75 Miss. 559 | Miss. | 1897
Lead Opinion
delivered the following opinion, favoring a reversal of the judgment appealed from:
At the March term, 1897, of the circuit court of Kemper county, the appellant, Dr. W. H. Lipscomb, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged for the murder of Charles P. Stewart, from which judgment and sentence he prosecutes this appeal. Stewart died on the night of January 21, 1897. Just before going to bed for the night, he bathed his feet and took a capsule of medicine and laid down upon his bed. In a few minutes thereafter he became ill, and in twenty or thirty minutes died in convulsions, manifesting the symptoms usual in cases of strychnine poisoning. His wife, who was in the room, a Mr. Duran, and also a negro man, who came in, made endeavors at ministration for his relief. Duran went out to send to Scooba, a village about three miles away, for a physician. Stewart called upon the old negro to pray for him. In the interval between the third and last convulsions, and just before he died, he said to his wife: “lam going to die. I have been dead. The good Lord has sent me back to tell you that Dr. Lipscomb has killed me, has poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to-night; that Guy Jack had insured his life, and had hired Dr. Lipscomb to kill
The foregoing is a brief statement of such of the facts as are deemed necessary to our understanding of the questions of law presented by this appeal. On the trial of the case, the wife of the deceased testified to the declaration above mentioned, made
An autopsy was held by several physicians, including the appellant. The result of the autopsy was reduced to writing. It described the appearance and condition of the body and the various organs. It was written out by one of the physicians, and read over, section by section, in the presence of all, and, as he testified, it was his understanding and recollection that all, including Dr. Lipscomb, assented to it, and he thereupon signed his own and the names of the other physicians. This paper was admitted in evidence, and read to the jury, over defendant’s objection. When the jury retired to consider their verdict, the defendant requested that the paper be delivered to the jury, which the court refused. Exceptions were also talqen to the action of the court in granting or refusing certain instructions. These rulings of the court, among others, are now, on this appeal, assigned for error. We will first consider the instructions.
The second instruction given for the state is an effort to define a “ reasonable doubt. ” It is as follows: “ The court charges the jury that by a reasonable doubt is meant, not a mere speculative doubt or vague conjecture, mere supposition or hypothesis, but such a doubt as reasonably arises out of the testimony in this case — a doubt for which a reason can be given, in view Of the testimony or want of satisfactory testimony.” This instruction is not erroneous, for it does not embody an incorrect definition. It is no definition at all. It is mere tautology, stated with awkward circumlocution. The terms of the expression, “reasonable doubt,” import the most exact idea of its meaning, and are incapable of simplification, and there is no equivalent in phrase more easily understood. All such endeavor is futile and foredoomed, the usual result being a maze of casuistry, tending to confuse rather than to enlighten, often evolving incorrect propositions, as shown in the recent cases of Powers v. State, 74 Miss., 779; Hammon v. State, 74 Miss.,
The seventh instruction for the state contains a hypothetical statement of facts, of which the jury are told, "if they believe, ” constitute guilt, omitting the word, ‘ ‘ beyond a reasonable doubt,” and is consequently erroneous; but the error seems to be avoided by the subsequent instruction, which is nearly identical, and by others.
The ninth instruction for the state is in these words: “ Circumstantial evidence has been received, in every age of common law as competent evidence, and it may rise so high in the scale of belief as to generate full conviction. When, after due caution, this result is reached, the law authorizes the jury to act on it. ” “ Full conviction ’ ’ is not the criterion of the degree of proof necessary to a conviction. It is a loose phrase. It has no distinct legal import, and is without accuracy to the common understanding. It is vague, indefinite, and inexact. It may be the equivalent of sincere or conscientious belief. It may mean that full conviction when the facts proven satisfy the judgment as to the truth of the charge. There is but one rule and one law in this state as to the measure and sufficiency of proof which will warrant conviction. It is that the evidence must engender a certainty of belief beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule has prevailed without abatement, not only in the ages of common law, but it embodies an everlasting human right, coeval with all society. It is not enough that “ the jury should be satisfied from the evidence, as fair, reasonable or conscientious men, of the guilt of the accused” (Powers v. State, supra), or ‘ ‘ that they conscientiously believe him guilty." Burt v. State, and Brown v. State, supra; Hammond v. State, 74 Miss., 214.
In Williams v. State, 73 Miss., 822, the jury were instructed that ‘ ‘ if, after a careful consideration of all the evidence in the
The fifteenth instruction asked by the defendant, and refused, is as follows: "The court instructs the jury that the dying declarations of the deceased, made to his wife, are not entitled to the same credit and force as if the deceased was still alive and testifying in the presence of the jury, under oath; that it is a species of hearsay evidence, and is intrinsically weaker than if the declarant was present and subject to cross-examination; and the jury alone is the judge of its weight and force.” We all concur that if it be the true purport of the instruction that it is intended to point out, by way of precaution, the inherent qualities, which, by law, pertain to all dying declarations, and be held to refer to the source, rather than the matter, of the testimony, it would, in that view, not be upon the weight of evi
The authorities abound with discussion of the reasons and considerations upon which these rules are founded, looking to the conservation of truth and that justice might prevail. The circumstance that the declaration is hearsay, and is without the essential element of cross-examination, stands, facile princeps, the most important of these reasons, and incidentally and necessarily involves other considerations. 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 162; 1 Phil. Ev., 300; People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal., 17. “ The admission of dying declarations as evidence, being in derogation of the general rule which subjects the testimony of witnesses to the two important tests of truth, an oath and a cross-examination, it is obvious that such evidence should be admitted only upon the grounds of necessity and public policy, and should be restricted to the act of killing and res gestee. ’ ’ Leiber v. Com., 9 Bush, 11; 2 Starkie, Ev., p. 366; Bell v. State, 72 Miss., 513.
