209 U.S. 264 | SCOTUS | 1908
LIPPHARD
v.
HUMPHREY.
Supreme Court of United States.
*267 Mr. Chapin Brown, with whom Mr. Charles H. Bauman and Mr. J.P. Earnest were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error and appellants.
Mr. B.F. Leighton and Mr. C. Clinton James for defendants in error and appellees.
*268 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The contention of appellant is that as testatrix could not read, and as the will was not read to her at the time of its execution, it was therefore to be presumed that she did not know the contents of the will when she executed it, or that the jury ought not to have been allowed to presume from the evidence produced before them that the testatrix had knowledge of the contents of the will.
Mrs. Lipphard brought the will with her to the office of one of the attesting witnesses for the purpose of execution, and after its execution took it away with her, and at her death it appeared in the possession of the Rev. Mr. Meador, the executor named therein, and by whom it was propounded for probate and record. She declared to the witnesses that it was her will, and requested them to attest it as such; and its provisions were reasonable and natural. She was shown to be a woman of intelligence and business capacity; she was in bodily and mental health and vigor when the instrument was executed; and there was no suggestion of fraud or undue influence in the case.
In these circumstances the jury properly concluded that the testatrix knew the contents of the will at the time of its execution, and the court might well have directed such finding, unless the bare fact of the inability of testatrix to read raised a legal presumption that she did not possess that knowledge, and the absence of the reading of the will to her at that time was fatal. But we know of no such presumption as matter *269 of law, and on the contrary, the presumption where a will is properly signed and executed is that the testator knows the contents. Where there is evidence of the practice of fraud or of undue influence, affirmative proof of knowledge of the contents may be necessary, but not so in any other case, simply because of a presumption arising from inability to read. Taylor v. Creswell, 45 Maryland, 422, 431; Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. St. 224; King v. Kinsey, 74 N.C. 261; Hoshauer v. Hoshauer, 26 Pa. St. 404; Clifton v. Murray, 7 Georgia, 565; Doran v. Mullen, 78 Illinois, 342; Walton v. Kendick, 122 Missouri, 504; Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Cush. 341; Guthrie v. Price, 23 Arkansas, 407.
In the latter case testatrix's name was subscribed to the will, and between her Christian and surname was her mark in the form of a cross. The attesting witnesses signed the will at her request, in her presence, and in the presence of each other. She produced the paper writing for them to attest and declared that it was her will, and that she desired them to witness it as such. She did not write her name, but made her mark to the paper. It was not shown who did write her name to the will. It was not written by either of the witnesses, nor in their presence. Testatrix could not read, and the will was not read to her in the presence of or to the knowledge of the witnesses. The trial court instructed the jury, in effect, that notwithstanding the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the statute, yet it being shown that the testatrix could not read, the will was invalid, unless it was proved that it was read to her and that she was informed as to its contents. After a review of the authorities, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held such instruction to be erroneous, and Chief Justice English, in the concluding part of his opinion, said:
"It was proven that she could not read, and it was not shown that the will was read to her at the time it was executed, but it may have been before. She produced the will herself, declared it to be her will, asked the witnesses to attest it as *270 such, signed it by making her mark. She was a woman of good sense, particular about her business transactions, and manifested her usual soundness of mind at the time. It is not shown that she was laboring under any feebleness of mind from disease, or approaching dissolution. The provisions of her will appear to be reasonable. It is not shown that any imposition was practiced upon her, or that her sons had any agency in the preparation of the will. It was erroneous for the court to tell the jury as a matter of law that it being shown that she could not read, it was necessary to prove that the will was read to her. They had the right to infer, from all of the circumstances, that she knew the contents of the will, though, as shown by the authorities above quoted, in determining whether there was fraud or imposition in the execution of the will, the fact that she could not read, and that the will was not read to her, at the time she signed it, were circumstances to be considered by the jury."
True, the presumption that a party signing a will by mark, or otherwise, knows its contents, is not a conclusive presumption, but it must prevail in the absence of proof of fraud, undue influence, or want of testamentary capacity attending the execution of the will. In the present case there was no attempt to show that the testatrix was not capable of making a valid deed or contract at the date of making the will; on the contrary, the evidence showed that she was a woman of energy, capacity and intelligence. Nor was any proof offered of fraud or undue influence in the production of the will. Mrs. Lipphard brought the will, as we have said, to Miss Parker's office for the purpose of having it executed; she declared to the attesting witnesses the paper to which she made her mark to be her last will and testament. She was a person of sound mind at the date of the will, and it was executed and attested in the manner required by statute.
It is obvious that the verdict of the jury ought not to be disturbed and a new trial allowed, unless some reversible error was committed in the course of the trial, and appellants insist *271 that such error existed in the exclusion of evidence of declarations alleged to have been made by the testatrix prior and subsequent to the date of her will as to how she intended to dispose, or had disposed, of her property.
