Lisa Woodward; Peter Woodward, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Credit Service International Corporation; Richard Muske, Defendants - Appellees
No. 24-1373
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: October 22, 2024; Filed: March 24, 2025
Before LOKEN, SMITH, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
The Woodwards hired attorney Kevin Giebel who filed this lawsuit in state court, claiming that CSIC and Muske violated Minnesota garnishment laws and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
I. Procedural History
After the Woodwards’ employer received the garnishment summons, Giebel contacted CSIC attorney Muske and explained that the conciliation court judgment should be voided because the Woodwards did not receive service. Muske agreed to withdraw the garnishment summons and void the conciliation court judgment. Consistent with his practice, Giebel then filed this FDCPA action in state court, knowing that CSIC had committed an indefensible FDCPA violation in obtaining the default judgment and would likely seek a quick settlement to avoid litigation expense.
1. Judgment shall be entered in the total amount of . . . [$2,002.00] in favor of Plaintiffs Lisa and Peter Woodward, collectively, as against [CSIC] and Richard Muske . . . .
2. In addition, Plaintiffs Lisa and Peter Woodward‘s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with Plaintiffs Lisa and Peter Woodward‘s claims against Defendants [CSIC] and Richard Muske in the above-referenced suit are to be added to said judgment; said attorneys’ fees and costs as are agreed to between the parties, or if they are unable to agree, as determined by the Court upon motion and any responses thereto.
Following acceptance of the
Federal
Local Rule 7.1 governs Civil Motion Practice in the District of Minnesota. Local Rule 7.1(c) governs Dispositive Motions. As relevant here, it provides:
(c) Dispositive Motions. Unless the court orders otherwise, all dispositive motions must be heard by the district judge. Before filing a dispositive motion, a party must contact the district judge‘s courtroom deputy. The courtroom deputy will either schedule a hearing or instruct the party when to file its motion and supporting documents. . . .
(1) Moving Party; Supporting Documents; Time Limits. At least 42 days before the date of a hearing on a dispositive motion -- or, if no hearing has been scheduled, as instructed by the courtroom deputy -- the moving party must file and serve the following documents simultaneously:
(A) motion;
(B) notice of hearing;
(C) memorandum of law;
(D) any affidavits and exhibits;
(E) meet-and-confer statement, if required under LR 7.1(a) (unless later filing is permitted . . . ); and
(F) proposed order (an editable copy of which must be emailed to chambers).
* * * * *
(5) Motion Hearing or Other Resolution.
(A) On Court‘s Initiative. At any time after a party files a dispositive motion and the motion‘s supporting documents, the court may:
(i) schedule a hearing (if no hearing was initially scheduled)
(ii) reschedule a hearing
(iii) refer the motion to a magistrate judge; or
(iv) cancel a hearing and notify the parties that the motion will be otherwise resolved.
On May 13, 2023, attorney Giebel filed Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to “Minnesota Federal Rule of Procedure . . . 54(d)(2).” The Motion stated that the May 5 Judgment, Minnesota‘s garnishment statute, and the
Most importantly, the motion was filed without adequate factual support on which the Court could base a determination whether the fees incurred were reasonable. Although Plaintiffs’ motion references a supporting declaration and exhibits concerning the estimated $28,000 in attorney‘s fees claimed, neither a declaratiоn nor any documentary evidence has been submitted. Similarly, although Plaintiffs state that their motion is based upon their memorandum of law, none was filed in support of the motion. . . . Because denial of the motion is without prejudice, Plaintiffs may refile their motion and should do so promptly. . . . [T]hey shall simultaneously file their motion, meet-and-confer statement, memorandum of law, any supporting affidavits and exhibits, and a proposed order. However, a notice of hearing need not be filed. . . . The Court will decide the motion based on the written submissions alone, unless the Court determines that a hearing is necessary . . . .
