for summary judgment based on the untimeliness of Little’s notice of claim. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that, because Johnson was Little’s authorized agent and Little specifically had approved his filing the Board complaint on July 1, 2007, her May 2008 notice of claim was untimely. The court also denied Little’s cross-motion for summary judgment, in which she had argued that her notice of claim was timely because her cause of action did not accrue until the Board issued its decision and, alternatively, that any untimeliness should be excused under the doctrines of equitable estoppel and tolling. We have jurisdiction over Little’s appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(B).
Discussion
¶ 7 Little argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the state based on its finding that her notice of claim had been filed untimely.
4
The entry
Timeliness of Notice of Claim
¶ 8 Under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), a party wishing to assert a claim against a public entity first must file a notice of claim within 180 days after the cause of action accrues. Any claim not filed within this time limit is barred.
Id,.; see Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa County,
¶ 9 A cause of action accrues under § 12-821.01 “when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” § 12-821.01(B). The term “accrual” is construed in accordance with the common law discovery rule, which “provides that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligent conduct.” Stu
lce v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
¶ 10 Here, we must determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that Johnson’s filing the Board complaint on Little’s behalf marked the accrual of her claim for purposes of § 12-821.01(B). Little argues a number of reasons why it did not, contending she did not know the contents of the Board complaint, Johnson’s opinion that Dr. Porter was negligent cannot be imputed to her, and “the cause of action d[id] not accrue until a medical expert t[old her] she was injured as a result of medical negligence,” which she maintains did not occur until the Board issued its decision. She further argues that the filing of the Board complaint could not cause the 180-day period to accrue because, “when Johnson told [her] he filed the [Board] complaint, neither had the slightest idea that Johnson’s opinion about Dr. Porter’s negligence could cause Little’s cause of action to accrue.”
¶ 11 We find these arguments unavailing and agree with the trial court that Little’s cause of action accrued as a matter of law no later than the date the Board complaint was filed. The Board is charged with investigate ing complaints filed against physicians who may be “medically incompetent,” “guilty of unprofessional conduct,” or “mentally or physically unable safely to engage in the practice of medicine,” A.R.S. § 32-1451(A), and its “primary duty is ‘to protect the public from unlawful, incompetent, unqualified, impaired or unprofessional practitioners,’ ”
Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Examiners,
¶ 12 By authorizing and knowing about the filing of the Board complaint against Porter, even if she did not read its contents, Little demonstrated that, as of that time, her “‘knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provided sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.’ ”
Walk,
¶ 13 Here, although Little contends she was unaware of Porter’s negligence until the Board had ruled on her complaint against him, her Board complaint detailed Polk’s symptoms and warning signs as well as Porter’s allegedly inadequate treatment. The complaint also alleged that other state actors had contributed substantially to Polk’s death.
5
Thus, we reject Little’s argument that her cause of action did not accrue until she had received an “expert medical opinion of malpractice.” At oral argument, Little’s counsel asserted that
Walk
was the primary case supporting her theory, but in fact
Walk
undercuts her assertion.
Walk
explains that “the core question” as to when a cause of action accrues is when a “reasonable person would have been on notice” to investigate whether negligent conduct may have caused her injury; it does not provide or suggest that a plaintiff first must receive an expert medical opinion stating that malpractice has occurred, which is the litmus test Little proposes.
¶ 14 Furthermore, despite her arguments to the contrary, because Johnson had been acting as Little’s agent, his filing of the complaint is imputed to her. The undisputed facts demonstrate Little knew of and specifically authorized Johnson to file the Board complaint; therefore, he was acting as Little’s agent when he did so on her behalf.
See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Grisham,
¶ 15 Because “an agent’s acts bind the agent’s principal,”
Queiroz v. Harvey,
Equitable Estoppel and Tolling
¶ 16 Little next contends that, even if her notice of claim was untimely, the trial court erred by denying her cross-motion for summary judgment because the court “should ... have found [that] the State was equitably estopped from raising the timeliness defense or that AR.S. § 12-821.01[ (A) ] was equitably tolled by the conduct of Little’s attorneys.” “The notice of claim statute is ‘subject to ... estoppel and equitable tolling.’ ”
Jones v. Cochise County,
¶ 17 In support of her estoppel argument, Little points to the fact that a state insurance adjuster opened a file after Polk’s death, implies the adjuster may have prevented Porter from contacting Little, and suggests the adjuster attempted to delay Little’s and Johnson’s receipt of Polk’s medical records. These assertions, however, are not only speculative but do not demonstrate the trial court erred. The undisputed facts show that any delay in obtaining Polk’s medical records had been substantially remedied by the time Johnson filed the Board complaint and thus was irrelevant to Little’s subsequent delay in filing her notice of claim. And Little has failed to explain how a state adjuster’s opening a file or allegedly preventing Porter from contacting her should estop the state from relying on the notice-of-claim statute, especially when the court did not deem her claim to have accrued until almost two years after Polk’s death when Johnson filed the Board complaint on Little’s behalf. Furthermore, the eases on which she relies are distinguishable and do not compel a contrary result.
See Jones,
¶ 19 Again, however, Little has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in refusing to apply equitable tolling to her claim. Equitable tolling applies only in “extraordinary circumstances” and not to “ ‘a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.’ ”
McCloud,
¶20 Moreover, the cases on which Little relies are inapposite.
See United Liquor Co. v. Stephenson,
Disposition
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the state and its denial of Little’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Notes
. Later, in January 2008, after much of the investigation had been completed, Little and Johnson entered into an agreement for Johnson to receive ten percent of any settlement Little might receive in connection with Polk’s death.
. The Board, previously known as the Arizona State Board of Medical Examiners, is the state agency that licenses and regulates physicians in Arizona.
Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Examiners,
. The complaint also contained allegations that others had committed misconduct and contributed to Polk’s death, including an allegation that University of Arizona basketball personnel and another physician had delayed life-saving treatment on the morning of her death. But, because the Board required the complaint to be filed against a single party, Johnson primarily directed the complaint at Dr. Porter.
. Little also purports to preserve other issues raised below but not addressed on appeal and "asks this Court to consider them as though set forth herein.” Our rules do not permit either the preservation or raising of issues in this manner; instead, any argument not developed on appeal is
deemed waived. See Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. 13(a)(6) ("An argument ... shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.");
Polanco v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.,
. Although the Board complaint, notice of claim, and civil complaint all allege that other university employees also had contributed to Polk’s death, because Little now contends that her cause of action did not accrue until the Board reprimanded Dr. Porter, we conclude she has waived any argument that her notice was timely as to any of those individuals.
. Although determinations of when discovery occurs and a cause of action accrues are often jury questions,
see Walk, 202
Ariz. 310, ¶23,
. Because we affirm the trial court's judgment based on the filing date of the Board complaint, we need not reach the state’s alternative argument that Little’s claim accrued on September 13, 2007, the date her second attorney wrote to her about the case.
. Citing
Walk,
Little also asserts that, ”[i]f a doctor suspects his treatment may have been negligent or even if he believes [it] was entirely proper, but knows that another doctor thinks his treatment may have been below the standard of care,” the physician “has a fiduciary duty to voluntarily tell the patient not only what he knows, but what he is chargeable with knowing and his failure to do so will toll the statute of limitations.” She then claims any such duty Porter may have owed Polk "was and should have been equitably and equally owed to Little.” Because Little has not adequately developed this argument, however, we do not consider it further.
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.,