146 Ky. 345 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1912
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
Claiborne Lisle died a resident of Clark County on the 18th of January, 1910. .He left surviving Mm five children, Minerva Hodgkin, Thomas Lisle, D. C. Lisle, Zipporah Oliver and J. D. Lisle. Three of his children, to-wit, Marcus Lisle, Lon Ann Eubank and Nancy Duck-worth, had theretofore died leaving children. Marcus left one son, E. C. Lisle. Lou Ann Eubank left five children, Rosa Tracy, Minerva Eads, Kate Hisle, Walter Eubank and Charles Eubank. And Nancy Duckworth left surviving her four children, Esther L. Couchman, Ben K. Duckworth, Ernest Duckworth and John Duckworth. John died, leaving no children.
Following the death of Cláiborne Lisle there was filed in the Clark. County Court certain papers, purporting to be his last will and testament. These papers were admitted to probate as such. Thereafter the three children of Nancy Duckworth, to wit, Ben K. Duckworth,
The subject matter of this litigation is two papers executed by Claiborne Lisle on the 20th of December, 1909, as follows:
“I, Claiborne Lisle, of Clark County, Kentucky, being of sound mind and disposing memory, do make and publish this my last will and testament.
“ITEM FIRST. I desire to be buried decently and without ostentation.
“ITEM SECOND. I desire all my just debts paid.
“ITEM THIRD. I have by deed conveyed all of my real estate to those of my children whom I wish to have it, saving and excepting my lot in the Winchester Cemetery, which I leave to all of my children and their de-scenderás jointly, with the right to be buried therein, should any of them so desire.
“ITEM FOURTH. I desire a suitable stone to be placed at my grave, and that there shall be inscribed upon it the following epitaph: ‘What conscience dictates to be done, or warns me not to do, is more than Hell to shun or Heaven pursue.’
“ITEM FIFTH. I give to each of the living children of my son, James D. Lisle, excepting his son, Jesse, the sum of one thousand dollars, and to said Jesse Lisle I give the sum of five hundred dollars. I make this bequest to my grandchildren instead of my son, because he has a mania for speculation and would squander it.
“ITEM SIXTH. I give to each of the five children of my deceased daughter, Lou Ann Eubank, the sum of five hundred dollars.
“ITEM SEVENTH. I give to each of the three living*348 children of my deceased daughter, Nancy C. Duckworth, the snm of five hundred dollars.
“ITEM EIGHTH. I give to my grandson, E. C. Lisle, the snm of one dollar. I do this for the reason that I have advanced to his father, Marcns C. Lisle, more than has been received by any of my children, and far more than his full share of my estate, and for the further reason that he now has all the money he can expend judiciously.
“ITEM NINTH. I give to my daughter, Minerva Llodgkin, my ten shares of stock in the Winchester Building & Loan Association, and direct that all dues thereon shall be paid out of my estate by my executors until said stock is fully matured, the same to be paid over to her and to be hers absolutely. This special bequest is made in recognition of her constant care and attention to me in my illness.
“ITEM TENTH. I give to my daughter, Zipporah Oliver, twelve shares of stock in the Winchester Bank of Winchester, Kentucky, for and during her natural life, she to have all the dividends declared and profits thereon that may be divided during her life, and at her death said stock with all undivided profits to go to her son, Charles Oliver, and his heirs at law.
“ITEM ELEVENTH. I give to my son, Thomas Lisle, twenty-one shares of stock in the Winchester Bank of Winchester, Kentucky, the same to be liable for contribution, as hereinafter provided. ■
“ITEM TWELFTH. I give to my daughter, Minerva Hodgkin, twenty-one shares of stock in the Winchester Bank of Winchester, Kentucky, subject to contribution as hereinafter provided.
“ITEM THIRTEENTH. I give to the five children of my son, D. C. Lisle, twenty-one shares of stock in Winchester Bank of Winchester, Kentucky, subject to contribution as hereinafter provided.
