This is an antitrust case involving alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the *594 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. It comes to us after the district court 1 granted Appellee Baptist Health’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied Baptist Health’s motion to tax discovery-related copying costs. The principal issue on appeal concerns the proper methodology for determining the relevant market in an antitrust case. We also address whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to tax costs. We affirm on both issues.
I. Background
Appellant Little Rock Cardiоlogy Clinic PA (“LRCC”) is a professional association of cardiologists located in Little Rock, Arkansas, practicing in both diagnostic and interventional cardiology procedures. Baptist Health is the largest hospital company in Arkansas, operating five hospitals in the state, its largest being a 585-bed facility in Little Rock. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Arkansas (“Blue Cross”) is a health-insurance company headquartered in Little Rock. 2 Beginning in 1975, LRCC and its cardiologists maintained clinical and staff privileges at Baptist Health and were in Blue Cross’s FirstSource network, a network of prеferred providers used by all of Blue Cross’s health plans. This changed, however, with the opening of the Arkansas Heart Hospital.
In 1997, LRCC developed Arkansas Heart Hospital, which specializes in cardiology services and competes with Baptist Health. Prior to developing Arkansas Heart, the LRCC cardiologists were on staff at Baptist Health, and participated in Blue Cross’s FirstSource network. Shortly after LRCC opened Arkansas Heart, Blue Cross terminated its network provider agreements with LRCC and LRCC’s doctors. LRCC alleges that Baptist Health effected this termination “in concert and in combination with ... Baptist Health to restrain and monopolize trade unlawfully, specifically, to protect Baptist Health from competition in the relevant market.” In 2003, Baptist Health adopted an “Economic Credentialing Policy,” which prohibited any doctor from maintaining staff privileges at any Baptist Health facility if that doctor directly or indirectly held an interest in a competing hospital. Recently, an Arkansas state circuit court permanently enjoined enforcement of this policy.
LRCC initially filed this suit against Baptist Health in Novembеr 2006, alleging that Baptist Health conspired with Blue Cross to restrain trade in, and monopolize the market for, cardiology services for privately insured patients by: (1) forming a jointly owned HMO, HMO Partners, Inc., with Blue Cross; (2) agreeing with Blue Cross that Baptist Health would be the HMO’s exclusive in-network facility; and (3) agreeing with Blue Cross that Blue Cross would remove LRCC from Blue Cross’s FirstSource network. A month later, LRCC amended its complaint to add as plaintiffs a number of individual cardiologists and each of their individual professional associations through which they and LRCC provide cardiology services. Baptist Health then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion.
In December 2007, LRCC filed a second amended complaint, adding Blue Cross as a defendant, as well as Blue Cross’s and Baptist Health’s individually owned subsid
*595
iaries and their jointly owned subsidiary.
3
All defendants then moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion on the grounds that, among other things, LRCC’s complaint failed to allege a proper relevant market. In doing so, the district court noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
In March 2008, LRCC filed a third amended complaint, the complaint at issue in this appeal, alleging six antitrust claims against Baptist Health. 4 Count I alleges, under § 1 of the Sherman Act, that Baptist Health and Blue Cross unlawfully conspired to restrain trade in the market for services to cardiology patients. The remaining counts allege violations of § 2 of the Sherman Aсt. Counts II and III allege that Baptist Health conspired with Blue Cross to monopolize, and attempted to monopolize, the market for cardiology procedures. Count IV alleges that Baptist Health monopolized the market for cardiology procedures. Counts V and VI allege that Baptist Health conspired with Blue Cross to monopolize, and aided in Blue Cross’s attempt to monopolize, the market for private health insurance.
The district court granted Baptist Health’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that the alleged relevant market for Counts I-IV wаs legally flawed and therefore Counts I-IV did not state a plausible antitrust claim. As to Counts V and VI, the district court dismissed LRCC’s claims against Baptist Health as barred by the statute of limitations because LRCC failed to allege an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy or attempt to monopolize the private insurance market within the four-year limitations period. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b.
After the district court dismissed LRCC’s complaint, Baptist Health filed a bill of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), seeking discovery-related costs for transcription, in-house copying of documents, scanning documents produced in discovery, and reproduction of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”). The district court declined to tax those costs against LRCC.
On appeal, we address two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in dismissing Counts I-IV; and (2) whether the district court erred in declining to tax Baptist Health’s discovery-related costs. Because LRCC does not raise on appeal the district court’s dismissal, on limitations grounds, of Counts V and VI, we do not address it here.
