*1
FURR v McLEOD
148079, 148087,
Docket
Argued
application
Nos.
and 149344.
on
May 5,
appeal
July
leave to
2015. Decided
2015.
Tyra
against Organ
Lisa
filed an
Agency
action
Procurement
Michigan (Organ Procurement);
Cohn, M.D.,
Steven
and William
(the
Hospital
defendants);
Beaumont
Dillip
Beaumont
Samara
Pungavan, M.D.; and
Court,
John Doe in the Oakland Circuit
alleging
malpractice
medical
complications
after she suffered
following kidney transplant. Tyra
sent a notice of intent to sue
(NOI) to defendants under MCL 600.2912b and filed her com-
plaint
days later,
waiting
days
rather than
required
the 182
600.2912b(l).
Pungavan
and Doe were dismissed from
Organ
the action.
Procurement and the Beaumont defendants
summary disposition,
moved for
claiming that the action should
prejudice
Tyra
be dismissed with
prematurely
because
had
filed
complaint
period
her
and
expired
the limitations
had
so it could
Tyra argued
not be refiled.
that defendants had waived the
notice-period affirmative
responsive plead-
defense because their
ings
put
had failed to
her on notice that
complied
she had not
requirement.
court,
Grant, J.,
granted
The
summary
Nanci J.
disposition
Organ
in favor of
Procurement and the Beaumont
defendants, concluding
provide
that their failure to
detailed facts
concerning the affirmative defense did not waive the notice-
prematurely
complaint
defense and the
filed
failed to toll
period,
of the limitations
expired
which had since
so
Tyra
notice-period
could
not cure the
refiling
error
complaint. Tyra appealed.
Appeals,
The Court of
Ronayne
Krause
(Wilder, P.J.,
dissenting), reversed,
JJ.
holding
Stephens,
that the trial court had discretion under MCL 600.2301 to allow
Tyra
to amend
complaint.
date
of her
(2013).
(Docket
Organ
148079)
Procurement
No.
and the Beau-
(Docket
148087)
mont defendants
sought
No.
both
leave to
appeal.
Supreme
The
argument
ordered and heard oral
on
grant
applications
whether to
peremptory
or take other
action. 497 Mich
brought
action
Susan and William Furr
medical
McLeod, M.D.,
against
Kalamazoo
Circuit Court
Michael
Manel,
others,
M.D.,
alleging
Tara B.
that Susan had suffered
damage during surgery. The Furrs
the healthcare
nerve
served
NOI,
providers
the end of
with an
but filed their
before
applicable
forth in
The Furr
set
MCL 600.2912b.
*2
summary disposition, contending that the
defendants moved for
by
running
statutory
of the
limitations
not been tolled
had
filing
premature complaint
the
and the action was now
Growney,
pursuant
barred. The
contended that
to Zwiers v
Furrs
(2009),
App
Mich
38
court could
286
the
invoke MCL 600.2301
premature
long
prejudice
ignore
filing,
doing
the
as
as
so did not
J.,
court,
right
party.
Lipsey,
The
a substantial
of a
Alexander
summary disposition.
denied the motion
The Furr defendants
sought
application
pending,
appeal.
leave to
the
was
the
While
Court,
Naini,
(2011),
Supreme
clarified
in Driver v
Under MCL the court in which action or any proceed- pending power process, pleading has to amend substance, proceeding, ing in the action or either form or for any justice, just, are at time furtherance of on such terms as therein, every stage judgment before is rendered and the court proceeding disregard any of the action or shall error or defect proceedings rights of the that does not affect the substantial parties; complaint MCL 600.2301 cannot be used to amend a but timely period expired filed limitations that was because the malpractice action when without the commencement of a medical expiration filed the before the of the MCL period. 600.2912b notice Granzotto, Granzotto), Mc- (by Mark PC Mark Associates, Counsman), for (by Keen & PC Richard T. and William Furr. Susan Cole, Seltzer, Neilson, PC C. (by & Garin
Lipson, Organ A. for Pro- Smyth) Thomas Ludden and Karen Agency Michigan. curement Opinion of the Court DeGrazia, Tamm, O’Connor, O’Connor, & PC (by O’Connor), for Julie McCann O’Connor and Richard M. Cohn, M.D., Beaumont Hospital. Steven and William C. Haughey Roegge (by Stephanie Smith Rice & Oleniczak) McLeod, and Paul M. Michael Hoffer M.D., M.D., Mancl, Michigan University Tara B. State Studies, Inc., Kalamazoo Center for Medical and Bor- Medical Center. gess
Amicus Curiae: *6 Coté, Hillock, (by & PC Kimberlee A.
Willingham Nelson, Michi- Stephenson), David and Michael W. gan Defense Trial Counsel.
MARKMAN, J. At issue here is whether Zwiers v
38;
(2009),
Growney,
App
286 Mich
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
A. TYRA
9, 2007,
On
plaintiff,
Tyra,
June
Lisa
received a
kidney transplant
at defendant William Beaumont
with a
Hospital,
kidney
made available
defendant
Procurement
Opinion
Couet
Organ
Agency Michigan (Organ
Pro-
curement).
allegedly
Plaintiff
suffered complications
kidney
match,
because the
did not constitute a proper
and she now asserts that defendants should have iden-
23, 2009,
tified this fact
the surgery.1
April
before
On
(NOI)
sent defendants a
plaintiff
timely notice of intent
13,
to file a medical
On
August
action.