On May 25, Giebel refiled Plaintiffs’ Motion, supported by declarations of Giebel and Lisa Woodward and a memorandum of law. Defendants responded on June 8. On June 9, Giebel sent a letter to the district court “to correct the record.” “When I called the Court on May 9, 2023 to secure a motion date, one was not available. . . . A hearing date on Petitioner‘s motion was to be provided at a later date. In the meantime, I was properly instructed to . . . filе the Motion so as to be timely, and proceed with the Notice of Hearing, briefing and other filings once the hearing date was scheduled. I did exactly that.” The court responded to this letter in an Order dated June 12, 2023:
To the extent Plaintiffs seek leave to file a reply concerning communications with the Court‘s staff or to establish a record on the reasons why Plaintiffs filed the initial motion in the manner that they did, that request is denied. The Court will not deny any portion of a fee award based on the way that the initial filing was made and will disregard any suggestion in the Defendants’ opposition that the manner of the initial filing should discount the recoverable fees in this matter. Neither Plaintiffs, Defendants, nor the Court should spend any more time concerned with those issues.
(Emphasis added). Despite this clear and very sensible directive, counsel for both parties have belabored this issue on appeal. For this reason, the court directs that each side will bear its own appeal costs. See
In its January 22, 2024 Order, the district court granted in part and denied in part Giebel‘s motion, awarding him $12,075.00 in attorney‘s fees. The court properly used the “lodestar method” to begin its determination of a reasonable fee, multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. The court concluded that $350 represented a reasonable hourly rate for what it considered a straightforward case, rather than the $450 hourly rate Giebel requested, and that only 34.5 out of the 72.4 hours Giebel claimed were reasonably expended.
Giebel then requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration of the court‘s January 22 Order, arguing the court made several legal and factual errors. The district court denied the letter request in a February 14, 2024 Order, explaining the letter “does not explicitly address the standard for obtaining permission to file a motion for reconsideration,” “identifies no manifest errors of law or fact justifying granting permission to file,” and “seeks to reargue matters the Court has already considered and presents primarily a disagreement with the Court‘s ruling.” The court noted that the letter “did identify аn opinion regarding prevailing market rates,” but “the highlighted opinion does not change the calculus that led the Court to conclude
II. Discussion
A. The May 24 Order. Giebel argues the district court erred when it denied Plaintiffs’ initial motion for attorney‘s fees without prejudice because the filings “fully complied with Minnesota District Local Rule 7(c), and all required rules and court procedures when making those filings . . . as separately instructed by the Court Deputy.” Arguing that this “clear error of fаct and law . . . undoubtedly questions and impugns the competency and reputation of Counsel in a field where” he practices, Giebel urges us to “remand to make the appropriate correction or redaction” in the May 24, 2023 Order and in the reference to that Order in footnote 1 of the January 22, 2024 Order. We conclude this contention is without merit for multiple reasons.
First, the issue was not preserved for appeal. A notice of appeal must “designate the judgment -- or the appealable order -- from whiсh the appeal is taken.”
(4) The notice of appeal encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into the designated judgment or appealable order. It is not necessary to designate those orders in the notice of appеal.
(Emphasis added). The Advisory Committee notes explain that “the amendment does not attempt to codify the merger principle but instead leaves its details to case law.”
Generally, an appeal from a final judgment permits review of “earlier interlocutory orders [because they] merge into the judgment for appeal.” Beadle v. City of Omaha, 983 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Here, however, the May 24 Order was not an interlocutory order -- it directed Plaintiffs to file a proper motion for attorney‘s fees and costs under Local Rule 7.1 within the time limits of Federal
Our conclusion that the May 24 Order was not preserved for appeal under Federal
Second, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention that the district court made “clear error of fact and law.” The Advisory Committee Notes unambiguously state that motions filed under Local Rule 54.3 must comply with Local Rule 7.1. District of Minnesota precedents unambiguously state that the Dispositive Motions requirements of Local Rule 7.1(c) govern Local Rule 54.3 motions. Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) unambiguously states that “the moving party must file and serve [six other] documents simultaneously” with the motion, including a supporting declaration and exhibits and a memorandum of law. Because Giebel did not file those documents, the district court denied the initial motion without prejudice and gave Plaintiffs a second opportunity to file a timely attorney‘s fees
For Giebel to assert -- in his June 9 letter to the court, in his letter requesting permission to move for reconsideration, and again in his briefs on appeal -- that his initial filings “fully complied with Minnesota District Local Rule 7(c), and all required rules and court procedures” raises a strong inference he did not bother to read Local Rule 7.1(c)(1), or he thinks that court rules need not be followed.