There are other considerations which have been dwelt upon by law writers and judges. Statements made under the shadow of approaching death may come with the infirmity of inattention, when the mind is diverted to the thoughts of the future; the vigor of the mind may be impaired; facts may be but partially stated; inferences and opinions may be stated as facts; the passions of anger and revenge may linger, after all hope of life is fled, and affect the truth of the statement. It must come as the memory of those who heard it, subject to all the uncertainties of a-correct understanding of the speech as made, and of a correct reproduction by the memory of what was truly said. Mr. Roscoe says: ‘ ‘ Such considerations show the necessity of caution in receiving impressions from accounts given by persons in a dying state, especially when it is considered that they cannot be subjected to the power of cross-examination, a power quite as
In Brown v. State, 32 Miss., 442, it is said, after commenting upon the nature of dying declarations, that "it is, therefore, the dictates of reason and common sense that declarations of this character, in all cases, and under any circumstances, should be admitted with caution and weighed by the jury with the greatest deliberation.” 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 162. We all concur that it is clear that as to dying declarations it would not be objectionable if the jury be charged that while they are the sole judges of the weight and effect to be given to a dying declaration, and that it is to be determined like any other evidence, in the light of all the evidence of the case, and to caution them, in determining its effect, that they should weigh it with great deliberation and care, and take into consideration the circumstances of its being hearsay; that it is the statement of one not subject to cross-examination, or such other relevant circumstances in that regard as may exist in any given case; and that it is the duty of the court to lay before the jury, by precautionary instructions, when asked, the inherent elements of weakness which the law recognizes in certain classes of evidence, but in
We come next to consider the ruling of the court upon the admission of the dying declaration, in respect to which several propositions are contended for by the appellant, which may be formulated as follows: (1) The proof did not show that at the time of making the declaration Stewart realized that his days were numbered, and the solemn hour of his death was at hand; (2) that the statement itself, in its peculiar character, bore evidence of mental incapacity, of unbalanced reason, and that it was a mere hallucination of a disordered mind; (3) that the declaration was not the statement of a fact, as of his knowledge, but an opinion, a mere belief, a conclusion deduced and inferred from other collateral facts.
All of the above propositions involve questions of fact, to be ascertained and passed upon by the trial judge upon a preliminary investigation, and in that sense are commonly designated questions of law. 1 Rosc. Cr. Ev. (8th ed.), 61; 1 Greenl. Ev., 219; Whart. Cr. Ev., 689; 1 Phil. Ev., 3, 7, 573; Simmons v. State, 61 Miss., 243; State v. Burns, 33 Mo., 483; Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala., 1; Owens v. State, 59 Miss., 547; Ellis v. State, 65 Miss., 48; Bell v. State, 72 Miss., 510.
It is therefore pertinent to inquire what degree of proof in
Taking up the first proposition, we find that the authorities in this state establish the rule that in a preliminary investigation by the court, for the ascertainment of facts precedent and necessary to the competency of proposed evidence, the degree of proof should be such as to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the facts of such foundation; and this is certainly true when the competency of any testimony rests upon collateral facts, independent of the main fact proposed to be proved; and in this case the rule applies to the preliminary questions (1) whether Stewart realized he was in extremis; (2) whether he was at the time sane and rational. Bell v. State, 72 Miss., 510; Owens v. State, 59 Miss., 549; Simmons v. State, 61 Miss., 257; Holly v. State, 55 Miss., 430; Ellis v. State, 65 Miss., 48.
But the competency of a statement, whether one of fact or opinion, is a question of judicial interpretation as to its meaning, as indicated by its terms, viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. The interpretation must rest upon the ascertainment as to what was the true purport of the declaration. It is the conclusion to be reached as to this fact which must control. If it bo a reasonable construction that a statement is one of fact, it ought to be admitted.
Tested by the foregoing principles, we are of opinion that the judgment of the court below was right in holding that the foundation was sufficiently laid (1) as to the fact that Stewart
This brings us to the question as to the admissibility of the declaration itself as evidence. If, according to the rule announced, it is a reasonable and probable theory that the declaration, according to its just import, taken in connection with the surrounding and relevant circumstances, was a statement of a fact within the knowledge and observation of Stewart, then it is competent, and its credibility and value as evidence was properly submitted to the jury; but if such an interpretation be unreasonable, or involves an improbable theory as to any assumed fact, it was incompetent, and the ruling of the court erroneous. At the threshold of the question we are met with the contention that so much of the statement as refers to Huy Jack having insurance upon Stewart’s life, and. that he hired Lipscomb to kill him, are facts which are not of the res gestee, as immediately connected with the killing, and that part — “that he had been dead, and the Lord had sent him back to tell ” — is irrelevant, and consequently that the court erred in admitting the whole declaration which embraced these statements. That they were not a part of the res gestee, and are irrelevant, goes
It is well settled, by numerous adj udications, that a general objection raises no issue, except it is as to whether the evidence would, under any circumstances or for any purpose, be admitted, and that a specific objection raises no other issue than the particular one tendered. If, under any circumstances of the case, testimony be admissible, a general objection would be properly overruled; and, conversely, it would be error to sustain a general objection if, under any view of the case, the evidence might be admissible. This rule applies with particular force in cases where the objection may have a twofold aspect, and may be put upon different grounds. It might go to the competency of the witness, to the mode of proof, to the insufficiency of the foundation, or to the relevancy or competency of the matter of the testimony. Testimony may be material and relevant, and still incompetent by reason of the method of proof or lack of some precedent predicate required by law to be first established, and vice versa. In Heard v. State, 59 Miss., 546, it is said: “When an objection is made to evidence which in its nature is such as may be obviated, it must be specific, so as to allow the party offering it an opportunity to supply its place if the objection is sustained, and, where this is not done, it will not be noticed m the appellate court." Morris v. Henderson, 37 Miss., 492; Brown v. State, 72 Miss., 95. The reason of the rule is said to be twofold: (1) To enable the trial judge to understand the precise question upon which he has to rule, that he should not be required to search for objections
A large number of cases to the same effect are collected in 1 Thomp. Trials, sec. 693. The rule also involves the particular proposition that a general objection is properly overruled to testimony a part of which is admissible and part not. But this particular rule has not been uniformly followed in this state. In Merrill v. State, 58 Miss., 66, and in Field v. State, 57 Miss., 474, statements were admitted in evidence parts of which were admissible and part were not. In both cases the ruling of the court was held to be erroneous, notwithstanding the objection was general. It is true the point was not made in either case invoking the rule that the objection was general. It has been well observed that a court might take cognizance of fatal error in proper cases to avoid injustice, notwithstanding, by inadvertence or accident, the objections were not made specific or properly framed. In view of the fact that the rule has not been strictly enforced in this state in all cases, by reason whereof some doubt may have prevailed as to the practice, it might be questioned whether it ought to be enforced in this case, especially as the record shows that the objection was argued by both sides, and presumably, of course, upon specific grounds. We do decide that Field’s case and Merrill’s case are not to be held as precedents for a different rule than that announced above.