See United States v. Azure,
II. Antitrust Claims
On appeal, we review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
*596
under Federal Rule of Civil Prоcedure 12(b)(6), “accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Express Scripts, Inc. v. Aegon Direct Mktg. Servs., Inc.,
The four counts at issue on appeal raise federal antitrust claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Under that Act, it is unlawful to contract or form a conspiracy “in restraint of trade or сommerce among the several States,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, or to “monopolize or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,” 15 U.S.C. § 2. The parties agree that LRCC has not alleged a per se violation. LRCC therefore has the burden of alleging a relevant market in order to state a plausible antitrust claim.
Double D. Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc.,
A. Product Market
A court’s determination of the limits of a relevant product market requires inquiry into the choices available to consumers.
Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
The parties extensively brief the issue of what LRCC alleges to be the relevant product market. The complaint first states, “The relevant product is those medical services that cardiology patients receive exclusively in a hospital from a cardiologist.” It also states, however, thаt “cardiology services and hospital services are not distinct products for the purposes of antitrust analysis.” Finally, it states that the relevant product market is “the market for cardiology procedures obtained in hospitals by patients covered by private insurance.” Thus, it is unclear whether LRCC is alleging a market in which there is a single, conjoined service — cardiology services obtained in hospitals' — or a market in which there are two distinct and complementary services — hospital services and cardiology services. One issue on which thе parties agree, however, is that the product market LRCC alleges is limited to patients covered by private insurance. We base our affirmance of the dis *597 triet court’s product-market holding on this undisputed limitation.
LRCC proposes a market limited by how consumers pay for cardiology procedures. This theory lacks support in both logic and law. As stated above, the general issue when determining the relevant product market concerns the choices available to consumers.
Craftsmen Limousine,
LRCC argues that the product market should be limited to patients using private insurance because private insurance and government insurance — the other primary method of payment — are not reasonably interchangeable. The trouble with this theory is that it analyzes the issue from the wrong side of the transaction. It may be true that, from thе patient’s perspective, private insurance and Medicare/Medicaid are not reasonably interchangeable. For a variety of reasons, including age and financial considerations, a person with private insurance may not qualify for these government programs. But this lawsuit is not about the options available to patients, it is about the options available to shut-out cardiologists. LRCC’s claims boil down to the allegation that, due to Baptist Health’s allegedly unlawful actions, LRCC has access to fewer patients. The relevant questiоn, then, is to whom might the cardiologists at LRCC potentially provide medical service? LRCC’s complaint provides the answer: LRCC can provide service to “patients ... from either a government program such as Medicare or Medicaid, or from a private insurer.” (emphasis added). Patients able to pay their medical bill, regardless of the method of payment, are reasonably interchangeable from the cardiologist’s perspective — the correct perspective from which to analyze the issue in this case.
In reaching this conclusion wе do not, as LRCC argues, disregard the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. LRCC has made no allegation that private insurance is the only method of payment it can accept. Quite the opposite, LRCC’s complaint states both that it can and that it does accept payment from sources other than private insurers. Our conclusion does not challenge LRCC’s factual allegations, but rather its legal theory, to which we owe no deference.
Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp.,
We conclude that, as a matter of law, in an antitrust claim brought by a seller, a product market cannot be limited to a single method of payment when there are other methods of payment that are acceptable to the seller. We also analyze LRCC’s alleged relevant geographic market as an alternative ground on which to affirm the district court’s dismissal.
B. Geographic Market
LRCC’s failure to allege a coherent relevant geographic market provides an adequate and independent means of affirming the district court’s dismissal. Properly defined, a geographic market is a geograрhic area “in which the seller operates, and to which ... purchaser^] can practicably turn for supplies.”
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
LRCC’s complaint alleges that Baptist Health operates and competes in an area well beyond the city of Little Rock. The complaint alleges that Baptist Health serves “a large percentage of residents from around the state who need cardiology services in hospitals.” More specifically, the complaint alleges that, in addition to Little Rock, Baptist Health operates in Hot Springs, Pine Bluff, Conway, Searcy, and El Dorado. Despite these allegations detailing the apparently broad reach of Baptist Health’s cardiology services, LRCC’s complaint seeks to limit the relevant geographic market to “the cities of Little Rock and North Little Rock.” The geographic market is defined as such, LRCC contends, because cardiology patients in Little Rock and patients from hospitals in surrounding areas “overwhelmingly” go to Little Rock for cardiology procedures.