“ITEM FOURTEENTH. I own fourteen shares of stock in the White City Bank, Kansas, and two and one-half shares of stock in the Louisville National Banking Company. This, I desire, shall be sold by my executors, either publicly or privately, as they may deem best, to provide for the payment of the cash legacies given by the preceding items of this will, and after payment of the cash legacies from the sale of said bank stock and the proceeds derived from my notes and choses in action, the said residue shall be divided into three equal shares, and*349 I give one share thereof to my son, Thomas Lisle, another to my daughter, Minerva Hodgkin, and the other eqnal share to the living children of my son, D. 0. Lisle, provided, however, that if my estate he insufficient to pay off the legacies given to my other children, the hank stock given in the last three preceding items to my said son, Thomas Lisle, and my daughter, Minerva Hodgkin, and L>. C. Lisle’s children shall be charged with a sum sufficient to make up said deficiency to be paid hack by them to my estate, in equal proportion.
“ITEM FIFTEENTH. I appoint my son, Thomas Lisle, and my grandson, H. Clay Hodgkin, executors of this my last will and testament, and request them to strictly carry out all of its provisions. And I hereby request the Clark County Court that no surety he required of them on their bonds as such executors.
“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name this 20th day of December, 1909.
“Claiboene Lisle.
“Subscribed by Claiborne Lisle in our presence, and by each of us at his request and in the presence of each other, this 20th day of December, 1909.
“D. A. Thomson,
“J. B. Eubank.”
“I make this codicil to my foregoing will, dated De-cumber 20 1909
“ITEM SIXTEENTH. If any legatee or legatees named in my said will shall seek to set it aside, directly or indirectly, by resisting the probate thereof or by appeal from the order of court admitting same to probate, or shall in any wise encourage, aid, assist or countenance such proceeding on the part of another, then the portion given to such legatee or legatees so offending shall pass under item fourteen of my will to the persons named therein as residuary legatees.
‘ ‘ Claiborne Lisle.
“Subscribed by Claiborne Lisle in our presence, and by each of us at his request in his presence and in the presence of each other.
‘ ‘ This 20th day of December, 1909.
“D. A. Thomson,
“J. B. Eubank.”
At the date of their execution the testator lacked but a few months of being ninety years old. He had been sick since the latter part of October, preceding; óonfined to his bed with pneumonia from the 15th day of Novem-
When this will was written his oldest son, J. D. Lisle, was confined in an asylum, a hopeless lunatic and a helpless paralytic. He did not long survive his father. His children and the children of kfrs. Eubank refused to join in the prosecution of this appeal. It is shown in the record that E. C. Lisle, son of Marcus, inherited from his mother a considerable estate; that the children of Mrs. Eubank are poor, as are the children of Mrs. Duckworth. What little property they inherited from their fathers was, in the main, expended during their minority in an effort to acquire an education. M]rs. J. D. Lisle owns a good farm of some two hundred acres or more. It is not shown what property Minerva Hodgkins, Zipporah Oliver, Thomas Lisle, or D. C. Lisle owned, other than that which they acquired from their father.
When the case was called for trial the propounders moved the court to require the contestants to file in writing a statement of the grounds upon which they relied to have the will set aside. The court overruled this motion, and of that ruling the appellants now complain.
Proceedings upon appeal from an order of a county court, probating or rejecting a will, are controlled wholly
It is next urged tkat tke court erred in admitting certain incompetent evidence. Tke first of suck evidence complained of is a conversation alleged to kave taken place ketween Mrs. Couckman, one of tke contestants, and Tkomas Lisle, one of tke propounders. Tkis conversation took place some tkirteen years kefore tke date of tke execution of tke paper offered as a will. At tkat time ke was ker guardian and, according to ker testimony, ok-jected to ker visiting ker friends around tke neiglikor-kood. Some difference arose ketween tkem on account of tkis okjection, and ske alleges tkat, in a conversation growing out of tkis desire on ker part to visit ker friends and relatives more tkan ke was willing to kave ker do, ke said to ker, “If you don’t mind me and do wkat I tell you you will regret it some day. ’ ’ And I asked kim wky, and ke said, “On your grandfatker’s account, tkat is wky. ’ ’
Tkrougkout tke trial an effort was directed on tke part of contestants to skow tkat tke testator kad keen prejudiced against tkem ky some one for tke purpose of preventing tkem from skaring in kis estate. It was skown tkat Tkomas Lisle did not entertain a kindly feeling toward Mrs. Couckman, and tkis tkreat of kis, communicated to ker, it is true, some tkirteen years or more kefore tke draft of tke will, was offered in connection witk otlier evidence for tke purpose of skowing tkat ke kad succeeded in doing wkat ke tkreatened ker to do, to-wit, induce kis fatker to practically disinkerit ker. As kas been frequently keld in litigation of tkis ckarac-aeter, a broad latitude is allowed in tke introduction of