Again, as preliminary to the question of the admissibility of
It is of common experience that matters of information, and of belief or opinion, are generally expressed in a form importing personal knowledge. Fixed convictions, regardless of' the mental processes involved, take the form of dogmatic assertion, and suspicion is couched in terms of direct accusation. Even the cautious and learned do not discriminate, and give emphasis to their settled conclusions by declaring, "I know. ’ ’ In this case, an expert physician, who had heard all the evidence pertaining to the symptoms of Stewart’s malady, and the evidence of the presence of strychnine disclosed by analysis, when asked if he could state from these facts the cause of death, replied
Cases could be multiplied all to like effect, that a statement is not to be held as one of fact because of the literal sense of its words, but is to be interpreted in the light of all the attendant circumstances. Applying these rules of interpretation to the dying declaration in this case, the majority of the court hold that a part of the declaration, to wit: that “Dr. Lipscomb has killed me, has poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to-night, ” is separable from the other parts of the statement, and is competent as a statement of fact. The other parts — the reference to “ the Lord sending him back to tell,” etc., “ that Guy Jack had his life insured, and hired Lipscomb to kill him ” — are, of course, inadmissible. Judges Whitfield and Thompson hold that no error can be predicated on the admission of the incompetent matter under a general objection. I dissent from the view that any part of the declaration was admissible. It seems to me that when the declaration, “ Dr. Lipscomb has killed me; he has poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to-night, ” is considered, not according to its literal terms, but in the light of all the circumstances and in connection with all parts of the statement and the nature of the act alleged and the mental processes necessa
It is urged in argument that it is a “ fact ’ ’ that Stewart
The argument is in a circle. Of course a ‘ ‘ fact ’ ’ may be stated, but not in the sense that the statement makes the ‘ ‘ fact, ” for the fact exists independent of the statement, but in the sense that it asserts knowledge that a thing was done or an act come to pass. The question is. not whether the matters of the statement are matters of fact, of things or acts done, but whether the statement made in reference thereto is an opinion concerning the facts or an assertion of personal knowledge of the facts. A “statement of a fact,” as distinguished from hearsay or opinion evidence, means the testimony by a witness of his recollection of things observed and perceived by him. It is that knowledge which is derived through impressions made upon the senses by external objects and through subjective sensations. Without reference to the metaphysical theories of the processes of sensation, experience, acquired perception, intuitions, reflection, ideation, and the like, it is enough for the practical purposes of the law that the knowledge of which a .witness may testify is the ordinary perception and understanding of things seen or heard, or otherwise perceived through the senses, or subjectively.experienced through sensation, and whatever other facts these import are inferences.
The argument based upon the illustration that when one is seen to fire a pistol toward another, and that other feels the shock and pain of the wound, and in such case knows that he is shot, though not seeing the flight of the missile, is without analogy, and its fallacy is apparent. For in that case the very agency or cause of the hurt is seen. The act of the shooting and design is seen before and simultaneously with the effect, and the instrument used, according to universal experience and common knowledge, is a deadly weapon, and when fired produces a wound instantaneously and simultaneously with the shot,
Whenever poison is taken, and it be not known at the time, it cannot be known in a legal sense at all. It may be demonstrated as a certainty, and even that cannot be done absolutely, if the symptoms felt by the victim or seen by others be relied on. This is self-evident. It may be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt, but then only by inductive reasoning. If, besides the symptoms, an analysis is made, then the demonstration may become absolutely certain, but no one will say that the disclosure afforded by an analysis imparts knowledge of the cause of the death, as distinguished from conclusion.
It is argued that the nearness in point of time between the taking and the effect of poison, enables one to know that he is poisoned. The fact is, he knows nothing but the effect, and the cause, whether near or distant, stands in mental contemplation apart from it, and cannot be perceived by the senses, but must be reached by the reason. And this argument would concede that, if longer time intervened, it might not be ‘ ‘ knowledge, ’ ’ which demonstrates that it is only opinion in both cases, the difference being in the degree of certainty. Cause and effect are concepts of the relation of things. Both may be perceived and known, but where only one is known, the other can only be inferred. It is true that one may speak of his sensations and describe them as of his knowledge, and it would be competent if the statement meant only that he felt as if he was poisoned, for that would be but a description, however uncertain, vague and conjectural it might be. In my opinion no part of the statement is admissible. It is true the fact is stated by implication that he took a capsule which Lipscomb gave him, and if that stood by itself, it would be admissible. But it is not stated directly. It is stated by implication, sub modo, in the general charge that Lipscomb poisoned him with a capsule he gave him. The principal proposition of the statement is
Nor can I concur with the majority of the court that the statement can be separated in its parts, and to hold a part admissible and a part not. Even conceding, as held by the majority of the court, that so much of the statement, to wit: ‘‘ That he poisoned me with a capsule he gave me, ’ ’ is admissible, taken by itself, yet, it seems to me that the declaration is so related in its parts that the true meaning of any part cannot be had, except when considered in its connection. It should stand or fall as a connected whole.
