143 S.E. 827 | N.C. | 1928
This cause was considered in Harden v. Raleigh,
From the foregoing judgment the plaintiffs appealed upon the ground that the trial judge did not hold as a matter of law that the former judgment of the board of adjustment in Harden v. Raleigh was an estoppel or resjudicata.
The case of Harden v. Raleigh,
1. That the board of adjustment is clothed with at least quasi- judicial power and that the investigation of facts as a basic of official action is *795 not a ministerial duty, the Court saying, "but the exercise of judgment or discretion may be regarded as the usual test by which to determine whether an act is ministerial or judicial. Within the class of quasi- judicial acts fall the board's conclusions as to whether the proposed building would be noxious or offensive or detrimental to the public safety or welfare by reason of its situation or the surrounding conditions; also in this class is the legal discretion to be exercised by the board upon the conclusions reached."
2. That the record did not disclose that the board of adjustment in declining the permit had improperly exercised its discretion.
From the finding of fact made by the trial judge in the case at bar it therefore appears that practically the same parties are contesting the same matter and in the same manner as in the case of Harden v. Raleigh, supra. Moreover the controversy is based upon the same facts and allegations contained in the former case. The petitioners appeared before the board in the case at bar, and filed a plea of res judicata contending that the case of Harden v. Raleigh, supra had determined the rights of the parties upon the same facts. While the plea of res judicata, is not available with respect to proceedings by a purely administrative board, it is available with respect to the proceedings and final decision of a judicial orquasi-judicial body. In re Smiling, N.C. 448. There is no allegation, no proof, and no finding by the trial court that the facts in the case at bar are in anywise different from the facts in the case of Harden v. Raleigh. Indeed the trial judge finds that Mrs. Harden applied to the building inspector "to reopen and rehear its former decision upon the building of the filling station upon her said lot."
Upon these circumstances we are constrained to hold that the plea of resjudicata, duly filed in apt time by the petitioners, was available, and therefore that the owner of the lot is not entitled to reopen and rehear the case upon the identical facts presented in the former record.
Reversed.