2009,
NOI,
after
days
sending
plaintiff
filed her
.112
complaint against
defendants. When
filed her
complaint,
182-day
period
notice
set forth MCL
600.2912b(l)
yet expired,
13,
had not
and on January
2010, Organ
summary
Procurement moved for
dispo-
sition on the basis that
filed
plaintiffs complaint was
i.e., before the
of the
prematurely,
expiration
182-day
and the
had
period,
limitations
since
expired.2
Cohn,
The
and Dr. Steven
the trans-
hospital
19, 2010,
plant surgeon, joined the motion on March
May 20, 2010,
and on
the trial court granted the
that,
motion. The trial court
reasoned
under Burton
City
745;
Reed
Hosp Corp,
NW2d
(2005), the
filed
prematurely
complaint failed to toll
of limitations and
by refiling
could not cure the error
the complaint.
August
On
a divided Court of Appeals
the grant
summary disposition. Tyra,
reversed
208. The Court of
concluded
Appeals majority
*7
had not
and
Driver
overruled Zwiers
“on
basis
600.2301,
purpose
of both Zwiers and the
behind MCL
(a
Pungavan
nephrologist)
Dillip
Defendants
Samara
and John Doe
(believed
coordinator)
transplant
to be a
were dismissed from the case.
opinion
the “defendants” in Docket Nos.
General references
Cohn,
Procurement,
Organ
148079 and 148087 are to
Steven
Hospital.
William Beaumont
2 Assuming
plaintiffs complaint
did not toll the
expired
period,
undisputed
it is
that the
on Decem
limitations
8,
ber
2009.
the trial court to amend her com- allowing plaintiff possibility re- accordingly The Court . . Id. at 226. plaint . its [to] “the trial court exercise manded to allow amend- denying by granting discretion either Id. at to MCL 600.2301 and Zwiers.” pursuant ment that “Zwiers dissented on the basis Judge 227. WILDER subsequent Court’s Supreme was undermined (WILDER, P.J., . at 231 decision in Driver . . .” Id. dissenting). (in applications) sought two separate
Defendants
Court,
that the Court of
arguing
leave to
in this
appeal
that Zwiers remained
by concluding
erred
argument
Driver.
directed that oral
be
valid after
We
for leave to
applications
appeal
heard on defendants’
to address “whether Zwiers
parties
and instructed
(2009),
overruled
Growney,
286 Mich
Naini,
in Driver v
On October
McLeod, Mich
Furr v
affirmed
trial court.
panel
Judge
opinion,
his lead
In
App 801
WHITBECK
he
have reversed the
Tyra,
that but for
would
asserted
Zwiers.
that Driver overruled
trial court and held
convening
requested
therefore
Judge WHITBECK
M.
concur-
Judge
J.
panel.
a conflict-resolution
KELLY,
analysis,
but
Judge
ring, disagreed
WHITBECK’s
convened.
should be
panel
that a conflict
agreed
concurring
a separate opinion,
OWENS wrote
Judge
Tyra
result,
noting his own conclusion
but
was
correctly.
panel
A conflict-resolution
was decided
7.215(J)(5),
and,
to MCR
pursuant
convened
Furr,
vacated.
in Furr was
judgment
Court’s original
decision,
4-3
the Court
App
801.
court.
the trial
then affirmed
panel
conflict
was “not
majority
The
Furr,
Mich
677.
5 Even,
1, 2010,
April
it is
assuming
sent on
that the NOI had been
day prematurely.
least
undisputed
filed at
one
that the
plaintiffs complaint
Assuming
did
toll
limitations,
undisputed
of limitations
that the
it is
expired in October 2010.
[July-
Opinion of the Court
to hold that Driver overruled
prepared
Zwiers
Id. at
The
implication.”
dissenting judges
706.
would
have reversed the
on
trial court
the basis that Driver
*9
did overrule Zwiers.
J.,
Id.
706-707
(O’CONNELL,
J.,
id.
dissenting);
dissenting).
at 707
(METER,
sought
Defendants
appeal, arguing
leave to
that the
panel
by ruling
conflict
erred
that Driver did not
overrule Zwiers. This Court directed that oral argu-
ment be heard on defendants’ application and directed
the
to
parties
address “whether Zwiers v Growney, 286
(2009),
Mich
38
was overruled
this Court’s
(2011).”
Naini,
decision in Driver
239
Furr
(2014).
v McLeod,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo decisions on motions for
summary disposition. IBM v Treasury Dep’t, 496 Mich
(2014).
642, 647;
III. ANALYSIS A. BACKGROUND 600.2912b(l) MCL requires that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice give action the defendant written notice of the intent to file a claim before commencing medical malpractice action against defendant. After NOI, providing the the plaintiff must applicable wait period, notice usually days, before pass can file the medical mal- 600.2912b(l) practice action.7 MCL provides: pertinent period may The days be shortened even 91 under 600.2912b(3) (8). not circumstances relevant here. See MCL It is Tyba Organ Opinion the Court section, person provided in this
Except as otherwise malprac- alleging medical commence an action shall not facility against professional or health unless a health tice person professional or health given has the health less facility than notice under section written [Emphasis days is commenced. before the action added.] normally action, a claimant
“In a medical the time his claim accrues years has two from MCL Driver, 249, citing 490 Mich at a suit.” commence 600.5805(1) 600.5838a(2) However, and MCL running two-year 600.5856(c), the under MCL the notice during period. of limitations is tolled period 600.5856(a), of a addition, under of merit after required affidavit with the also tolls elapsed has provides, per- MCL 600.5856 limitations.8 part: tinent *10 any are in of repose or tolled
The statutes of limitations following the circumstances:
(a)
filed,
copy
complaint
if a
of the
the
is
At the time
complaint
served on the defendant
and
are
summons
supreme
the
court rules.
time
forth in
within the
set
complaints
plaintiffs
their
undisputed
in these two cases filed
that the
pertinent
periods.
expiration
notice
the
the
of
before
600.2912d(l)
malprac
plaintiff in medical
provides that the
MCL
In
complaint
merit..