The statement cannot be even constructed grammatically into different sentences. It embodies a continuity of thought and expression relating to a single fact, the cause of his death. The parts proposed to be rejected stand in the relation of emphatic qualification of the meaning of that proposed to be admitted, even to the extent of casting upon the whole suspicion and doubt. Is not the defendant entitled to the benefit of the absurdity involved in the introduction: “I have been dead, but the good Lord has sent me back to tell, ’ ’ etc. ? It goes to the discredit of the whole statement. So the concluding part: “Guy Jack had my life insured, and hired Lipscomb to kill me,” is a component part of the statement. It is manifestly the expressed reason and ground for the statement that Lipscomb had poisoned him. It is rejected as inadmissible because it is a palpable conjecture, but that very construction supports the theory that the whole statement is mere opinion, and in that respect tends to qualify it. To vary the weight and significance of the statement by arbitrary and artificial adjustment is to juggle with its sense. It is a grave injustice, to be remedied only by admitting the whole statement — a greater injustice.
In the cases of People v. Farmer, 77 Cal., 41; Richards v. State, 87 Wis.; Robert v. State, 5 Tex. App., 141; People v. Green, 1 Denio; Weight v. State, 30 Tex. Co. App.; State v. Terrell, 12 Richards, 330; State v. Belton, 24 S. C., 188, the question as to whether the declaration was one of "fact" or “opinion” was not raised. In the case of Walker v. State, 39 Ark., 22, the statement was, “Nick Walker shot me,” and though the evidence shows it was through an auger hole at night, it was admitted upon the theory that it was in the form of a statement of fact, and if, by any possibility, it could be known to the declarant, it was admissible; but this case was overruled practically in Jones v. State, 52 Ark., where a person was shot through a crack, and it was held impossible that he could know. In Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y., 159, the deceased stated he did not recognize the prisoner until he commenced his pranks. The prisoner was disguised as a tramp, was the son-in-law of and well known to the deceased, and the testimony was clearly admissible as indicating knowledge from his personal observation. In the case of State v. Arnold, 13 Iredell, the declaration was that “A. B. has shot me, and none other.” It is contended that, from the situation of the parties at the time, deceased did not have an opportunity of knowing the fact so as to enable him to express more than an opinion on the point, which was held to go to the credibility of the statement. In State v. Giles, 8 Wash., 12, the declaration was, “They butchered me.” The indictment was for manslaughter for an unnecessary surgical operation. The court held that it no more expressed an opinion than the word ‘‘ killed ’ ’ used without qualification. Hackett v. People, 54 Barbour, 370, merely distinguishes between what is and what is not res gestae. In Com
It will thus be seen that but few of the cases cited for the state are distinctly upon the question whether the dying declaration was a statement of fact or an opinion, or throw any light upon the precise question in this case. In but two of the cases where the question was a debatable one is any reason given for the conclusion that the statement was one of fact. In one (Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala., 142) it is put on the ground that
View its own feather on the fatal dart
That winged the shaft that quivered in its heart.
Several of the cases above referred to have been challenged and condemned.
Rice on Evidence, vol. 3, p. 536, refers to Wroe’s case, 20 Ohio St., 460, to Roberts’ case, 5 Texas App., 141; Payne v. State, 61 Miss., 161; People v. Abbott, 4 Whart. Rep., 422; Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y., 159, as being opposed to the weight of authority, as precedents for the admission of opinion evidence, and referring to the dissenting opinion in Boyle v. State, 105 Ind., 469, says: "It is seldom, indeed, that any opinion is so critical in its analysis, so exhaustive in its citation, or so logical in its conclusions. Any discussion of this subject which omits a careful consideration of this case must be regarded as grossly imperfect. The principal opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Elliott. It is a very ingenious argument in favor of the prevailing view. But while perfectly aware that my function as a text writer will not tolerate the least attempt to make a law, I submit the dissenting opinion of this exceedingly able court contains the statement of the better view both on principle and authority. ’ ’
Turning- now to the other decision, I think it will appear that the declaration in this case, as admissible evidence, is absolutely condemned by precedent. Of all the adjudications examined, but one has been found directly in point, where the facts are almost identical. In the case of Berry v. State, 63 Ark., the circumstances were that the prisoner had given to the deceased a drink of whisky; that shortly after he was taken ill, and died from the effects of poison. To the physician who was called to at
The same principle is illustrated in many analogous cases. In Whitley v. State, 38 Ga., the statement was, that “it was hard to be killed for telling the truth; that God knew he told the truth, and Ed knew it was the truth,” and was excluded as an opinion. In Willaims v. State, 67 N. C., the statement was excluded as an opinion which was to the effect that Williams shot him, but “I did not see him,” though it was contended that he might have heard the prisoner, and identified him in that way. A witness cannot be allowed to state that the shooting was intentional. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind., 328. In McPherson v. State, 22 Ga., 478, the declaration was, “Did not believe that accused intended to hurt him. ’ ’ This was excluded as an opinion, although in favor of the accused. People v. Washington, 3 W. C. Rep.: “ I think this man Washington was the man that shot me, ’ ’ was excluded as an opinion. In the case of Shaw v. People, 3 Hunt (N. Y.), 272, it is said that “ it is more important to exclude an opinion deelaratio in articula mortis.” In Chambers v. State, 87 Mo., 408, declarant said he thought he ivas about to draw something from his pocket— a knife or pistol — and that he followed him so that if he did draw a knife or pistol he could catch or knock it out of his hand before he could hurt him, and this was excluded upon the ground that it was an opinion. Moore v. State, 33 Ala., 421, the de-
It is assigned for error that the court refused the request of the defendant to deliver to the jury the paper containing a memorandum of the autopsy. Seeing that it was plainly required by the statute, it is not perceived upon what possible ground the request was refused. But as all the facts in the memorandum were testified to orally, and the memorandum read, the error is not deemed material. If the dying declaration was irrelevant and incompetent evidence, there can be no doubt, in view of its character and probable effect, as to the consequences of such error. It is conceded that such error must be fatal to any verdict, and for which, as well as for the error in the ninth instruction given for the state, I am of opinion that the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
The conclusions of the court are, all concurring:
1. That the court below erred in granting the ninth instruction given for the state.
2. Judges Whitfield and Thompson concurring, Magruder dissenting, that the court erred in refusing fifteenth instruction asked by the defendant.