On appeal, Giebel argues that Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) only applies when a hearing date has been obtained. Since no hearing date could be obtained before his initial filing was due, he “fully complied” with Local Rule 7.1(c). But Local Rule 7.1(c) expressly provides that the courtroom deputy will either schedule a hearing “or instruct the party when to file its motion and supporting documents,” and Rule 7.1(c)(1) provides, “if no hearing has been scheduled,” the moving party must file the motion and other required documents simultaneously “as instructed by the courtroom deputy.”2 Giebel‘s Reply Brief asserts he “followed Rule 7.1(c)” when he “phoned the District Court‘s Scheduling Clerk seeking tо secure a fee motion hearing date”
The district court‘s May 24 text Order denied Plaintiffs’ initial filing without prejudice for non-compliance with Local Rule 7.1(c)(1)‘s unambiguous requirements. There was no clear error of fact or law. “[A]pplication of local rules is a matter peculiarly within the district court‘s province” -- it is within the district court‘s broad discretion to “determine what departures from its rules may be overlooked.” Reyher v. Champion Int‘l Corp., 975 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).3
Third, if there was error, it was clearly harmless. As the May 24 Order directed, Plaintiffs prоmptly refiled their motion with supporting documents and the motion was then fully briefed and decided on the merits, with the initial filing incident having no effect on the district court‘s final ruling. As the court said in its June 12 Order, “[n]either Plaintiffs, Defendants, nor the Court should spend any more time concerned with those issues.” Attorney Giebel unwisely ignored that directive.
Fourth, the relief Giebel requests -- “remand to make the appropriate correction or redaction” to the district court opinions, rather than its rulings, is inappropriate and arguably beyond our authority as a federal appellate court. As Justice Scalia concisely observed, “[w]e sit, after all, not to correct errors in dicta; [t]his Court
B. The January 22 Order. Giebel argues the district court erred when it reduced Plaintiffs’ requested attorney‘s fee award. The court‘s analysis properly followed the well-established rule that “[t]he starting point for determining attorneys’ fees is the ‘lodestar,’ which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.” Beckler v. Rent Recovery Sols., LLC, 83 F.4th 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). Giebel contends the court erred in its determination of the number of hours reasonably expended and the reasonable hourly rate to apply to those hours. We review the court‘s award for abuse of discretion, according substantial deference to its determination that the requested fees were excessive. Id. at 694-95. “The essential goal in shifting fees is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (cleaned up).
1. Regarding the district court‘s determination “that a $350 hourly rate is reasonable in this matter,” Giebel argues the January 22 Order “erroneously contains” two “undisputedly false” findings of fact -- (a) that his two declarations did not offer into evidence “any specific opinion regarding the prevailing attorney fee market rate in the Twin Cities legal community for comperable [sic] services,” when the court admitted in its February 14 Order that Giebel‘s second declaration did so; and (b) that the fee petition did not “point to any affidavit from another local practitioner offering any opinion” as to the reasonableness of the requested $450 hourly rate, when Plaintiffs’ memoranda cited an unpublished 2023 District of Minnesota decision noting declarations by defendants’ counsel and his law partner that they charge clients up to $425 per hour in similar matters.