..”
the
an affidavit of
file with
tice action “shall
(2000),
Pollak,
547, 549-550;
607 NW2d
Scarsella
that an affidavit
“[u]se
‘shall’ indicates
of the word
held that
imperative,”
mandatory
there
complaint
accompanying
is
the
required
of
complaint
the
affidavit
tendering
without
of
"the mere
fore
the com
and “because
commence the lawsuit”
is
to
merit
insufficient
to commence
plaint
was insufficient
an affidavit
without
(Quotation
action,
period
limitation.”
not
of
malpractice
it did
toll
omitted.)
marks and citation
Finally, general a statute of applicabil- ity, provides: any proceeding pending,
The court in which action or power any process, pleading has proceeding amend or proceeding, substance, such or action either in or form for justice, just, any on such terms as are furtherance of judgment time before every rendered therein. The court at stage proceeding or disregard any action shall error proceedings defect which do not affect the rights parties. substantial [Emphasis added.] Burton, 471 Mich at this Court held that “[a] filed before the expiration of the notice period violates MCL 600.2912b and is ineffective to toll the limitations period,” id. at because “the failure comply statutory requirement renders the complaint insufficient action,” commence the id. at 754, because MCL 600.2912b “unequivocally provides that a person ‘shall not’ an commence action alleging medical against a health professional or health facility until expiration statutory notice period,” id. at 752. Burton further held that “dismissal is an appropriate remedy noncompliance with the notice provisions MCL 600.2912b and that dismissed, when a case is must still comply with the applicable statute limitations.” Id. *11 Therefore, at 753. if the statute of limitations has already expired, the case must be dismissed with prejudice. 81 v Opinion the of 562-564; Ctr, 558,
In Mich Borgess Med Boodt (2008), held that “a this Court NW2d he or she files a an action before cannot commence re- intent that contains all the information notice of 600.2912b(4)],” and accordingly, under quired [MCL of and the affidavit merit “the the file the yet [because not authorized to information] not all could required NOI did contain the of limitations.” have tolled possibly 600.2301, allows Boodt further held that MCL which or proceed- “to amend any process, pleading court in the “disregard any to error defect ing” and actions and proceedings,” only applies “pending” deficient, no action the notice of intent was “because n . . .” Id. at 563 4. pending [was] . 156, 161; 772 NW2d Shabahang,
In Bush
(2009),
that,
held
under
the 2004
this Court
600.5856,
timely,
MCL
“if an NOI is
amendments of
is
defects contained
despite
statute of limitations
tolled
“may
further held that MCL 600.2301
therein.” Bush
at
cure
an NOI.” Id.
177.9
be
defects
employed
for amendment and
MCL 600.2301 “allows
Specifically,
the substantial
error or defect’ where
disregard
‘any
and the cure is
are not affected
rights
parties
“A
Id. at 161.
cure
justice.”
the furtherance of
good-faith
party
makes
justice
furtherance of
when
requirements
content
with the
attempt
comply
Id. at 185.
600.2912b].”
[MCL
Appeals,
Court of
Zwiers,
600.2301,
“[u]nder
held that
on Bush
MCL
relying
Boodt, Bush did not
Although
result than
reached different
Bush
explained by
addressed
the fact that while Bush
Boodt. This is
overrule
600.5856,
by 2004 PA
interpretation
amended
proper
as
it
interpretation
as
existed
proper
of the statute
Boodt involved
by
This Court denied the defendants’ appeal. Growney, cation for leave to Zwiers v 486 Mich justices Three would have reversed the Court for the reasons in stated the dissent- ing statement in Ctr, Ellout v Detroit Med (2010). Zwiers, 486 Mich (MARKMAN, J., at 1058 dissenting). Ellout involved the identical issue and was day on decided the same as Zwiers. The dissent in Ellout stated: inapplicable
Bush is here because it involved the intent, of a notice while this case involves the defective filing of a complaint period expired. before the notice MCL inapplicable only 600.2301 is also here it applies because actions, “pending” “pending” and there was no action timely complaint here because a had never been As filed. 600.2912b(l) Burton, recognized this Court in unam- 10Zwiers, “[a]lthough application 286 Mich stated that require summary Burton alone would us to affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs case, Burton, bar, opposed the Court as case at presented argument 600.2301,” “[g]iven not with an under MCL that Burton did not address MCL 600.2301 and that Bush has shed new light statute,” on MCL 600.2301 and its on the “[w]e effect NOI cannot blindly follow if Burton MCL 600.2301 and Bush demand a different did, outcome.” Zwiers then concluded that MCL 600.2301 and Bush fact, demand a different outcome. Opinion of the Court
biguously person “shall not commence an states expired. plain- the notice has Because action” until she tiff was authorized to commence this action when not and, commenced, complaint, no has filed the action been thus, explained pending action. As there is no (2008), Ctr, Borgess Boodt Med if a complies to file a of intent that fails statutory requirements, autho- complaint. rized to file a
Furthermore, allowing plaintiff to file *13 period expired affect before the notice has would defen- rights deprive it them of dants’ substantial because would days clearly notice that the statute the or 182 of entitles them to. overruled, and, thus, Boodt not been