.3. All concur that a part of the dying declaration is inadmissible. Judges Whitfield and Thomspon concur in holding a part admissible, to wit: “ Dr. Lipscomb has killed me; he has poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to-night,” and that this may be separated from the other parts of the statement. Judges Whitfield and Thompson hold that no error can be predicated of*599 the admission of the dying declaration on the ground a part of it is incompetent, for the reason that the objection to its admissibility is general, and not specific. Magruder holds that no part of the dying declaration is admissible, and, from the character of the statement, is incapable of separation without injustice to the defendant. Judges Thompson and Magruder concur that the case should be reversed, for the reasons indicated in their respective opinions, and Judge Whitfield, notwithstanding the errors conceded by him as to giving the ninth instruction for the state, and the refusal of the fifteenth instruction for the defendant, hold the case should be affirmed.
I fully concur in the view stated by Judge Thompson as to the law which should govern the reversal of cases for error. It is not within the province of the appellate court, under our constitution and laws, to be the triers of fact and of guilt. Our duty is to lay down, with unswerving purpose, the law as we find and understand it. Questions of public policy belong to another forum. A legal trial is a trial according to the law, and a legal conviction is a conviction by a jury according to recognized procedure and principles of law. If, in any trial, an error of law be made, the case should be reversed, if it be so material or of such character as is calculated to influence, and probably did influence, the verdict. The case is not to be looked at from a judicial standpoint, and the guilt of the accused be so ascertained, or the materiality and consequence of the error be so determined, the question in all cases being, not what the jury ought to do, or might do, according to our judgment, but whether the error is of such character.as that the jury itself might have been influenced by it.
Dissenting Opinion
delivered the following opinion favoring an affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
Beyond what immediately follows I do not desire to be understood as saying anything touching the rules of law applicable to the laying of the predicate for the admission of a dying
Whether my view as to these two features is correct or not, I am sure that the question of the competency of a part of a dying declaration, turning on its being an opinion or a statement of a fact, forms no part of the preliminary inquiry of the court as to the existence of the predicate making the declaration competent. The reasons which make the dying declaration competent are reasons which go alone to the source of the testimony, its character and nature, as the deliverance of a party soon to die, conscious that he must die, speaking under the solemnity of this consciousness — the substitute for the oath— and, from his situation, not able to be subjected to cross-examination. Whether part of the dying declaration is opinion or
The question whether it is opinion or the statement of a fact is exclusively for the court in a dying declaration, just as it would be, and precisely for the same reason it would be, if such opinion or statement of a fact were testified to by any witness on any other subject. And so, I think it is for the court to determine what parts of such declaration relate to the killing and its res gestee, it being its duty to exclude all such parts as do not relate to the killing and its res gestee, just precisely for the same reasons it would be the duty of the court to exclude the testimony of any other witness which did not relate to the fact in controversy and the res gestie of that fact. And so, clearly, that which the court deemed not relating to the fact of killing and the res gestee of the killing would never reach the jury, and ought never to reach the jury. And, so, also, whether the statement in a dying declaration would be competent if the party lived and testified, is exclusively for the court as to its competency, and, if not competent, the court would exclude it, and it would never reach the jury, and ought not to. These three things — whether the testimony is the statement of an opinion or the statement of a fact, whether the declaration would be competent if the party were living and testifying "to
In this case I think the legal predicate for the admission of the dying declaration was abundantly shown. And now as to the competency of the dying declaration. It is in these words: ‘ ‘ He said he had been dead, and that he was going to die, and the good Lord had sent him back to tell me that Dr. Lipscomb had poisoned him with a capsule he gave him that night, and Guy Jack had his life insured, and had hired Dr. Lipscomb to kill him.” I think that part of the declaration, that "he had been dead, and that the Lord had sent him back, ’ ’ ought to have been excluded on a specific objection to that end. Here are three statements: (1) “That Dr. Lipscomb had poisoned him with a capsule he gave him that night; ” (2) “ that Guy Jack had his life insured; ” and (3) “ that Guy Jack had hired Dr. Lipscomb to kill him.” Clearly, that Guy Jack had his life insured is the statement of a fact, and a fact of which he might well have had knowledge. Here is, at least, one clear statement of a fact reasonably within his knowledge. The state
We are brought face to face, then, with the thoroughly established rule of evidence, supported by an overwhelming array of authorities set forth in the briefs of the learned counsel for the state, that where a part of a dying declaration is competent, as the statement of a fact, and part not so competent, the whole is properly admitted, unless the defendant, by specific objections, points out, and asks the trial court to exclude, the objectionable parts. In this case the objection was twice presented —once before the court on a preliminary investigation, and once when offered before the jury — and, in both cases, it was, clearly and indisputably, nothing more than the merest general objection to the whole of the dying declaration as incompetent, without the specification of a single ground of incompetency, and without pointing out the part which was objected to as incompetent. It will not do to say, because the jury retired, and the objection was fully argued before the court, that we can assume that, in that argument, counsel made specific objections on the ground of opinion or otherwise. We look, to see the specific objections urged to the testimony, not to the argument of counsel, but to the objections the record itself sets forth as having been made; nor would it help the appellant if we did look to the bare statement that it was argued, for the argument is not set forth, nor is it stated that in the argument any specific objections were made. The unequivocal declaration of the record is that the objection was made in the merest general form and argued as such. If this court is to supply the omis
In Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss., 322, it was held by the court, through Judge Yerger, that, if so grave a matter as the constitutionality of the competency of dying declarations was not presented in the trial court, this court would not regard it, when made here for the first time; and whether that be a sound declaration as to a constitutional objection or not, it is surely the most positive alignment of this court with courts elsewhere, which hold that, if the specific parts of a dying declaration, objected to as not competent, are not pointed out by specific objections in the court below, this court will not here regard such objection, disclosed here for the first time.
