Pаtricia Ann Little and her husband, William Deryl Little, brought suit against Liberty Savings Bank, FSB and Adams Distributing Company d/b/a Macon Tile & Carpet Company to recover damages for injuries Mrs. Little sustained when she slipped and fell in the bank’s building. The trial court granted summary judgment to Liberty Sаvings Bank, and the Littles appeal.
The record reveals that Mrs. Little was employed by INA Insurance Company, which rented office space in appellee’s building. Appellee contracted with Adams Distributing to replace the сarpeting in the eleventh floor hallway of the building. Mrs. Little testified by deposition that as she exited the elevator on thе eleventh floor early in the afternoon of June 20, 1985, she and the others on the elevator noticed that the cаrpet had been removed, exposing the concrete floor. She walked down the bare hallway to the lunchroom, where she stayed for approximately 25 minutes. As she stepped back into the hallway from the lunchroom, which she testified had solid wood doors that swung outward (although there was testimony that the doors opened inward), upon taking her first step Mrs. Little slipped on carpet glue placed on the floor by employees of Adams Distributing and fell, injuring her leg and back. Mrs. Little recalled smelling the glue after she fell, and stated that the floor looked shiny and wet. William David Andre, appellee’s operations manager, testified by affidavit that, other than requesting “that the carpeting be laid in stages so that persons in the building could use the hallways at all times,” appellee gave no instructions to Adams Distributing regarding the method оr manner of installation, and inspected the work only after completion.
Appellants contend the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment because material factual questions remain regarding whether Adams Distributing was acting as an independent contractor and whether appellee exercised the requisite dеgree of care.
“[W]here a landowner surrenders a portion of his premises to an independent contraсtor!,] the landowner is relieved of his duties with regard to the portion of the premises which he no longer controls. [Cit.] . . . ‘Possеssion may be defined as having personal charge of or exercising the rights of management or control over the property in question. Custody and control are the commonly accepted and gener
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ally understood incidents of possession.’ [Cit.]”
Towles v. Cox,
Appellee contends that the grant of summary judgment in its favor nevertheless was correct because Mrs. Little failed to exercise ordinary care to notice and avoid an obvious hazard. We do not agree.
To recover in a slip and fall case involving a foreign substance, “the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.”
Alterman Foods v. Ligon,
Appellee’s argument is that appellаnts cannot claim lack of knowledge of the presence of the glue because Mrs. Little was aware when shе entered the lunchroom that the carpeting had been removed. “However, it is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the
specific
hazаrd which precipitates the slip and fall which is determinative, not merely his knowledge of the generally prevailing hazаrdous conditions or of the hazardous conditions which he observes and avoids. The true issue in a slip and fall case suсh as the instant one is whether ‘the plaintiff was without knowledge of the (foreign) substance’ which precipitated his slip and fаll. [Cit.]”
Telligman v. Monumental Properties,
Judgment reversed.
