135 So. 2d 403 | Miss. | 1961
This is a suit for damages based upon the alleged breach of a year to year farm lease contract, and from an adverse decree, appellant appeals to this Court.
The defendants, appellees here, answered the bill and denied the allegations of the bill and stated that it had been agreed in the fall of 1956, that the “Gin Place” would be changed into a cattle farm, and that the appellant was given other land in lieu of the “Gin Place”. The appellees then attempted to put the “Gin Place” into the Soil Bank Program, but that the appellant told appellee Arch Dalrymple he would work the rest of the property on the condition that if any of the balance of the land was put into the Soil Bank appellant would receive a share of the payment; that the Soil Bank application fell through because appellant would not release his claim and appellant would not work any of the property, and that the appellees had to employ others to work the property. Appellees deny that they are due any money to the appellant. Appellees reported to the court the amounts made on the various pieces of land worked by other tenants; the appellees also claimed that they had to pay a certain fine because the appellant produced more cotton than the appellees were allotted. The answer is made a cross bill and requests payment from Mr. Little for the fine and damages for the breach of the contract for the year 1957. The appellant filed his answer to the cross bill and denied that he owed the appellees damage, or that he was due to pay the landlord’s fine.
It is apparent from the record, that no controversy had arisen between the parties until some time in the spring of 1957, when the appellant made demand upon the appellees for a part of the soil bank benefits. The Chancellor held that the “Cotton Gin Place” was not rented to the appellant in the fall of 1956 for the year 1957, and the appellant was therefore not entitled to any part of the soil bank benefits because the appellant had not rented the land; nevertheless the appellant admits that he told Arch Dalrymple in February 1957 that he would go ahead and work the 150 acres if he would pay appellant part of the soil bank check.
The appellant testified that a Mr. Scribner, a partner of Arch Dalrymple III, called and told him that, unless he signed a release so that Mr. Dalrymple could put the place in the Soil Bank, appellant would not be permitted to farm any of the Dalrymple land.
A part of the testimony with reference to the request made to Sam Parham to look out for more land for appellant, was objected to and this unexplained testimony is of little value to this Court. The testimony does
The appellant contends that the statement made by him to Arch Dalrymple that “If he would pay me part of the soil bank check that I would go ahead and work it,” was a conditional statement and that the appellees had no right to anticipate a breach of the contract on the part of appellant based upon an equivocal statement. He points out the general rule that “In order to give rise to anticipatory breach of a contract the defendant’s refusal to perform must have been positive and unconditional,” and cites 5 Williston and Thompson, Contracts, Per. Ed. 1937, Section 1324; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 393; Old Ladies Home Assn., et al. v. Hart, 212 Miss. 67, 52 So. 2d 650.
The appellee Arch Dalrymple admitted he anticipated that appellant would breach the contract, but states he did not try to get a tenant in place of Mr. Little until April 15 although he had asked Mr. Rogers to check to see if he might be able to get somebody in the event Mr. Little would not work the land and stated that it was getting late to begin a crop.
The definition of an anticipatory breach of a contract is one committed before the time has come, when there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention to refuse performance in the future. If it does not precede the time of performance — it is not anticipatory. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, p. 969, Sec. 391.
The Chancellor stated in his finding of fact: “The Court is of the opinion that under the proof in
The appellees pointed out the rule, and the appellant admits, “that where the evidence was conflicting, the Chancellor’s findings on a disputed question of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence and not manifestly wrong.” Boat-wright v. Horton, 233 Miss. 444, 102 So. 2d 373; Shipman v. Lovelace, 214 Miss. 241, 58 So. 2d 657; Hastings v. California Co., 129 So. 2d 379; Smith v. Fanning, 25 So. 2d 481, (Miss. 1946).
It is apparent to us that the Chancellor reached the correct solution of the problems presented in this case, and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Affirmed.