Burton and have law; clearly of not good are still and the Court did Therefore, I would reverse the follow Burton and Boodt. (Markman, J., [.Ellout, Appeals. Mich at 1059 Court of added).] (emphasis dissenting) 243, we that “a Driver, plaintiff 490 Mich at held an NOI to add original not to amend is entitled the amended NOI relates defendants so that nonparty tolling of original filing purposes to the back “[t]he of . . . .”Driver explained statute limitations all an fails to meet majority Bush held that when NOI 600.2912b(4), under MCL requirements the content of to allows amend NOI plaintiff MCL 600.2301 to failed make tolling unless the preserve 600.2912b(4).” to with MCL comply effort good-faith held that “the Accordingly, at 252-253. Driver Id. timely could yet NOI holding in Bush a defective apply does not simply of limitations toll statute never nonparty [the defendant] CCA here because Id. at 253. defective, NOI.” timely, albeit received a Burton, Driver ex- effect of Bush on Concerning the plained: Opinion of
Nothing holding our Bush altered in Burton. The central issue in Bush involved effect an had on NOI tolling comply when the NOI with content failed 600.2912b(4). requirements of MCL The issue in central comply Burton involved the effect the failure notice-waiting-period requirements with the had on toll- Indeed, ing. repeatedly emphasized the Bush Court 600.5856(c) compliance of is the focus MCL with the notice waiting set forth in MCL 600.2912b. In contrast to viability Burton, placing aspect doubt on the aligned holding Bush that a Burton’s must waiting comply with the notice to ensure the [Id. tolls statute limitations. at 257-258 (citations omitted).] also Driver held that “MCL 600.2301 inapplicable because there proceeding was no action or pending against “plaintiffs CCA” because the claim was al- ready NOI”; time-barred when he sent and “[a]n commenced,” action if pending is not it cannot be “[b]y plain its language, only applies 600.2301 actions proceedings that are Id. at pending.” omitted). (quotation marks and Finally, citation Driver noted that “amendment the original NOI to allow plaintiff to add CCA would be ‘for the furtherance ” justice’ and would affect CCA’s rights,’ ‘substantial *14 because it would CCA of “deprive statutory right its to timely NOI by followed the appropriate notice wait- ing period” and “CCA would also be its right denied a statute-of-limitations defense.” Id. at (quo- 254-255 omitted). tation marks and citations In Tyra, 302 Mich at 220-221, Court App Appeals reluctantly on this relied Court’s decision in Burton, held that “a medical com- plaint filed prior expiration to the of the MCL waiting 600.2912b does not commence the ac- tion and does not toll the of the limitations 600.5856(a).” period pursuant to MCL The majority Opinion of the Court recognized has not been overturned” and that “Burton recently “citing Supreme Burton, Court our strictly comply fails to reaffirmed that ‘when waiting period 600.2912b, under MCL with the notice complaint prematurely filed fails to com- his or her ” mence an action that tolls the statute of limitations.’ Tyra, MichApp quoting Driver, 490 Mich at at 256. relying Appeals opinion
However, on the ultimately distinguishing Driver, the Court Zwiers and may permitted Tyra plaintiff to amend held that the be Specifically, her under MCL 600.2301. “[i]n distinguishable Court held that Driver is because step from the initial Driver, the were barred filing proceedings intent, whereas ofthe the notice dispute of intent was here, there is no that the notice proper” used and that “MCL600.2301 cannot be while cloth,... create a out of whole no such boot- requisite strapping here, all the would occur where actually Tyra, 224. documents exist.” Relying 600.2301, the Court of Zwiers and MCL on Appeals court for it to “examine remanded to the trial good seeking party amendment lacked whether party opposing will amendment faith and whether the prejudice a lesser that cannot be remedied suffer Id. at 226. than dismissal.” sanction relying Burton and dissent, on The Court of “significantly believing that Zwiers was Driver and Supreme later decision Court’s undermined our “plaintiffs complaint cannot be Driver,” concludedthat Mich App Tyra, MCL600.2301.” resurrected under dissenting). The dissent ex (WILDER, P.J., at 230 plained: expired commencement without
[T]he limitations
plaintiffs com-
malpractice action because
a medical
*15
In 303 Mich App Court of originally held that although the Furr filed their complaint before the end of the 182-day notice period, they could amend their prematurely filed com- plaint. opinion, however, his lead Judge WHITBECK only reached that result because he concluded the Court was by Tyra. Judge bound WHITBECK asserted Tyra was wrongly decided and called for a conflict- 7.215(J). panel. resolution See MCR Specifically, Judge WHITBECK believed that Driver overruled Zwiers be- cause Driver held that “a plaintiff may only invoke MCL 600.2301 to correct a defective content require- ment the notice of intent.” Id. at 809 (opinion by J.). WHITBECK, decision,
In a split the conflict panel held that Driver did Furr, not overrule Zwiers. 680. It further held that Driver is distinguishable from Zwiers, Tyra, and Furr because in Driver the plaintiffs claim was already time-barred NOI, when he sent the Zwiers, “[i]n but Tyra, Furr, however, the NOIs were timely served on the defendants, so while actions had not been commenced because of the premature filing of complaints and no actions were therefore pending purposes 600.2301, of MCL proceedings had been commenced given timely NOIs and pro Opinion the Court “MCL 600.2301 therefore ceedings pending,” were ” ‘action or Id. at 694. pending proceeding.’ of a speaks *16 Driver cannot inter The conflict held that be panel amendments only to mean that content-based preted are under MCL 600.2301 because permitted any amend process, 600.2301 a court to “empowers ” [.]’ in form or substance ‘either pleading, proceeding (alteration origi in 699, Id. at MCL 600.2301 quoting nal). that were judges they The indicated dissenting in WHITBECK’s Judge for the reasons stated dissenting in dissenting opinion vacated in Furr and opinion (O’CONNELL,J., Judge dissenting). Id. at 706-707 Tyra. a although indicated that he was separately METER Zwiers, of the that decided he believed panel member (METER,J., at 707 that Driver overruled Zwiers.11 Id. dissenting).
B. AFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES
910,
parties
we asked the
Tyra,
In
497 Mich at
defenses
defendants’ affirmative
address “whether the
did not
state
they
specifically
defective because
were
held
Appeals
The Court of
for the defense.”
grounds
did not adequately
defendants
although
Tyra
of plain-
affirmative defense
for the
grounds
state
did
period,
with the
comply
tiffs failure to
remand,
granted
Zwiers,
the defendants’
the trial court
on
holding
Supreme Court
summary disposition,
motion for
Appeal’s
in Zwiers. The Court
the Court of
decision
overruled
engaged
analysis
this
“[t]he
held that
reversed the trial court and
presented in
applicable
situation
to the factual
Court in Zwiers is still
per
Growney,unpublished opinion
curiam
appeal.”
v
the instant
Zwiers
(Docket
312133), p
No.
3.
Appeals,
June
the Court of
issued
stated,
concurring opinion
“If not for
Judge
in which he
a
Riordan wrote
granting
decision,
order
the trial court’s
I would affirm
the Furr
J.,
summary disposition
defendants.” Id.
in favor of the
(Riordan,
currently
appeal
pending
application
concurring), p
for leave to
1. An
149815).
(Docket No.
in this Court in Zwiers
not matter because this Court held Auslander v
(2007),12
Chemick, 480 Mich
that a
fail-
comply
ure to
with the notice
remains available
irrespective
as a defense
of whether the defendant
adequately
grounds
stated the
for the defense. Al-
though
appealed
Tyra defendants
different
portion
Appeals’ opinion,
of the Court of
the Tyra
plaintiff
appeal
portion
opinion.
did not
Indeed, the Tyra
has not even filed a brief in
this Court. Because the
not
has
briefed
Tyra
issue,
it has been
abandoned.
McGraw,
People
(2009)
36;
131 n
if this Court were to Therefore, prevail this basis. a decision would not be able to on dants would, fact, holding result in an the defense that defendants waived than that rendered the Court more favorable to outcome Appeals. granting Although oral correct that our orders Justice Viviano parties argument applications to address whether on the directed sufficiently pleaded “[a]t oral their affirmative defenses defendants *18 may supple parties argument,” “[t]he file our orders also stated supple for the filed a . ...” And while counsel mental briefs Furr, supplemental file a brief in the same counsel did not mental brief Tyra except that Tyra. cases are identical The issues in these sufficieney-of-the-pleading-of-the-affirmative- additionally involves is, merit that the substantive issue. That while counsel believed defense 498 MICH Opinion of the Court
C. ZWIERSOVERRULED
Furr,
909-910,
Mich at
and
Tyra,
both
910,
directed the
to address
parties
Mich at
this Court
whether Zwiers was overruled
Driver. We hold
in this
Zwiers was so overruled. As discussed earlier
Zwiers,
held that Bush
opinion,
and MCL 600.2301 can be used to save a medical
never commenced
malpractice action
before
the statute
limitations
when the
expired
waiting
was filed before the
of the NOI
expiration
it
abundantly
because “Bush makes
clear that
MCL 600.2301
to the entire NOI
applicable
process
any
failures under the NOI
compliance
statute.”
added.) However, Driver,
Moreover, ignoring the defects these cases would justice” not be “for the furtherance of and would affect defendants’ MCL 600.2301. That rights.” “substantial is, 255, just Driver, as in 490 Mich at “[a]pplying in the present deprive case[s] [defen- 600.2301 would statutory right timely dants] [their] to a NOI fol- lowed the appropriate waiting period,” a they right [their] “would also be denied to statute-of- Therefore, if limitations defense.” even MCL 600.2301 ” omitted.) (Quotation rights.’ CCA’s‘substantial marks citations yet example This is smother of the inconsistencies between Zwiers and Driver. Tyea Organ Opinion of having applicable as here,
was it should not be viewed been satisfied.
Finally, plaintiffs argue under MCL 600.5856(a), which states that the statute of limita complaint “[a]t filed,” tions tolled the time the is running periods of the limitations in these cases was though complaints filed, tolled once were even complaints prematurely. However, were ar filed this gument repeatedly rejected by this has been Court. 552; First, Pollak, in Scarsella v (2000), complaint filed NW2d 711 we held that running not without an affidavit of merit does toll contrary period inter of the limitations pretation because Legislature’s clear state “would undo ment an filed with the affidavit merit ‘shall’be (Citation omitted.) complaint.” Burton, Later, complaint we held that a filed before the expiration not toll the of the notice does running period. Boodt, limitations And argument rejected 562-564, when we Mich at held filed after the of defec does toll the tive NOI explained: *21 Boodt, limitations. As the [P]laintiff failed file a notice of intent that satisfied 600.2912b(4)(e)], thus, and, plain- requirements [MCL yet complaint a and an not to file tiff was authorized filing complaint Therefore, of merit. affidavit yet not merit was and the affidavit of period possibly not have authorized to file could tolled of limitations. argue be over- that these decisions should
Plaintiffs
they are inconsistent with MCL
ruled because
“[a]
is
600.1901,
civil action
com-
which states
by filing
complaint
This
a
with the court.”
