MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thе Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Civil Division in the District of Columbia’s Superior Court is a unique animal. Housed in a building separate from the main courthouse, the Branch has its own rules and procedures. It is, first and foremost, a place landlords go to seek possession of their property — typically on the ground that their tenants have violated lease provisions, such as by failing to pay rent. In this case, a number of tenants are attempting to turn the tables, claiming that their landlord’s law firm has played fast and loose with the L & T Branch rules.
More specifically, Plaintiffs Natasha Lipscomb, Kimberly McLaughlin, Margaret O’Brien, and Felicia Pate bring this class-action suit against The Raddatz Law Firm, P.L.L.C., and its principals, Mark R. Raddatz and Edward L. Pugh II, for allegedly improper debt-collection practices. They contend that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq., by making false statements in eviction suits that the firm filed in the L & T Branch. Defendants now move to dismiss. They argue, inter alia, that the FDCPA is not meant to govern the filing of eviction comрlaints in *254 state court and that, in any event, their misrepresentations could not have misled consumers. Because the Court ultimately concludes that such actions can trigger the Act’s protections and that Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim, it will deny the Motion.
I. Background
When a tenant residing in the District fails to abide by certain lease provisions, such as the requirement to pay rent, a landlord may file an action for posses
sion
— i.e., an eviction complaint — in the L
&
T Branch of Superior Court. Prior to filing such a suit, the landlord must serve the tenant with a notice to quit, unless the tenant has waived her right to such notice.
See Grimes v. Newsome,
According to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which is presumed true at this stage, Defendants primarily focus their legal practice on representing commercial and residential landlords in landlord/tenant disputes. See Compl., ¶ 12. In this véin, in November 2013, they filed eviction complaints against each of the named Plaintiffs in the L & T Branch on behalf of their landlord, Capitol Gateway. See id., ¶¶ 23-26. The Verified Complaints for Possession of Real Property indicated that Capitol Gateway was seeking to both repossess the rental properties and recover back rent allegedly owed. See Compl., Exh. 1. (Lipscomb Summons and Complaint); Exh. 2 (McLaughlin Summons and Complaint); Exh. 3 (O’Brien Summons and Complaint); Exh. 4 (Pate Summons and Complaint). In support, Defendants swore in each of the complaints that Plaintiffs had failed to pay certain fees for water, defined as “rent” under their leases. See Lipscomb Compl.; McLaughlin Compl.; O’Brien Compl.; Pate Compl.
Although each Plaintiff “plainly reside[d]” in a unit that was subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the D.C. Housing Authority, the complaints averred that Plaintiffs’ rents were not subsidized by the federal or local government. See Compl., ¶¶ 23-26. For example, the complaint filed against Lipscomb stated that “[Capitol Gateway] seeks other fees of $2,593.00 for water ..., defined as rent under paragraph no. 7 of the lease ... for this property, which is not subsidized and is exempt from rent control.” Lipscomb Compl. (emphasis added). In response to Question 4 of the complaint, which requires a landlord (or its counsel) to check off whether a tenant’s rent is subsidized by the federal or local government, Defendants again indicated that Lipscomb’s was not. See id. The complaints filed against McLaughlin, O’Brien, and Pate contained similar averments and incorrect check-offs. See McLaughlin Compl.; O’Brien Compl.; Pate Compl.
According to Plaintiffs, the manner in which landlords (or their counsel) represent the subsidized status of rental properties “may be of critical importancе.” Compl., ¶ 20. “[Tjenants residing in subsidized rental properties are entitled to as *255 sert certain statutory and/or regulatory defenses to repossession that are not available to tenants residing in non-subsidized rental housing.” Id. Where a tenant is unrepresented by counsel, properly indicating the subsidized status of a rental property may thus alert the presiding judge “to the need to assure that the pro se tenant is appropriately advised of his/ her rights.” Id. Even “where the tenant does have legal representation, an affirmative answer to Question No. 4 alerts counsel to the availability of special defenses relating to subsidized tenants that are simply inapplicable in non-subsidized rental housing.” Id., ¶ 21. It is Plaintiffs’ belief that Defendants incorrectly stated that their rents were not subsidized in order to “mislead the tenants for the unilateral benefit of the Defendants’ landlord clients, and to avoid alerting the tribunal to the existence of special defenses.... ” Id., ¶ 2.
