204 Conn. 502 | Conn. | 1987
The plaintiff, administratrix of her husband’s estate, alleged in the first count of her complaint that the defendant had obtained a quitclaim deed of certain real property on Huntington Turnpike, Trumbull, from the decedent through undue influence. The plaintiff claimed in a second count that her deceased husband, Paul F. Liscio, had paid the purchase price for this property and she sought, therefore, the impression of a resulting and constructive trust.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the first count, which alleged undue influence, and the jury accordingly returned such a verdict.
The jury could reasonably have found that John Liscio and the defendant Dina Liscio were husband and wife and that the plaintiff’s decedent, Paul F. Liscio, was their son. The jury could further have found that the following events occurred in the sequence indicated:
September 13, 1947—Dina Liscio quitclaimed her interest in 1329 Huntington Turnpike to Kenneth J. Zarilli;
September 13,1947—Kenneth J. Zarilli quitclaimed his interest in 1329 Huntington Turnpike to John Liscio and Dina Liscio “and unto the survivor of them and unto such survivor’s heirs and assigns forever;”
November 4, 1968—John Liscio quitclaimed any interest he had in 1329 Huntington Turnpike to Arthur T. Fattibene;
November 4,1968—Arthur T. Fattibene quitclaimed any interest he had in 1329 Huntington Turnpike back to John Liscio;
November 4,1968—John Liscio executed his will in which he devised “all of my interest . . . in 1329 Huntington Turnpike” to his son, Paul F. Liscio;
1970—John Liscio died;
December 12, 1972—The Trumbull Probate Court issued a certificate of devise setting out from the estate of John Liscio a one half interest in 1329 Huntington Turnpike to Paul F. Liscio;
June 30,1980—Paul F. Liscio quitclaimed his interest in 1329 Huntington Turnpike to Dina Liscio;
August 2, 1980—Paul F. Liscio died.
In its charge to the jury, the court declared that John Liscio and Dina Liscio owned the Huntington Turnpike
While there is common law authority for the proposition that certain survivorship interests in real property are indestructible absent the voluntary act of both joint tenants,
Based on these statutes, it is evident that the 1968 quitclaim deed from John Liscio to Arthur T. Fattibene
The plaintiff further claims error in the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence Dina Liscio’s will. She claims that this refusal impacted adversely upon the jury’s consideration of both counts of the complaint. We note that this claim of error is the only claim relating to the second count. Since this claim involves an evidentiary ruling likely to recur at the new trial, we would ordinarily address such an issue. Examination of the record, however, discloses that the will was never produced at trial, was never offered in evidence, nor was any motion made to quash the subpoena duces
The plaintiff has further asserted claims concerning the court’s failure to give certain requested jury instructions. Again, these claims have not been fully developed and supported in her appellate brief and therefore we do not examine them. Practice Book § 4065; Petrizzo v. Commercial Contractors Corporation, supra.
There is error in part, the judgment is set aside as to the first count and the case is remanded for a new trial on that count. The judgment on the second count is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
In the course of its charge, the court stated: “I further charge you that because of the status of the title, the claims made in the first count of the complaint are without merit and I charge you, that if you so find this to be so, you should return a verdict for the defendant.”
The parties dispute whether this charge constitutes a direction of the verdict on the first count. The line between a direction of a verdict and an instruction to the jury is often difficult to draw. “When the jury is told that only one verdict is open, the instructions take the form of direction of a verdict.” E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure § 193 (e). Based on our examination of the court’s entire charge, we are satisfied that the jury was essentially instructed that only one verdict was open to them on the first count, and that the court therefore directed a verdict.
This is the transfer out of which the plaintiff claimed the resulting trust.
This is the deed which the court ruled a nullity.
This is the deed that the plaintiff claims was the product of undue influence.
See cases cited in E. Stephenson, “Survivorship Deeds Under the Statute,” 34 Conn. B.J. 15, 16 (1960).
The defendant-appellee argued in her brief and at oral argument that if General Statutes § 47-14a et seq. permit a joint tenant with a right of survivorship unilaterally to sever the survivorship, then those provisions are unconstitutional. We decline to address this issue, however, as the defendant failed to file a statement under Practice Book § 4013 presenting for review alternate grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed. We note that the record does contain a § 4013 statement, but the statement only requests a new trial, should error be found. While we have occasionally overlooked a failure to file a statement setting forth alternate grounds; see DiSesa v. Hickey, 160 Conn. 250, 262-63,278 A.2d 785 (1971); we are unable to do so in this case because the constitutional issues were not fully briefed and argued, and because the plaintiff would be likely to suffer prejudice.