139 S.W.2d 683 | Ark. | 1940
The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, hereinafter called the Commission, was created by
It is first contended that both said order and the provision of said act 105, subsection C of 12, are void; that the order is void as an emergency order for lack of notice or an opportunity to be heard; that said provision of the act, permitting such an order to be entered without notice or hearing, is void for the lack of due process under both the state and federal constitutions. Said provision is as follows: "In the event an emergency is found to exist by the Commission which in its judgment requires the making, changing, renewal or extension *439 of a rule, regulation or order without first having a hearing, such emergency rule, regulation or order shall have the same validity as if a hearing with respect to the same had been held after due notice. The emergency rule, regulation or order permitted by this section shall remain in force no longer than ten days from its effective date, and, in any event, it shall expire when the rule, regulation or order made after due notice and hearing with respect to the subject matter of such emergency rule, regulation or order becomes effective."
It is conceded that no notice was given appellant in advance of the making of said order, but if it is an emergency order, no notice was necessary unless that part of the act is void. It is true that one of appellant's attorneys learned of the meeting of the Commission about the time it was assembling, and was present and opposed the making of the order, but we assume, for the purpose of this opinion, that appellant had no notice of the meeting. We cannot agree that subsection C is void for the reason suggested. Sub-section B of the same section prohibits the Commission from making any rule, "in the absence of an emergency," except after a public hearing on at least seven days' notice. A rule or order established in an emergency cannot be permanent. It automatically expires in ten days unless sooner terminated. A number of cases are cited to support the contention that legislation, and the order based thereon, of a regulatory body, are void which do not provide for notice and a hearing. Such a case is C. M. St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minn.,
Here, appellant and all others were afforded an opportunity to be heard on this emergency order on a date therein set for August 26, but, instead of waiting for this hearing, it immediately went into court to enjoin the enforcement of the order, and we hold that the requirements of due process have been satisfied.
It is next argued that, even though it be held that subsection C of 12 of said act 105 is constitutional, the order is void because it did not contain findings of fact which are conditions precedent to the jurisdiction of the Commission to act in the premises. It is generally held in this court and elsewhere that, where jurisdiction is conferred on administrative agencies and courts of special and limited jurisdiction, the order or judgment must show on its face the findings of fact essential to jurisdiction. Specifically the contention is that the order did not contain any finding that any one of the oil pools affected by it was discovered after January 1, 1937, whereas, 6 of act 105 provides: "All common sources of supply of crude oil discovered after January 1, 1937, if so found necessary by the Commission, shall have the production of oil therefrom controlled and regulated in accordance with the provisions of this act . . ." *441 We cannot agree with this argument, because we think the order sufficiently recites facts showing that it was dealing with oil pools discovered since January 1, 1937. While the order did not contain those specific words, it applies only to regulated fields in Arkansas, which implies that those fields were discovered after said date, because the act does not confer jurisdiction on the Commission to regulate any field not so discovered. It is also said the order is void because there was no finding therein that waste was being committed or was imminent and that an emergency existed. We cannot agree with these suggestions, as the order shows on its face that it was made in the interest of conservation to prevent waste and that it was acting in an emergency, even though the word "emergency" was not used in the order. Whether an emergency existed was for the Commission to determine and not the courts, if there is any substantial evidence to support it, and unless fraud be shown, and none is.
Other matters are argued which we have duly considered and find them without merit. On the whole case we think the decree of the trial court is correct and it is affirmed.