Plaintiffs, however, “each had the good fortune to obtain legal representation” from attorneys employed by the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia, and their “cases were resolved without either an adverse judgment or loss of the residence.” Id., ¶ 27. Yet few may be so lucky. Tenants are represented by counsel in only about 5-10% of the cases filed in the L & T Branch, id., ¶ 18, and Defendants’ conduct appears to be widespread. According to “[a]n extensive pre-suit factual investigation,” they have filed hundreds, if not thousands, of similar complaints in the L & T Branch that “falsely characterize ... rental properties ... as ‘not subsidized and ... exempt from rent control.]’ ” Id., ¶¶ 1-2. The investigation. found, for instance, that from November 2013 through October 2014, they filed “roughly 100 actions” on behalf of three of the firm’s landlord clients that appear to have misrepresented the subsidy status of the subject properties. See id., ¶ 32. Specifically, although the vast majority of those landlords’ units are subsidized by HUD and DCHA and although the complaints listed vastly below-market rents, “only four (4) of the Complaints indicated that the rental property at issue was subsidized.” Id., ¶¶ 29-33. In the eleven months preceding that period, the firm filed 118 eviction complaints on behalf of the same landlords, and not a single one indicated that the rental unit at issue was subsidized. See id., ¶ 34.
The named Plaintiffs ultimately filed this putative class-action suit on November 19, 2014, alleging that Defendants’ conduct has violated, and continues to violate, the FDCPA. More particularly, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, by using “false, deceptive or misleading representation^] or means in connection with the collection of’ a debt, and 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, by using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a debt. In pursuing these claims, they seek to represent a class comprised of “all individuals residing in federally and/or locally subsidized rental housing units within the District of Columbia which are owned by landlords represented by the Raddatz Firm and who have been, are now, Or will in the future be subjеct to legal proceedings filed in the L/T Branch of the D.C. Superior Court in which the Raddatz Firm misrepresents the subsidy status of their rental properties.” Id., ¶ 36. On behalf of the class, they seek to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as statutory damages. Defendants now move to dismiss.
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss a claim for relief when the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must “treat the com
*256
plaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”
Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
III. Analysis
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To that end, “[t]he Act regulates interactions between consumer debtors and debt collectors.”
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,
A private plaintiff seeking to hold a person liable under Section 1692e or Section 1692f must establish that: (1) the defendant is a “debt. collector”; (2) who took an action “in connection with the collection of a[] debt”; and (3) the action violated the substantive proscriptions in those provisions.
See, e.g., Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP,
A. Applicability of the FDCPA
Defendants’ primary argument in support of dismissal is that the FDCPA does not cover the activities at issue here. In their view, “[a]n eviction proceeding is an action filed by the owner of a rental property for the purpose of retaking possession of that property” — “[i]t is not а collection of a consumer debt.” Mot. at 4. They argue, additionally, that even if certain acts related to pursuing security or property interests are covered by the Act, it should not apply to formal legal pleadings, especially where a “strict, regulated, and inherently localized process,” such as D.C.’s eviction, procedure, is already in place to protect consumers. See id. at 6-7.
These are both matters of first impression in this circuit. The Court will consider each separately, relying on the statutory text and caselaw from other circuits to inform its decision.
1. Application to Eviction Proceedings
In assessing whether the L & T filings were submitted
in connection with debt collection,
the Court must determine (1) if there were “debts” and (2) if the eviction complaints were filed in order to collect on those debts. Although the parties ignore the text of the statute, that is where the Court begins its analysis.
See Hughey v. United States,
The FDCPA defines a “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, оr services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). This statutory language would clearly seem to encompass Plaintiffs’ unpaid “rents,” including overdue fees for water service. Such amounts, after all, constitute obligations to pay money, and the subjects of the relevant transac
tions
— i.e., the rental units and/or water service — were primarily used for personal, family, or household purposes.
See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd.,
In their Motion, Defendants rather offhandedly suggest that a lease transaction may not create a consumer “debt” because it “does not involve an extension of credit.” Mot. at 6. Although Defendants state that “the Circuits are ... split on whether an extension of credit is required for a transaction to fall within the FDCPA,” they only cite to a single district-court cаse from Colorado in support.