Acknowledging that determining an appropriate market rate for a lawyer‘s services is “inherently difficult,” a unanimous Supreme Court held in Blum v. Stenson that, “[t]o inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to producе satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the attorney‘s own affidavits -- that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (emphasis added).
When determining whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable, a district court may “rely on [its] own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates.” Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005). That is what the district court did here in rejecting Giebel‘s requested $450 hourly rate. “The Plaintiffs’ evidence submitted in support of the requested $450 rate,” the court concluded, “falls short of satisfying their burden.” “[T]he rates allegedly charged by defense counsel in similar FDCPA cases [though relevant] are not particularly persuasive” because “an opponent‘s fees can be an ‘apples-to-oranges comparison’ and require additional analysis” (citation omitted). In the case cited by Giebel, defense counsel and his partner charged a discounted $295 rate. The court further explained that Giebel‘s award of a $575 rate in a heavily litigated Fair Labor Standards Act case “sаys very little about why such a rate would be reasonable in this relatively simple FDCPA and supplemental state law garnishment case.” The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument this case was complex enough to justify a higher hourly rate. “To the contrary this case . . . was a run-of-the-mill dispute that was resolved quickly, and likely could have been resolved even sooner.” Giving “due consideration” to Giebel‘s long career as a practicing attorney and specifically his experience in collections litigation, “the Court finds thаt a $350 per hour rate is reasonable under the circumstances.”
According this finding the substantial deference to which it is entitled, we uphold the court‘s $350 hourly rate determination. Even if the district court was wrong to state that Giebel had not offered his opinion regarding the prevailing market rates, that opinion lacked specifics and did not meet his burden to produce satisfactory evidence -- in addition to his own declarations. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 895
2. We likewise see no reversible error in the district court‘s conclusion that only 34.5 out of the 72.4 hours Giebel spent on the matter were reasonably expended. Giebel first argues the court “erred as a matter of fact and law” when it deducted 24.2 hours Giebel spent working on the conciliation court matter because those fees were more accurately categorized as Plaintiffs’ damages, which were settled in the $2,002.00 Rule 68 Judgment. This contention is without merit. The
Giebel further argues the district court “erred as a matter of fact and law in finding that this case involved a bare minimum of litigation and was not particularly complex.” The court excluded “hours that [were] excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Beckler, 83 F.4th at 695, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “Hours that are not properly billed to one‘s client also are not properly billed to one‘s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quotation omitted). The district court thoroughly reviewed Defendants’ extensive objections to Plaintiffs’ attorney‘s fee claims, rejecting many but finding that 24.2 hours connected to the underlying collection matters in state court and 13.7 hours of
C. The February 14 Order. In Part IV of Appellants’ Reply Brief, Giebel argues for the first time on appeal that the district court “erred in denying Appellants’ logical request for permission of the court to formally move for reconsideration.” Though the February 14 Order was designated for appeal in Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal, it was not included in the Statement of the Issues presented for review in Appellants’ Brief, as Federal
In any event, the contention is without merit. “The district court‘s denial of a request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration . . . [is] reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” COMSAT Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 2001). As the district court noted, a motion for reconsideration serves the limited function “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Hagermаn v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). Under District of Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j), a court can only grant a party‘s motion for reconsideration when that party shows “compelling circumstances.” We agree with the district court‘s conclusion that Giebel‘s letter request “identifies no manifest errors of law or fact” and merely reargued matters the district court had already considered and rejected. Pointing out the court did not take into account one part of Giebel‘s declarations did not “change the calculus” that led the court to find that $350 was an appropriate hourly rate.
The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that “[a] request for attorney‘s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The district court‘s February 14 Order was entirely consistent with that directive.
III. Conclusion
Giebel‘s briefs on appeal are disrespectful of the district judge, court staff, and opposing counsel. If our review of the attorney‘s fee award was de novo, we might well further reduce it to $5,000, the financial benefit the Woodwards obtained from vacating the conciliаtion court default judgment and from the