Merril’s case, cited in the opinion of my brother Magruder, was a case where the attorney-general confessed error, practically, and the point here discussed was not presented. We all concur in the rule that the whole of a dying declaration will be properly admitted, unless the parts of it which are objectionable are specifically pointed out in the court below, as the true rule. If it be possible that in some capital case in the future, to enforce the rule strictly would result in imposing the death sentence by the mere rule itself, where, from other testimony in
It was said in Brown v. State, 72 Miss., 97 : "It is not permissible for one to experiment with the court by consenting by silence to all the evidence of a witness, and then move to exclude all the evidence because some part was incompetent. All the evidence was competent, except in the one particular already adverted to, and this, no doubt, the court would have excluded if attention had been called to it by a specific objection. To have excluded all the evidence would have been palpable error, and this is what the court was asked to do, as we suppose. ’ ’ In this case it is beyond supposition, it is a fact shown by the record, that the defendant asked the court to exclude all of the dying declaration, when, as I and my brother Thompson think, that part of it, to the effect that “ Dr. Lipscomb had po.isoned him with a capsule he gave him that night, ’ ’ was clearly competent as the statement of a fact. To the same effect, precisely, is Heard v. State, 59 Miss., 545. I think, therefore, there was no error in this case in the admission of the dying declaration, because the objectionable parts were not sufficiently pointed out, and because it is a case in which the
I desire to add that 1 think the rule announced in State v. Williams, 67 N. C., 12, to the effect that the court should allow the dying declaration to go to the jury as the statement of a fact, and not of an opinion, where it is, from all the circumstances attending the declarant at the time of the killing, reasonably probable that he had knowledge of what he states as a fact, is a correct rule. The mere form of a declaration is not conclusive as to whether it is the statement of a fact or of an opinion, for that is form, and not substance. But where the circumstances attending the declarant at the time the facts occur about which he speaks, to wit, the killing and its res gestee, are such as reasonably and probably demonstrated that he was speaking from knowledge, and not from opinion, such circumstances are of substantial value in showing that the statement is one of fact, and not one of opinion. Grant that the circumstances established, showing that he probably had knowledge, are true — made out by the proof in the case- — they then are established realities, and declarant’s statement may be of a fact made known to him by these realities — as, for example, that he saw or heard, or in any other way identified, the party killing him. In the Williams case, for instance, the murderer had gone out a few minutes before the killing, from the house, but the other proof showed clearly that he was lingering about the house, in the dark, eavesdropping; that there was a brilliant light in the house; that the deceased was lying on his back, with his legs stretched out, on the floor, wide apart from each other, directly fronting the door, within about five feet from the door; that the door was open; that the light from within the house would disclose objects some distance from the door; that the defendant was shot through this open door, by the party standing only a few feet from the door, and was shot straight through the body, between the legs; and the court held that it was altogether probable that the deceased saw
I desire further to say that 1 take no part in the criticism of Payne v. State, 61 Miss., 161. The statement in that case was to the effect that the defendant £ £ shot him without any cause whatever,” and the criticism is of the court for holding that the words “without any cause whatever” is the statement of a fact, and not of an opinion. There is not in this case any statement by Stewart that Lipscomb killed him £ ‘ without any cause whatever; ” and, hence, the whole criticism of the opinion seems to me clearly beside the issue in this case. Stewart’s statement was that Lipscomb had poisoned him; that he killed him with a capsule he gave him that night; and this is like the statement of Hawkins in Payne v. State, 61 Miss., 161, that Payne had ££ shot him, ’ ’ and is the statement clearly of a fact within the knowledge of the declarant. For the reason, therefore, that the statement of Stewart does not contain the declaration that Lipscomb poisoned him ££ without any cause whatever, ’ ’ it seems to me foreign to the issue to discuss the question as to whether the words £ £ without any cause whatever ’ ’ is the statement of an opinion or of a fact.
Finally, I desire to say that I very.much doubt the correctness of the decision in Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky., 287, and in Handy v. Com., cited in the opinion of my brother Magruder, in so far as they hold that the statement there, to the effect that the shot was an accident, was admissible for the defendant, but not for the state. Without committing myself one wajr or the other, definitely, as to whether the competency of any dying delaration is to be determined, in any case, by the consideration that it was for the defendant, and not against him, I will say that such a distinction seems to me untenable. I cannot see how the competency of a dying declaration, any more than the competency of any other testimony, is to be determined by whether it makes for or against the defendant. It would seem that, if it were competent, it should go to the jury, no matter
I think the fifteenth instruction asked by the defendant should have been given, on the authority of Lambeth’s case, 23 Miss., 322. It might have been more felicitously phrased. It might have told the jury that, in considering the dying declaration, it was proper for them to remember that, as to its source and nature, it was the declaration of one not sworn and not cross-examined, but that, remembering this, they alone had the power to graduate its weight and effect as testimony; and this is what I think it does, though not as felicitously as it might have done. But I do not think the refusal to give it was reversible error.
The ninth instruction for the state, I think, is erroneous for the reasons given in Williams v. State, 73 Miss., 820 but I do not think that is reversible error, since the jury were abundantly instructed as to reasonable doubt and as to the value of circumstantial evidence. The giving of the instruction in the Williams case was not reversible error of itself alone— it operated as a mere make-weight. That case, as the reading of it discloses, was reversed for the admission of incompetent testimony.