See id.
(citing
Cook v. Hamrick,
This is likely because the great weight of authority stands against them. A majority of circuits has held that an extension of credit is
not
required for an obligation to constitute a “debt” under the Act.
See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P.,
In reaching their consensus on this issue, courts have largely followed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Bass.
The defendant law firm there had argued that the FDCPA did not apply to efforts to collect on dishonored checks because the underlying transactions did not involve extensions of credit. In rejecting the law firm’s argument, the court noted a “complete lack of textual support in the Act” for its position. There was simply “no language in the Act’s definition of ‘debt’ (or any other section of the Act) that mentions, let alone rеquires, that the debt arise from an extension of credit.”
Bass,
Thus satisfied that Plaintiffs’ “back rents” were “debts,” the Court proceeds to the second question: whether the eviction complaints were filed in connection with the
collection
of those debts. The statute does not define what it means to “collect” or “attempt to collect” a debt. The Supreme Court has stated, however, in the context of interpreting the statute’s definition of the term “debt collector,” that “a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly ‘attempts’ to ‘collect’ those consumer debts.”
Heintz v. Jenkins,
It seems clear that Defendants filed the eviction complaints against the named Plaintiffs, at least in part, to obtain payments on their debts. Indeed, although complaints in the L & T Branch must include a claim for possession, this in no way precludes them from serving the dual purpose of also seeking judgments on tenants’ debts, see SCR-LT R. 3(b), and each of the complaints at issue here sought a money judgment for amounts allegedly owed. See Lipscomb Compl. (requesting money judgment of $2,593); McLaughlin Compl. (requesting money judgment of $5,064); O’Brien Compl. (requesting money judgment of $1,263); Pate Compl. (requesting money judgment of $2,593). Obtaining such judgments would have enabled Defendants to recover the sums through court-authorized procedures, such as garnishing wages.
The conclusion that the FDCPA applies where eviction proceedings include an attempt to recover back rent finds support in the Second Circuit’s decision in
Romea. See
Here, as in Romea, it is irrelevant that Defendants filed the eviction complaints to regain possession of Plaintiffs’ rental properties. The pеrtinent question is whether they also sought to collect on Plaintiffs’’ debts. It is clear from the face of the complaints that they did. See, e.g., Lipscomb Compl. (stating that in addition to “seeking] possession of property located at 228 58th Street, N.E., Washington, D.C.,” Defendants were “seeking] other fees of $2,593.00 for water”).
Defendants nonetheless rejoin that cases considering the FDCPA’s application to foreclosure proceedings aid them. According to their research, “[t]he majority of courts who have considered the question have concluded that ‘foreclosing on a mortgage does not qualify as debt collection activity for purposes of the FDCPA, ... due to the understanding that foreclosure proceedings instead qualify as enforcing a security interest.” Mot. at 4 (quoting
Derisme v. Hunt Leibert Jacobson P.C.,
Notwithstanding the immense amount of ink spilled by Defendants expounding on this point, they never clearly articulate why cases addressing
foreclosure
are relevant to a court’s decision on whether
eviction
proceedings are covered. To the extent some analogy can be made, moreover, such cases do not in fact aid Defendants. While they may be right that a number of district courts have held that the FDCPA is generally inapplicable to foreclosures because they pertain to the enforcement of security interests,
see Glazer,
In sum, the Court sees no basis for excluding Defendants’ conduct from coverage because it involved attempts to regain possession of the rental properties. Whatever else they .may have been seeking, they were clearly attempting to collect money that Plaintiffs allegedly owed.
See also, e.g., O’Connor v. Nantucket Bank,
2. Application to Formal Pleadings
In their Motion, Defendants attempt to distinguish this case from Romea and certain foreclosure cases that found the FDCPA applicable on the ground that those involved pre-suit notices, as opposed to formal pleadings filed in state court. The line they seem to draw is confusing, as they appear to concede elsewhere that the Act applies to debt collectors’ litigation activities. See Mot. at 6-7. In any event, they have failed to offer a cogent reason for courts to overlook deceptive and abusive practices solely because they involve the filing of formal complaints.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Heintz
would seem to foreclose any argument that formal complaints are somehow exempt from the FDCPA. The Court there was presented with the question of whether the Act applies to lawyers who attempt to collect debts through litigation.