menced
concurring
specificargument
in a
state-
addressed
by
Opinion
Viviano, J.
ment
order
denying
plaintiffs
Court’s
mo-
Ctr,
rehearing
Borgess
tion for
in Boodt v
Med
Mich 1001
As was stated:
specific statutory provisions
[M]ore
control over more
general statutory provisions,
specific
thus
re-
and
600.2912b(l)]
quirements
regarding
[MCL
“commenc-
ing]
malpractice”
alleging
prevail
an action
medical
over
general requirements
regarding
of MCL 600.1901
commencing
[Boodt,
of civil actions.
rv. CONCLUSION reasons, For these we reverse Court of Appeals part both In Tyra, cases. we reinstate the trial granting court’s order defendants’ motion for summary Furr, disposition, and in we remand to the trial court entry for of an order granting defendants’ motion summary disposition. YOUNG, C.J., JJ., Kelly, Zahra, and concurred J. MARKMAN,
VIVIANO, J.
(concurring
part
dissenting in
forward,
Two
part).
steps
one
back. That is
I
step
how
*22
Agency
Tyra Organ
95
v
Procurement
by
Opinion Viviano, J.
today’s
Although it satisfacto-
would describe
decision.
appeals,
the first
in these
Court
rily resolves
issue
compelling
threshold
leaves unresolved
inexplicably
in
v
Procure-
plaintiff
Tyra Organ
issue raised
Mich:
held to
Agency
procedural
ment
if she
to be
of
More
requirements,
specifically,
so should defendants.
trial court
that defendants
plaintiff1 argued
affir-
notice-waiting-period
waived the MCL 600.2912b
plead
failed to
they
adequately
mative defense because
2.111(F)(3).
it
The
of
found
Appeals
under MCR
Court
it
in this
that
argument,
merit
but determined
Chernick,
(2007),
I. ISSUE ABANDONMENT her holds that “abandoned” majority The failed to argument affirmative defense because she decision and this appeal aspect Tyra, opinion “plaintiff’ are Lisa References Organ to the to “defendants” are references Cohn, Hospital. Michigan, and William Beaumont Steven Mich 68 Opinion by Viviano, J. *23 file failed to an answer to defendants’ for applications leave are appeal. true, to Both but irrelevant no to certainly reason for the Court take a on pass this issue.
First, plaintiffs failure to file a is a red cross-appeal herring. Having obtained a favorable in the decision Court Appeals, plaintiff required—under is not threat separate of “abandonment”—to file a application to press order an alternative for affirmance. ground Co, v Wayne 41; Middlebrooks n (1994) (“A NW2d 774 cross appeal necessary was not to ”). urge an ‘alternative for ground Contrary affirmance.’ majority’s to the implication, any decision holding that defendants waived the notice-waiting-period affirma- tive defense would not result in an outcome more plaintiff favorable to by than that rendered the Court of Both Appeals. would in a to holdings result remand trial court for further proceedings.
Second, plaintiffs failure to file written answer to defendants’ applications is irrelevant. Our orders this specifically stated, case “We direct the Clerk to schedule oral on argument whether to grant appli- cation or take other action. At oral argument, parties shall . . . address whether the [defendants’] affirmative defenses were they defective because did not specifically grounds state the for the Tyra defense.” v Organ Agency Mich, Procurement 856 NW2d (2014) (citation added). omitted; emphasis Plaintiff did exactly requested what was her by this Court: argument counsel attended oral on defen- dants’ applications and argued that defendants’ affir- mative defenses inadequate were and that Auslander incorrectly decided. It is a perversity of the “aban- donment” doctrine to avoid a preserved issue argued at the time and place directed Opinion Viviano, J. circumstances, has primed Court. these for us address the issue.2 sufficiently appellate pump ADEQUACY AFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES II. OF DEFENDANTS’ affirmative de- Plaintiff that defendants’ argues her on notice that she inadequate put fenses were re- notice-waiting-period failed to comply Michigan’s pleading of MCL 600.2912b. quirement 2.111. With respect is codified in MCR standard 2.111(F)(3) defenses, pro- affirmative MCR pleading constituting” facts that “a must state the party vides defense is ad- defense. An affirmative an affirmative 2.111(F)(3) reasonably as as it long under MCR equate the defense such of the nature of apprises *24 Hanon responsive position. the can take a plaintiff that (1980); Barber, 851, 856; 866 v 298 NW2d App 255; 83 Heathcott, NW2d Ewing defense must be an affirmative differently, Put the give plaintiff detail to in sufficient factual stated the defendant issues that fair notice of defensive litigation. will raise in the mind, and to turning standard in
With this case, defendant alleged affirmative defenses (OPA) Affir- of Michigan’s Organ No. 11 stated: mative Defense provisions comply with the notice 11. Plaintiff failed to 600.2912b; that Plaintiffs MSA 27A.2912b and of MCL says, plaintiff’s true, majority to failure if as the Even it were issue, ill-equipped response to address this has left us file a written applica granting simple defendants’ a enter an order there is solution: question. parties least then require briefs on this At to file tions majority. analogous See one on to the relied this case would be Co, Wayne Sys Mich 983 Wayne Employees Charter Co Retirement (2014) argument hearing (granting appeal oral on leave to after application), ante 89. cited Mich 68 Opinion by Viviano, J. barred; gives