It will thus be seen that I think two instructions — one refused the defendant and one given the state — are erroneous, but that I do not .regard these errors, singly or combined, as constituting reversible error; for the reason that I think the testimony, which was competent, overwhelmingly establishes the guilt of the defendant, that the right result has been reached on the facts and the law applicable to the case, as it went to the jury, and that np other result could be reasonably reached by any jury on another tidal, and hence that substantial j ustice has been done between the state and the defendant; and, wherever such is the
In 1 Thomp. Trials, p. 122, sec. 116, it is said: "In England and many American jurisdictions a paramount inquiry upon such objection is whether it has resulted in an unjust verdict. If not, the objecting party has sustained no injury, and a new trial will not be granted in order that public or private time may be consumed and the danger of other, irregularities incurrrd, where the same result must, on a just view of the evidence, be reached. Unless there is plain evidence of injustice done to the party complaining, the verdict shall be allowed to stand.” In 2 Thomp. Trials, secs. 2401, 2402, considering the express point here involved — the giving of erroneous instructions — it is said: “Courts of error do not sit to decide moot questions, but to redress real grievances. It is therefore a rule of nearly all the courts that no judgment will be reversed on account of the giving of erroneous instructions unless it appear probable that the jury were misled by them. Expressions of this rule could be multiplied almost without limit. Thus, it is said that instructions faulty or technically erroneous will not work a reversal of the judgment if the jury were not misled, or if, as a whole, the case was fairly presented to them, and especially if their verdict is obviously correct. Of course, it can never be said that the jury were misled by the giving of erroneous instructions where they have reached the correct result by their verdict. Accordingly, it is the. practice of most of the courts, before passing upon exceptions to instructions, to look into the evidence and see if the verdict is right, and, if it is found to be so, the court will look no further. The rule of these courts is that a good verdict cures all errors in the intermediate steps by which it was reached. In England it is no ground for a new trial that the judges misdirected the jury, unless it is shown that the jury was thereby induced to form a wrong conclusion. If the revising court sees that justice has
In Magee v. Harrington, 13 Smed. & M., 406, the court say: “The verdict of the jury was correct, according to the law and the facts, and, if it were conceded that the court below erred in the instruction which it gave, we would not be authorized to disturb it, as there is no probability that a different result would follow upon another trial. ’ ’
In Brantley v. Carter, 26 Miss., 285, it is said: “It is well settled that a judgment will not be reversed for erroneous instructions to the jury, if it is apparent that the verdict is according to the law governing the case and the evidence before them."
In Hanna v. Renfro, 32 Miss., 131, it is said: “The instructions given to the jury upon the trial are very numerous and general in their character, and, in some respects, are not entirely accurate. So far as they are applicable to the material points involved under the facts of this case they appear to be correct, and we are satisfied that the verdict is well sustained by the law arising upon the evidence, and that the errors in the instructions are therefore immaterial. ’ ’
In Fore v. Williams, 35 Miss., 540, speaking of instructions, the court say: “This was obviously irregular and improper; but it appears that the jury came to a correct conclusion upon the subject, and, as the error in the court did not operate to the defendant’s prejudice in law, it was no ground for setting-aside the verdict and granting a new trial.”
In Wesley v. State, 37 Miss., 351 (a murder case), the court say: “But it is not for every error committed by the circuit
In Cameron v. Watson, 40 Miss., 209, after holding instructions to be erroneous, the court say: “But no injury was done by it, for the verdict is correct, notwithstanding the erroneous instructions. In such a case the error in the instruction is not ground for granting a new trial, where it is manifest the verdict is correct upon the facts appearing in the record. ’ ’
In Hanks v. Neal, 44 Miss., 227, 228, it is said: “Although this instruction, as a legal proposition, may not be correct, yet, as the evidence shows that the verdict is right, there is no error in overruling the motion for a new trial. The rule is that the verdict will not be disturbed when it is according to law and the justice of the case, though the instruction be erroneous.”
In Head v. State, Id., 752 — a murder case — the court said: “We would not disturb the verdict for any supposed error in the instructions, when the verdict is manifestly right on the evidence, and it does not appear that the accused was prejudiced by any one of the charges of the court. ’ ’
In Evans v. State, Id.., 775 — a murder case — the court said: ‘ ‘ It has been several times declared from this bench that all the charges are to be construed together, as of pa/ri materia, one as modifying another, so as to see whether, as an entirety, they correctly lay down the law, and, if so, although a single instruction may be too broad in its terms, a reversal ought not to take place. The rule as deduced by Wharton from American cases is, if the error be immaterial and irrelevant and justice has been done, the court will not set aside the verdict nor enter into a discussion of the questions of law.” Am. Cr. Law, sec. 3080. “ It finds full support in the adjudications of this court, ’ ’ citing authorities.
In O'Leary v. Burns, 53 Miss., 171, it was held, Simrall,
In Cheatham v. State, 67 Miss., 341, this court well said: "The standard sought to be erected by counsel, by which to test a fair and impartial trial, to which one accused of crime is entitled, is too perfect and refined. It excludes not only appreciable error, but invades the field of metaphysics, and invites investigation of subjects with which neither courts nor juries are competent to deal. Courts must consider juries as bodies of plain men, imbued with an honest desire to perform with fidelity the duty imposed upon them of discovering the truth from the evidence submitted to them, in conformity with the instructions as to the law given them by the court. ’ ’
In Graham v. Fitts, 53 Miss., 307, this court said, through Campbell, C. J.: "Some of the charges given by the judge to the jury, given at the instance of the plaintiffs and the defend
In Lamar v. State, 65 Miss., 95, 96, this court said: “But this was not the only infringement of the right of the defendant. In his concluding argument the district attorney, over the objection of the defendant, in spite of the twice - repeated direction of the court to desist, persisted in reading to the jury, as evidence against the accused, certain portions of the written testimony of a witness, which had not been put in evidence. Thus, each of the counsel for the state invoked against the accused prejudicial facts not in evidence. Such conduct deserves the severest censure, and should have drawn from the court an instant and sufficient correction.. For this palpable and serious error we are urged by the counsel for the appellant to reverse the judgment and award a new trial. ’ ’ But the court held that the defendant .was guilty on his own testimony, and affirmed the judgment, notwithstanding these serious errors. Exactly the same point is decided the same way in Allen v. State, 66 Miss., 388. These cases go upon the ground that this court should affirm the verdict of the jury finding a defendant guilty, where this court, passing upon the testimony of the defendant himself, sees that it makes him guilty. There can be no logical difference between thp power of this court to hold the verdict of a jury finding a defendant guilty right where his own testimony satisfies this court that he was guilty, and in affirming the verdict of a j ury finding a defendant guilty on other uncon-tradicted testimony in the case, this court believing him guilty on such uncontradicted testimony. I do not mean to say that, in this case, the testimony showing guilt, other than the defehd-ant’s own testimony, is not contradicted in some respects. I
Again, it has been held, in Houston v. Smythe, 66 Miss., 123, Campbell, J., speaking for the court, that, where the right result has been reached, errors of law as to pleadings will not cause reversal. The court said: “The court erred m sustaining the demurrers, but the whole case was fully developed by evidence, and any other result than the defeat of plaintiff in replevin would not be tolerated. In such case it would be wrong to keep alive a controversy which, since, under the law, it could have but one end, had better at once be terminated. Therefore, following numerous precedents, we will not inflict upon the party ultimately losing the cost of further and useless litigation, by remanding the cause because of errors and rulings in the pleadings, since it is manifest that no harm was done by these rulings.”