See
Relying on
Heintz,
circuit courts have widely recognized that litigation-related conduct, including the filing of formal complaints, can give rise to claims under the Act.
See, e.g., Kaymark,
The Court also notes, as further evidence of Congress’s intent to regulate litigation-related activities, that after Heintz it
twice amended the statute and exempted “formal pleading[s] made in connection with a legal action” from 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(ll), and “communication^] in the form of [ ] formal pleading[s]” from § 1692g(d), two provisions not here at issue. If Congress intended that all conduct in the course of formal pleadings be exempt from the FDCPA, then these express exemptions would be superfluous ....
Kaymark,
Not yet ready to concede defeat, Defendants last contend that it is appropriate to exempt L & T complaints from the Act’s reach because of the strong protections already afforded consumers in those proceedings. The Court cannot agree. It notes, first, that Defendants’ assertion of such an argument is rather bold. The thrust of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, after all, is that Defendants attempted to evade certain protections by falsely representing the subsidized status of the tenants’ rental units. See Compl., ¶¶ 18-21.
Putting that aside, however, the Second Circuit’s rejection of a similar argument in
Romea
is instructive. The defendant there had argued that applying both the procedural requirements for eviction under New York law and the prohibitions in the FDCPA was more than either Congress or the New York legislature could have intended. The court explained that, even if that were true, such fact would “not empower [the court] to disregard the plain language of the FDCPA unless the result [would be] absurd or directly contravene[ ] the purpose of the statute.”
Romea,
In a footnote, the court also pointed out that the FDCPA provides a mechanism to exempt certain debt-collection practices from the Act’s coverage where state law
*262
provides adequate protections for consumers.
See id.
n. 11. Specifically, Section 1692o, titled “Exemption from State regulation,” provides that “[t]he [Federal Trade] Commission [now the Bureau for Consumer Financial Protection,
see
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. No. Ill— 203, § 1089(1) (2010),] shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this sub-chapter any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Bureau determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this subchapter, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692o. The Second Circuit explained that “if the protections afforded tenants under New York’s Article 7 [eviction] process do result in ‘requirements substantially similar to those imposed by [the FDCPA],’ then New York may petition ... to ... exempt § 711 notices from the [Act].”
See Romeo,
As in
Romea,
the Court sees no basis for ignoring the plain reach of the Act. Defendants have not offered any reasons to believe that applying the FDCPA here would lead to absurd results or would frustrate the goals of the statute.
See Hubbard v. United States,
While tenants might not require any further safeguards because they “have the protection of an entire branch of D.C. Superior Court dedicated to and uniquely equipped to handle their disputes with their landlords,” Reply at 5, the Court cannot exempt broad swaths of debt-collection practices from the FDCPA simply because it believes it wise to do so. Defendants arguments are, instead, more properly addressed to the District, which may petition the Bureau for an exemption,
see Romea,
On a somewhat related note, Defendants also make much of the fact that Plaintiffs did not fully avail themselves of certain mechanisms to obtain corrections from them in the Superior Court proceedings. See, e.g., Mot. at 2 n.1. The thrust of their argument seems to be that they should not be held acсountable for false statements in eviction complaints because the proper way to address such statements is to bring them to the opposing party’s attention and allow them to amend their pleadings. The Ninth Circuit directly rejected a similar argument in Donohue:
[A]ll communications can be “amended” in this way by simply sending out a subsequent communication correcting the error. Sections 1692e and 1692f do not suggest that otherwise unlawful representations are permitted so long as they are followed up, at some later time, with a communication correcting the statements that gave rise to the .communication’s unlawful nature. We see no reason to treat complaints differently *263 where there was no effort to correct the error before an answer was filed.
