Marni Owens sued Louise Little and Maxine Bullock for interference with easement. Owens’ husband, C. J. Chesser, made a claim against Little for malicious prosecution and arrest. The jury awarded $3,000 to Owens on her claim of interference with easement and $5,000 to Chesser on his claim аgainst Little for malicious arrest. The jury also awarded Owens $12,500 as punitive damages against Little and $12,500 as punitive damages against Bullock. Little and Bullock appeal, claiming that the trial court erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), аnd a new trial because (1) the jury’s award to Owens for actual damages on her claim for interference with easement was excessive and unsupported by the evidence, (2) the jury’s award to Chesser on his claim for malicious arrest was excessive and unsupported by the evidence, and (3) the issue of punitive damages was improperly submitted to the jury. For reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Chesser and Owens accessed their farm through an unpaved road which ran through property owned jointly by Little and Bullock. The right to use and maintain the road was established by a reciprocal easement contained in a court order. Chesser and Owens were married, but the rights established by the easement belonged to Owens as оwner of the farm.
In 1998, a tornado came through the area and blocked the road *229 with fallen trees and other debris. The road was partially cleared with the help of volunteers. A few days later two tires on Chesser’s horse trailer were flattened when the trailer hit а log lying in the curve of the roadway. Logs continued to reappear in the roadway after Chesser moved them. Owens went to investigate and saw Bullock put logs on the road and turn the stobs up. Owens took photographs, and Chesser later made a videotape of Bullock moving logs onto the road, and Bullock admitted to placing the logs when Chesser and Owens asked her about it.
The reciprocal easement gave Owens the right to maintain the road. Shortly after the tornado, Chesser and Owens decided to repair the rоad. Before beginning the physical work, Chesser hired a surveyor to mark the easement. The surveyor marked the boundaries of the roadway using three-foot-long sticks painted fluorescent orange. Chesser then hired Donald and Darren Alexander to clear and flatten the road within the surveyed area.
Shortly after the Alexanders began work, Bullock stopped them by standing in the middle of the road. For over an hour, Chesser read and reread to Bullock the court order that defined the reciprocal easement; she then walkеd back to her house and work resumed. Little, who was in town at work, learned about the roadwork through a telephone call from Bullock, who told her that “the dozers were tearing up everything” on their property. Little became very upset and left her job to go tо the courthouse, where she swore out a warrant for Chesser’s arrest based on a violation of the court order establishing the easement. Little had no personal knowledge of Chesser’s activities, but she falsely swore to the magistrate who issued the warrant that shе did have personal knowledge. That afternoon, a sheriff’s deputy drove out to the road to execute the arrest warrant for Chesser. The deputy told Chesser that he had come to arrest him, but allowed Chesser’s employee to drive him to the White County Detention Center, where Chesser waited in the detention area for five hours before being allowed to go home.
When the Alexanders came back to work on the road two or three weeks later, Little and Bullock both interfered with the work; Chesser testified that approximately twelve hours of work were lost through interference by Little and Bullock, and that the Alexanders charged $100 an hour. Evidence also showed that Little and Bullock would slow traffic on the road by walking on it in front of a vehicle for an extended period of time, which would force the vehicle to travel at walking speed, and that on occasion Bullock would just stand in the middle of the road and stare at Chesser.
1. Little and Bullock claim that the trial court erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict, for j.n.o.v., and for a new trial because the jury’s damage award for interference with easement was
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excessive and not authorized by the evidence. We disagree. “The standards for granting a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same. Where there is no conflict in the evidenсe as to any material issue, and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed.”
Wesleyan College v. Weber,
Absent compelling evidence, we will defer to the ruling of the trial court on a motion for new trial based on inadequate or excessive damages.
Moody v. Dykes,
2. Little also claims that the jury’s award to Chesser for malicious arrest was impropеr, and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial on this ground. We again disagree. The trial court charged the jury: “Now, as to the claim of C. J. Chesser, I charge you that in an action in which the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plаintiff, no measure of damages can be prescribed except in the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors.”
Little argues that the trial court determined that the proper measure of damages for the malicious arrest would be “vindictive damages” equal to double the actual damages — which she further
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argues would amount to nothing inasmuch as there were no actual damages. The trial court used the term “vindictive damages” in his discussions with counsel, but “Ga. L. 1987, p. 915, § 6[,] codified as OCGA § 51-12-6, repealed vindictive damages as a рunitive damage and recreated such damages to the peace and happiness as a general damage, measured in the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors.”
Sletto v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County,
Little further argues that, because of the order in which the jury received the charges on damages, the jury was under the impression that its damage award to Chesser on his claim of malicious arrest was an award for punitive damages. The jury was charged on punitive damages with regard to the interference with easement claim asserted by Owens, and the trial court then shifted to the charge on the malicious arrest claim, stating, “Now, as to the claim of Plaintiff C. J. Chesser. . . .” We find no error in the order in which the trial court presented the jury charge.
3. Little and Bullock further argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict, j.n.o.v., and new trial because the issue of punitive damages for Owens’ claim for interference with easement was improperly submitted to the jury. The evidence shows a wilful and repetitive violation of Owens’ property rights. “If a person commits a trespass with knowledge that he is acting without right, exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Dalon Contracting Co. v. Artman,
The amended complaint included a claim for punitive damages for obstruction of the driveway easement. Nevertheless, the parties stipulated during trial that punitive damages would not be available for Owens’ claim for interference with easement:
The Court: Unlawful interference with easement. You agree there’s no way [Owens] can get punitive damages on unlawful interference of easemеnt.
Plaintiff’s counsel: That’s my position today. . . .
The Court: Then I will take that as a stipulation of the parties.
Despite the stipulation, and without indication on the record that the stipulation was withdrawn, the trial court charged the jury that Owens had made a claim for punitive damages and instructed the jury on the definition of рunitive damages and the burden of proof.
The form of the verdict submitted to the jury allowed the jury to award punitive damages on Owens’ claim for punitive damages; defense counsel reviewed the written verdict form before it was given to the jury; a judgment for punitive damages оn Owens’ claim was returned by the jury; and the trial was bifurcated and a separate proceeding was held to determine the amount of punitive damages. All this occurred without objection from Little or Bullock that punitive damages were unavailable because of the previous stipulation or that they were unfairly surprised by the form of the verdict submitted to the jury.
It is not clear from the trial record why the claim for punitive damages was presented to the jury after a stipulation was made that such damages would not be available, but thе post-trial hearings indicate that the claim was not presented to the jury by the trial court sua sponte and without warning. Counsel for the plaintiffs testified that the decision by the trial court to submit punitive damages to the jury was made in an unrecorded discussion among counsel аnd the trial court. Defense counsel testified that he recalled the trial court commenting in an unrecorded charge conference, “Hey, why can’t Mami Owens get punitive damages?” The trial court also indicated at the post-trial hearing that he did not simply introduсe the punitive damages claim without telling anyone. But for whatever reason that the charge and verdict form actually given to the jury were inconsistent with the stipulation against punitive damages, if
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defendants thought they need not or had not defended against punitive damages by reason of the stipulation, they had the opportunity and the duty to object once they knew that a punitive damages claim would be submitted to the jury. A litigant cannot acquiesce to a trial court’s ruling and then assign error to it later. See
Plaza Properties v. Prime Business Investments,
Judgment affirmed.