See, also, supporting the general doctrine announced, Vance v. State, 62 Miss., 137; Cheatham v. State, 67 Miss., 341; and Vicksburg L. & T. Co. v. United States Express Co., 68 Miss., 149. With these authorities in our mind, this court has recently declared, in the case of Ellerbe v. State, ante, p. 523, the rule to be as follows: “So far as the lawful power of this court can be exerted in affirming convictions for violations of the law of the land, it shall be exerted; and mere technical errors, without intrinsic merit, where we can, after a careful and thorough examination of the whole case, confidently say that the right result has been reached, that
With all deference, it seems to me that my brethren have clearly confounded the primary function of the jury to pass on the evidence and find the defendant guilty, if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and the power which this appellate tribunal exercises in reviewing that finding of the jury. When the court so reviews the finding of a jury in a criminal case, and reverses, as it repeatedly has done, on the sole ground that the evidence was manifestly insufficient to warrant the verdict of
In_view of the fact that a majority of the court think this defendant should have a new trial, I refrain from any particular detailed statement of the testimony in the case, not wishing in any wise to prejudice him on the new trial. I say, only in vindication of my views, that on the testimony in this case, without reference to the dying declaration, he is, to my mind, shown overwhelmingly to be guilty, and that that part of the dying declaration, “Dr. Lipscomb poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to-night,” was the statement of a fact, and was
For these reasons I feel constrained to dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court, that a new trial should be granted. I think the judgment should be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
delivered the following opinion, favoring a reversal of the judgment appealed from:
In reference to the questions pertaining to the dying declaration, I concur in Judge Whitfield’s opinion. The statement, a part of the dying declaration, “that [he Lord had sent him back to tell,” if objected to, was inadmissible, justas a declaration to a j ury by a living witness, to the effect that ‘ ‘ the Lord had sent him to tell them,” preceding a narrative of facts, would be inadmissible. The statement “that Dr. Lipscomb had poisoned him with a capsule he gave him that night” was, in a just and legal sense, the statement of a fact, and not the expression of an opinion, and it was admissible in evidence. The statement that “Guy Jack had his [the declarant’s] life insured ’ ’ was the statement of a fact, but it was not admissible in evidence, because not a part of the res gestee of the homicide. The concluding part of the declaration, “and [meaning Guy Jack] had hired Lipscomb to kill him” (the declarant), while, in form, the declaration of a fact, yet, in truth, as we find from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, was but the expression of an opinion, and was not a part of the res gestee of the homicide, and it was inadmissible.
In my opinion, the court below erred in granting the second and ninth instructions given for the state, and 1 concur in the opinion of Judge Magruder in so far as it points out the error
It may be that public policy would be promoted by the existence of authority in the judges of this court to determine, in every criminal case, whether, upon the facts of the case, the appellant be guilty or innocent, and, if believed by them to be guilty, to affirm a judgment of conviction in spite of errors committed on the trial in the court below; but I do not understand such power or right to exist. I find no warrant for it in authority, and I do not believe that it ought to be brought into existence, if at all, save by legislation. I think the first inquiry in respect to every assignment of error should be, is it well taken — was error committed in the trial appealed from to the prejudice of appellant in the matter complained of? If this inquiry is answered affirmatively, then the second inquiry presents itself, and that is, was error calculated to and did it probably produce the result evidenced by the judgment appealed from ? If this is to be answered in the affirmative, then the case should be reversed. Appellate j udges, under existing law, cannot too carefully refrain from becoming themselves the triers of the fact of guilt or innocence in determining whether an error committed by the court below was calculated to and did probably produce the result there reached. The two questions are certainly separate and distinct. In this case I cannot see how it can be affirmed that the errors in the instructions
As a matter of law, it cannot be said that the ninth instruction given for the state had no weight, because, as a matter of law, it is the duty of a jury to carefully consider and to be governed by the instructions of the court. Looking at the question as a matter of fact, it can be said such an instruction —
I have carefully read and considered the several authorities cited in support of the idea that this court should affirm the conviction appealed from notwithstanding errors, but I do not think any one of them covers this case, and that this appeal is distinguishable from all of them.
The writer does not overlook the rule that the instructions in a cause are to be considered as a whole, but, looking at all
After the delivery of the foregoing opinions a motion was made by attorneys for the state to vacate the judgment of reversal which had been entered by order of the court, and to substitute therefor a judgment of affirmance. The motion was argued by counsel.
delivered the opinion of the court on the motion.
On this motion to vacate the judgment of reversal heretofore entered, and substitute a judgment of affirmance, upon the ground that no two of the judges concur in a common ground of reversal, we have listened patiently to a full and extended oral argument, and' have carefully examined all the authorities cited for the state — the Phillips case, the Spivey case, and all the other cases. The facts of those cases clearly distinguish them from this one as to the point here presented for decision. Of course, anything said (and much was so said) as to whether the original holdings of the court were right or wrong, was proper to be made on a suggestion of error. All that, of course, we discard.
The judges remain of the opinions they originally severally entertained. My brethren thought then, and think now, that