Finally, before moving on to the alleged misrepresentations in the complaints, a final note on the FDCPA’s applicability is in order. The preceding analysis has relied heavily on the fact that the complaints filed against the named Plaintiffs included requests for money judgments. At this juncture, it is not entirely clear whether Plaintiffs seek to represent a class that includes only those against whom Defendants sought eviction and money judgments, or whether they also wish to represent those against whom Defendants sought repossession of the rental units alone. Compare Compl., ¶ 36 (indicating that Plaintiffs “seek to represent a class consisting of all individuals residing in federally and/or locally subsidized rental housing units within the District of Columbia which are owned by landlords represented by the Raddatz Firm and who have been, are now, or will in the future be subject to legal proceedings filed in the L/T Branch of the D.C. Superior Court in which the Raddatz Firm misrepresents the subsidy status of their rental properties”) (emphasis added), with Opp. at 1, 11-12,16 (arguing Defendants engaged in debt collection largely because they sought money judgments against the named Plaintiffs). Because the intended and actual contours of the class are not yet known, the Court need not decide, at this time, whether requests for money judgments are necessary to trigger the Act’s protections. It leaves it to the parties to address the issue in greater depth in the future.
B. Plausible Claim
The Court now turns to Defendants’ contention that the alleged misrepresentations could not have violated the Act’s substantive provisions. As discussed previously, Plaintiffs invoke two of those provisions here. The first prohibits “false, deceptive, or misleading representation^] or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The second prohibits the use of “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect a debt. Id., § 1692f. Their claims under both are premised on the same conduct — ie., Defendants’ misrepresenting the subsidy status of Plaintiffs’ rental properties.
Although this circuit has not addressed the standard that governs conduct under these provisions, numerous others have held that “[w]hether conduct violates §§ 1692e or 1692f requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether ‘the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by the communication.’ ”
Donohue,
This standard is “lower than simply examining whether particular language
*264
would deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor.”
Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Servs., Inc.,
Some circuits have, additionally, articulated a materiality requirement.
See, e.g., Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships, LLC,
Applying these standards, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under both § 1692e and § 1692f. According to the Complaint, Defendants falsely averred in the suits for possession that Plaintiffs resided in non-subsidized units. See Compl., ¶¶ 22-26. 1 These misrepresentations would appear to be material since Plaintiffs have assertеd — and Defendants have not disputed — that whether rental properties are subsidized is relevant to the availability of statutory and regulatory defenses to eviction. In fact, the instructions for completing the standardized eviction complaint for nonpayment of rent cautions filers that “you may be limited in your ability to seek other fees” — such as fees for water — “if the property is subsidized or subject to rent control.” See Verified Complaint for Possession of Real Property — Form 1A Instructions.
*265
Misrepresenting rental units as not subsidized could, therefore, impede a tenant’s ability to “intelligently choose his or her response” to Defendants’ collection efforts. Unsophisticated consumers may, for instance, be unable to accurately apprise potential attorneys about the subsidy status of their properties. That could, in turn, affect counsel’s ability to defend against eviction for the nonpayment of their client’s debts or to settle those debts to avoid eviction.
See id.,
¶¶ 21;
see also Tourgeman,
Defendants are not yet ready to surrender the field. They first contend that the essence of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that Defendants misled L & T Branch judges, and that the FDCPA does not protect
them. See
Mot. at 9-10; Reply at 1. They point to Plaintiffs’ allegations that correctly indicating the subsidy status of rental units is important because it may alert judges and attorneys to tenants’ rights to assert certain defenses.
See
Compl., ¶¶ 20, 21. Notably, the text of the FDCPA does not indicate to
whom
a communication or practice must be directed to be actionable. Courts have thus struggled to determine whether and when conduct aimed at misleading attorneys and judges is covered by the Act.
Compare, e.g., O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC,
This case, however, is unlike many of those in whiсh courts have held that false statements aimed at misleading state-court judges are not covered by the Act. Consider, for example,
Walsh v. Law Offices of Howard Lee Schiff, P.C.,
No. 11-1111,
This case similarly differs from
O’Rourke,
which held that a false exhibit attached to a state-court complaint did not give rise to liability under Section 1692e because the plaintiff only alleged that it would mislead a state-court judge. The plaintiff had argued there that the defendant law firm filed attachments to state-court complaints that looked like credit-card statements in thе hopes of more easily obtaining default judgments.