5
The reason for this mi
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gration to Little Rock, LRCC alleges, is that the cardiology procedures are “not practicably available in hospitals in surrounding cities.” In short, LRCC’s argument is that Little Roсk is the relevant geographic market because it is the location to which would-be cardiology patients must travel. Accepting the allegations as true and reading them in the light most favorable to LRCC, as we must,
Express Scripts,
This case presents an unusual question. Our cases typically have addressed disputes raising the issue of where a consumer can practicably turn in the event of a defendant’s anticompetitive price increase — the second prong in our two-prong geographic-market analysis.
See, e.g., Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp.,
Adopting LRCC’s theory of a geographic market has the potential to create problems in antitrust cases where the product or service at issue requires the consumer to travel to a specified location. It would, as the district court stated, allow antitrust plaintiffs to “define a market by identifying a small area around the defendant’s location in which nearly all potential customers patronize the defendant.” Using LRCC’s logic, we could delineate the relevant geographic market as the square mile surrounding a hospital, the block on which a hospital sits, or even a hospital building where the relevant procedure takes place. Surely a sufficiently large percentage of people in this area use the hospital’s services. These “geographic markets,” however, are obviously too narrow.
LRCC next argues that relevant case law does not permit us to hold that a single city is not a relevant market. This argument is problematic for two reasons. First, although we find that the geogrаphic market in this case is implausibly narrow, our opinion should not be read to reject the notion that a city by itself could, in a different case, be a relevant geographic market. The boundaries of a relevant market will turn on the factual allegations presented in any given case.
Tenet,
Second, the cases from the Seventh Circuit, which LRCC cites in support of its position, are not contrary to our ruling in this case. The first case,
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,
The second ease on which LRCC relies,
Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C.,
Moreover, we do not mean to endorse the idea that a firm’s trade area is equivalent to a relevant geographic market. There is voluminous case law cautioning against such a holding.
See, e.g., Bathke,
We are well aware of our court’s reluctance to dismiss antitrust complaints before the parties have had an opportunity to fully conduct discovery. Huelsman v. Civic Ctr. Corp., 873 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1989) (stating that a “dismissal ... on the pleadings should be ‘granted sparingly and with caution.’ ”) (citation omitted). However, more discovery in this case could not cure the defects in LRCC’s legal theory as to either the relevant product or geographic market. Without a showing as to the proper relevant market, LRCC cannot establish the necessary predicate for their antitrust claims. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of LRCC’s antitrust claims.
III. Costs Claim 7
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives district courts the power to tax costs in favor of a prevailing party. These awards, however, must fit within 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which enumerates the costs that a district court may tax.
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons,
Inc.,
The threshold issue herе is whether the district court erred in declining to tax discovery-related copying expenses. It is unclear whether the district court ruled as a matter of law or as a matter of its discretion. We believe, however, that it is fair to read the opinion as an exercise of the district court’s discretion. Therefore, we confine our holding to the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its *602 discretion. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, Baptist Health does not cite, nor are we aware of, any decision that
requires
a district court to tax discovery-related expenses. We note that there are cases suggesting that a district court may tax costs for discovery-related copying.
See, e.g., Slagenweit v. Slagenweit,
Second, numerous district courts within the Eighth Circuit have refused to tax discovery-related copying costs.
See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Am. Univ.,
No. CIV. 06-5075-KES,
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court on both the antitrust and costs claims.
Notes
. The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
. Prior to oral argument, LRCC and Blue Cross settled their dispute. Blue Cross is no longer a party to this appeal.
. For the purpose of this opinion, we refer to the parties as "Baptist Health" or “Blue Cross.” The identities of the subsidiaries are not material to our decision.
. We note that the third amended complaint contains two additional counts, Counts VII and VIII. Count VII alleges that Blue Cross monopolized the insurance market. It does not name Baptist Heаlth, and is not a subject of this appeal. Count VIII seeks injunctive relief, which the district court rejected as barred by laches. LRCC waived any review of this holding by not raising the issue in its appellate brief.
Ballard v. Heineman,
. LRCC's complaint alleges that "99.5% of privately insured cardiology patients from the area code with zip codes beginning with the three digits 722, which is Little Rock proper, use hospitals within Little Rock.” Further, "[o]f the privately insured cardiology patients *599 who reside in Little Rock and its surrounding areas, which are covered by zip codеs that begin with 722 and 721, 84.7% use hospitals in Little Rock. The remaining 15.3% of cardiology patients in these zip codes use hospitals in North Little Rock and Conway.”
. In addition, LRCC cites a series of district court cases in support of their relevant geographic market.
See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
. On July 16, 2009, LRCC submitted to us, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(j), a letter indicating that Baptist Health should be judicially estopped from seeking discovery-related copying costs because it had previously argued that such costs are not taxable.
See Platte River Ins. Co. v. Baptist Health, et al,
No. 4:07cv0036 SWW,