It is likewise urged that the court erred in permitting Mrs. Couchman to testify to a conversation between herself and her aunt, Mrs. Hodgkins, in which Mrs. Hodg-kins is alleged to have told her that her grandfather did not like them, referring to herself and her brothers, because her uncle Tom was always telling him something-against them, the exact language being, “I asked her why grandpa did not like us, and she said she thought it
It is likewise urged that the court erred in permitting Mrs. Couchman to detail in rebuttal a conversation which she had with Clay Hodgkins, in which he told her that, in closing out a business transaction which he and his brother had with her grandfather, her grandfather said to him that he and his brother ought to give him a suit of clothes; that he had no other except the one he had on, and no money to buy one with, and that when he made this statement he broke down and wept. Clay Hodgkins had been asked if he had made this statement. He denied making it in terms, although admitting that a conversation akin to the one set out and detailed by Mrs. Couchman had taken place. This was competent for two reasons. If the transaction occurred as stated by Mrs. Couchman, it evidenced a recognition on the part of Clay Hodgkins that his grandfather’s mentality was weakening, for he knew at the time that this statement was alleged to have been made to him that his grandfather was worth at least forty or fifty thousand dollars. It was likewise properly permitted to be introduced as affecting the credibility of the witness, Clay Hodgkins.
The only remaining evidence complained of is that in which the court permitted Mrs. Eosa Tracy to detail a conversation between herself and her grandfather, the
In determining the relevancy of this evidence, it must be viewed from the standpoint of the contestants. Its purpose was to show that Mrs. Hodgkins would not permit her niece to converse with the testator relative to matters of business, and we think this evidence, coupled with other evidence, tending to show that for some time Qust prior to the execution of the will none of these grandchildren, who were practically disinherited, were permitted to be alone with their grandfather, but there was always present with them in the room when they visited him either Mrs. Hodgkins or some member of her family, was competent; and, while slight, was nevertheless some evidence tending to illustrate or substantiate the charge that the testator, in the attempted disposition of his property, was dominated, influenced and controlled by those of his children to whom he attempted to give. it.
The instructions are criticised as being not applicable to the facts in this case; but they are practically such instructions as this court has many times approved as correct in cases where the grounds of contest relied upon were, as here, lack of capacity and undue influence.
It is urged that counsel for contestants were guilty of misconduct in their argument of the case to the jury. The language complained of can not be criticised. One statement, of which complaint is particularly made, is that counsel said to the jury that the instructions were merely dry bones, and that counsel had the right to put flesh and blood on them, so that the jury might know the whole law of the case; that counsel then said that it would be argued by counsel for propounders that there was no
Nor is the statement that the instructions were “dry bones” subject to the criticism which counsel for appeb lant would make of it. The instructions are abstract propositions of law, and when the facts of this case were applied to the instructions, the act of applying the facts as developed by the evidence to the law as given by the court might properly be likened unto the clothing of dry bones with flesh. The analogy may not have been altogether apt, but this effort on the part of counsel is not subject to criticism. There was no statement by counsel that the law of the case was other than that given by the court. The effort was merely to take the abstract propositions of law, as given by the court, and'the individual facts and circumstances, as detailed by the witnesses, and demonstrate to the jury that from them it could be shown that the papers under consideration were the product either of an unsound mind or of one unduly influenced in their execution, to the prejudice of the contestants.
This leaves for our consideration but two questions, first, did the court err in refusing to peremptorily instruct the jury to find for the propounders; and, second, if he did not err in this, did he err in refusing to set aside the verdict of the jury as being flagrantly against the evidence. Prom what has already been said in disposing of the objection to the admission of certain evidence, it is apparent that the court correctly refused to give the peremptory instruction.