See
Moving on, Defendants next suggest that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim because they are “unable to establish that the alleged misstatements in the eviction complaints ... were material to the existence or amount of any debt the Plaintiffs owed.... ” Reply at 1, 3. They contend, in оther words, that because Plaintiffs actually owed the amounts alleged, their representations could not have violated Section 1692e or 1692f. The FDCPA’s provisions, however, are not so narrow. Sections 1692e and 1692f plainly proscribe debt-collection practices that go beyond misrepresenting the existence or size of a debt. To take just a few examples, Section 1692e prohibits the use of “false representation[s] or implication^] that the consumer committed any crime ... in order to disgrace the consumer,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(7), and Section 1692f prohibits “[c]ommunicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card,” id., § 1692f(7), or “[depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check ... prior to the date on such check or instrument.” Id., § 1692f(4). The Act’s provisions are thus more broadly aimed at any abusive conduct taken to collect on a debt. Misrepresenting the subsidy status of rental units to decrease the chances that an attorney or judge might advise tenants of potential defenses to eviction is the type of deceptive behavior that the FDCPA was designed to stop.
Defendants also argue that these misrepresentations could not have misled the named Plaintiffs or the class they seek to represent because tenants would know whether they receive rent subsidies.
See
Mot. at 10-11. They draw upon cases finding that even the least sophisticated debtors cannot be misled about facts clearly known to them. They point, for in
*267
stance, to the Second Circuit’s decision in
Gabriele,
which held that certain false statements in foreclosure filings could not have misled the plaintiff because they involved assertions of fact he would have known were untrue.
See
Even if the Court were bound by these cases, it is easy to imagine that the least sophisticated debtor could be misled about whether her rent “is subsidized by the federal or local government!!]” Compl., ¶ 20. Such fact is rather technical, and the uninformed may not understand how their rents are lowered or by whom. As Plaintiffs point out in their Opposition, it is also entirely plausible that an unsophisticated consumer “might assume that his/her failure to keep current on rent or utilities had the effect of fоrfeiting or cancelling the previously-existing subsidy.” Opp. at 20.
In sum, the Court believes that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim to relief under Sections 1692e and 1692f.
C. Available Relief
Defendants last contend that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed because the Act does not permit such relief in private suits.
See
Mot. at 11-12; Reply at 7. They emphasize that Section 1692k, which authorizes private causes of action, says nothing about equitable remedies; it mentions only private litigants’ right to recover actual and statutory damages.
See
15 U.S.C. § 1692k. They also underscore that “[m]ost courts that have examined the issue have held that equitable relief is not available under the FDCPA to private parties.” Mot. at 11 (citing
Weiss v. Regal Collections,
Defendants’ points are well taken. It does, indeed, appear that most courts that have considered the issue have concluded that they are not empowered to grant equitable remedies to private plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc.,
In coming to this conclusion, these courts have largely relied on the fact that Section 16921 of the Act authorizes the FTC to pursue equitable remedies, while Section 1692k is silent regarding whether such relief is available to private parties. The Third Circuit, for instance, held in
Weiss
that “[bjecause the statute explicitly provides declaratоry and equitable relief only through action by the Federal Trade Commission, we believe the different penalty structure demonstrates Congress’s intent to preclude equitable relief in private actions.”
Yet this is not necessarily as easy as it appears. Here, Section 1692k is silent as to the availability of equitable relief. Section 16921, moreover, does not specifically mention the FTC’s ability to obtain injunctive relief. It merely authorizes the Commission to pursue such relief by cross-reference to another Act — that is, by authorizing the FTC “to enforce compliance with this subchapter” by using all of the “functions and powers” available to it under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
See
15 U.S.C. § 16921(a). The Supreme Court has held that “[a]bsent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction.”
Califano v. Yamasaki,
Thankfully, however, it need not decide the issue now. The case is currently at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Because Plaintiffs have stated a claim for damages under the Act, questions regarding other available remedies can wait for another day. That will also give the parties an additional opportunity to brief this issue more fully.
IY. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. A contemporaneous Order will so state.
Notes
. Plaintiffs have also alleged that Defendants misrepresented the nature of their debts by improperly indicating that their unpaid water fees could be legally deemed unpaid rent. See Compl., ¶21; Opp. at 21. Although this would appear to constitute a significant misrepresentation, Plaintiffs do not rely on it in their briefing. As a result, the Court at this juncture confines its discussion to the subsidization issue.