action is thus Defendant notice that it will summary disposition. move for certainly This defense could have been more factu- ally precise.3 persuaded However, I am was that it specific enough satisfy pleading to standard of 2.111(F)(3). alleged MCR Affirmative No. 11 Defense comply provi- failed to with the “notice” Generally speaking, § sions of 2912b. there are two ways comply in which a can fail to with the timing requirements § notice or 2912b: content. specifically referring Here, it was clear that was OPA timing very because, defense, to in the next affirmative alleged deficiency. OPA a content Affirmative Defense alleged, failing 12No. “Plaintiff’sclaims are barred for provide adequate to information in her Notice ofIntent required by as MCL 600.2912b.” OPA’sAffirmative Defense No. when read in the context of the content-deficiency next, raised defense sufficient apprise plaintiff timing requirement § and, 2912b was not satisfied thus, was sufficient to permit plaintiff responsive position. take See (“The primary Hanon, 99 Mich at 856 function of give pleading the nature of the claim permit party opposite defense sufficient to to take responsive position.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). would, therefore, I hold that OPA’s affirma- 2.111(F)(3).4 adequate tive defense was under MCR In contrast to OPA’s defense, affirmative the affir- alleged mative defense Cohn, defendants Steven *25 3 instance, case, companion McLeod, For in the Furr v Furr alleged, days defendants serving “Plaintiffs failed to wait 182 after their of Notice Intent before of suit contravention MCL 600.2912b.” 4 coming opposite opining In to the conclusion and that the affirmative “pertained itself, period,” defense notice as distinct from the notice Tyra, 302 at Mich of Court overlooked OPA alleged separate pertaining affirmative defense to the notice itself. Tyea Organ 99 Opinion Viviano, J. M.D., Hospital (collectively, and Beaumont William defendants) Their inadequate. was plainly Beaumont 4 Affirmative Defense No. stated: necessary, 4. If assert all of the benefits Defendants Michigan’s Reform provisions set forth in tort Acts 1986, 1993, regarding caps, non-economic off- 1995 value, sets, present offsets collateral reduction to etc., any insurance, security, payments, such as social damage applicable by Michi- other reduction deemed gan Appellate interpretation Courts in of these statutes. In the Beaumont defendants alleging everything, Transue, nothing all. See Dacon v 441 alleged at four 315, 330; Together, NW2d tort reform acts cited the Beaumont defendants See PA statutory amended or added 90 sections. 78; PA PA 249; 161; 1995 PA 178. Global like this do not reasonable allegations provide her how, why, to what extent his or It does not indicate cause action is barred. 600.2912b—indeed, under MCL nature of the defense this, it is fails mention the statute all. Given it respon for a to take a virtually impossible as that set allegation to such a broad position sive reason, For in Affirmative Defense No. 4.5 this forth was affirmative defense the Beaumont defendants’ 2.111(F)(3) and be under MCR should inadequate deemed waived. argue
The
defendants
Beaumont
court’s
grant
affirm the trial
should nevertheless
because,
favor
under our
disposition
their
summary
to raise
Auslander,
they
obligated
decision in
were
fact,
argument
their
at oral
whether
affirmative
when asked
notice,
put plaintiff
Beau
on
counsel for the
defense was sufficient to
conceded, “no, it
not.”
mont defendants
*26
III.
VALIDITYOFAUSLANDER
malprac-
In Auslander, this Court held that medical
obligation plead
tice defendants have no
affirmative
response
defenses
comply
to a
that failed to
statutory
prerequisites.
Our decision con-
adopting
unpublished
sisted
Court of
dissenting opinion,
part:
which stated in relevant
“I
required
conclude that defendants
never
were
to raise
plead
or
their asserted defenses in the first instance
because this medical
action
never
properly
unpub-
commenced.”
Chernick,
Auslander v
opinion per
Appeals,
lished
curiam of the Court of
(Docket
274079)
May 1,
issued
No.
(JANSEN, J.,
dissenting), p 1.
Any
begin
discussion Auslander should
with a
description
actually
exception
of what it
is: an
to the
general
Michigan,
general
rule. In
rule is that
responsive
affirmative defenses must be raised in the
granted
claim
Defendants also
trial
court
a constructive
However,
amendment of their affirmative defenses.
as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, there is no indication that the trial court
or
parties
any
Tyra,
believed
such
constructive amendment occurred.
Accepting
argument
302 Mich
at 217.
under these circum
improperly usurp
discretionary authority
stances would
trial
court’s
grant
pleading
justice
requires.”
leave to amend a
“when
so
MCR
2.118(A)(2).
Opinion
J.
Viviano,
(“Affir-
2.111(F)(3)
MCR
they are waived.
pleading
party’s
be
in a
responsive
mative defenses must
stated
377, 389;
Nadell,
. .
.”); Walters
pleading.
(2008). An
defense” is a
Auslander extended Burton’s into the assumption dural realm on the that, if an action is defective as a matter of law, substantive that necessar- ily procedural obligations. relieves a defendant from its legal The basic flaw of Auslander is that it conflates procedural substantive rules of law with rules for enforcing legal those substantive standards. Under reasoning, Auslander’s circular a defendant is relieved obligation allege of its and establish that a com- plaint legally is deficient because the legally deficient.