Decedent's husband testified that his wife talked to him often, prior to the date of the will, as to what she intended to do with her property after her death, and that they talked the matter over after the date of the will. He was asked what she said, but objection to the question was sustained. Appellants did not state what they expected to prove by the husband.
Albert R. Humphrey, another witness, testified that he had a conversation with Mrs. Lipphard about two years before she died. He was asked the following questions:
"Did she tell you how she had left her property, or how she was going to leave it? A. Yes, sir.
"What did she say to you in reference to that matter?"
To which caveatees objected, and the court sustained the objection. Counsel for appellants stated that he desired to show by this witness that testatrix denied leaving the property as mentioned in the will, this being more than three years after the will was executed.
William A. Lipphard, one of the caveatees, was asked a similar question, and, upon objection, the court made a like ruling, excluding the evidence. He said that he had a conversation with her in reference to her will just before her death; that she told him how she had left her property.
Mrs. Sarah Lipphard, the wife of one of the caveatees, testified that eight or ten weeks before decedent died she asked her if she had made a will, and then she was asked the following question:
"What did she say in reference to what was in her will and what she had done with her property, if anything?"
On objection by the caveatees the evidence was excluded. Counsel for caveators stated to the court that he desired to show by this witness that testatrix had denied to the witness *272 that she had left her property as and in the manner stated in the will.
Appellants' brief asserts that the offer was made in support of the issue of want of mental capacity in the testatrix at the time she made her will.
In Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C.C. 262, 265; S.C., 23 Fed. Cases, 35, Mr. Justice Washington said that declarations of a deceased, prior or subsequent to the execution of a will, were nothing more than hearsay, and that there was nothing more dangerous than their admission, either to control the construction of the instrument or to support or destroy its validity.
In Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 573, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the court, expressed the opinion, after much consideration, that the principles upon which our law of evidence is founded necessitated the exclusion of such evidence, both before and after the execution, saying:
"The declarations are purely hearsay, being merely unsworn declarations, and when no part of the res gestae are not within any of the recognized exceptions admitting evidence of that kind.
"Although in some of the cases the remark is made that declarations are admissible which tend to show the state of the affections of the deceased as a mental condition, yet they are generally stated in cases where the mental capacity of the deceased is the subject of the inquiry, and in those cases his declarations on that subject are just as likely to aid in answering the question as to mental capacity as those upon any other subject. But if the matter in issue be not the mental capacity of the deceased, then such unsworn declarations, as indicative of the state of his affections, are no more admissible than would be his unsworn declarations as to any other fact.
* * * * * * * *
"When such an issue (one of mental capacity) is made it is one which relates to a state of mind which was involuntary, and over which the deceased had not the control of the sane individual, and his declarations are admitted, not as any evidence *273 of their truth, but only because he made them, and that is an original fact from which, among others, light is sought to be reflected upon the main issue of testamentary capacity.
* * * * * * * *
"It is quite apparent, therefore, that declarations of the deceased are properly received upon the question of a state of mind, whether mentally strong and capable, or weak and incapable, and that from all the testimony, including his declarations, his mental capacity can probably be determined with considerable accuracy."
And see In re Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 176. In Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Massachusetts, 123, it was ruled:
"Where a foundation is laid by evidence tending to show a previous state of mind, and its continued existence past the time of the execution of the will is attempted to be proved by subsequent conduct and declarations, such declarations are admissible, provided they are significant of a condition sufficiently permanent, and are made so near the time as to afford a reasonable inference that such was the state at the time in question."
In the present case no foundation was laid for the admission of this evidence. Not a syllable of testimony was adduced by appellants to show want of testamentary capacity at the date of the will. For aught the record shows, she retained her mental powers up to the time of her death, which took place five years and eight months after making her will.
As we have said, appellants did not state what they expected to prove by decedent's husband, nor what they expected to prove by the evidence of William A. Lipphard. This witness testified on cross-examination that he did not know his mother had made a will until after her death. In his direct examination he stated that she told him, in a conversation had with her a week before she died, how she had disposed of her property by her will.
And so the offer to prove by Albert R. Humphrey, that the testatrix two years prior to her death, and more than *274 three years after the execution of the will, denied giving her property as provided by her will, or the similar offer made with respect to the witness Mrs. Sarah Lipphard, wife of Adolph Lipphard, as to alleged conversations with decedent eight or ten weeks before her death, were at a period too remote to throw any light upon the mental condition of the testatrix at the time the will was made.
There was no evidence whatever of mental incapacity and this particular evidence was too remote to justify any reasonable inference to that effect, and if there was no lack of mental capacity, then this evidence would have no tendency to show that she did not have knowledge of the contents of the will when she executed it and declared it to be her last will and testament. Because she may have resisted importunity for information in respect to what she had done, three years after she had made her will, it does not follow that she did not know the contents of the will when she made it. There must be some other proof, some suspicious circumstances, some evidence of fraud or undue influence before evidence of conversations years after the execution of the will should be admitted to show that she did not know what she was doing when she made it.
Decree affirmed.