Nor is any reason assigned in the evidence why E. C., son of Marcus Lisle, should have been disinherited, unless the statement that he had a comfortable estate of his own which he had inherited from his mother, he accepted as sufficient ground. There is evidence in the record showing that some one was evidently attempting to influence and prejudice the testator against him, for it is shown that upon one occasion, when testator met him and accused him of not attending school regularly, he stoutly denied the charge and demanded an investigation. When he had satisfied his grandfather that the statement was not true, his grandfather refused to state the source of his .information, on the ground that it would only cause trouble. Again, his grandfather accused him of being extravagant, and told him, in substance, that if he did not cease his extravagant ways he would disinherit him. All of the proof shows that this charge was not well founded, and that he was not in fact extravagant. His son, J. D. Lisle, had for many years been paralyzed, and a short time before the date upon which the will was written had been adjudged insane and sent to, and was at that time confined in, a lunatic asylum. This last step had been taken on his father’s, the testator’s, initiative, and yet the will recites that nothing is given to his son, James D., because he has a mania for speculation and he would squander it. These are the relations, as shown by the record, which existed at that time between himself, his children and grandchildren. ■The contestants state that, from their acquaintance- and association with the testator, they are of the opinion that .he was not competent to make a will when he undertook to do so.
They further insist that, in addition to this lack of capacity, he was unduly influenced by those, or at least some of those named in his will as his chief beneficiaries, to make disposition of his property in the way and manner in which he did. It is shown that .he made no conveyance of any of his real estate to his children until after he was more than eighty years of age. The first of these conveyances was to the wife and children of D. C. Lisle, in 1901, at which time he conveyed to them a part of eight-elevenths of two hundred and fifty acres; the balance he gave to them in 1906. The next conveyance was to his. daughter, Mrs. Oliver, in the fall of 1903, in
About the execution of this paper and the preparation for its draft there is such an air of mystery as would naturally leave the impression that it was all done and carried out according to a pre-arranged plan to meet a possible contest. It is difficult to understand why, if this was the product of the free and unbiased mind of the testator, and he was qualified at the .time to make a rational disposition of his property, he did not let his family know that he was making a will. He had theretofore given to these same people all of his land by deed, and all of these deeds had been put to record save Mrs. Hodgkins. No explanation is offered as to why either he or his lawyer should want to prevent Clay Hodgkins from knowing the contents of that paper which had been prepared by Mr. Winn and which was returned by him to his grandfather. It is in proof that Clay stood very near to him. He had
We have then, from the evidence, the following facts
Strong points in favor of the appellees, as developed by the evidence,, are found in .the, fact that the decedent and all of his grandchildren, whom he attempted to discriminate against in the disposition of his estate, were on. the very best of terms, and there is not an iota of evidence which would justify the conclusion that he cher: ished against them any of the ill-will he might have borne their mothers because of their marriage against his will and consent. One of them — a little girl — after her mother’s death, lived at the home of Mrs. Hodgkins and had charge of her grandfather’s room, and it is in testimony that he was fond of her; and yet she, like her brothers and sisters, is permitted to participate in his estate only to the extent of $500.00. He was, likewise, fond of the Duckworth children, for when they were living in "Winchester for the purpose of being near a school and at their own expense trying to get an education, it
It has frequently been held that gross inequality in the distribution of one’s estate among the natural objects of his bounty is not alone an evidence that testator was lacking in capacity, or was unduly influenced in the draft of his will. But it has with equal frequency been held that gross inequality, coupled with other evidence conducing to show that the testator was lacking in capacity, or was unduly influenced in the draft of his will, would justify setting it aside. Here we have a strong case, for we have not only the gross inequality, but also the evidence to the effect that Thomas Lisle was ever seeking to prejudice the testator against his grandchildren and the testator stating in his will a condition which is absolutely untrue, and which he, if in his right mind, must have known to be untrue, to-wit, that his poor, crippled, insane son would squander his estate if anything was left to him. In addition to this, we have the statement of his counsel, Mr. Winn, that he wanted to give his property where it would do the most good; and yet he withholds it from those in need of it and gives it to those well provided for, and as supplementing these facts, the jury was authorized to, and doubtless did, note the very peculiar circumstances under which the will was executed. The accidental gathering at the home of the testator on that fateful Sunday of those of his children who received the bulk of his estate, the fact that they were accidentally accompanied by their lawyer, the brother-in-law of one; the fact that the will was witnessed by the brother-in-law of Thomas Lisle and a friend of his who stood by him closer than a brother; the manner in which the draft of the will was returned from Mr. Winn to the testator, and the circumstances of its execution, all must have impressed the jury as indeed a strange proceeding, where a man was, according to his own free will, making a rational disposition of his property. And they were doubtless likewise impressed by the further fact that, had not Mr. Winn, by the veriest chance, happened to go to testator’s home on that day, no will would