97 P. 639 | Utah | 1908
Tbe respondents commenced tbis action in the district court of Salt Lake county to recover a commission alleged to' Lave been earned by them, in making a sale of real estate as the agents of appellants. Respondents are partners engaged in the real estate business in Salt Lake City, and appellants are nonresidents of this state, and during all of the time covered by the transaction referred to herein were absent therefrom.
The undisputed facts developed at the trial are substantially as follows: Appellants owned a certain parcel of real estate located in the business district of Salt Lake City, which they had listed wdth respondents for sale and to be sold by them. After some preliminary correspondence between respondents and appellants with respect to the terms and conditions of sale, respondents, pursuant to such-correspondence, on the 30th day of December, 1905, prepared an option agreement, which was duly executed by all the parties, and in which appellants were styled “first parties” and one W. S. Crismon, the purchaser, “second party.” The stipulations of this agreement, so far as material here, are as follows: “Said first parties further agree: (1) Within fifteen days after said date, to furnish to date and tender to said second party a complete abstract of said premises. (2) That said second party may have until May 1, 1906, to examine the said abstract; and if the title is marketable, and the second party elects not to buy, then said receipted sum is forfeited; if the title is not marketable, then said receipted sum to' he returned. (3) To tender to said second party a deed as above specified on May 1, 1906, or sooner if demanded. (4) If said title is not marketable then to make it so on demand, if the second party binds himself to buy. (5) To accept payment (if said second party buys) of said balance of the purchase price, as follows, to wit: E'ourteen thousand five hundred ($14,500.00) in current funds of the United States. Demand and tender to be made at the office of Little and Little.” The agreement was executed in duplicate; one copy being forwarded to Mrs. Agnes Herzinger, who lived in San Francisco, and the other delivered to the purchaser. The
Referring now to the alleged tender of Mr. Crismon, the undisputed evidence is, in substance, as follows: Mr. Louis H. Farnsworth, the assistant cashier of Walker Brothers’ Bank, testified that Mr. Crismon came to the bank on May 1, 1906, and made arrangements with the witness to obtain the
Upon substantially the foregoing evidence, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of respondents, and rendered judgment in their favor for the amount claimed by them. The assignments of error attack the findings upon the ground that there is no evidence to sustain them, and assail the conclusions of law upon the ground that they are contrary to both the law and the evidence.
Respondents assert that, under the decisions of this court, there is nothing for us to pass upon in this case; that the only questions involved are questions of fact, and, this being a law case, we cannot review the evidence to determine its weight and sufficiency; that all that we have the power to do is to determine whether there is any legal or competent evidence in the record in support of the findings of fact; that there is such evidence, and hence the judgment'should be affirmed. This court has repeatedly held that in law cases we cannot pass upon the weight of the evidence, and in that way determine its sufficiency, nor can we, in case of conflicting statements, or in case where there is reasonable ground for difference with regard to the inferences that may be deduced from certain facts or statements, determine upon which side the evidence preponderates. But this court has never held that, where the facts are undisputed and the inferences to be deduced from them leave no room, for reasonable doubt with regard to their legal effect, it will not pass upon and determine the questions of law that must govern and control when applied to the undisputed facts.
We have set forth the evidence at considerable length, and we think we have stated all of it that cari in any way influence the result; and from this evidence we have been forced to arrive at a conclusion of law diametrically opposite to that reached by the trial court. It is true the court, in effect, found that respondents had agreed to find a purchaser
Applying these rules of law to this case, the questions whether respondents produced a purchaser who was able, ready, and willing to purchase appellants’ property upon the terms and conditions imposed by them, and to pay therefor at the time specified, must be deduced from the undisputed evidence in the record. That an option agreement was duly entered into and what its terms and conditions are is clear., That there was an application for an extension of time by the purchaser to make the final payment is also clear. The legal
From all it necessarily follows that the findings of the court are not sustained by the evidence, and that the conclusions of law are contrary to the law applicable to the facts. The judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained, and it accordingly, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to grant a new trial, appellants to recover costs on appeal.