Although
may
subject
an action
be
to attack because
compliance
it
statutory
was not commenced in
with a
prerequisite,
consequences
might
flow from
comply
prerequisite
the failure to
with the
are not
self-executing. Our decision in
Simmons,
Saffian
(2007), recognized
8;Mich
The same should to 2912b, of statu- waiting-period prerequisite any § might matter. A tory for that defendant precondition mark has complaint 182-day think a filed before is ulti- filed but that determination prematurely, been legal question by a that must be resolved mately orderly trial order to facilitate resolution judge.7 issues, to court rules legal require parties these our applicable and assert affirmative complaints answer As we in defenses. said Saffian'. orderly honoring process presumption
[T]his more
answer,
validity
pleadings, requiring an
then
challenge
allowing the
reduces
defendant
to
affidavit
uncertainty
allowing
chaotic
that
the defendant
to
[Also],
ad
decline to answer would introduce.
this rule
justice
to
vances the efficient administration
because
and,
plaintiffs’
upon
nitpick
defendants
allow
to
affidavits
surely
discovering
imperfection,
an
decline
to
to answer
leads,
here,
challenged
judgments and
as it did
default
to
hand,
hearings
no such
those entail. On
other
procedure
require an
hearings are
if the
necessitated
challenge
and then a motion
the defendant
answer
judicial
re
approach
the affidavit. This
will conserve
[Id.
14.][8]
reason.
sources and is advisable for that
may
given
always clear-cut
That determination is not
days
days depending
rightfully
or 154
on the
be able to file suit after 91
600.2912b(3) and
facts of the case. See MCL
dicta, distinguished
acknowledge
Saffian, arguably
be
I
Saffian, 477
merit and no affidavit of merit.
tween a
affidavit of
defective
that,
acknowledge
rejecting
I further
the defendant’s
Mich at 13-14.
said,
Scarsella,
Scarsella,
we con
we
“In
on our decision in
reliance
complaint
accompanied
an
medical
cluded that a
malpractice cause of
merit does
a medical
not ‘commence’
affidavit
preclude
an
need not
answer to
action and thus
defendant
file
(citation
However,
omitted; emphasis added].
this was
at 13
Id.
default.”
say
misreading
in Scarsella. We did not
Scarsella
of our decision
obligation
All
file an answer.
defendants were relieved of their
law,
that,
failure to
held was
as a substantive matter of
that Scarsella
along
an
of merit
not “commence”
with an affidavit
does
file
*29
Auslander’s uncritical extension of Burton’s
procedural
appreciate
rule into the
realm failed to
procedure.
example,
difference between law and
For
the statute of limitations affirmative defense involves
legal
complaint
determination that a
was filed
statutorily designated period
outside a
oftime for
600.5805(1)
complaint.
provides
“[a] per-
a
bring
son shall not
or maintain an action . . . unless . . .
periods
the action is commenced within the
of time
5805(1)
prescribed by
language
§
this section.” The
2912b(l) (and
§
malpractice pro-
similar medical
visions)
materially
prohibits
are
identical—each
party
bringing
from
an action unless certain conditions
By
logic,
complaint
are satisfied.
Auslander’s
filed
expiration
after the
of the statute of limitations is
“commencing”
ineffective at
and, therefore,
action
obligation
defendants should have no
to assert the
statute of limitations affirmative
Yet,
defense at all.
required
caselaw,
court rule and
defendants are
raise the statute of limitations defense in their first
responsive pleading or else it is waived. See MCR
2.111(F)(3)(a);Walters,
By deviating
accepted
requiring
from the
rule of
properly plead
prove legal
defendants to
defects in
plaintiffs filing,
essentially
Auslander
elevates com-
pliance
statutory prerequisites
to the echelon of
action or toll
Scarsella,
of limitations. See
(“We
that,
Mich at 549
therefore conclude
for statute of limitations
purposes
malpractice case,
in a medical
tendering
the mere
of a
required
without the
affidavit of merit is insufficient to
lawsuit.”)
omitted).
(quotation
commence the
marks and citation
Auslander—which itself involved the failure to file an affidavit of
merit—reflects an exacerbation of
error. See Auslander
Saffian’s
(Jansen, J., dissenting), unpub op
1, citing Scarsella,
461 Mich at
Thus,
549-550.
to the
misreading
extent Auslander is based on the same
committed,
of Scarsella that the
it is based on a misin
Saffian
terpretation of our caselaw.
Tyka Organ
*30
by
Opinion
J.
Viviano,
jurisdiction,”
subject
not
“lack of
a defense that is
respect,
rule. And in this
raise-or-waive
Auslander
years ago
a
is in tension with our decision 40
requirement
fil
similar notice-of-intent-to-sue
before
ing
jurisdictional.
suit was not
See Lisee
v Secretary
(1972).
32, 41-42;
388 Mich
IV.CONCLUSION simple, yet symmetrical, case, I craft a In this would strictly to the will be held rule of law: Plaintiffs statutory waiting-period requirement; too, defen- so required put plaintiffs on notice dants will be their affirmative defenses. other factual basis of same standard words, I hold defendants to the would procedural plaintiffs: compliance with their we hold agree obligations I do not under our rules. Because sidestep majority’s issue, I decision to with the respectfully III(B) majority dissent from Part opinion.9 Bernstein, JJ., concurred
McCormack Viviano, J. join majority opinion it to Furr. I Specifically,I in full as relates summary disposition correctly granted agree also that the trial court However, Agency. Organ as it relates to the
favor of defendants, Appeals on alterna I would affirm the Court of Beaumont proceedings with this grounds further consistent tive and remand for opinion.
