37 A.2d 741 | Pa. | 1944
These cross appeals arose out of an attachment execution issued by a divorced wife to recover, out of a life interest of her former husband in a spendthrift trust, alimony due her under a decree of a foreign state.
From the agreed statement of facts filed by counsel under our Rule No. 56, the following facts appear: James Janney Lippincott is the beneficiary of a trust established by his mother by a deed of trust dated April 20, 1927, the spendthrift clause providing that "so far as may be permissible in law" the income and principal of the trust "shall not be in any way or manner subject or liable to . . . anticipation, sale, pledge, debts, contracts, engagements or liabilities, and shall not be subject or liable to attachment or sequestration under any legal or equitable or other process." Mary, the first wife of this beneficiary and the mother of his now two adult children, on July 26, 1919, secured an absolute divorce *503 from him, with alimony of $150 a month, after personal service, by decree of the Supreme Court of New York. On January 2, 1921, he married his second and present wife, Alice, whom he deserted, without cause, on April 20, 1928. There were no children of this marriage. Personal service having been secured, Alice obtained from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, on July 30, 1935, an order of support in the sum of $80 a month, against her husband, and after that court had entered judgments from time to time for accumulated arrearages, she brought thereon three suits in foreign attachment in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, attaching his interest in the trust — the first was issued in 1936, the second in 1941 and the third in 1943. The judgment entered in the first of these actions against the trustee, Girard Trust Company, has been satisfied in full; but because the income of the trust was insufficient and also because this controversy arose, the second has been only partially satisfied thus far, and nothing has been paid on the third.
Before service of the third writ of foreign attachment by Alice on the trustee, an action in assumpsit was brought by Mary, the divorced wife, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, against Lippincott, to recover arrearages of many years of alimony on the order of the New York Court. Through counsel he entered his appearance, and judgment was later entered against him for failure to file an affidavit of defense. Mary then issued an attachment execution against her former husband's interest in the trust, and the writ was served on the trustee on April 13, 1943, thirteen days after Alice's third writ of foreign attachment had been served.
The trustee, after service of Mary's writ, refused to make further payments to Alice, and she secured a rule on it to show cause. Mary then obtained a rule for judgment against the trustee as garnishee. By stipulation of counsel these matters were consolidated, and the *504 learned court below made absolute both rules, but held that Mary's judgment was junior in lien to the judgments entered against the trustee in Alice's second and third foreign attachment proceedings, both of which must be satisfied in full before Mary was to receive any payment whatever. These cross appeals by Alice and Mary followed but only as to the judgment entered in favor of Mary.
Alice contends that the court erred in subjecting, to her detriment, the interest of her husband in the trust to attachment for alimony of his former wife; while Mary argues that it was error to postpone the lien of her judgment to those of the beneficiary's present wife. Thus, the question for determination is — Can the interest of a beneficiary under a spendthrift trust be reached and applied in payment of alimony of a divorced wife of the beneficiary? Upon the answer to this question depend the correctness of the entry of the judgment in the execution attachment, in favor of Mary, and its status as a lien.
That Lippincott's interest in this spendthrift trust is subject to seizure by attachment for the payment of arrearages due his wife, Alice, under the order of support awarded by the California Court is not here questioned. It could not be. It is now firmly settled, not only by our decisions, but also under our statutes, that as to claims for maintenance and support of deserted and neglected wives, not divorced, spendthrift trusts are invalid in this Commonwealth. See Moorehead's Estate,
Whether the deserted wife be a resident or nonresident, she may now seize by attachment her husband's interest in a spendthrift trust. The reason is obvious for considering such a trust an ordinary one, as far as support and maintenance of a wife are concerned, it being the duty of the husband to provide for and protect his wife during the life of their marriage. The Commonwealth has a vital interest in the maintenance of marriage, because it is the foundation of society. In this connection, we said in Com. ex rel. Deutsch v.Deutsch,
For these reasons, we are convinced that the learned court below erred in entering judgment in favor of Mary, the divorced wife, against the trustee-garnishee, and that it must be reversed.
There is no constitutional question involved. We are here only concerned with the form of the remedy, and that is to be determined by the law of Pennsylvania, since it is the place where the right was asserted: Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. EastonS. S. Co., Inc.,
Judgment reversed. *508